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SUMMARY
This thesis is concerned with exploring the process of 
change in government-owned and controlled enterprises, 
that is, the why and how of change and what happens 
during change, and particularly the role, participation 
and interactions of individuals in change. The literature 
on planned change and development is reviewed and it is 
argued that a "processual" interpretation is missing. On 
the other hand, very few research have been undertaken on 
the management of state-owned enterprises in less
developed countries and little is known about the
experiences and practices of organizational change in 
these enterprises.
An exploratory research of a major planned change is 
undertaken and the analysis of the case study reveal that 
change process can be interpreted in terms of a 
"political” model. Organizational change is the
"resultant" of interactions among key actors and
political dynamics may be caused by interests, conflicts 
and power exercised by the many actors who represent 
various stakeholders.
Change and order in organizations can be created by joint 
actions and the negotiated order theory (Strauss) further 
explores the notion of joint action. The politics of 
change is interpreted in terms of negotiations and it is 
argued that change may be a negotiated order. The
contribution of the negotiated order theory is closely 
outlined and discussed and its application for a 
processual analysis of "problematic" situations (as
created by a change situation) is recommended. However, 
it is also argued that this perspective needs to consider 
power as a key currency of all negotiations; power 
relationships can explain the components, occurrences and 
outcomes of negotiations. This is one of the main 
shortcomings in the development of the negotiated order 
theory.
A "political" approach to negotiation is suggested by 
conceptualising various definitions and interpretation of 
power relationships and their use in negotiative 
interactions. The negotiation of the organizational 
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iPREFACE
The approaches to organizational change are largely 
developed in the field of organizational development and 
change (OD) where the prevailing concepts and practices 
seem to be derived from two main sources, systems theory 
and humanism. These two theories do not adequately extend 
a processual analysis of organizations in which the 
complex interrelationship between individuals, groups and 
contextual factors are considered for inquiry and 
interpretation; and, therefore, change is often explained 
in terms of highly rational and linear theories of 
process. Chapter One begins with an examination of the 
reviews of OD research literature which critically assess 
the strengths and weaknesses and highlight the main 
conceptual themes on organizational change. The reviews 
clearly indicate the aprocessual analysis of change in OD 
and this state of affairs can be attributed to OD's 
conceptual foundations. The final part of the chapter 
supports inquiry into the change process in state-owned 
enterprises (SOE's) because of the importance and special 
characteristics of public enterprises in the economies of 
developing countries; and a brief introduction of SOE's 
in Nepal is included.
In Chapter Two, the choice of a methodology which is 
well-suited to achieve the goals of this research is 
discussed. The assumptions regarding ontology,
ii
epistemology and human nature are crucial determinants of 
methodology; and an exploratory, qualitative research is 
preferred to acquire grounded data. It is argued that the 
depth interview method of data collection is apposite to 
capture and interpret the empirical world of social 
actors and their actions.
Chapter Three presents the social setting in which 
this research is carried out. Some of the intrinsic 
background information on the political and economic 
development of Nepal and the key features of the 
electricity sector are inspected before discussing the 
role of the two lending agencies (the Asian Development 
Bank and World Bank) in the development of the sector. 
Their initiative on the "reorganization" and creation of 
a single entity to be operated as a commercial utility is 
discussed here and further developed in the subsequent 
chapters. The key elements of the planned changes 
recommended by the expatriate consultants are summarised. 
The chapter concludes by suggesting that the "real" 
implemented changes were diverse from the prescriptions. 
Chapter Four begins to analyze the change process and 
explore how and why the changes came about. The 
investigation identifies various internal and external 
stakeholders who are related to the reorganization of the 
electricity sector and who, in turn, have different 
interests and definitions concerning the change. They 
undertook various actions to protect and promote their 
interests; hence a political model can capture the
iii
dynamics of the change process in the context of state- 
owned enterprises.
The concept of "negotiated order" (Strauss, 1978) is 
incorporated to the political interpretation of change
because change and order can be created by political 
bargaining and negotiations among key individuals
representing the stakeholders. Chapter Five introduces 
and reviews the development of the negotiated order 
theory and advocates a careful examination of the power 
relationships in the analysis of processual dynamics of
negotiations. It is argued that power is the essential 
currency of all negotiations but the development in 
literature has not made significant contributions to this 
conceptual field. On the basis of this assessment, the 
conceptualization of power as developed by Lukes (1974) 
is proposed for the study of negotiations. Chapter Six
uses this framework to explore the four major planned 
changes in the reorganization of the electricity sector. 
The detailed examination of each of the changes 
identifies and analyzes the key actors, their 
definitions, the negotiation of solutions and the 
dimension of power exercised in negotiation (using the 
"three-dimensional" view of power) . The outcome of such 
an interpretation, it is argued, provides a comprehensive 
understanding of the variety of ways in which power can 
be exercised in negotiations.
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In Chapter Seven, the theoretical contributions of 
this research in the field of political process of 
change, and particularly the dynamics of power in 
negotiations of organizational changes in government- 
controlled and owned enterprises are covered. Some of the 
issues related to this investigation on organizational 
change and negotiations are suggested for further inquiry 
and analysis.
1CHAPTER ONE
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
Study of Organizational Change
The subject of organizational change has been one 
of the major areas in the study, research and 
understanding of organizations. Many writers assert that 
change is ubiquitous and change has become a way of life 
in organizations. Various concepts on organizational 
change have been contributed to the general knowledge of 
organizations; and "understanding, planning, and 
influencing change is the prime of organization theory" 
(Berg, 1979). The organizational behaviour literature has 
been particularly concerned with change according to 
Goodman and Kurke (1982):
"Think about leadership, motivation, organizational 
environment, and roles. It is impossible to think 
about these and other concepts without inquiring 
about change."
The effective management of change for the long-term 
success and survival of organizations has been a major 
concern of many organizational writers and Pettigrew 
(1985) drives home this point:
2"Given the substantial changes in the economic, 
political and business environment of large firms 
over the past two decades, a critical factor 
affecting the relative competitive position of the 
British firms must be the capacity of firms to 
adjust and adapt to major changes in their 
environments and thereby improve their competitive 
performance. The importance of these adjustments and 
adaptation processes suggests that the nature of 
management itself is a crucial input into the 
competitive issue."
Goodman (1982) echoes a similar view on management of 
change for the future success of organizations:
"The need to understand more about the process of 
change will continue to increase. Organizations are 
constantly challenged by new technologies, new 
government policies, international competition, and 
new demands to improve productivity. To meet these 
challenges, organizations must adapt and change."
Katz and Georgopoulos (1971) draw attention to processes 
of adaptation for improving the effectiveness of 
organizations:
"For organizations to survive and perform their 
functions effectively in the future, some sizeable 
proportion of their resources will have to be 
committed to enlarging their adaptive subsystems to 
deal with new social inputs. Social effectiveness 
will have to be added to productive efficiency as an 
important objective."
On the other hand, one of the most difficult and 
challenging problems faced by organizational theorists, 
change specialists and managers is how to create 
effective change. The difficulties in the management of 
change is explained by Argyris (1967):
3"Anyone who has planned major organizational change 
knows (a) how difficult it is to foresee accurately 
all the major problems involved, (b) the enormous 
amount of time needed to iron out the kinks and get 
people to accept the change, (c) the apparent lack 
of internal commitment on the part of many to help 
make the plan work, manifested partly (d) by people 
at all levels resisting taking the initiative to 
make modifications that they see are necessary so
that the new plan can work..... I reviewed my notes
from thirty-two major reorganizations in large 
organizations in which I played some consulting and 
research role, I did not find one that could be 
labelled as fully completed and integrated three 
years after the change had been announced
..... after three years, there were still many
people fighting, ignoring, questioning, resisting, 
blaming the reorganization without feeling a strong 
obligation personally to correct the situation."
Kanter (1989) describes the task involved in managing 
change as a series of "balancing acts" which implies 
that change is created as a result of human initiatives, 
actions and interactions:
"We must juggle contradictions, we must make 
tradeoffs between contrasting goals, and we must 
steer a goal that does not go too far in any one 
direction lest events require an about-face. We are 
perched on a pendulum that is swinging back and 
forth faster and faster." (Kanter, op. cit.)
This short introduction puts into perspective the 
challenges of organizational change and the importance of 
understanding the change process. This study is about 
organizational change in government-controlled and owned 
enterprises (referred to as state-owned enterprises). My 
main interest is to understand the process of change, 
that is, the processual dynamics of change, the how and 
why of change, and what actually happens during change. I 
am particularly interested to explore how people manage
4and create change because change occurs in a social 
setting and people (managers, shareholders, stakeholders, 
consultants, etc.) as social individuals generally tend 
to have strong influence and control over its management. 
Dalton (1973) points out that organizational behaviour is 
made up of the actions and interactions of the 
individuals in it and he recommends this approach for 
understanding organizational change:
"We read so frequently about an organization 
'adapting' to market shifts, economic conditions, 
and scientific discoveries that we slide over the 
internal processes by which an organization does 
that adapting".
An organization can be understood in terms of human 
actions that underline it/ hence change can be created 
out of human action and the change process may be 
understood in terms of the behaviour of individuals. The 
individual can be seen as a social actor who "exists in 
dual systems" (Mangham, 1978), that is, "he is influenced 
by and influences the social order which he inhabits". A 
processual analysis of organizations has been suggested 
by several theorists and I refer to the writings of two 
proponents to bring out the key components of such an 
approach. Benson (1977) suggests that a process-oriented 
analysis will attend "to the micro-processes continuously 
occurring within the organization and its environment 
within a particular period of time". Weick (1969) 
proposes the concept of the social psychology of
5organizing which includes a processual approach to 
organizational analysis:
"An organization can be understood only in terms of 
the processes that are underway, or its organizing 
activities, yet it is possible to see regularities
in these activities,...... the crucial events to be
explained are processes, their structuring, 
modification and dissolving. It is not the tangible 
fixtures in an organization that are crucial. These 
merely provide the media through which the processes 
are expressed."
This study is focused on state-owned enterprises 
(SOE's) partly because of my experiences with this sector 
in Nepal as a faculty member of the Nepal Administration 
Staff College. Being involved with training and several 
consultancy services to government controlled 
enterprises, I was generally familiar with the status and 
management practices of these enterprises. The 
performance of SOE's is regarded as very unsatisfactory 
by the government in Nepal and reforms and changes are 
frequently introduced to "correct" the situation. The 
government has time and again announced a package of 
reforms and, in addition, the management has introduced 
specific changes of their own initiative or on the 
recommendation of consultants. However, such change and 
reform decisions tend to create much sensation and raise 
expectations initially but fizzle out gradually over the 
next few years. No lasting improvements on performance 
seem to take place and SOE's continue to be blamed for 
poor performance and are regarded as a (financial) burden 
on the national economy even though they have been
6assigned commercial objectives. Strangely enough, neither 
the government nor the management seem to be too 
concerned about the outcome or more appropriately the 
"non-outcome" of change and the organizations continue to 
do what they have been doing in the established manner. 
This continuity with old established ways seems a very 
interesting phenomenon and I wish to explore how it is 
maintained in situations of change. Pettigrew (op. cit.) 
argues that "the more we look at present-day events the 
easier it is to identify change; the longer we stay with 
an emergent process and the further back we go to 
disentangle its origin, the more we can identify 
continuities"; he concludes that change and continuity 
are "inextricably linked". I am interested in studying 
continuity in relation to human actions directed at 
certain goals or self-interests. For instance, Handy 
(1989) states that continuity can ensure comfort and 
predictability for those who are in control. Thus change 
and continuity may be interpreted in terms of processes 
that take place between individuals.
The Theoretical Field
Many of the theories and concepts of organizational 
change have been developed in the writings and research 
on planned organizational change and this particular 
research can be placed within this theoretical framework. 
Change is treated as planned change in this work and
7there is usually the involvement of a change specialist 
who applies certain techniques or introduces a programme 
to modify the behaviour of individuals or the 
organization or both. Planned change used in this sense 
is synonymous to the practice and principle of 
organization development (OD). Since its inception in the 
late forties, the field of OD has grown enormously, 
thousands of studies have been undertaken on this subject 
and the largest collection of writings on organizational 
change is probably contained within this area. Similarly, 
the origin, growth and development of OD have been very 
well chronicled by several authors such as French and 
Bell (1973), Greiner (1977), Back (1972), Friedlander 
(1976), Solomon (1971). A review of this vast area of 
literature is outside the scope of this study and is not 
relevant to my inquiry. My chief interest is to examine 
and evaluate the OD literature in terms of its 
contribution to understanding the process of change which 
may be applicable to state-owned enterprises which is why 
I chose to undertake an examination of the existing 
research work on organizational change. Since there have 
been several major reviews of OD research literature 
(starting in the early seventies) that critically examine 
their strengths and weakness and highlight the main 
conceptual themes on organizational change, I have 
decided to look closely into the work of these writers 
with a view to using these reviews to evaluate the 
general direction and achievements of OD so far and, 
furthermore, examine the concepts of the process of
8change that have been developed by these authors. The 
selection of authors and their work is by no means 
exhaustive but my analysis may give a picture of the 
writings on OD since the early seventies.
From a review of 175 references through the 1973-74 
period, Friedlander and Brown (1974) concluded that one 
of the key concerns of OD writers has been the 
development of methods for facilitating change and 
development in people, technology, organizational 
processes and structure. They identify various 
"technostructural” (job design, job enlargement, etc.) 
and "human process" (survey feedback, group development, 
intervention, etc.) methods that are suggested in the
literature and provide the reader with a summary of the 
empirical knowledge on methods. In addition, they
identify two other common themes in their review: the
characteristics of successful versus unsuccessful 
intervention and how multiple interventions are different 
from single intervention. Alderfer (1977) updates the 
review of Friedlander and Brown using 104 references. He 
identifies various new trends emerging in the literature, 
such as new OD technologies being applied successfully in 
new settings such as schools, governments, and health 
organizations, new types of survey techniques, more 
sophistication in the designs used to evaluate
organizational interventions and new instruments designed 
to capture the changing process.
9Pettigrew (op. cit.) classifies the reviews of Kahn 
(1974), Stephenson (1975) and Strauss (1976) as the 
"evaluative" approach in the presentation of OD 
literature because all these three studies are very 
critical. Pettigrew concludes that Kahn goes straight for 
"OD's soft underbelly" and Stephenson chastises much OD 
for being "obsessed with the people variable to the 
exclusion of structural, environmental, and societal 
influences, for misrepresenting bureaucratic functioning 
by concentrating only on its negative connotations and 
for hypocrisy". Likewise Strauss describes OD as a "fad, 
its anti-intellectualism, essentially conservative
objectives and methods, and tendencies towards
manipulation and violations of individual privacy". 
Strauss uses some of the strongest words which have often 
been quoted by others in their critique of OD; he is 
particularly critical about the selling approach of OD:
"For my taste OD has more than its share of 
evangelic hucksterism. As an academician, I am 
repelled by the cloying emotionalism and unsustained 
claims which appear in some of the literature and 
much of the advertising".
White and Mitchell (1976) completed a review of 
published research on OD from 1964 to 1974. They
classified the research studies into three categories for 
analysis: (a) the recipient of change (individual,
group); (b) the level of expected change (conceptual,
structural); and (c) relationships involved in change 
(interpersonal, intrapersonal). They conclude that most
10
OD programmes have attempted to change attitudes or 
behaviour of either the individual or his immediate 
subgroup, and focus on factors affecting self­
relationships or relationship to peers. There is also a 
concern for evaluating the success of intervention; 
achievements in change are usually measured in 
percentages without statistical comparisons.
The themes from the literature on planned change of 
the early and mid 1970's are well summarised by Goodman 
and Kurke (op. cit.) and McLean (1978). Goodman and Kurke 
list several central themes which emerge from their 
"review of reviews" of OD: methods or techniques of
change (including OD methods for non-business 
organizations); empirical assessment of change; and the 
role of values in OD interventions. McLean's search for 
main trends in the field of management of change is 
undertaken by reviewing twenty-nine research cases and he 
concludes that the writers have been principally 
concerned with three issues: the role and characteristic 
of the consultant, organizational implications of change 
and a survey of OD techniques and their results.
Goodman and Kurke (op. cit.) review the planned 
organizational change literature since 1977 and their 
study identifies five major themes which again indicate 
the focus and interest in the growth and development of 
OD. I shall briefly discuss these themes drawing heavily 
from the work of the authors:
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1. Intervention Methods: The intervention method is still 
the dominant issue in OD and there is much concern about 
how to categorize methods and discussion of
characteristics of methods. There is considerable 
interest in the examination of particular intervention 
methods, such as survey feedback, compressed workweek, 
job redesign, autonomous work groups, etc. There is a 
movement toward "structural interventions" rather than 
"process interventions".
2. Large-scale multiple system interventions: A 
combination of intervention methods is used on a total- 
system basis, for example in the quality of working life 
(QWL) programmes. This is a new trend in planned 
organizational change efforts.
3. Assessment of change: One consequence of large-scale 
multiple system intervention is the development of 
evaluation technologies for assessing planned 
organizational change efforts, for example, models of 
assessment, analytical procedures, etc.
4. Failures in change: There is much documentation on
failures of planned organizational change in which 
various factors related to failure are discussed. The
problems related to maintenance of change is widely 
covered in this work.
5. Level of theorizing: There are three trends in this
area. First, "broad-systems theoretical orientation" 
which identifies a broad set of variables that should be
12
considered in change; second, the development of 
"propositional inventories"; third, the elaboration of a 
particular change process such as implementation or 
institutionalization. Goodman and Kurke conclude that 
there are no clear trends in the theoretical elaboration 
of change. They are of the opinion that the second and 
third trends in theorizing can provide concepts through 
which change may be understood.
In addition to these conceptual developments in OD, 
models of different phases in a programme of planned 
change have been developed as guidance to practitioners 
of change (for example, Lippitt, et al. 1958; Beckhard, 
1969; Schein, 1969; French and Bell, 1973) . Probably the 
best known is the one described by Lewin (1947) which 
prescribed three stages in the process of change: 
unfreezing, changing, refreezing. These phases and stages 
of intervention recommend a certain direction for change 
and have a normative character. However, these 
prescriptive models neither say anything about how and 
why change takes place nor about the dynamics behind the 
process of change. Referring to these models of process 
of change, McLean (op. cit.) concludes that they are "too 
rudimentary to serve as guiding theories and too abstract 
to serve as useful guide for practitioners". Weisbord 
(1974) finds a "vast gap between OD as researched and 
written down, and OD as actually practised". Wieland and 
Ullrich (1976) agree that the "real" processes of change 
differ very much from the normative models propounded by
13
the OD literature and the rationality in the models of 
planned change is rarely, if ever achieved.
The reviews of OD literature and the list of key 
themes indicate that very little has been written on the 
process of change in organizations. As a result, critics 
have pointed out that one of the main shortcomings in 
existing theories of planned change is the absence of 
knowledge about the process (dynamics) of change (for 
example, Berg, op. cit.; Lavoie and Culbert, 1978). 
Furthermore, the change process remains a largely 
unexplored area although critics have been pointing out 
this inadequacy for some time. For example, Friedlander 
and Brown (op. cit.) state that OD has failed to produce 
a theory of change which emerges from the change process 
itself. Alderfer (op. cit.) infers that theorising about 
organizational change is in a relatively primitive form. 
Goodman (1982) proposes more research which 
conceptualizes the change process because this will 
provide a better understanding of change and improve the 
chances of developing and testing theories. This list 
could include more critics but the important conclusion 
to be drawn is that there has been very little research 
on change which allows "the change process to, reveal 
itself in any kind of substantially temporal or 
contextual manner" (Pettigrew, op. cit.). One important 
explanation for this absence may be the very dominant 
perspectives and assumptions on which OD has been built 
which take a very different view of individuals and
14
organizations and inhibit a processual view and analysis 
of change. I argue that a processual interpretation of 
change has not emerged from the OD field because the
research and practice of planned change are derived 
largely from systems theory and humanism. A processual 
analysis of change will consider the central role of 
individuals and their collective actions because change 
cannot be separated from the people who create and manage 
it. Greenfield (1973) suggests that an organization has 
its "base" in human action; hence change as an 
organizational process can be related to human action and 
interaction. Such a focus does not exist in OD.
The systems theory which is placed within the 
regulative/objectivist paradigm developed by Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) has been the main theoretical perspective 
in the development of planned change. Legge (1984) lists
four assumptions of the systems theory: first, some sort 
of a boundary can be drawn between the organization as a 
system and its environment; second, the organization
interacts with the environment through a series of input, 
conversion, output and feedback processes; third, the 
subsystems of the organization contribute to the overall 
system; and finally, the operation of the organization
can be observed in terms of the behaviour of its 
constituent sub-systems. Therefore, the models of 
organizational analysis and change originating from these 
assumptions reflect a dependency on the environment, and 
organizational change is treated as a "process of
15
adaptation to the environment and adjustment of sub­
systems in order to maintain the organization's dynamic 
equilibrium". Legge elaborates this point:
"...Organizational analysis, at the macro level, 
should be centrally concerned with identifying and 
explaining the key associations which characterize 
relationships between the organization and its
environment.........A tool in operationalizing this
basic approach at the micro level, is socio- 
technical systems analysis. This identifies two 
subsystems - the "technical" and the "social" as 
central to the organization's conversion processes 
and hence in determining organizational processes."
Burrell and Morgan (op. cit.) refer to the 
"congruency hypothesis" in contingency theory which 
implies that the elements of different subsystems must be 
congruent in terms of the characteristics along each of 
the basic dimensions by which they are defined. This 
hypothesis spells out implications for theories of 
organizational change and development, according to 
Burrell and Morgan:
"for example, (that) attempts to change the 
operational subsystem through some programme of job 
redesign has implications for all the other 
subsystems within the organization. Any analytical 
framework for studying and prescribing 
organizational change must therefore pay due 
adherence to the elements of the model as a whole."
Much of the explanation and understanding of OD is 
offered in "systems terms" and "for many the whole basis 
of organization development itself may be conceived of in 
terms of the individual versus the organization" 
(Mangham, 1978). Even the quality of working life
16
movement developed by the "neo-human" relations theory is 
basically a regulative stance in which the main concern 
is to make adjustments designed to improve the viability 
of the technological society. "Although committed to 
humanitarian concern for the development of human growth 
and potential through the satisfaction of 'higher-level' 
psychological needs, their 'selling pitch' is invariably 
geared to the contributions which this will make to the 
stability and survival of the system as a whole" (Burrell 
and Morgan, op. cit.). The predominance of a systems 
approach to change is well documented in the writings of 
Margulies and Raia (1972), French and Bell (1973), Lippit 
(1971), Mumford, (1976, 1981), Argyris (1971), Blake and
Mouton (1969), Beckhard (1969) and many more.
Criticisms of the systems perspective on 
organizational change have come from theorists who oppose 
an objective view of social reality where individuals in 
organizations are treated as if they were "moulded by the 
norms and values of their culture" Legge (op. cit.). The 
systems view is essentially "conformist". Child (1972), 
Silverman (1970), Wood (1979), and Mangham (op. cit.) 
have criticized the perspective of assuming individuals 
to be passively reacting to a deterministic organization 
and environment rather than defining the situations in 
which they find themselves. Silverman treats man as a 
central social actor in the analysis of organization and 
he proposes that social reality should be viewed as being 
"socially constructed, socially sustained and socially
17
changed". Mangham proposes that there is the "potential 
for nonconformity within us all" and relationships can be 
formed, maintained and dissolved but the "naive" systems 
men and women are not concerned about these issues; thus, 
this perspective "tends to cast the individual social 
actor into the role of passive receiver of forces" and 
much of the research process which accompanies systems 
theory "reinforces the basic tenants of systems theory". 
In the end, the systems perspective ignores individuals 
and their actions in organizational change and denies the 
possibility of a processual analysis in which 
interactions among the individuals can be of central 
importance.
A review of the humanist influence on OD is 
presented by Mangham (op. cit.) and I refer to the key 
points argued by him which seems to relate to and explain 
the tradition of "aprocessual" analysis in planned 
change. The central feature of the humanistic approach is 
the emphasis upon the human person, upon the individual, 
his experiences and his choices; and subsequently, 
humanism in OD is more concerned with individual 
experience, individual choice, and individual acceptance. 
The individual is at the "centre of events"; the 
individual is the "creator" rather than the "responder". 
Mangham summarises the key shortcomings of humanism:
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"It has led to a denial of the impact of society 
upon the individual and a curious kind of anti- 
intellectualism nourished by an over-emphasis upon 
feelings, upon phenomenology, and upon the 
idiosyncratic as the only basis for true
knowledge....... Humanists produce little in the way
of thought or research into organizations,
presumably since many are much more concerned with 
the development of alternative life-styles rather 
than with the problems of relations within
contemporary organizations.
Because the complete focus is on the individual, there 
seems to be no consideration for the "dialectical
interplay" that can take place with others in
organizations and in situations of change. Human action 
in organizations is a complex interrelationship that is
planned, interpreted and performed by a collection of 
individuals but such a dynamic processual phenomenon is 
not recognized by humanism and OD practices based on it. 
Consequently, systems and humanist perspectives do not 
seem to be concerned with the complex process of change. 
A conceptual framework and methodology, more suited to a 
processual analysis are proposed in this study.
Organizational Change in State-Owned Enterprises
This study explores the organizational change
process in a state-owned enterprise in Nepal. Much of the 
literature in OD (as in management) has been 
predominantly based on the experiences of commercial 
organizations in developed countries and very few 
research has been undertaken on state-owned enterprises 
in less-developed countries (LDC's). Consequently, very
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little is known about the management of change in SOE's 
in LDC's. For instance, Somasundaram (1985) suggests that 
SOE's live in a world of "abrupt, discontinuous, 
qualitative change" because individuals who represent the 
government and stakeholders change frequently and they 
are able to "change the complexion of their ideology" and 
"introduce radically different emphasis on policy". But 
very little is written about such changes. In addition, 
it would seem unfair to impose management concepts 
developed in the industrialised countries on the LDC's. 
Fubura (1984) recounts several studies which show that 
the models of management and business policies developed 
and practiced in developed countries have been 
superimposed on the developing countries' business 
environment and such models were found to be greatly 
constrained.
McLean (op. cit.) refers to the "undesirable state 
of affairs" in the understanding of change management and 
he recommends various priorities for future research work 
which includes more investigations into new 
organizations:
"We need to place a much greater emphasis on 
studying actual changes in a wide variety of 
different organizations and from a range of 
different perspectives. We need to have more 
'grounded' data about change, in order to develop 
precise and valid concepts, that enables more 
accurate and reliable accounts of change to be 
made."
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There are two principal reasons for undertaking an 
inquiry into SOE's which I shall discuss in this section. 
The first concerns the important role of SOE's and their 
dominance in the economic development of LDC's. Second, 
the SOE's are "different" from the private sector 
organizations and their special characteristics affect 
organizational and management practices. Somasundaram 
(op. cit.) recounts this difference and indicates the 
need for the rethinking of organization theory when 
applied to SOE's:
"Organization theory, misguided as it is in respect 
of private sector interrelationships, tends to apply 
private enterprise models for understanding public 
enterprise organizations. One is in respect of 
management autonomy of private enterprises and the 
other, perhaps derived from it, the whole concern 
for laying down objectives. The legal base for a 
private enterprise company is that it is an 
artificial legal person and the management which is 
vested with the responsibility of its direction is 
vested with autonomy. As a concept this may be valid 
but it would require a Diogenic effort to locate 
where autonomy lies."
Aharoni (1982) states that very little is known about the 
way SOE's are managed because the -majority of studies 
have been concerned with the economics of state 
intervention. On the other hand, few authors who have 
written about the management of SOE's tend to be very 
critical about poor performance without adequate 
consideration of the special features which are extremely 
important contextual influences.
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SOE's in Less-Developed Countries
An enterprise in a LDC can be defined as a SOE 
(occasionally referred to as public enterprise or 
parastatal) if:
"(1) the government is the principal stockholder in 
the enterprise, or otherwise has the ability or the 
potential to appoint and remove enterprise 
management, and to exercise control over the broad 
policies followed by the enterprise; (2) the 
enterprise is engaged in the production of goods or 
services for sale to the public or to other 
enterprises; and (3) as a matter of policy, the 
revenues of the enterprise are supposed to bear some 
relation to its costs." (Gillis and Peprah, 1982)
There has been a sudden surge in the growth and expansion 
of SOE's in LDC's since World War II which Hope (1982) 
describes as a "great proliferation" that has tended to 
be more "vigorous" than "orderly" - vigorous because the 
expansion has not been based on best allocation of 
resources among the various sectors and on the basis of 
records of success. The account of growth of SOE's is 
presented by Gillis and Peprah in terms of external 
borrowing at the international level. SOE's have swiftly 
become major debtors in the international capital market 
with their external debt rising by 350 percent during the 
period of 1975-1978 alone; loan commitments from the 
Eurocurrency market reached an estimated U.S. $12.2 
billion in 1978. Similarly, SOE's have grown very 
important in the national economy of LDC's with 
remarkable expansion in number and size. They have spread 
beyond the traditional areas (the so-called 'natural
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monopoly1 industries such as telecommunications and 
electricity industry) into all the important economic 
sectors including manufacturing, construction,
agriculture, services, banking, and natural resources. 
Consequently, SOE's now account for "75 percent of 
industrial value added in Egypt, at least 60 percent in 
Bangladesh, one-third in Nepal (emphasis added) and Sri- 
Lanka, one-fifth in India, one-sixth in Korea" (Gillis 
and Peprah, op. cit.). Furthermore, many SOE's are the 
dominant companies in their sectors and in their 
respective countries.
The motives for the establishment of SOE's in LDC's 
and the reasons for the government's interventionist 
objective in an economy are issues which have generated 
various interpretations. A brief reference to a few of 
the writings may indicate the reasons for expansion of 
SOE's and complexities in their creation. Jones and Mason 
(1982) identify four broad explanations for the 
establishment of SOE's. The first is "ideological 
predilection" where there is a prior belief that certain 
forms of organizations are generally preferable to 
others, for example, socialism may be more favourable to 
SOE's. The second is "acquisition or consolidation of 
political or economic power", that is, ownership and 
control of economic units are used as instruments for 
advancing certain interests and frustrating others by the 
various interest groups. The third is "historical 
heritage and inertia" as in the wake of colonial exodus
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when new governments often have little short-term 
alternative but to take over substantial responsibilities 
in the industrial base. The fourth is "pragmatic response 
to economic problems" where governments tend to have a 
variety of centralized and decentralized institutional 
arrangements to choose from in their pursuit of economic 
goals; and the mixed economies of the LDC's generally 
rely heavily on "pragmatic consideration". Pragmatic 
considerations have given rise to SOE's either because 
"an organized private sector does not exist at all or 
because the private sector does not have the inclination 
or the resources to enter into high-risk, long gestation 
and low productivity industries" (Fernandes, 1985a).
The perspective and analyses presented by other 
authors writing on the causation of SOE's in LDC's tend 
to fall within the four categories discussed above. Ahmad 
(1982) and Sobhan and Ahmad (1980), from their study of 
SOE's in Bangladesh, argue that decisions on SOE's are 
made by individuals representing particular class 
interests and having broader political objectives. Evans' 
(1979) study of Brazilian SOE's reveal that they support 
the interests of the private capitalists. The World Bank 
study of SOE's in developing economies concludes that 
their number appears to be on the rise in spite of the 
continuing debate about their operational inefficiency; 
Shirley (1983) presents the many reasons cited by 
governments of LDC's for creating SOE's:
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"Some see state ownership as a way to correct 
perceived market failures, including a small, highly 
risk-averse private sector. Others believe that 
SOE's may raise revenues, increase employment, 
promote regional development, redistribute income, 
and encourage (or discourage) a particular national 
group. SOE's are also perceived as a way to achieve 
independence from foreign companies and to direct 
the course of development by controlling key 
sectors. Some SOE's are created as a channel for 
development aid. As for the reasons given for 
embodying an activity in a public corporation rather 
than a government department, this arrangement is 
said to increase flexibility through
decentralization, escape the inefficiency or 
corruption of central bureaucracies, attract 
different personnel, and apply different incentives 
outside the civil service pay limits."
SOE's as "Different" Organizations
SOE's in LDC's share some common features which make 
them sufficiently different from private sector 
enterprises. These differences have direct implications 
on the management and operation of the enterprise 
(including the process of change). These characteristics 
become the context and the framework within which 
organizational change takes place and individuals perform 
and act.
SOE's are frequently described as "hybrid" 
organizations (Jones, 1982) . As an "enterprise" the SOE 
sells its output and performs functions that are the 
concern of management specialists, such as production, 
finance, and marketing. As a "public" organization, it is 
owned and controlled by the government or its agents and 
it is subject to direct and indirect pressures from
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bureaucrats, politicians, and the public at large. 
Vratusa (1985), the president of the International Centre 
for Public Enterprises in developing countries,
acknowledges that the problem of SOE's is very complex
because essentially it represents "a basic cell of 
production relations" but, on the other hand, the
government has been entrusted by legislation with "the 
responsibility of coordinating, monitoring and 
controlling public enterprises or other institutions of a 
similar nature". Fernandes (1985b) mentions that there 
are inherent problems in this interface relationship
between SOE's and governments:
"The enterprise itself is a recognizable corporate 
entity with a cohesive thought process. This cannot 
be said of the concept of 'Government1. The belief
that Government is a single entity which expresses
its views and makes its policies in a highly
cohesive and coordinated manner is valid only in 
theory. In actual practice, modern Governments are 
highly complex and even fragmented organisms 
consisting of a large number of agencies
representing and acting in the public interest. Each 
of these agencies has an element of inherent power, 
an area of jurisdiction and has consequently an 
influence over a publicly-owned enterprise. It could 
be presumed that the various organs and agencies of 
Government work within an agreed framework in terms 
of practical politics."
Aharoni (op. cit.) argues that it is a mistake to 
view the government as the shareholding, goal-setting 
principal and the enterprise as the executing agent in 
the case of SOE's. Rather, the public at large is the 
principal on whose behalf a variety of agents act, 
including various political parties, government 
ministers, civil servants and other public enterprises.
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In this situation, each agent's view of the public 
interest is naturally influenced by its own self and 
group interests. In addition, managers of SOE's often try 
"to influence the process of goal specifications, resist 
the imposition of certain goals in many different ways, 
and claim the right to participate in the formulation of 
goals". In the end, "the actual outcome and degree of
discretion managers enjoy in their operations seem to be
the result of a fight for power among the various agents
of the state".
The existence of plurality of agents is closely 
related to the issue of "multi-dimensionality" of goals 
and objectives in SOE's. There is strong expectation that 
SOE's should operate "as sound business firms generating 
surpluses and providing resources to the public 
exchequer" but at the same time, there is "an equal
desire that public enterprises should function as 
instruments of national development and social policy" 
(ICPE, 1985) . The problem of the multiple objectives 
policy is that it calls upon the SOE's to pursue a 
mixture of commercial and non-commercial objectives at 
the same time. In conditions of such dual and conflicting 
corporate and social objectives, the measurement of 
performance of SOE's become very complex, according to 
Suarez (1985):
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"The fact that public enterprises have dual
objectives makes the question of performance more 
complex, since they are not only economic entities 
responding to consumer demands in the market, but 
instruments of public policy responding to multiple 
publics. These multiple publics have an effect on 
the behaviour of the enterprise and tend to make its 
performance more intricate and often difficult to 
achieve on conventional grounds."
Jones (op. cit.) looks into the plethora of objectives 
imposed on the SOE's and argues that this is the 
equivalent of having "no objectives" and "management is 
all often left free to pursue its own interests or a 
constantly shifting, incoherent mix".
The lack of agreement on goals raises a long­
standing dilemma about autonomy versus control or 
autonomy versus accountability in SOE's. If autonomy is 
essential for the successful performance of a SOE's as an 
enterprise, how can this be reconciled with the control 
by the government as the enterprises are accountable to 
it? If more autonomy is given to the operating 
management, the less control for the government and vice 
versa. Hope (op. cit.) states that autonomy and control 
are "inversely related" or in "perennial conflict" and, 
therefore, the autonomy of a SOE is in "inverse ratio to 
the dimensions of depth of control".
SOE's in Nepal
The political philosophy governing the establishment 
of SOE's in Nepal has been frequently described as
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"pragmatic" one (CCC, 1980) . A review of the SOE history 
seems to suggest that the desire for more rapid 
development, the desire for self-sufficiency, the heavy 
aid-dependency syndrome of the government and the 
theoretical virtuosity of SOE’s as an instrument of 
implementing national plans have served as powerful 
objectives for their establishment. During the first five 
year plan (1956-61), there were only eight SOE's and the 
total increased to sixty-one by the fourth year plan 
(1970-75). Of these, forty-four were engaged in 
manufacturing and wholesale trade with commercial 
orientation and the remaining were established as 
utilities, financial institutions, industrial estates, 
etc. covering almost all the important sectors of the 
economy .
A research study of SOE's in Nepal presents a 
critical account of their growth:
"The establishment of SOE's in Nepal cannot but 
impress upon one that they were created in haste. 
Right from their birth, they have very little chance 
of healthy growth as goals are not clearly 
stipulated, ministers who were actively in favour of 
them are faced with a very short tenure of office, 
financial capitalization is not properly planned, 
management is largely inexperienced and evaluation 
criteria are never known." (PPEN, 1980)
In the mid-eighties, SOE's still had a "vital role 
to play in the economic development of the country" 
because they were expected to contribute towards the 
fulfilment of "people's demand for consumer goods and
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supply of construction and development materials" (NPC,
1985). Their contribution to the national economy was 
significant because:
"around 17 percent of HMG's total development budget 
was involved with loans, equities and subsidies to 
public enterprises. Similarly, about 20 percent of 
HMG revenue originated in public enterprises by way 
of indirect taxes, repayment of loans, and interest, 
income taxes and dividends. Around 50,000 must be 
employed in public enterprises which represents 
about 40 percent of those employed in the organized 
sector." (Rana, 1987).
The total number of SOE's remained almost the same during 
the sixth and seventh plan period (during the eighties) 
because the government adopted a "restraining policy". It 
was concerned about the poor performance of the majority 
of SOE's and the huge financial liability incurred by 
them. The government's assessment of these enterprises is 
well stated in the plan document published by the NPC 
(op. cit.) :
"With rising government spending for the enterprises 
and diminishing returns from them, the government 
owned corporations have become a mere liability to 
HMG. Their contribution to the GDP has not increased 
during the first four years of the sixth plan. 
However, corporations have proved to be a major
source of employment..... The financial condition
of these enterprises is also critical. This is 
mainly due to the failure in determining clear and 
target oriented objectives, inability to make the 
management solely responsible, inability to dissolve 
or transfer unnecessary corporations and the failure 
in making the management shoulder economic 
obligations."
Similarly, the PPEN research study, mentioned above, 
takes a very critical view of SOE's in Nepal and blames
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both the government and the management of the concerned 
enterprises:
"There is a high degree of adhocism in the 
establishment and management of SOE's. In the 
absence of a clear-cut rationale for the 
establishment of SOE's and the roles they are 
expected to play, opinions in government about the 
role of SOE's and their management suffer a great 
deal of inconsistency....For instance, even when 
public sector management could be greatly improved 
through a mere change in top management, HMG/Nepal 
is apathetic and would rather let the SOE suffer 
than take the necessary corrective
measures...... The working and performance of SOE's
fall far behind their stated objectives but nobody 
seems to be bothered. There is a high degree of 
allocative inefficiency in the establishment of 
SOE's and an equally virulent inefficiency in their 
operation."
This short introduction to SOE's in Nepal is 
presented here to reflect the complexities in their 
management and performance. It may be stated that in many 
respects the problems faced by them are similar to those 
experienced by other SOE's in LDC's, that is, many of the 
problems seem to arise from the special nature of SOE's 
discussed earlier. This study does not attempt to suggest 
prescriptive remedies to improve the situation but it 
puts into perspective the general situation of SOE's in 
Nepal within which planned change has to be explored and 
understood.
To summarise, then, this inquiry will attempt to 
explore the process of organizational change in SOE's. A 
processual analysis of change is generally missing in the 
literature on organizational change and development; and
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organizational studies of SOE's in LDC's are very few. 
The actions, role and influence of individuals will be 
paid particular attention to because an analysis of the 
organizational process can answer questions related to 
the how and why of change. The next chapter will discuss 




This chapter will explain my choice of methodology 
and its implementation to achieve the goals set out for 
my research. The discussion will encompass the
principles, processes and procedures by which the 
research problems were approached and answers sought. It 
will be related to the wider scheme of analysis which
suggests that the various approaches to social sciences 
are based on interrelated sets of assumptions regarding 
ontology and human nature. I propose a qualitative 
research methodology, in line with the phenomenological 
perspective, that is, understanding human behaviour from 
the actor's own frame of reference. Lastly, I move on to 
describe the procedures and experiences in conducting 
this research and elaborate on the choice of a single 
case study, data collection and processing, and
interpretation.
Methodological Assumptions and Considerations
My choice of method could not be related to any 
prevailing methodological developments in the area of 
planned organizational change and development (OD)
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because the majority of research has been concerned with 
different issues, themes and aspects of change (as 
reviewed in chapter one). Furthermore, since the practice 
of organization development and the dominant modes of 
research are derived largely from systems theory and 
humanism, this has led to a strong reliance upon a 
positivistic approach. Mangham (1978) explains that 
research in OD has been narrowly limited to: "(1) little 
more than the forcing of new data into pre-established 
categories or existing theoretical frameworks; (2) 
abstract rambling about concepts such as values divorced 
from any empirical referent, or (3) detailed accounts of 
particular interventions with little or no attempts at 
generalizations". He recommends qualitative research for 
an understanding of human actions and processes within 
organizations in place of positivism:
"...the scientific influence has led to an emphasis 
upon system and upon positivism, and creates the 
idea that the scientist approaches organizational 
change and development with established concepts and 
models and is primarily, if not exclusively, 
concerned with deriving data to enrich his 
particular framework. Such data tend to be centred 
around things and abstracts rather than individuals 
and their experiences.... organizations are to be 
understood in terms of the individuals who 
participate in them and individuals are to be 
understood in terms of the organizations of which 
they are members. Such 'understanding' can only 
arise from an intimate familiarity with the 
processes occurring within organizations, a 
familiarity which is at the heart of qualitative 
research which aims to go beyond the ideographic 
without doing violence to the complexity of its 
subject matter. Familiarity, it may safely be said, 
breeds concept." (Mangham, op. cit.)
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With reference to research studies on organization 
development and change, McLean (1978) highlights the use 
of "traditional" methods which "alienate organizational 
members by casting them into the role of 'subject' and by 
imposing onto them measures which are based on constructs 
which have meaning for the researcher but little or none 
for the subject". He expresses dissatisfaction with such 
methods because they leave a wide gap between the theory 
and practice of change management and recommends that
further research should examine more closely the 
"natural" process of change in organization; a 
phenomenological method is suggested.
Beer and Walton (1987) review seven major research 
articles on OD and organizational change literature which 
try to assess the relative effectiveness of typical 
interventions in a wide range of areas such as team
building, laboratory training, survey feedback, techno- 
structural interventions, and process consultations. They 
evaluate the methods used by these researchers and find
that "investigators have felt the needs for, and have
begun to use quantitative data, sophisticated research 
designs, and statistical procedures aimed at accurate 
measurement of change". Beer and Walton are critical of 
the positivistic assumptions adopted by these researchers 
and their search for "perfect" quantitative methodology 
in OD research. They identify several problems in 
pursuing such a method - first, the research aims to 
isolate causation because it tries to identify the result
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of a single intervention and overlooks the "systemic" 
nature of organizations. Second, there is imprecision in 
the in-depth description of the intervention because the 
environmental context is overlooked. Third, the more and 
more complex statistical techniques and quasi- 
experimental designs are used to achieve more precision 
and tighter scientific proof, the "social construction" 
of knowledge in the social sciences is neglected. The 
authors conclude that OD should attempt to build a 
different model of knowledge rather than attempt to find 
the perfect quantitative method and they propose action 
research traditions with full participation of the client 
in the research.
Berg (1979) states that the dominant philosophy in 
OD has been contributed by the functional paradigm and 
hence research has been dominated by traditional science 
methodology which is of little use in the study of the 
process of change. No methodology has been developed 
which allows the change process to reveal itself. 
Pettigrew (1985) points out that the entire literature on 
organizational change and development is wanting in a 
number of crucial respects, amongst which is the "extent 
to which the theories and empirical findings in this area 
have been circumscribed by the limited frames of 
reference and methodologies and approaches used to study 
change".
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The methodologies used in studies of organizational 
change are not suitable for my exploration into the 
process of change and the role and actions of key 
individuals. Close/ continuous and intensive interaction 
with key individuals and actors in the social setting 
over a period of time seems to offer a better 
understanding of the organizational process and the human 
actions that constituted it. A qualitative research 
methodology seems more appropriate for my inquiry. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) state that "all theories of 
organization are based upon a philosophy of science and a 
theory of society", and they conceptualize social science 
in terms of four sets of assumptions related to ontology, 
human nature, epistemology and methodology. An 
investigation into a subject and the methodology used is 
guided by explicit or implicit assumptions about the 
nature of the social world, that is, different 
ontologies, epistemologies, and models of human nature 
are likely to incline the social scientists toward 
different methodologies. A subjective - objective 
dimension is proposed for the analysis of these four 
variables and each can be expressed in terms of two 
extreme opposing points in a continuum, for example, the 
ideographic and nomothetic methodologies as the two 
opposing extremes. The ideographic approach believes that 
the social world can be understood only by obtaining 
first hand knowledge of the subject under investigation, 
and their analyses emphasise the importance of subjective 
account that is generated by "getting inside" situations
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and involving oneself in everyday life. On the other 
hand, the nomothetic approach regards the social world as 
a hard, external, objective reality and recommends that 
research should focus upon an analysis of relationship 
and regularities between various elements on the basis of 
"systematic protocol and techniques". With reference to 
the large amount of empirical research carried out in 
organization theory that is based on highly objectivist 
assumptions, Burrell and Morgan (op. cit.) point out that 
the consideration of methodology has dominated other 
assumptions on ontology, epistemology and human nature; 
they question the contribution of the "dominant" methods 
taken from the natural sciences in much of the 
organizational research. Their concern about relating 
method to the nature of phenomenon has been one of the 
main considerations in my choice of methodology in this 
research:
"The problem of developing m e t h o d s  appropriate to 
the nature of the phenomenon to be studied remains 
one of the most pressing issues within the whole 
realm of social science research."
Morgan and Smircich (1980) take their lead from this 
scheme of analysis and develop the "core assumptions" 
that underlie the arguments in favour of different 
methods in social science research. They state that 
qualitative research is an approach rather than a 
particular set of techniques and its appropriateness for 
certain research is derived from the nature of the 
phenomenon to be studied. More importantly, they argue
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that assumptions about ontology and human nature of the 
subject will define epistemological positions:
"The different assumptions regarding ontology and 
human nature pose interesting problems of
epistemology As we pass from assumption to
assumption along the subjective - objective 
continuum, the nature of what constitutes adequate 
knowledge changes. To take the extremes of the 
continuum by way of illustration, an objectivist 
view of the social world as a concrete structure 
encourages an epistemological stance that emphasizes 
the importance of studying the nature of 
relationship among the elements constituting that 
structure. Knowledge of the social world from this 
point of view implies a need to understand and map 
out the social structure, and gives rise to the
epistemology of positivism At the other end of
the continuum, the highly subjectivist view of 
reality as a projection of individual imagination 
would dispute the positivist grounds of knowledge in 
favour of an epistemology that emphasizes the 
importance of understanding the processes through 
which human beings concretize their relationship to 
their world. This phenomenologically oriented 
perspective challenges the idea that there can be 
any form of "objective" knowledge that can be 
specified and transmitted in a tangible form...."
A preference for qualitative research arises as one 
departs from the objective view of the social sciences 
and moves toward the subjective end. Once the ontological 
assumptions move away from the view of the social world 
being external to individual cognition and made up of 
hard, tangible and immutable structures, and human beings 
being determined by situations and the environment, the 
methodological approach to the study of social sciences 
also shifts from the dominant "nomothetic" approach which 
is common in natural science. One should be reminded that 
the subjective-objective continuum provides a "rough 
typology" illustrating the various views that different
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social scientists hold about human beings and their 
world. Morgan and Smircich warn that the main objective 
of the scheme is not to determine who advocates what 
positions but to use it as "a useful way of thinking 
about the kind of assumptions that underline continuing 
research and debate within the social sciences, and the 
thorny problems regarding epistemological and 
methodological adequacy".
When I decided on an in-depth study into the fairly 
new area of the change process in SOE's, I was prepared 
for "no clear expectation of what to expect" as described 
by Harre and Secord (1972) in the context of exploratory 
research. I entered the field of organizational analysis 
with an open mind anticipating and accepting 
organizations as complex, ambiguous and paradoxical. I 
wanted to understand the situation in its "natural" form 
and let it reveal itself rather than impose my point of 
view. Morgan (1986) proposes two essential steps in
organizational analysis which seem a reasonable and sound 
way of conducting exploratory research: diagnostic
reading and critical evaluation. The diagnosis involves 
studying the situation being investigated by using 
different metaphors to identify the key features and 
character of the situation. It allows the "luxury of 
being able to jump from one position to another"; a
description of what is seen, understood and experienced; 
and most important of all, it enables a creative
interpretation of the situation. The diagnosis stage is
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followed by evaluation and identification of insights 
which is useful in developing a most effective "story 
line". The metaphorical framework provides the background 
within which the story is developed, and the story is a 
mode for understanding the situation.
Blumer (1969) proposes a two-stage model of inquiry 
into the empirical world which shows similarities to the 
art of organizational analysis discussed above. He 
propounds a "naturalistic" examination for all social 
inquiry and the key activities are "exploration" and 
"inspection". Exploration is described as a flexible 
procedure in which the scholar shifts from one to another 
line of inquiry, adopts new points of observation, moves 
in new directions, and changes his recognition of what 
constitutes relevant data as he acquires more information 
and better understanding. This stage of the inquiry has 
two objectives according to Blumer:
"On the one hand, it is the way by which a research 
scholar can form a close and comprehensive 
acquaintance with a sphere of social life that is 
unfamiliar and hence unknown to him. On the other 
hand, it is the means of developing and sharpening 
his inquiry so that his problems, his directions of 
inquiry, data, analytical relations and 
interpretations arise out of and remain grounded in 
the empirical life under study."
The inspection is similar to the critical evaluation 
suggested by Morgan and involves an intensive examination 
of the contents of the analytical element and the nature 
of the relationship between such elements. It is an 
analytical stage which "consists of examining the given
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analytical element by approaching it in a variety of 
different ways, viewing it from different angles, asking 
many different questions of it, and returning to its 
scrutiny from the stand-point of such questions".
The advantage of using a diagnostic reading in my 
research was that I could undertake an analysis of the 
execution of the change programmes and let the "real" 
situation reveal cues and insights that corresponded to a 
frame of reference for analysis. This called for careful 
probing, reading, seeking answers to doubts and 
confusion, and gradually moving towards an understanding 
of the situation. At this stage, I specified an 
appropriate metaphor that best described and matched the 
data of the situation under study. The metaphor was not 
imposed upon the data to advance my research preference 
or my view of the world but the analysis clearly revealed 
that the change process was best captured in a "political 
model", that is, a political analysis of change. I was 
able to comprehend and convey the story line on the 
process of change by proceeding with the political 
framework; and, at the same time, I was constantly on the 
look-out for "unforeseen and serendipitous" (Shalin,
1986) discovery of new categories from the data.
The application of metaphors to understand and 
explain the social world is a common and an on-going 
tradition (Brown, 1977; Morgan, 1980; Schon, 1963). 
Morgan and Smircich (op. cit.) assert that a strong case
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can be made for the view that science of all kinds, 
whether nominalist or realist in its basic orientation, 
is primarily metaphorical. Morgan's (1986) acclaimed book 
discusses the variety of metaphors that have been applied 
to build theory and explain organizational life; he 
proposes the use of metaphors for organizational analysis 
as well:
"Metaphor is often regarded as a device for 
embellishing discourse, but its significance is much 
greater than this. For the use of metaphors implies 
a w a y  o f  t h i n k i n g  and w a y  o f  s e e i n g  that pervade how
we understand our world generally......... By using
different metaphors to understand the complex and 
paradoxical character of organizational life, we are 
able to manage and design organizations in ways that 
we may not have thought possible before."
The use of metaphors reveals the important properties of 
organizations and provides a basis for exploration 
according to Mangham (1979):
"Without recourse to metaphor it would probably be 
extremely difficult to comment upon organizational 
life at all since metaphor is, at its simplest, a 
way of proceeding from a known to an unknown. It is 
a method by which the identifying characteristics of 
one thing are transferred almost by a flood of 
intuition, a shaft of insight, to some other thing 
which up until that point has been opaque, 
unilluminated or unfathomable."
Similarly, Miles and Huberman (1984) recommend the use of 
metaphors for generating meanings from qualitative data:
"(Metaphors) are d a t a - r e d u c i n g  d e v i c e s ,  taking 
several particulars and making a single generality
of them..... are also p a t t e r n - m a k i n g  d e v i c e s  are
also excellent d e c e n t e r i n g  d e v i c e s  finally
metaphors are ways of c o n n e c t i n g  findings to 
theory...The metaphor is halfway from the empirical 
facts to the conceptual s i g n i f i c a n c e  of those facts; 
it gets the analyst, as it were, up and over the
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particulars en route to the basic social processes 
that give meaning to those particulars. For 
instance, Glaser (1978) advises the field researcher 
struggling to make sense of social phenomena to 
attach metaphorical gerunds to them...."
One also needs to be aware that a metaphor always 
produces a one-sided insight of the subject under study 
because it highlights certain interpretations and forces 
other to the background. Mangham (op. cit.) warns that 
the use of metaphors equally diverts attention from other 
aspects of existence because "any way of seeing is 
simultaneously a way of not seeing: all metaphors are at 
once directive and misleading." Given this nature of 
metaphors, I faced the challenge of capturing the 
comprehensive reality of the change process in 
reorganization, that is, an understanding of the complex 
and paradoxical features which exist together in a social 
world. The political model was my preferred choice 
because the data highlighted the political dynamics of 
change and I also followed Pfeffer's (1981) suggestion 
that it is important for those analysing organizations to 
be able to figure out the kind of analytical framework 
that can be most usefully employed to diagnose the 
particular organization of interest. I assumed that a 
political analysis could capture the change process in a 
coherent and consistent manner and paradoxes could be 
explained in relation to the main framework.
The political metaphor derived from the analysis of 
data implies that I uphold certain ontological and human
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nature assumptions because all metaphors already include 
such assumptions. Morgan and Smircich (op. cit.) state 
that the choice of a metaphor has "implicit commitment to 
an epistemological position emphasizing particular kinds 
and forms of knowledge". The key underlying assumption of 
the political metaphor is that it treats man as a social 
actor who not only responds to others but can make 
indications and interpret their actions; therefore, it 
opposes the view that human beings are mechanistic and 
purely determined by the situations encountered in the 
social world. Similarly, the social world is created and 
upheld by actions and activities of people. The symbolic 
interactionism perspective is most hospitable to a 
political analysis of organizations and will be discussed 
in chapter five.
Choice of Qualitative Research
The assumptions on human nature and social reality 
indicate an epistemological position that determines the 
grounds of knowledge for investigating the process of 
change. Since the political perspective requires an 
understanding of the dominant roles played by key 
individuals, change is explored in terms of actions and 
interactions of individuals in a social setting. The 
social world is treated as "relativistic" and to be 
understood from the point of view of individuals who are 
directly involved in activities related to the change.
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This is a typical stance taken by the anti-positivists 
who claim that one can only understand human activities 
by occupying the frame of reference of the active 
participants. The implication of this approach for
methodology is to let one's subject unfold its nature and 
characteristic in the process of investigation; hence the 
researcher can obtain knowledge by getting close to the 
subject under study. The anti-positivists reject the 
"observer" role for understanding human action which is a 
typical approach of the positivist methodology.
Positivism is based upon the traditional approach that 
dominate the natural sciences and seeks "to explain and 
predict what happens in the social world by searching for 
regularities and causal relationship between its 
constituent elements" (Burrell and Morgan, op. cit.). The 
pioneering theorists such as Auguste Comte1 and Emile 
Durkhime assume that social facts are "things" which 
exercise external and coercive influence on human
behaviour and the positivist's main interest is to seek 
these facts as "causes" of social phenomena. The 
subjective state of individuals is not important. 
Positivists share the view that the social and natural 
world "conform to certain fixed and unalterable laws in 
an endless chain of causation" (Hughes, 197 6). Labowitz 
and Hagedorn (1971) state that "the major goal of 
scientific research is to establish causal laws that 
enable us to predict and explain scientific phenomena. At 
a minimum, to establish these laws a science must have 
reliable information or facts". Positivist methodology is
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concerned with the construction of scientific tests which 
produce quantitative data and establish a relationship 
between defined variables. Surveys, questionnaires, 
inventories, personality tests, and standardised research 
instruments which use quantitative techniques for 
analysis of data are popular with the positivists.
There are many critics of positivism and 
quantitative methodology in the literature on research 
methodology (for example, Halfpenny, 1982; Harre, 1981; 
Giddens, 1976; Lally, 1976; Hesse, 1980; Cronbach, 1982; 
Lincoln and Guba, 1985) . A few of the critiques tend to 
disparage the word "positivism" and undermine the useful 
contributions previously made, such as the explications 
offered by functional theories on formal organization, 
the sociology of organization, and the behaviour of 
individuals in organizations. I shall focus my critique 
of the positivist tradition to several points that relate 
to this exploratory research on organizational change.
Walker (1985) considers that positivism is 
inadequate in account of two themes:
" (a) that positivist social science in its concern 
with scientific procedures, hypothesis testing, 
measurement, statistical significance and the like 
has become sterile and introspective; and (b) that 
fundamental differences between the natural and 
social worlds rule out the possibility of using the 
techniques of natural science to study social 
phenomena."
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Walker states that there are real problems in applying 
the measurement theory of the "causal laws" paradigm to 
social sciences. He agrees with Brenner (1981) who 
criticizes the positivist paradigm as "under-identified, 
as far as methodology is concerned, as it does not 
consider, nor elaborate, except in terms of measurement 
error...., the social processes that constitute the 
practices of method". He identifies several problems, a 
few of which are relevant: first, the theoretical
concepts are frequently insufficiently precise to suggest 
an appropriate measurement; second, the control and 
simplification necessary for measurement may lead one to 
ignore the fundamental complexity of the social 
phenomena; third, the objectivity and consistency 
necessary for the development of classification systems 
is difficult to achieve because the decision procedures 
are subjective and variable with actors; lastly, the data 
collection procedure itself is necessarily reactive.
A familiar argument amongst the anti-positivists is 
the inappropriateness of methods developed in the natural 
sciences for the study of subjects in social sciences. 
The two worlds are viewed as fundamentally different and, 
furthermore, an understanding of human behaviour needs to 
be related to people's perception. The researcher as a 
social being should "get inside" the objects of his study 
so as to acquire adequate description of the social 
world. Scwartz and Jacobs (1979) state that an 
appreciation of meanings conferred upon situation by
48
individuals is essential and this requires the researcher 
"to interpret what is going on from the social context in 
which these events occur". Walker (op. cit.) makes 
pertinent comments about the subjective element in 
qualitative research which is absent in quantitative 
methods:
"What the researcher learns from his research 
depends on the quality of his interaction with his 
subjects, his ability to interpret what he observes 
and is told, and his own ethical and social
values....... Consequently there can be no absolute
objectivity but only agreements on truth and 
validity shared by people who hold the same meaning 
system, most notably by researchers of the same 
methodological persuasion."
The positivist model of social science demands almost 
"pure" objectivity in generating knowledge but Siedman 
(1977) points out the subjectivity element in their 
method as well:
" few have questioned the inherent subjectivity
of quantification which requires 'selection' of 
parameters and baseline data, the interpretation of 
findings, and the selection of facts and evidence. 
There is much to be gained by destroying the myth of 
objectivity since subjectivity is always intricately 
involved - but disallowed."
Lincoln and Guba (op. cit.) disapprove positivism on 
the grounds that it embraces very "unacceptable" 
assumptions about human beings which make it inadequate 
for the study of social phenomena. Positivism assumes 
"determinism" and "reductionism" which have implications 
for restrictions on human free will and human beings are 
subject to a single set of laws respectively (conceptual
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assumptions which contradict with the political 
metaphor). Positivism has produced research with human 
respondents that "ignores their humanness, a fact that 
has not only ethical but also validity problems". They 
describe this kind of research as "exogenous" - that is, 
"research in which all aspects of the research, from 
problem definition through instrumentation, data 
collection and analysis, and the use of findings, have 
been researcher-determined"; and "etic" - that is, 
"research carried out with an outside perspective" (to 
the virtual exclusion of an inside perspective).
The positivist method has dominated research inquiry 
in social and psychological sciences and many researchers 
"turn away from direct examination of the empirical 
social world and give preference, instead, to theoretical 
schemes, to preconceived models, to arrays of vague 
concepts, to sophisticated techniques of research, and to 
an almost slavish adherence to what passes as the proper 
protocol of research inquiry" (Blumer, op. cit.). The 
"cardinal" principle of empirical science for Blumer is 
that the researcher should respect the "obdurate 
character" of the empirical world and "reality" can only 
be identified by close examination of the world. In his 
words:
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"The task of scientific study is to lift the veils 
that cover the area of group life that one proposes 
to study. The veils are not lifted by substituting, 
in whatever degree, performed images for firsthand 
knowledge. The veils are lifted by getting close to 
the area and by getting deep into it through careful 
study. Schemes of methodology that do not encourage 
or allow this betray the cardinal principle of 
respecting the nature of one's empirical world."
Blumer understandably recommends symbolic interactionism 
as a perspective for empirical science - an approach 
designed to yield verifiable knowledge of human group 
life and human conduct. He suggests a rigourous 
"naturalistic" examination of the empirical world that 
involves "exploration" and "inspection" modes of inquiry 
(discussed earlier), and qualifies as qualitative 
methodology.
Mangham (1978) criticizes the research methodology 
of positivism with its emphasis upon heavy reliance on 
"statistical inference about concepts which have an 
indefinite relation to the empirical world". He suggests 
that an empirical science should be "constructed out of 
the interplay of data and speculation that generates 
concepts and at the same time g r o u n d s  them in context of 
empirical materials"; and his suggested approach is:
"to be familiar with one's subject matter - to have 
a detailed and dense awareness of a particular set 
of social actors over a period of time and to seek 
to understand how it is that they go about defining 
and acting in their particular social world; to 
participate with them while observing or, as a 
second best, to spend a considerable amount of time 
talking to them in a relatively unstructured form 
about their perceptions and their actions."
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Just as there is no single method suited for all 
kinds of research, some methods may be more appropriate 
for certain research, and grounds of knowledge. My choice 
of method was qualitative research because I wanted to 
capture the richness of the social process and actions, 
interactions among actors, and meanings from actor's 
frame of reference. I decided to apply qualitative 
method in order to understand the process of change which 
emerged as a political process. Thus, I wanted to
identify actors who were closely related to the change
programme, actions and interactions among them which 
could be interpreted as political, how actors negotiated 
the changes, the negotiation process and power 
relationships, etc. In the entire change process, the 
central position was taken by several key individuals and 
it was essential to try to understand their actions and 
behaviour. I had to get inside their world to see it from 
their point of view. I had to interact with them to
understand their interpretation of various elements of 
the change. Furthermore, the multiplicity of actors in
the social settings indicated that I might not only have 
to interpret meanings expressed by them but also 
understand the reasons for differences and their 
implication on the events. The difficulties associated 
with these tasks were aggravated by the fact that I was 
trying to study the political dimension of the change 
process and I had to be extremely sensitive and cautious 
about questions concerning interests, conflicts, 
negotiations, and power. The objectives and purpose of my
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research convinced me that a qualitative method was 
appropriate to understand the experiences of actors as 
they lived and participated in the change process. 
Quantitative techniques would hardly have been able to 
meet these goals as stated by Blumer (op. cit.):
"Actor's definitions, cannot be obtained from 
questionnaires; no quantitative measures can 
adequately represent meanings; and no statistical 
analysis can explain them."
My role as a researcher involved me closely in the 
lives of the people studied. This is one of the key
features of qualitative research that has been supported 
by writers adopting this paradigm. Bogdan and Taylor 
(1975) favour qualitative methods because they allow the 
researcher to get to know the researched people 
personally, to see them develop their definition of the 
world and to experience what they experience in their
daily struggles with their society. Cottle (1972) states 
that the methods of qualitative research which involves 
visiting people, listening, speaking, etc. means that 
"one's own feelings are evoked by the language, history 
and account of this other person". Blumer (op. cit.) 
supports a collaborative research approach to capture 
accurately the subject's frame of reference:
"To try to catch the interpretive process by
remaining aloof as a so-called "objective" observer 
and refusing to take the role of the acting unit is 
to risk the worst kind of subjectivism - the
objective observer is likely to fill in the process 
of interpretation with his own surmises in place of 
catching the process as it occurs in the experience 
of the acting unit which uses it."
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Lincoln and Guba (op. cit.) emphasise that one of the 
axioms, i.e. a "basic belief", of the naturalistic 
paradigm is that the "inquirer and the object of inquiry 
interact to influence one another: knower and known are 
inseparable". As early as 1929, Dewey stated that 
"knowing is not the act of an outside spectator but of a 
participant inside the natural and social scene".
Lastly, the application of qualitative method in my 
exploratory research allowed an understanding of social 
process "grounded" on the data and experiences of the 
real world. Grounded theory, a term coined by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) , is inferred from data and is a principal 
contribution of qualitative research:
"Generating a theory from data means that most 
hypothesis and concepts not only come from the data 
but are systematically worked out in relation to the 
data during the course of the research."
The formulation of theory "grounded" on data has been 
recommended by other authors who have generally conducted 
research from the qualitative paradigm (Lincoln and Guba, 
op. cit.). Elden (1981) uses the term "local theory" 
which is generated by participatory research with 
employees. Diesing (1972) describes how patterns of model 
and themes emerge from a network. Kidder (1981) defines a 
process called "negative case analysis" that basically 
consists of a "process of revising hypotheses with 
hindsight" and can be seen as another way of 
conceptualizing the development of grounded theory.
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McLean et al. (1982) state that an investigation is 
"grounded" when it is comprehensible to all the parties 
in the collaborative task and not merely to the framework 
of the researcher; and satisfactory validation of the 
research can only come from such shared understanding.
The Case Study Method
Case study research can contribute to our knowledge 
of the organizational process in a unique way and is more 
acceptable in qualitative research; hence I have used it 
in this investigation. However, one of the striking 
features of the case study method in social science 
research is its controversial position. Both Berg (1979) 
and Yin (1984) refer to the "paradox" in the use of case 
studies for organizational research - that is, it 
continues to be used extensively, but at the same time, 
few other methods seem to have been so heavily 
criticised. Furthermore, there seems to be little 
agreement on the definition of the term itself. A very 
narrow meaning is attached to the case study method by a 
few who consider it as an initial stage or an exploratory 
stage in the overall research strategy. Berg (op. cit.) 
refers to the works of Hagg and Hedlund (1978) and 
Andersson (1979) who both agree that there is no clear- 
cut understanding of what is meant by a case method. 
Denny (1978) interprets case study as "an intensive or 
complete examination of a facet, an issue, or perhaps the
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events of a geographic setting over time". Lincoln and 
Guba (1981) explain case study as "a snapshot of 
reality", a "slice of life" or "an episode"; and "an 
intensive or complete examination of a facet, an issue or 
perhaps the events of a geographic setting overtime" 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Yin (1981a, 1981b) asserts that 
all the critical "technical" features of a case study are 
accounted for in his definition:
"A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context; when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and 
in which multiple sources of evidence are used."
The case study method has been widely used in the 
study of the management of organizational change. McLean 
(1978) spells out the reasons for this popularity:
"As a technique for describing the complexities of 
change, it allows the practioneer much freedom to 
explore the intricacies of a particular episode. 
Potentially the case study is a rich source of data 
on which researchers may base comparisons of a 
number of changes, enabling them to make 
observations and draw conclusions at a higher level 
of generality. Moreover, ideally case studies 
provide an opportunity for an observer to see the 
complexities of a situation through the eyes of 
people in that situation and to learn something of 
the reasoning underlying their actions."
Likewise, McClintock, Brannon and Maynard-Moody (197 9) 
state the objectives of using the case study:
"The goals of the qualitative case study are: (1) to
capture the frame of reference and definition of a 
situation of a given informant or participant and 
thus to avoid instrumentation artifacts of 
standardized measurement procedures; (2) to permit
56
detail examination of organization processes; (3) 
and to elucidate those factors peculiar to the case 
that may allow greater understanding of causality."
My decision to use the case study method can be 
justified because it seemed to contribute to the goals of 
my research. The choice involved various important 
considerations:
First, as stated earlier, I was conducting inquiry into 
the process of organizational change in government-owned 
enterprises and I was seeking answers to the how and why 
of organizational change, and finding out what actually 
happens during change. This was an poorly researched area 
and hence there were no guiding theories and methods. The 
case study method was particularly suited to exploratory 
research because it took into account the complexities of 
the real world. The case study has a degree of freedom 
because each item of information provides another point 
of leverage from which to test interpretations (Campbell 
and Stanley, 1966). Berg (op. cit.) mentions that the 
case study allows a large number of variables to be 
studied and often these variables mutually influence and 
shape each other. Similarly Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
support the case study method because it is "more adapted 
to a description of the multiple realities encountered at 
any given site".
Second, I was conducting an investigation into a very 
complex social phenomenon, the politics of organizational 
change, and I wanted to learn about the meaningful
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characteristics of real-life events. All forms of 
political behaviour, activities and negotiations are 
usually sensitive issues and closely guarded aspects of 
human life which may become accessible for study through 
the case study method as it allows intensive research of 
the social process. The case study as a research method 
seemed appropriate for the study of the change process 
because of the "three conditions" of its use identified 
by Yin (1984). It provided answers to exploratory 
research questions, that is, the "how" and "why" of 
change because "such questions deal with operational 
links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere 
frequencies or incidence". It required no control or 
manipulation of the behaviour of the subjects. Lastly, it 
involved an examination of contemporary events and the 
use of various sources of evidence such as documents, 
artifacts, interviews and observation.
Third, the case method allowed me close access to the 
social setting and data was collected through 
interactions with members of this setting in accordance 
with my epistemological assumptions; only the natural 
social setting was able to provide insight into meanings 
shared by individuals who were part of the context. The 
case study method facilitates the collection of 
"illustrative data" (Strauss, 1987) which conveys the 
view point of key individuals. This was particularly 
pertinent to my study because I could probe into the 
minds and memory of people regarding the process of
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change. Lincoln and Guba (op. cit.) state that the case 
report is ideal for providing "thick description", in 
order "to make clear the complexities of the context and 
the ways these interact to form what ever it is that the 
case report portrays".
Choice of the NEA and Access
Bogdan and Taylor (1975) state that "any setting 
that meets the substantive and theoretical interests of 
the researcher and that is open for study might be chosen 
as a research site". The choice of organization was 
mainly guided by a search for a major planned 
organizational change in a state enterprise where I could 
carry out an inquiry. I was keen to "explore and seek" 
answers to substantive questions on the process of change 
and my prime concern was choosing a setting that had 
undertaken a major planned change programme. Another 
important consideration in the selection of the setting 
was the warning given by Bogdan and Taylor (op. cit.):
"For a number of reasons, we would recommend that 
researcher choose settings in which the subjects are 
stranger to them and in which they have no 
particular professional knowledge or expertise."
I regarded this advice very carefully because I was 
conscious that serious limitations could be imposed on me 
if I selected an organization in which my close relatives 
or friends or professional acquaintances worked. In the
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context of the culture of the Nepalese society, informal 
relationships are predominant and permeate all walks of 
social life; hence I realized that I should choose an 
organization where I would not be restricted by 
commitments to close family relationships or blinded by 
biases from friends. I wanted a free and frank exchange 
of opinions, feelings and experiences. An organization 
that was largely unfamiliar to me in terms of its 
history, objectives, structure, and activities was 
selected and whatever little that I knew about it could 
not help me to form an opinion or a bias.
I decided to conduct my research in the Nepal 
Electricity Authority (NEA) because it had been 
established four years earlier as the result of a major 
planned organizational change programme that involved the 
complete reorganization of the electricity industry in 
Nepal. The NEA was a state-owned enterprise with the 
highest capital investment of the government and was the 
largest employer among the public sector enterprises. Its 
future role in the overall economic development of Nepal 
was considered extremely important by the government and, 
in addition, the sale of electricity to the neighbouring 
states of India was regarded as a prime source of revenue 
for the country. The reorganization was envisaged as a 
movement in the right direction for improving the 
performance of the industry. However, the achievements, 
performance and results were controversial issues and 
opinions were widely divided after four years of
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operation. The government had formulated plans to execute 
more "reorganizations" of several other state-owned 
enterprises and create "authorities" but these plans were 
either shelved or postponed following the confusion and 
doubts in the creation of the NEA. The decision-makers 
were not very certain about the advantages of an 
authority or the radical institutional rearrangement of 
state-owned enterprises; and many civil servants regarded 
the reorganization of the electricity industry as a total 
fiasco. This disputable situation of an ambitious planned 
change prompted me to undertake an investigation in the 
NEA.
Another important consideration for selecting the 
electricity industry was that the organizational change 
seemed to be still "visible". The creation of the NEA 
itself was an outcome of the reorganization and various 
other aspects of the change could be distinctly 
identified and associated to the goals of the 
reorganization. I was able to recognize and locate 
organizations, groups and individuals who participated in 
the planning and implementation, and in the interactions 
and decision-making processes. The reorganization was 
initiated only four years prior to my study and was still 
"fresh" in the memory of the people. Moreover, the 
implementation of the changes related to the 
organizational design and the staff transfer continued 
much later after the validation of the NEA and I could
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focus my inquiry on changes that were undertaken fairly 
recently.
The availability of data related to the 
organizational change was an important reason for the 
choice of the NEA; and both primary and secondary data 
were easily accessible to me. The availability of 
secondary data was an important consideration in the 
context of Nepal because the documentation system in all 
government offices is very poor and efforts to recover 
old records and reports can be an impossible task. In the 
case of this reorganization, the involvement of the 
international lending agencies and expatriate management 
consultants ensured that documentation was well recorded 
by them and I was able to get hold of all the reports and 
documents. The primary data generated from interviews 
with people was not problematic because (as stated 
earlier) the events were fairly recent and not something 
that had faded in their memory. I was also fairly 
optimistic that people would be eager to talk to me and 
tell me their "stories” because the change was not only a 
controversial event but affected the careers of many who 
worked in the industry. Since several organizations took 
part in the reorganization, I was able to speak to a wide 
range of representatives and sources so that I could 
"triangulate" (Webb, et al. 1966) the data and develop 
an accurate picture of the change process by weaving 
together the information collected from them. The 
turnover of staff in the NEA in the past four years had
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been high because a large number of them managed to 
return to the ministry and a few resigned in the course 
of the change. These individuals were very helpful for 
generating and checking data because they had been 
members of the NEA for a long period of time and knew the 
details of the reorganization; they did not feel any 
restraint in talking freely as they were out of the NEA. 
I decided to talk to the individuals who were detached 
from the situation but who were still familiar with the 
events. A valid and an accurate interpretation of the 
change process was attempted by putting together pieces 
of data acquired from many sources.
I had no problem gaining access into the NEA once I 
proved to them that my research was purely academic and 
for a doctoral degree. I needed some evidence to reflect 
my goals and objectives and I turned to my employer for 
the introduction. Brown et al. (1976) explain such a
strategy to gain access:
"Access to research s e t t i n g  may often be solved by 
'engineering tricks', for example using a 
prestigious institution's stationary or working 
together with a trusted person who can guide you 
into the system."
As a member of the Staff College in Nepal, I asked my 
executive director to introduce me to the managing 
director of the NEA and request him to allow me to 
undertake a study of the reorganization of the 
electricity industry. My boss prepared a formal letter in 
which he introduced me, mentioned the topic of my
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research and stated the academic nature of my work. I 
might mention here that the Staff College as the training 
institution for civil servants and the public sector has 
a prestigious position and is treated favourably by 
governmental agencies. My first meeting with the NEA was 
with the managing director during which I explained to 
him the scope, purpose and method of my research. He was 
extremely supportive and allowed me to initiate the study 
at my convenience. In addition to the letter from my 
boss, I also carried an introductory letter from my 
academic supervisor which spelled out my research area 
and this evidence was very useful for gaining access to 
individuals and expatriates. I felt that my image as a 
researcher was enhanced as soon as I produced my 
supervisor's letter in the introductory phase of the 
interviews because of the goodwill and prestige attached 
to the academic institutions of the U.K. by the Nepalese. 
The expatriates, that is the management consultants to 
the NEA and the staff of the lending agencies, provided 
me access quite readily after I had produced the two 
introductory letters and described to them the nature of 
my research. The study required me to talk to several 
government ministries and agencies and I had to gain 
access to these settings and this again seemed a fairly 
easy process. I experienced an easy and quick acceptance 
because I was considered and treated as one of them, that 
is, an employee of the government and part of the 
"family", and not an "outsider". Their acceptance was 
particularly important for my research because I needed
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access to government decisions and documents which were
classified as confidential. Mutual trust between the
researcher and the researched seemed to prevail and this
is one of the essential elements of access in qualitative 
research.
My access within the NEA was facilitated by the
appointment of a liaison officer who assisted me in the 
introductions and arrangement of appointments with 
various staff members. He also supplied me with various 
written documents and files. He was extremely helpful in 
providing me an overview of the history of the 
electricity industry and the reorganization which 
enhanced my level of understanding of the NEA and 
prepared me for interviews with the others. Although I 
did make use of his assistance throughout the course of 
the research, I used him less and less to gain access to 
staff as I became more familiar with the NEA and its 
staff grew confident on seeing me around and came to know 
about my research. They did not mind me making direct 
contact as they preferred the informal way of going about 
things and setting dates, times and venues for our 
interviews.
Collection of Data
The principle of data collection was placed within 
the framework of the qualitative methodology. My
65
preference for a subjectivist view of social science and 
methodology initiated me to gain first hand knowledge of 
the social world by getting close to individuals and 
exploring their world along with them. I supported the 
phenomenologist perspective which seeks to yield 
descriptive data so as to see the world as the subjects 
in it see it, interpret it. I stated earlier that people 
act on the basis of meanings and interpretations of 
objects; and organizations can be explained in terms of 
human actions. The real life experiences of people can be 
understood in terms of meanings given by the individuals 
and a social phenomenon may be explicable from their 
perspective. Therefore, my investigation into social 
action and process tried to capture the positions 
maintained by the individuals; and data collection was 
along the line suggested by Blumer (1969):
"one would have to see the operating situation as 
the actor sees it, perceive objects as the actor 
perceives them, ascertain their meaning in terms of 
the meaning they have for the actor, and follow the 
actor's line of conduct as the actor organizes it - 
in short, one would have to take the role of the 
actor and see his world from his stand-point."
i. Depth Interviews
The descriptive data produced from the qualitative 
method consisted mainly of people's spoken words and 
interpretations of various incidents and events related 
to the reorganization. Bogdan and Taylor (op. cit.) 
describe qualitative data as "personal documents.... in
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which people reveal in their own words their view of 
their entire life, or a part of it, some other aspect 
about themselves". Primary data of this nature was 
collected by unstructured/depth interview. Jones (1985a) 
recommends depth interviews where people are allowed to 
express their views and explain their version of reality:
"to understand other persons* constructions of 
reality we would do well to ask them (rather than 
assume we can know merely by observing their overt 
behaviour) and to ask them in such a way that they 
can tell us in their terms (rather than those 
imposed rigidly and a priori by ourselves) and in a 
depth which addresses the rich context that is the 
substance of their meanings (rather than through 
isolated fragments squeezed onto a few lines of 
paper)."
Dexter (1970) acknowledges that an unstructured 
interview brings out the interviewee's definition of the 
situation, a description of the situation, and allows him 
or her to choose and introduce relevant issues rather 
than relying upon the interviewer's notion of relevance. 
My interest was to explore people's meanings and to 
understand how these meanings influenced their actions 
and interpersonal interactions. I was able to reconstruct 
their past interpretations and experiences from the data 
generated by these interviews.
Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that depth interview 
should be the choice when the interviewer "does not know 
what he or she doesn't know" and must, therefore, rely 
on the respondent to tell him or her. This quality of 
depth interview was particularly suited to my exploratory
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research because I wanted the respondents to explain the 
change process, how they created it and lived through it. 
On the basis of such data, I tried to locate a pattern or 
a perspective that could describe the phenomenon I was 
trying to study and guide my exploration. Therefore, a 
"grounded" understanding from data was possible when the 
depth interview was used.
The last consideration for using the depth interview 
was the historical nature of this research, that is, the 
study of an organizational change programme implemented 
several years earlier. There was no question of using the 
participant observation method although I accept it as a 
very useful tool for studying the process of change in 
which individuals, meanings, interactions, and 
construction of social reality can be closely examined, 
observed and interpreted. On the other hand, the depth 
interview as a joint exploration with people can 
contribute an accurate and a rich explanation of 
historical events and social process (as used by 
Pettigrew, 1985; and Berg, 197 9 to explore strategic 
change).
ii. Collecting Interview Data
The bulk of the data for this study came from depth 
interviews conducted with a total of sixty-three persons 
related to the reorganization in some way. These people 
represented a number of organizations but the majority of
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them were from the NEA because it had retained most of 
the staff from the previous autonomous units of the 
electricity industry. Senior civil servants from five 
government institutions were included in the interviews 
and so were representatives of the three "external" 
agencies. These were the two lending agencies, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank, and Coopers 
and Lybrand, the management consultants. Since the 
creation of the NEA was sponsored by the ADB, it played a 
significant role in the initiation, design, financing and 
implementation of the reorganization; and I arranged to 
travel to the bank's headquarter in Manila to talk to 
individuals who actively participated in it. Unlike the 
ADB, the World Bank has a local office in Kathmandu and I 
was able to interview the deputy representative. He had 
been in Nepal for a long period of time and was very 
familiar with the reorganization because he was 
responsible for the power sector on behalf of the bank. A 
staff member of Coopers and Lybrand had been assigned to 
the NEA in Kathmandu since 1984 and I had several 
interviews with him. I also spoke to a senior consultant 
in the London office of Coopers and Lybrand who had 
worked on the reorganization for sometime in Nepal. 
Lastly, I conducted interviews with several retired civil 
servants who had been associated with the electricity 
industry in the past and those members of the electricity 
industry who had retired after the establishment of the 
NEA. Altogether thirty-six persons from the NEA were 
interviewed and most of them were from the higher
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echelons. The senior management staff seem to dominate in 
the reorganization as they were directly involved in the 
decision-making and interactions. I spoke to several 
junior managers but they seemed to know very little 
because they were excluded from any kind of 
participation. Frequently they repeated the same story 
line that I had already heard from their superiors. A few 
middle level managers were interviewed because they were 
well "informed" about certain events or incidents.
The candidates who were interviewed emerged out of a 
gradual selection process as I moved along with the 
investigation and came to know more and more about the 
NEA. The first group of people were recommended by the 
liaison officer at my request because I wanted to talk to 
several staff who were closely associated and informed 
about the change programme. This was a starting point and 
the names of other staff for the next interviews were 
recommended by these interviewees. In addition, as I 
identified and understood the contents and details of the 
reorganization, I was able to relate events, decisions 
and outcomes to individuals who played principal roles 
and they were very important candidates for interviews.
All my respondents could be categorised into two 
general groups in accordance to the terms offered by Berg 
(op. cit.) but used in a slightly different sense by me. 
First, there were the "key actors" in the reorganization, 
that is, senior staff in the NEA, civil servants from
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government organizations, and representatives of external 
agencies. These individuals were active in the planning, 
interactions and decision-making of the reorganization 
and they were influential members in the change. All of 
them were interviewed because I felt it would be 
essential to learn their meanings, definitions and role 
in relation to the change. These key actors seem to 
operate as a tightly-knit group and other members of the 
staff were disallowed access. The second group consisted 
of "key informants", that is, people who were either 
recommended by the key actors or by the other staff in 
the NEA. The informants were usually members of the
electricity industry and they were well informed about 
the reorganization and the internal dynamics of the
industry. These members collected information through 
both formal and informal channels and much of it was done 
on personal initiative. I selected the informants on the 
basis of their familiarity with particular aspects of the 
change because none of them knew everything about the 
entire change programme. As the "key actors" and 
"informants" were interviewed, I started to put together 
the main elements of the reorganization and I stopped
further interviews only when I was able to draw a
complete picture and when I realized that the new data 
was repetitive and did not generate useful information or 
insights.
The field research was conducted in two stages - the 
first from November, 1988 to February, 1989 and the
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second from August to November, 1989. A "reflective” 
phase between the two stages was designed to assess the 
suitability and success of the methodology in the context 
of Nepal because I had a few doubts about people's 
reactions to depth interviews. As far as I was aware, 
this was not a very familiar method of research in Nepal 
and I was not sure how the respondents would react to it. 
The intermission was designed to study the data and
formulate strategies for the next phase of the research. 
The advantage of conducting the research in two phases
was that I could report back to my supervisor and share
my experiences and findings, clear doubts and 
difficulties, and identify particular areas for 
investigation for the second field visit. Most of the 
interviews in the first phase were conducted within the 
NEA to give me a fair idea of the complexities of the 
reorganization and to identify key individuals and 
institutions who had played an influential role. The
second phase of the research covered the external 
agencies and additional interviews were conducted with 
the key individuals in the industry to clarify and 
develop themes emerging from the data.
iii. Interview Procedure
Most of the interviewees were reached by me in 
person to arrange an interview and only in a few cases 
did I use a telephone to make the initial contact. On 
meeting the potential interviewees, I was able to explain
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the objective and purpose of the research, my 
professional background as an employee of the Staff 
College, the broad issues which could be touched upon 
during the interview, and, lastly, make arrangements for 
our meeting such as the date, time and venue. I always 
made a special request concerning the duration of the 
interview because I needed a fairly substantial length of 
time from them and I did not wish to be interrupted by 
other office business. The timing of the meeting was set 
according to the convenience of the interviewee. One of 
the questions that I was frequently asked at this stage 
was whether I could leave a copy of the questionnaire so 
that they could prepare for our meeting. Many of them 
were surprised when I explained the nature of my 
interviews and we generally agreed that issues related to 
the reorganization would be jointly explored by us. 
Interviews were also arranged with the people concerned 
in Manila and London through correspondence and telex 
before I travelled to see them.
At the time of the interview, the respondent was 
again briefly informed of my research interest and we 
jointly identified the subjects we could talk about. When 
I had a list of specific questions to be addressed to the 
interviewee either to clarify the confusion from our 
previous meeting or questions related to his role or 
decisions, I chose not to mention this in the early 
stages of the interview because I waited to see if the 
issues would be raised by the person himself. I did not
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wish to influence the opinion of the interviewee and I 
wanted to see if he would provide a different 
interpretation of the same issue. Before the interview 
began, I assured the respondent that I would maintain 
total confidentiality of his statements and comments if 
he so wished and my research was for an academic degree 
and not to be submitted to my employer or the management 
of the NEA.
The use of a tape recorder in the interviews was 
one of my prime worries because I was not sure how people 
would react to such a request especially as this would be 
a novel experience for majority of them. However, I did 
set out with the intention of recording all the 
interviews since it offered many advantages, as described 
by Lincoln and Guba (op. cit.):
"providing an unimpeachable data source; assuring 
completeness; providing the opportunity to review as 
often as necessary to assure that full understanding 
has been achieved; providing the opportunity for 
later review for nonverbal cues such as significant 
pause, raised voices, or emotional bursts; and 
providing material for joint interview training and 
reliability checks".
I always made a request to record each and every 
interview but the choice was always left to the 
interviewee without any pressure from my side. I 
explained to them why I was using it and most appreciated 
my position. The large number of interviewees who agreed 
to be recorded was far more than my expectation and I was 
able to record most of the "important" interviews. I
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experienced certain advantages of using a tape recorder 
during the interviews. I was more attentive to the 
conversation, able to hold eye contact and listen to what 
was said, make notes of issues that confused me or 
concepts that was repeatedly raised and, lastly, I was 
attentive to non-verbal gestures made by the interviewee 
that had relevance to the issues being discussed. 
However, a few interviewees frankly stated that the 
presence of a tape recorder would restrain them from 
speaking their minds and relating experiences freely and 
I would only get a "censored" version of their 
interpretation. In these circumstances, I appreciated 
their honesty and I decided not to use the tape recorder. 
We agreed that I could return for an another interview if 
I needed to clarify any of the issues we discussed or if 
I wanted to explore any other topic at a later stage. On 
the whole, I found a great deal of willingness to 
cooperate and assist me. For example, I had five to six 
hours of interviews with some of the key individuals who 
were very senior managers or civil servants and they 
obliged me by meeting several times, even during 
weekends.
The average length of each interview was about two 
hours; and few of the more "useful" ones took much longer 
and were conducted in several sessions. Almost all the 
interviews started off as a general discussion exploring 
the broad issues that the interviewee wanted to talk 
about. I proposed an issue only when the latter insisted
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that I kick off the discussion. I was always careful and 
attentive to the salient points of the data being 
presented by the interviewees and I made sure that I 
heard and understood what they were saying. Probing and 
sensitive questions and issues were usually kept aside 
for the latter part of the interview when both of us were 
more relaxed. I had to use my judgement to decide how far 
I could go with the discussion on a few of the sensitive 
issues and I relied a good deal on long interviews with 
key individuals. The story line articulated by each of 
them was compared and studied. The second and subsequent 
round of interviews with the key individuals were used to 
explore the conceptual themes that were emerging, and 
more interviews in the second field visit were used to 
develop an understanding of the theoretical concepts in 
relation to the change process. The purpose of the depth 
interview was more than the collection of general 
statements and opinions of the interviewees; it was a 
search for individuals' meanings. Berg (op. cit.) 
explains the objective of the "deep" interview:
"I see an interview in depth as addressing itself to 
a higher level of insight than an ordinary 
interview. To interview in depth accordingly means 
to go beyond the obvious, to explore the meaning of 
a statement (rather than to simply to record it), to 
look for patterns (consistencies and
inconsistencies) in what is said, etc. Thus, an 
interview in depth is more than a simple collection 
of data; it is also the simultaneous interpretation 
and validation of this data within the researcher's 
frame of reference."
Blumer (1969) makes a similar point when he recommends 
that researchers should uncover the reality of the
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natural world by getting "deep" into group life and by 
careful study. The interviews in this research were used 
to achieve such a goal.
iv. Written Documents
Different sources of secondary data, especially 
written documents, have been extensively used in this 
research to learn about the background of the electricity 
industry and to trace events, identify persons and 
analyse decisions and choices related to the 
reorganization. The study of documents has furnished 
essential information about the history, growth and 
development of the industry and seems to make my inquiry 
more sensitive in the collection of primary data by depth 
interviews. I shall briefly refer to the key documents 
used in this research. The files maintained by various 
ministries and government agencies on different decisions 
were a very significant source of information. I was 
allowed easy access to all files in the Ministry of Water 
Resources which kept records of cabinet and ministerial 
decisions on the reorganization. The secretary of the 
ministry was very supportive to my research and he 
directed the administration division to make the files 
available to me. The Public Services Commission 
maintained on file decisions on personnel matters and 
copies of correspondence with the NEA and I was allowed 
to study these documents. The power project documents of 
the lending agencies described the loans negotiated
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between the borrower and the banks and contained a 
separate section on organization and management of the 
electricity industry; these documents were made available 
to me by the two banks. The numerous volumes of the 
management consultancy report covering the institutional 
study of the electricity industry were a very rich 
sources of data for understanding the goals, objectives 
and contents of the "planned” reorganization. The report 
submitted by Coopers and Lybrand was specially relevant 
to this study because it was the "planned" organizational 
change, that is, the institutional arrangement envisaged 
for the NEA. My study attempted to explain the "how" and 
"why" of organizational change by relating the planned 
change to the "real" change processes initiated by the 
many interacting individuals.
The utility of the written document was enhanced by 
incorporating it to the information from depth interviews 
because the documents considered alone were only records 
of decisions and events and did not contain meanings and 
intentions of the individuals. The documents usually 
stated an outcome without adequate interpretation of the 
process which caused it to occur; and the interviews 
offered insights into actions. The practical limitations 
of written documents for the study of the politics of the 
decision-making process in government are recounted by 
Allison (1971):
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"Information about the details of differences in
perceptions and priorities within a government on a 
particular issue is rarely available. Accurate 
accounts of the bargaining that yielded a resolution 
of the issue are rarer still. Documents do not
capture this kind of information. What the documents 
do preserve tends to obscure, as much as to
enlighten. Thus the source of such information
should be the participants themselves...... What is
required is access, by an analyst attuned to the
players and interested in governmental politics, to 
a large number of participants in a decision before 
their memories fade or become too badly discolored."
Allison draws his methodological principle from
Neustadt*s (1960) political analysis of the American 
presidency and quotes him in his book:
"If I were forced to choose between the documents on 
the one hand, and late, limited, partial interviews 
with some of the principal participants on the 
other, I would be forced to discard the documents."
I have not rejected written documentation but tried to 
use it in conjunction with data acquired from depth 
interviews. The data obtained from these two sources have 
been optimally used in my analysis.
Analysis of Data
Data analysis involved the process of making sense 
of a large collection of recorded statements and written 
documents; the main goal of the analysis was "to 
understand the world of the research participants as they 
construct it" (Jones, 1985b). The analysis took place 
throughout the field research period and directed the 
process of data collection. A continuous and sequential
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analytical activity contributed a "set of tentative 
conclusions based on a running analysis of the field data 
instead of a mass of undigested fieldnotes" (Becker and 
Geer, 1982) . The two activities of research, that is, 
data collection and data analysis, were not treated as 
disconnected and sequentially-exclusive functions with 
the former preceding the latter; rather, overlapping was 
considered essential for the qualitative research I was 
undertaking. Data analysis enabled me to direct my 
inquiry from very broad issues to more specific questions 
related to the social process and actions and to concepts 
and constructs emerging from the data. Glaser and Strauss 
(op. cit.) state that by joining collection and analysis 
activities, the researcher is "tapping to the fullest 
extent the in vivo patterns of integration in the data 
itself; questions guide the collection of data to fill in 
gaps and to extend the theory". Miles and Huberman (1984) 
agree that the data collection is closely associated with 
three concurrent flows of analytical activities:
"...these three streams - data reduction, data 
display and conclusion drawing/verification - as 
interwoven before, during, and after data collection 
in parallel form, to make up the general domain
called analysis.......the three types of analysis
activity and the activity of data collection itself 
form an interactive, cyclical process. The 
researcher steadily moves among these four 'nodes' 
during data collection, then shuttles among 
reduction, display and conclusion
drawing/verification for the remainder of the 
study."
The interweaving between data collection and 
analysis activities in my study was well assisted by the
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execution of the field research in two stages (as stated 
earlier) ; the phase between the two stages was used to 
undertake a very detailed analysis of the data. I was 
able to leave the field and write a "memo” of my findings 
and ideas, and it was presented to my supervisor for his 
comments. This interaction not only contributed to the 
clarification of confusion and identification of 
conceptual themes but was an immensely useful exercise 
for subsequent data collection and analysis.
Transcripts were prepared from selected interviews 
which yielded useful information to my research questions 
and I ended up with 1200 pages. The key points were noted 
down from other interviews when I decided against writing 
a full transcript. I also prepared a file consisting of 
notes I made during the course of the interviews, such as 
my feelings and impressions at the end of interviews, the 
context of the interviews, any particular non-verbal 
reaction of the interviewees, issues to be further 
pursued, etc. This kind of information was useful as I 
started to become "immersed" in the data and when I 
wanted to reflect upon the contextual conditions of the 
interviews. In addition to the primary data, written 
documents from several sources were classified, filed and 
studied. The data analysis was concerned with drawing 
meanings from these extensive sources.
The process of data analysis I followed was 
generally in line with the "constant comparative method"
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developed by Glaser and Strauss (op. cit.) and 
operational refinements on it by Lincoln and Guba (op. 
cit.). Goetz and LeCompte (1981) describe the constant 
comparative method as a combination of inductive category 
coding with a simultaneous comparison of all social 
incidents:
"As social phenomena are recorded and classified, 
they are also compared across categories. Thus, the 
discovery of relationship, that is, hypothesis 
generation, begins with the analysis of initial 
observations, undergoes continuous refinement 
throughout the data collection and analysis process, 
and continuously feeds back into the process of 
category feeding. As events are constantly compared 
with previous events, new typological dimensions, as 
well as new relationships, may be discovered."
The initial step in my analysis was the identification of 
themes emerging from the data which illustrated and 
described the process of change. This required very 
careful repeated listening to the interview tapes, 
several reading of the transcripts, and close scrutiny of 
my notes on the interviews. Gradually "chunks of meaning" 
(Marshall, 1981) began to come out of the data which 
various qualitative researchers describe in different 
terms, for example "incidents", "unitizing", "themes". I 
searched for statements and phrases related to the 
process of reorganization and used my "tacit knowledge" 
to make a judgement on the selection. Four separate files 
were created early in the research to pay special 
attention to the four major planned changes which 
constituted the reorganization: the creation of a single 
authority, the enactment of new legislation, the
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organization structure of the new authority, and the 
staff transfer and adjustment. The themes related to the 
four changes were entered into index cards in the 
respondent's words as much as possible and additional 
codes were used in the cards to mark distinctions 
concerning interviewees, organizations, and sources. All 
the themes emerging from the data were written on the 
cards after making comparisons with previously noted 
themes and I was not too concerned about over-inclusion 
at this stage. A collection of themes was prepared for 
each of the four planned changes.
The next step was creating categories to bring 
together cards with similar content or cards that 
described similar properties of the change - "to devise 
rules that describe category properties and that can, 
ultimately, be used to justify the inclusion of each card 
that remains assigned to the category.... and to render 
the category set internally consistent" (Lincoln and 
Guba, op. cit.). Each and every card was compared and 
closely examined to make a decision on a new category or 
inclusion into an existing one. At times, the properties 
of a category had to be slightly redefined to incorporate 
the meanings generated by a new theme. There was a 
constant back and forth movement between themes and 
categories throughout the period of data collection and 
analysis. The categories were also repeatedly compared to 
check for overlapping or close relationship that could be 
integrated. A few remaining themes which conflicted or
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contradicted with the overall pattern of categories were 
set aside for interpretation for a later stage.
The final task was the integration and linking 
together of categories, that is, bringing together those 
with similar properties. Distinct parallels, regularities 
and patterns in the categories were searched and noted 
down and, at the same time, a few of the categories were 
screened because the supporting themes were inadequate or 
irrelevant to the subject of my study. On this basis, the 
central concepts on the change process were drawn up - 
these concepts were explicitly "grounded" on the 
categories emerging from the data. Finally, the concepts 
were interpreted and developed by relating them to the 
wider bodies of knowledge and theories in the literature.
•
Validity
The validity of findings in qualitative research 
still tend to be surrounded by controversy and one of the 
reasons may be that "there are no canons, decision rules, 
algorithms, or even any agreed-upon heuristic in 
qualitative research to indicate whether findings are 
valid and procedures robust" (Miles and Huberman, op. 
cit.). On the other hand, very often the validity of the 
findings of the qualitative method is unfairly criticised 
by using the criteria developed in the quantitative 
methodology. For example, the quantitative tradition
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usually regards it as extremely crucial to avoid
interview bias because this issue is tied up with the
question of reliability and replication. Jones (1985a) 
rejects such a criterion for qualitative research
because:
"the notion of some kind of impersonal machine line 
investigation is recognised as chimera. An interview 
is a complicated, shifting, social process occurring 
between two individual human beings which can be
never exactly replicated."
Lincoln and Guba (op. cit.) argue that replicability 
depends upon an assumption of "naive realism" because 
replication can only take place if there is something 
"tangible" and "unchanging" out there. However, "if the 
thing 'out there' is ephemeral and changing, noted 
instabilities cannot be simply charged off to the inquiry 
procedure; they are at least as much a function of what 
is being studied as of the process of studying". They
contend that repetitions cannot be applied to the same
units, just as "one can never cross the same river 
twice".
Shalin (1986) argues that the relationship between 
validity and reliability is that of "uncertainty", that
is, the two cannot be maximized simultaneously with
arbitrary precision:
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"Reliability, taken in its most common sense of 
reproducibility, is typically secured by the 
neutralization of the multiple determinations of 
things: the more thoroughly the thing is stripped of 
its multiple identities, the more reliably the 
measuring device yields the same result on
successive occasions. But the more reliable the
data, the less valid it is."
Shalin recommends commitment to validity as the basic
goal in research, as done by the interactionists.
Blumer (op. cit.) states that the empirical validity 
in social enquiry can only be achieved by meticulous
examination of the empirical social world and not by 
"adhering to scientific protocol, engaging in 
replication, testing hypotheses, and using operational 
procedure". Methodological schemes which can capture the 
reality that exists in the empirical world fulfil the 
test of validity. "Exploration" and "inspection" 
activities suggested by Blumer can contribute to an 
understanding of the empirical world and I have tried to 
incorporate the same principles in my method.
The validity of a social inquiry should be 
considered in different terms and not necessarily 
compared with approaches from other perspectives. Morgan 
(1983) suggests that different research perspectives make 
different kinds of knowledge claims with the result that 
criteria for what counts as significant knowledge should 
vary from perspective to perspective:
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"...it is not possible to judge the validity or 
contribution of different research perspectives in 
terms of the ground assumptions of any one set of 
perspectives, since the process is self-justifying. 
Hence the attempts in much social science debate to 
judge the utility of different research strategies 
in terms of universal criteria based on the 
importance of generalizability, predictability and 
control, explanation of variance, meaningful 
understanding, or whatever are inevitably flawed. 
These criteria inevitably favour research strategies 
consistent with the assumptions that generate such 
criteria as meaningful guide-lines for the 
evaluation of research. It is simply inadequate to 
attempt to justify a particular style of research in 
terms of assumptions that give rise to that style of 
research."
Lincoln and Guba (op. cit.) agree that the criteria 
defined from one perspective may not be appropriate for 
judging actions taken from another perspective and they 
propose a criteria that is more appropriate for 
qualitative research. They suggest various activities to 
increase the probability of credible findings, that is 
the internal validity, and I refer to several of these to 
address the validity of my research. For example, they 
propose "prolonged engagement" in the social setting and 
"persistent observation" which have both been important 
aspects of my inquiry in the process of trying to get 
"deep" into social actors and actions to interpret their 
empirical world. In addition, the technique of 
"triangulation" (Webb et al., 1966) was extensively used 
to collect data and to draw different perspectives and 
opinions on an issue from various sources (Denzin, 1970, 
1978; Halfpenny, 1979). Every change action/decision was 
explored from interpretations provided by the key 
individuals and informants; hence a "finding" was
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achieved "by seeing or hearing multiple instances of it 
from different sources, and by squaring the finding with 
others it needs to be squared with". Diesing (1972) 
proposes that "the validity of a piece of evidence can be 
assessed by comparing it with other kinds of evidence on 
the same point".
The case study method is often criticised on the 
grounds that it provides little basis for generalization, 
that is, the issue of external validity. The value of 
generalization can be measured in terms of support and 
confirmation with other theories according to Yin (1984). 
He differentiates between "statistical generalization" 
which is largely adopted by the quantitative researchers 
doing survey research and the "analytical generalization" 
of the case method; and argues that it is incorrect to 
apply the former concept on the latter. An investigator 
using the case method should "try to generalize findings 
to theory, analogous to the way a scientist generalizes 
from experimental results to theory". Berg (op. cit.) 
makes a similar argument on generalization:
"If similar observations are made by other 
researchers, there is a greater possibility that the 
objects of observation are not isolated phenomena, 
but apply to other organizations as well... The 
issues of validity and generalizations can therefore 
not be limited to this case, but must include other 
theories as well. As this study uses a wide variety 
of theories from different fields to support its 
findings, there seems to be some reason to assume 
that the findings can be of general value."
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The political analysis of the reorganization of the NEA 
and the key concepts related to the process of change 
confirm with the theories developed in the general 
literature.
Summary
The choice of methodology was related to ontological 
and epistemological considerations. An exploratory, 
qualitative method of research was selected so as to 
arrive at concepts and perspectives which could be
"grounded” on the data. The main technique for data
collection was the depth interview because it was suited 
to capture and interpret the empirical world of the




THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY AND THE PLANNED REORGANIZATION
This chapter will focus on the background of the 
electricity industry in Nepal - the development policies 
pursued by the government and the establishment of 
various autonomous bodies that comprised the 
institutional arrangement of the industry before the 
reorganization. The involvement of the two main lending 
agencies, viz. the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and The 
World Bank (WB) , in financing the development of the 
industry will be reviewed, including the new 
institutional arrangement advocated by them. The key 
contents of the planned reorganization in the form of 
recommendations of the expatriate management consultants 
will be summarised as these planned changes were accepted 
by the government and endorsed by the lending agencies. 
Finally the "real" outcomes of changes are briefly 
mentioned which will be further discussed and analyzed in 
the subsequent chapters.
A short introduction to the political and economic 
development of Nepal is included in the beginning of this 
chapter for two reasons: first, in order for the reader
to have some essential background knowledge of the 
country; second, the "macro" context in the country can
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be related to the events and practices in the electricity 
industry and hence may be relevant.
Nepal: An Introduction to Political and Economic
Development
Nepal lies between China to the north and India to 
the east, west and south and is therefore a landlocked 
country sandwiched between the two most populous nations 
of the world. The country covers 147,181 square 
kilometres of which 35 per cent lies in the mountains, 42 
per cent in the hills and 23 per cent in the plains. The 
physical structure is of great diversity - from the high, 
snowy peaks of the Himalayan mountain range, the land 
descends through the hills to the flat, sub-tropical 
plains of the Terai bordering India. Only 2 6 per cent of 
the country is cultivated and the remaining mountainous 
terrain has placed great constraints on national 
development. The data compiled by the government’s 
Central Bureau of Statistics on the demographic features 
of Nepal state that the national population was around 
17.6 million in the mid-eighties. There has been an 
increasing trend in the population growth rate which 
reached 3.2 percent during 1976 and 1981. Despite 
successive developmental plans and growing foreign 
assistance over the last three decades, Nepal remains one 
of the least developed countries in the world.
91
Nepal was isolated from the rest of the world until 
1951 when a popular revolution overthrew the autocratic 
rule of the Rana family and the monarch, King Tribhuvan, 
was installed in his rightful place. In 1846, Jung 
Bahadur Rana, a shrewed and skilful member of the noble 
family, plotted the murder of all his rivals in the 
evening and he became the prime minister and ruler of 
Nepal. His family retained control until 1951, running 
the kingdom as if it were a private estate whose 
functions and interests were to enlarge the family 
fortune. The Shah kings were left on the throne in order 
to give the regime legitimacy but they were heavily 
guarded and treated as "prisoners" in the royal palace. 
This Rana regime lasted over a hundred years because they 
were supported by the powerful presence of the British in 
neighbouring India. Nepal was in a kind of political 
dependency of Great Britain for nearly a century and this 
arrangement had benefits for the Britishers and for the 
Rana rulers of Nepal:
"The former were guarantied a self-manning buffer 
against possibly hostile powers to the north, a 
regular supply of soldiers form the hill regions of 
Nepal (the famous Gurkhas), a small but growing 
market for manufactured goods, and, probably even 
more important, a source of raw materials and 
primary products from Tibet and Nepal; the latter 
were guarantied a minimum of support and protection, 
and a degree of insulation from outside pressures 
for political change." (Seddon, et al., 1979)
The Rana regime had a devastating effect in the 
development of the country because the system of 
government functioned primarily for their personal
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benefits. Mihaly (1965) describes the nature of the 
political history under the Ranas:
"The family was concerned with profits. By 
maximizing government revenues and minimizing 
expenses, Rana prime ministers created surpluses 
which went into their personal accounts and financed 
palaces, enormous expeditions to Europe, and vast 
investments in India....In this very private 
enterprise state, the function of the civil service 
was to maintain the flow of revenues and to keep 
down costs. All decisions were made by members of 
the Rana family. Civil servants carried out orders 
and focused their attention on avoiding the most 
dangerous of all mistakes: misuse of funds.
Initiative and enterprise were not only unwarranted 
qualities; they were dangerous. The Rana civil 
service, staffed by nervous men terrified of 
decision-making, was one of the family* s most 
unfortunate legacies."
When India gained independence in 1947 from the 
British, the evident power of the ruling Indian Congress 
Party had major political repercussions within Nepal 
because the Nepali Congress Party was openly supported by 
the former and many of the party workers sought political 
asylum in India and operated from there. The Rana regime 
had always been dependent on British India and when the 
partition took place and India became independent, the 
basis for Rana rule was so seriously undermined that 
three years later they were removed from power in Nepal. 
Seddon et al. (op. cit.) explain the support from the new 
government of India for political changes in Nepal as 
motivated by the former's own self-interests:
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"..the new popular forces that came to power in 
India were suspicious of the autocratic regime to 
the north, much as they were of the princely states 
in India itself, and established links with the 
small, but rapidly frowning ’radical' movement 
within Nepal; at the same time, there was 
considerable concern at the possibility of violent 
upheaval in Nepal, in view of the growing strength 
of China and its supposed ambitions in Asia, 
particularly after 1949."
Between 1951 and 1960, Nepal experimented with a 
multi-party parliamentary form of government. The Interim 
Government Act of 1951 restored legal and constitutional 
powers to the king but the Ranas, though officially 
ousted from power, retained very considerable influence 
in the circles of government and in the army. In 1954, 
the king proclaimed that supreme rights in the 
legislative fields should be vested in him pending the 
drawing up of the constitution. The constitution of 1959 
allowed for a parliamentary system of government with 
residual and emergency powers vested on the king. During 
the decade, many political parties sprang up, many of 
them essentially based on the personal following of a 
particular political figure rather than popular 
movements.
The election in 1959 gave an overwhelming victory to 
the Nepali Congress Party winning 74 of the 109 seats and 
they formed the first popularly elected government in the 
history of Nepal. But the experiment with multi-party 
system was to last a very short time. Pradhan (1973) 
explains that the government that came to power in 1959 
tried to implement "radical" reforms that included
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designs to "modernise" the administration and to 
encourage economic and political development through 
popular participation. Its objectives included radical 
agrarian reform, a fully planned economy, the elimination 
of discrimination and privilege in recruitment to the 
civil service, the army, and in other walks of life, and 
the reorganization of the administration. These plans and 
programmes of the government were opposed by the eighteen 
royal appointees in the upper house. Furthermore, the 
intentions of the government aroused considerable fear 
among the nobility and other more conservative sections 
of the population, including the royal palace itself who 
all were keen to defend the traditional vested interests 
against the proposed changes. In December 1960, King 
Mahendra, with reference to article 55 of the 
Constitution, revoked the Constitution itself, dissolved 
parliament and the cabinet, suspended the fundamental 
rights and promised "to restore to Nepal a more suitable 
form of democracy based on traditional practices of the 
Nepalese people".
In 1962, King Mahendra instituted a partyless, 
"panchayat democracy" which provided the only way in 
which the majority of the Nepalese people could 
legitimately participate in political activities. The 
national assembly consisted of 140 members of which 120 
were directly elected from the seventy-five districts and 
the remaining twenty-eight were nominated by the king. 
The king also appointed the prime minister and the
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cabinet of ministers. The significant feature of the 
system was that the national assembly consisted of 
individuals representing personal interests rather than 
members of political organizations representing the 
interests of particular sections of the population.
All forms of political parties were officially 
banned from 1961 but they continued "to operate and have 
an influence on political life in Nepal; some, like the 
Nepali Congress Party and the Communist Party, continued 
to speak and act 'in the name of1 and 'on behalf of' the 
mass of the Nepalese people in opposition to the more 
conservative interests so powerfully represented in the 
government, state bureaucracy and other less formal 
groupings and institutions" (Seddon, 1987). Resistance to 
the political system was expressed now and again. King 
Birendra's government was pushed to hold a national 
referendum on the question of a possible return to multi­
party democracy at the beginning of 1980's when growing 
unrest among students, labour and the intelligentsia was 
supported by the banned political parties. A narrow 
majority of voters supported the panchayat democracy but 
45 per cent of the electorates also voted for the 
reintroduction of political parties and wanted change. 
Although the panchayat political system continued after 
the referendum with few changes, within less than a 
decade there was another popular uprising. In April 1990 
people throughout the country demanded the restoration of 
democracy. It was reported that as many as 300 hundred
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people died in ten weeks and hundreds more were injured. 
In the end, King Birendra repealed the ban on political 
parties and promised a new constitution and free 
elections. A new constitution was approved by the king in 
the latter half of 1990 and his future role was expected 
to be as constitutional monarch as in the UK. Since the 
general elections in May 1991 in which the old Nepali 
Congress Party secured the majority in parliament, Nepal 
has entered into a new political era in which the top 
priority of the government is facing the challenges of 
economic development of the country.
Blaikie, et al. (1980) state that the principal 
concern and priority of the panchayat political system 
was the control of political opposition to it. Various 
means were adopted by the government and the growth in 
the size of the bureaucracy was one of the successful 
strategies:
"Perhaps the most important of these has been the 
massive growth in the bureaucracy - in terms of 
number of employees - through expansion of the 
number of distinct departments and offices in 
Kathmandu in particular but also laterally in the 
Regions. This serves at the same time to absorb 
relatively well-educated and politically dissident 
young men; to ensure that promotion and advancement 
depend generally on the conformity as much as on the 
technical ability and merit; and also to be seen to 
provide, for the more dedicated and idealistic, some 
chance of influencing the future of their country, 
albeit within the strict limits imposed by the still 
highly personalized structure of the bureaucracy."
The same authors warn of a "crisis" that was looming over 
the country: crisis because of the state of
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underdevelopment and crisis because of the government's 
inability to change direction towards catastrophe in the 
previous twenty years. They warn that the country as a 
whole would collapse unless major social and economic 
changes were introduced "in the relations of production 
associated with the various forms of production that 
together constitute the economy" and a major shift in the 
distribution of power. The ruling class in Nepal was 
interpreted as doing a "tightrope act", confronted with a 
basic dilemma: "that of promoting the economic and social 
changes without which the country as a whole will 
collapse and bring about their downfall, while at the 
same time preserving the essentially non-progressive 
political structure in whose absence their own privileged 
position becomes rapidly threatened". The crisis of 
underdevelopment was largely blamed on the traditional 
vested interests of the dominant group in power (a 
continuation of the legacy of the Rana regime) , such as 
the elites, landlords, senior bureaucrats, aristocrats, 
etc. Seddon (op. cit.) refers to the strength of the 
conservative interests at the higher levels of the state 
bureaucracy which inhibited developmental initiatives in 
the country and encouraged only those forms of state 
intervention whose effect was "to further strengthen the 
more conservative vested interests in the wider Nepalese 
economy and society". He disagrees that the failure of 
the bureaucracy to implement policies conceived and 
developed at the highest level in an effective fashion
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could be explicable only in terms of administrative 
capacity and organizational structure.
The national crisis which had been building up can 
be expressed and explained in terms of records of past 
economic development. A United Nations (UN) report 
(ARTEP, 1974) opened up with a very gloomy picture of the 
country: "Nepal is poor and is daily becoming poorer".
Beenhakker (1973) states that during the years 1956 to 
1965, the national output grew at the average rate of 
about 2 per cent while the population growth tallied
about 2.5 per cent per year. In 1972, the OECD stated 
that the annual growth rate in per capita food production 
indicated that Nepal attained a zero rate of growth 
during the decade and this too in a country where 90 per 
cent of the population were dependent on subsistence
agriculture. The IBRD/IDA Bank Atlas of the WB 
illustrated a decline of GNP per capita of 0.1 in the 
1965-1973 period. In the 1970's, the UN classified Nepal 
as one of the world's "poorest twenty-five" countries. 
Seddon et al. (op. cit.) state that Nepal was not just a 
very poor country that was increasingly unable to provide 
adequately for its rapidly growing population because 
"that would be an over-simplification and in many
respects an understatement of the problems". They
describe the major components of the problems: 
"...serious over-population, ecological collapse in the 
densely populated and highly vulnerable hill areas (where 
30 per cent of the cultivable land supports some 60
99
percent of the population) , the elimination of certain 
important 'natural' resources (such as timber), and 
overall declining yields in agriculture...".
The situation had not improved in the 1980's. 
According to the World Development Report of the WB 
(1985), Nepal had a GNP per capita of US $ 160 which made 
it one of the poorest nations in the world. Between 1979 
and 1985, the agricultural sector consistently 
contributed 60 per cent of the national GDP according to 
the National Planning Commission (1985) and 
industrialisation was extremely slow in spite of the 
various policies introduced by the government. Over 90 
per cent of the labour force was engaged in subsistence 
agriculture (a proportion which declined by only 4 per 
cent since 1961) and agriculture products constituted 
more than 60 per cent of all exports and 82 per cent of 
total industrial raw materials. In 1983, 42.55 per cent
of the population lived below the poverty line. The poor 
performance of the economy was clearly reflected in the 
trade figures. Total exports were constantly offset by 
higher total imports and there was a trade deficit every 
year. India continued to be the main trading partner and 
half of the total trade was carried out with it. Thus 
there was a perpetual dependence on India for trade and 
for transit, virtually to the exclusion of any other 
country, and this served "to reinforce India's monopoly 
position in the Nepalese market and her ability to 
perpetuate that monopoly through international trade
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agreements which Nepal has little choice but to accept" 
(Seddon, et al.). The expiration of the bilateral trade 
and transit with India in March 1989 and the failure of 
the two governments to come to an agreement was a serious 
blow to the economy of Nepal. "Nepal's external trade was 
severely constrained, posing potential problems for 
economic growth and the pace of reform" (The World Bank, 
1989) .
The implication of underdevelopment and poor 
economic performance is that the Nepalese economy has 
been sustained for a long time by aid from donor 
countries and loans from developmental agencies. Gaige 
(1975) argues that aid in the past had been supportive to 
the prevailing political economy and kept the panchayat 
political system afloat:
"The financial support of the four major aid-giving 
nations (India, China, USA, USSR) has been 
accompanied by the rhetoric of change. However, 
their aid has assisted the monarchy both directly
and indirectly to create a better-equipped and 
better-trained army and to put a large number of 
potentially restive young men on the bureaucratic 
pay-rolls. It is true that aid-giving agencies of
several nations have pressed the king of reforms, 
but aid programs have been maintained despite the
continued absence of significant reforms because, 
for these reasons, change has a lower priority than 
maintenance of the status quo, which they all found 
to their advantage for different reasons. Thus, in 
the short run at any rate, foreign assistance has
enhanced the monarchy's chances of survival and has 
inhibited the growth pressures for fundamental 
changes."
Blaikie (1983) argues that "foreign aid has served 
to provide alternative sources of income for an ailing
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landed aristocracy and for the maintenance and
proliferation of the state apparatus..... it has failed
largely to provide a political opposition to the status 
quo. The inexorable and painful upheavals which would 
have occurred sooner without this source of economic 
support are thereby postponed and will take a different 
form than otherwise would have been the case without 
foreign aid". Aid was often secured by the government 
after presenting various development plans to the donors 
and lending agencies, but these plans failed to translate 
into effective action and implementation. Over the years, 
new plans representing new thinking in the government's 
social and economic policy were put forth but often these 
were only changes in rhetoric.
The budget speech of the Finance minister in the 
fiscal year 1986/87 stated that the scarcity of domestic 
resources was the main obstacle to the expansion of 
public sector investment. The total national expenditure 
was met by 47 per cent revenue, 11 per cent foreign 
grants, 21 per cent foreign aid loans and the balance was 
raised from domestic borrowing. In the fiscal year 
1987/88, an estimated 41 per cent of total national 
expenditure was derived from foreign sources.
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The Electricity Sector
Undeniably the mountainous physical feature of Nepal 
has been a constant source of hardship to the people and 
one of the main challenges in the development of the 
nation. Many generations of Nepalese have been carving 
out a living from agricultural activities on the rugged 
slopes of the hills and mountains. Transportation and 
communication facilities are still lacking in much of the 
hill areas and provisions of other forms of modern 
amenities have been extremely difficult in the absence of 
a proper transportation network. In addition to these 
geographical difficulties, the country lacks many of the 
natural resources (such as minerals, oil, forests, etc.) 
which can contribute to rapid development as in other 
developing countries. Ironically, the same steep slopes 
of the Himalayan mountains offer hope for the future 
development of the country. The altitude of the country 
drops from 29, 000 feet to sea level within a short 
distance of fifty/sixty miles and the torrents which 
cascade down the southern slopes of the Himalayas are a 
rich potential source of hydroelectricity. Many analysts 
believe that water is Nepal's only significant natural 
resource and electricity generation is the only hope for 
the modernisation of Nepal. The theoretical hydropower 
potential is estimated at 83,000 megawatts (MW) which is 
fairly widely distributed throughout the country. In 
1985, the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) estimated the 
economically exploitable power potential to be around
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25/000 MW. (The economically exploitable hydro potential 
is limited to the ideal potential of sites that can be 
developed at costs competitive with other sources and 
that have no unacceptable social or environmental 
impacts) . Out of this huge potential, only 160 MW was 
developed by 1987 and a further 78 MW was under 
construction.
In recent years, the government of Nepal has viewed 
the efficient exploitation of this enormous resource as 
one of the country's most important economic priorities. 
The government has recognized the need to substantially 
reduce the cost of imported fuels, improve the 
availability of power to the domestic market and export 
competitively priced hydropower to India. The export of 
hydropower to India represents Nepal's most attractive 
medium-term foreign exchange option. The prospects for a 
hydropower-led export strategy are particularly good 
since the government of India estimates of India's load 
growth call for an addition of more than 5000 MW capacity 
per annum in the foreseeable future. Moreover, few of 
the potential projects in Nepal are very big (3,000 MW or 
above) and would be suitable for developing large exports 
to India.
104
Development Policy on Electricity
The importance of the electricity sector for the
economic development of the country has been frequently
highlighted at various levels of the government in the 
past. At the highest level, the King has proclaimed that 
"if our water power resources could be harnessed to turn 
them into an economic blessing, it is our belief that the 
spring of national development would surely be released 
in the country". Similarly, the development of the 
electricity sector has been given high priority in the 
policies spelled out in the various plan documents. The
Third Plan (and the first by the Panchayat government) of
1965-1970 indicated such a realization among the 
planners:
"Power is a basic requirement in the economic 
development of any country. In Nepal, the 
hydroelectric power potential is immense because of 
the abundant water resources. However, the 
development to date is not satisfactory and serious 
thought has to be given to power development during 
the Third Plan period. Lack of adequate transport 
facilities, hydrological survey data and technicians 
cause many bottlenecks... To determine the demand of 
industrial concerns and households for power, a plan 
has been framed dividing the country in three broad 
sections."
A significant 15 per cent of the total budget of the plan 
outlay was allocated to the sector.
The Fourth Plan (1970-1975) continued to recognize 
electricity as essential for "industrialization, 
agricultural development and for the development of other
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sectors". The government was also informed that the total 
hydroelectricity potential was estimated at 80 million 
kilowatts and hence it was more concerned about 
harnessing this source of energy gradually. The following 
objectives were laid down in the plan:
"In Nepal the objectives of power development are to 
make power available for the development of the 
national economy by utilising the water resources; 
to make power available in urban and rural areas, 
thereby helping in the development of agriculture 
and industry; and to utilize water resources 
properly in order to increase national income."
An important policy in this plan was the extension of the 
electricity supply to cover more areas of the country. In 
a country where 96 per cent of the population inhabit the 
rural areas, rural electrification was considered
essential for improving the national economy. Therefore, 
a series of small hydro projects were commissioned during 
this plan.
The government remained committed to developing a 
basic strategy for exploiting the country*s huge
hydroelectric potential to supply its need for 
electricity during the Fifth Plan (1975-1980); and a 
large share of the planned capital investment was
directed towards this sector. Since the domestic demand 
was too small to allow economic development of large 
hydroelectric schemes, micro hydro and diesel 
installations or, along the border, imports of 
electricity from India were some of the strategies 
considered. The major objectives of power development in
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this plan were: (1) to further develop hydroelectric
resources to meet the increasing demand; (2) to extend 
electric services gradually to new areas; (3) to bring 
about regional balance in the production and distribution 
of electric power. Canada, under its programme of 
economic and technical assistance to Nepal, started to 
provide expertise for the government's Water and Power 
Resources Development Project. The goal of this 
assistance was mainly to devise an appropriate 
development policy and institutional framework to carry 
out systematic policy planning, and where possible, to 
assist in implementation.
The Sixth Plan (1980-1985) laid out similar 
development objectives as in the past but specially 
emphasised the conservation of natural resources and the 
development of water resources. The plan highlighted the 
government's policy of reversing the rapid deforestation 
process in the country which was caused by the use of 
firewood for energy consumption. Given the absence of 
other conventional indigenous energy resources, the plan 
recognized the need to develop the energy potential of 
the country's water resources. The main aims of 
electricity development under the plan were: (1) to
produce sufficient electric power to meet the growing 
demands of all sectors; (2) to increase the share of 
electricity in domestic energy consumption with a view to 
reducing the share of fuelwood and halting the depletion 
of forests; (3) to supply the amount of power required to
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electrify the transport system as a substitute for 
petroleum. The possibility of exporting surplus power to 
augment foreign exchange earnings was recognized for the 
first time in this plan. To ensure these goals, the 
planned development programme called for the 
establishment of: (1) a few medium-sized hydropower
plants (in the range of 20 to 150 MW) to increase the 
capacity of the expanding national grids; (2) numerous 
isolated mini-hydropower stations (ranging in capacity 
from 40 to 1, 000 kilowatts) to provide for the 
requirements of secondary towns, major markets and 
tourists centres in hill areas for which extension of the 
grid would be uneconomic; and (3) as a part of integrated 
rural development projects, a number of "micro" 
hydroelectric power plants (ranging in capacity from 20 
to 40 kilowatt) to supply rural settlements in hill areas 
which have specific potential for the economic use of 
power. The government was concerned about building up a 
suitable pipeline of hydropower projects for 
implementation before the turn of the century and several 
feasibility studies for the development of medium- and 
large-scale hydroelectric projects were undertaken with 
the assistance of foreign donors.
The most recent policy of the government on the 
electricity sector was broadly outlined in the Seventh 
Plan (1985-1990) . The plan called for the extension of 
electricity supply to rural areas, widening the coverage 
and distribution, and enhancing the reliability of
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electricity services. The main objectives for the power 
sector in the plan were: (1) to meet the increasing needs
of the different sections of the economy by generating 
power from indigenous water resources; (2) to conserve 
the ever decreasing forest areas; (3) to reduce the use 
of imported fuels by encouraging the different sections 
of the economy to use electricity more extensively; and 
(4) to expand electricity supply. Once again, the 
efficient exploitation of Nepal's hydroelectric potential 
was viewed by the government as one of Nepal' s most 
important economic priorities, that is, to improve the 
availability of power in the domestic market and to 
enable the export of competitively priced hydropower to 
India. The export of power to India was referred to as 
Nepal's "most promising long-term foreign exchange 
earning option".
Attributes of the Electricity Sector
The key selected facets of the electricity sector 
are described here to indicate the size, scope and 
characteristics of the sector leading to its 
reorganization in 1985. The institutional arrangement of 
the industry prior to the reorganization will be covered 
in the next section. The quantitative indicators used in 
this section have been largely quoted from the various 
reports of the lending agencies.
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i. Generation
The strategy of the government was to build hydro 
and diesel power stations mainly in the Central Region 
because of the concentration of major loads in the 
Kathmandu valley, the capital city. In 1984, the total 
firm capacity in Nepal was 133 MW, of which 115 MW was in 
the Central Region. Of the total 133 MW, hydro plant 
accounted for 111 MW, and diesel plant for 22 MW, with 
the largest hydro power station (60 MW) located at 
Kulekhani and the largest diesel power station (16 MW) 
located at Hetauda, both in the Central Region and in 
close vicinity of Kathmandu. All hydro plants were "run- 
of-river" types except Kulekhani which has a live storage 
capacity of 73.3 million cubic meters, a catchment area 
of 126 sq. km. and rated head of 550 meters. During the 
wet season Kulekhani was operated only during the peak 
time; and in the event of a shortage of energy caused by 
abnormal low river flows, the stored water in Kulekhani 
reservoir was regulated and use was made of the diesel 
plants. It was the policy of the government to resort to 
load shedding rather than operate the diesel units with 
the intention of minimizing expenditures on imported 
fuels. For example, in 1980/81, when there was major load 
shedding, diesel units were utilized very infrequently; 
their capacity factor (that is, the percentage of the 
time they were operating) was approximately 8.5 per cent 
and they accounted for approximately only 8 per cent of 
the total generation.
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There was a significant change in the plant mix by 
1987 because 58 per cent (107 MW) of the total hydro 
capacity was installed in the period from 1982 to 1987. 
The hydro proportion increased from 72 per cent in 1981 
to 87 per cent in 1987. It is worthy to note that the 
generating capacity was less than 5 MW in the early 
1960's.
ii. Transmission and Distribution
In 1984, the central grid system was confined to the 
Central and part of the Western Regions and consisted of 
239 kilometres (km) of 132 kilovolt (kV) lines and 227 km 
of 66 kV lines. The Eastern Region did not form part of 
the grid system and depended heavily on electricity 
imported from India. For example, in 1983 only 6 per cent 
of the electricity was generated within the region, with 
the remaining 94 per cent being imported from India. The 
isolated network in this region consisted of 188 km and 
76 km of 11 kV lines connected to small hydros, diesels 
and to supply points from India. The Mid and Far Western 
Regions consisted of 85 km of 33 kV and 52 km of 11 kV 
lines, also connected to small hydros, diesels and to 
supply points from India.
The government pursued a policy of extending the 
grid system to interconnect all the regions in the 
country. The Eastern Region was being interconnected
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through a 283 km of 132 kV line and the project was 
financed by the ADB. There were also plans to extend the 
grid westward by erecting 45 km of 132 kV line under 
French assistance, and 225 km of 132 kV line under an ADB 
loan.
For a long time during the late seventies the demand 
for electricity was constrained by inadequate generation 
capacity and, as a result, little attention was paid to 
the pressing need for rehabilitation and extension of 
distribution systems throughout the country. Almost all 
the distribution systems were heavily overloaded and in a 
run-down condition. A Japanese bilateral aided project 
was carried out in Kathmandu valley to install new 
transformers and meters and an estimated 182 circuit-km 
of 11 kV lines and 273 km of 400/230 voltage lines were 
built or renewed.
iii. Status of Supply and Access to Electricity
The electricity energy consumption was characterized 
by seasonal variations. Due to increased heating and 
lighting requirements in winter, the average monthly 
consumption in the Central Region, where domestic load 
was predominant, was more in winter than in summer. Of 
the total annual consumption, about 55 per cent was 
consumed during the winter months of December to May and 
about 45 per cent during the summer months of June to
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November. The maximum demand recorded in summer was about 
80 per cent of the maximum demand recorded in winter.
There were considerable variations in electricity 
consumption in different parts of the country. The total 
electricity generated in 1983 was 292 gigawatt - hours 
(Gwh) of which 27 9 was hydro, 5 Gwh diesel and 8 Gwh was 
generated from other plants; in addition, 63 Gwh was 
imported from India. About 98 per cent of hydro and 42
per cent of diesel energy was generated in the Central
Region. Energy sales totalled 232 Gwh and export to India 
was 6 Gwh. The Central Region which had about 33 per cent 
of the population, accounted for 72 per cent of
electricity consumption, while the Eastern, Western and 
the Far Western Regions, each of which accounted for 22 
per cent of the population, respectively consumed 16 per 
cent, 6 per cent and 3 per cent. Based on a population of 
15.4 (in 1984) million and assuming six persons per 
household, only 5 per cent of the population in Nepal had 
access to electricity according to the WB. The per capita 
production of electricity was about 16 kilo-watt hour 
(kWh) ; that compared to 164 kWh in India, 26 kWh in 
Bangladesh and 307 kWh in China.
The growth in the national electricity sales by
consumers was highest in the industrial sector, but the 
domestic sector accounted for the largest share of sales. 
The Eastern Region was an exception because there was 
significant agriculture based industrial activity in the
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Biratnagar town area and sales to the industrial sector 
accounted for more than 60 per cent of sales, compared 
with the national average of 33 per cent.
From 1978 the sale of electricity was suppressed 
because of systematic load shedding. The WB estimated 
that during the winter of 1981, when load shedding was at 
its highest, about 14 MW and 2 MW of load was shed during 
the peak time in the Central and Western Regions, 
respectively. Consequently, applications for new 
connections from customers were accumulating since load 
shedding was introduced in 1978. In 1984, there were 
about 20,000 applications pending, out of which 10,000 
were in the Western Region and 8, 000 in the Central 
Region.
iv. Rural Electrification
Rural electrification was one of the priority areas 
of the government because the majority of the population 
lived in the rural areas of the country. The five 
administrative regions consisted of 14 zones and 75 
districts and the towns and villages in the districts 
were grouped together into "town panchayat" or "village 
panchayat". In 1984, 39 district headquarters (52%), 28
town panchayats (97%) and 137 village panchayats (5%) 
were electrified. Out of a population of 15.4 million, 
1.77 million were living in electrified towns and
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villages. Over the next five years, the government 
planned to electrify an additional 21 district 
headquarters, one town panchayat and 241 village 
panchayats.
v. Mini-Hydropower Project
The government supported the construction of mini­
hydropower schemes to electrify district headquarters and 
other areas with the capacity to use electricity, to 
promote the expansion of cottage industries and 
employment opportunities, and to gradually substitute 
electricity for firewood. Mini-hydropower schemes were 
promoted in the hill villages because electrification was 
more difficult to achieve due to the terrain and because 
of the hardship faced by villages, particularly in the 
far western part of the country. The government planned 
the construction of 32 projects, eight of which were in 
operation by 1984 and eight more to be completed by 1987.
vi. Load Forecast and Planning for the Sector
The government was particularly concerned about the 
load forecast so as to plan for future generation and 
transmission. Four different forecasts were prepared 
between 1981 and 1983 (by the Electricity Department, the 
ADB, the WB, and the Water and Energy Resources
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Development Project (WERDP), sponsored by the Canadian 
government). In 1984, the ADB reviewed the figures 
presented by these four forecasts and fixed an upper 
bound and a lower bound to future load growth. They
expected the average rate of growth in energy generation 
over the next five years to be 13 per cent, declining to 
an average of 12 per cent over the next ten years as the 
system matured.
The Water and Energy Commission (WEC) under the MWR 
was responsible for investigating new hydro resources for 
the development of power. The WERDP, in association with 
the WEC, prepared a hydropower ranking study which
identified three or four schemes for detailed study and
this study was used by the government as the basis for a
coordinated approach to hydroelectric development.
vii. System Losses
The system losses can be treated as one of the 
salient features of the electricity sector in Nepal 
because the figure was exceptionally high and was the 
subject of repeated negotiations between the industry and 
the donors and lending agencies for many years. System 
losses were calculated as the difference between the 
amount of electricity generated in Nepal and imports from 
India and the total sales of electricity. Although the 
government initiated many programmes to reduce this
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figure, the system losses remained high. The government 
first addressed the problem of excessive system losses in 
the mid-1970,s when the British Electricity International 
recommended a comprehensive set of administrative and 
engineering measures; and an agreement was reached on 
reducing the losses with the ADB. Many years later in 
1984, another agreement was reached with the WB, under 
the Marsyangdi Hydroelectric Project, to reduce the 
losses from approximately 34 to 18 per cent by 1991.
The highest levels of losses were recorded in the 
Bagmati Zone (includes Kathmandu valley) which accounted 
for 56 per cent of all electricity sales in Nepal, and 
where losses were estimated to have reached 36 per cent 
in 1985. The losses were classified as technical and non­
technical. The principal cause of the technical losses 
was the "under-investment in medium- and low-voltage 
distribution lines resulting in overloading and poor 
voltage conditions" and the non-technical losses were due 
to pilferage, meter reading errors, and billing errors 
according to the ADB (1983).
viii. Power Exchange with India
The power exchange began in April 1954 when Nepal 
and India signed an agreement to supply up to 6.8 MW of 
power to Nepal for use in the Eastern Region. The 
exchange of electricity was arranged at fifteen locations
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on an ad hoc basis with the two Indian State Electricity 
Boards on the border, that is, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. 
There was no formal contract agreement covering areas 
such as form of delivery, continuity of power supply, 
damages, billing, provisions for resolving disputes and 
modifying tariffs, etc. In 1985 the price charged for 
each unit supplied had remained unchanged since 1971. The 
imports of energy from India far exceeded the exports. In 
1983, about 63 Gwh was imported, equivalent to about 22 
per cent of energy generated in Nepal. However, with the 
expansion of the 132 - kV system to the Eastern Region of 
Nepal and the availability of additional hydro energy 
resulting from the commissioning of several hydroelectric 
plants, a significant reduction in net imports from India 
was experienced from 1986.
Institutional Arrangement of the Electricity Sector
Electricity supply was introduced in Nepal in 1911 
with a 500 kW hydro power station built to supply a few 
selected consumers in Kathmandu, mainly the royal palace 
and members of the Rana prime minister's family. It was 
not until 1934 that this supply was augmented with a 640 
kW hydro station to meet the demands of the growing 
members of the aristocracy. The operation of this 
rudimentary system was undertaken by expatriates because 
there was no trained manpower in the country. It was only 
after the independence of the country in 1951 that the
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newly formed government took responsibility for the 
management of the electricity sector and electricity was 
supplied to the members of the public as well. For a long 
time, electricity supply was limited and concentrated 
only in Kathmandu valley, except in the industrial belt 
in the Eastern Region where the private sector set up a 
few small diesel generating stations to operate their 
industries.
The institutional arrangement of the electricity 
sector starting from the early seventies when the ADB 
emerged as one of the main investors and initiated steps 
towards changing the structure will be discussed here. 
The institutional responsibility for the electricity 
sector was spread over several entities including 
overseeing ministries and government agencies. The MWR 
formulated policies and held general responsibility for 
coordinating and supervising all public sector activities 
related to electricity supply. The minister of the MWR 
was also the chairman of the WEC, which included 
representatives of all the main ministries. The WEC*s 
responsibilities included investigation of national water 
and energy resources, studies of national water and 
energy requirements, conservation, development and 
utilization of water and energy resources, and the 
preparation and coordination of short- and long-term 
plans for water and energy development. In 1978, the WEC 
was supported by technical assistance provided by the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and, in
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1982, the Water and Energy Commission Secretariat was 
established as the technical arm of the WEC. The Ministry 
of Finance was responsible for coordinating and securing 
external sources of finance for development assistance in 
the industry; it was also interested in the financial 
implication of investment and financial operations of the 
electricity bodies. The National Planning Commission was 
responsible for national economic planning and reviewed 
the programmes and projects of the electricity sector, 
particularly in connection with the preparation of the 
national five-year development plans. The Public Services 
Commission (PSC) provided the guide-lines governing 
conditions of service (recruitment, promotion, 
disciplines, etc.) in government departments and SOE's.
The electricity industry was characterized by a 
group of isolated supply schemes and there were five main 
bodies responsible for the supply of electricity in Nepal 
by the mid-seventies:
i. The Electricity Department (ED) of the MWR;
ii. Nepal Electricity Corporation (NEC);
iii. Eastern Electricity Corporation (EEC);
iv. Butwal Power Company (BPC):
v. Several Development Boards.
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i. Electricity Department
The ED was established under the MWR in the early 
fifties soon after the government took over the 
management of the electricity sector. The ED undertook 
the supply of electricity to the central region which was 
the only network at that time; and it was also 
responsible for power development throughout the country. 
It planned and constructed new generation and 
transmission facilities and controlled a few privately- 
owned facilities such as the small Butwal Power Company.
In 1978, the ED was headed by a chief engineer (of a 
joint secretary level in the civil service) who was 
appointed by a cabinet committee of His Majesty's 
Government (HMG) and he was directly accountable for the 
work of his department to the secretary of MWR. The 
direct subordinates of the Chief Engineer were (refer 
Appendix 1):
Deputy Chief Engineer:
to whom all divisional heads reported;
Administrative Officer:
covered general administrative and personnel functions; 
Chief Accountant:
covered accounts, revenue and deposits, budgets and 
internal audit;
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Planning/ Design and Budgets Officer:
covered programming and design of electrical and 
mechanical aspects of construction projects, including 
budgetary provisions and reporting;
Investigations Officer:
covered civil engineering surveys and designs for hydro 
electric stations, including test drilling;
Procurement and Stores Officers;
covered the specifying and central procurement of most of 
the stores used by the ED, importing of goods, management 
of the central stores.
There were three regional superintending engineers 
(all located in the head office of the ED) who were 
responsible for the central, eastern and western regions 
of the country respectively. Their main responsibility 
was to cover the construction, operation and maintenance 
works in electricity supply installations in areas not 
covered by government corporations or developmental 
boards. Additionally there were sub-offices and depots at 
perhaps 20 or more locations in the different regions of 
the country, nearly all having engineering, accountancy 
and administrative functions, most of these being headed 
by an engineer entitled Divisional Engineer, or Sectional 
Engineer, or Project Engineer to whom the local staff 
(ranging from 20 to 60) reported. Management information 
in the form of monthly reports, was sent by the person in 
charge at each locality to senior functional officers of
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the ED at the head office; many of these reports were not 
channelled through the relevant regional superintending 
engineers to whom the local persons in charge were 
nominally responsible.
Although the ED was initially considerably involved 
in the supply of electricity, it curtailed this activity 
gradually over the years. The ED operated the Sunkoshi 
hydropower station with a capacity of 10 MW and other 
smaller government-owned facilities, and distributed 
electricity in western Nepal as well as in fifteen newly 
electrified towns in 1975. Outside the network supplied 
by the NEC, the ED extended supply to numerous townships 
through , the installation of mini-hydro plants and small 
diesel units, the extension of 33 kV transmission lines, 
and through exchange of power with India along the 
southern border. In 1978, the ED handed over the last of 
the facilities operated by it in the western, central and 
eastern regions to the NEC and EEC. By the early 
eighties, most of the supply of electricity in the 
national grid was handed over to the NEC, and the ED 
retained and operated a few projects in the mid and far 
western regions. It continued to be responsible for the 
planning and construction of generation and transmission 
projects, and the facilities constructed by it were 
transferred to a government corporation for commercial 
operation.
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In 1984, there were some 900 staff in the ED 
including 200 engineers of whom about 150 were on 
secondment to other organizations in the electricity 
sector, mostly in various development boards. All the 
employees of ED were civil servants, on a permanent or 
temporary basis, and the professionals (known as 
officers) were classified as gazetted and the clerical as 
non-gazetted.
ii. Nepal Electricity Corporation
The NEC was established in August, 1962 under the 
NEC Act because it was increasingly difficult to 
undertake the commercial and selling functions of 
electricity in the northern part of the Central Region 
under the rules and regulations guiding the ED. Hence a 
primary reason for the establishment of the NEC was to 
free the management of the supply system from the 
constraints characteristic of government bureaucracy. As 
a separate public entity, the NEC was expected to be more 
flexible in the operation and maintenance of electrical 
services to the various types of consumers. As a 
corporate, self-governing body, it was able to receive, 
possess and transfer movable and immovable property, 
issue bonds and debentures, and accept loans and subsidy 
grants.
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The key responsibilities of the NEC in accordance to 
its charter were:
(a). to generate and distribute electricity in a secured, 
efficient, economic and orderly fashion, in the areas 
approved by HMG/Nepal;
(b) . to endeavour to develop the electricity distribution 
system in a way that might yield greater benefit to its 
consumers at a reasonable price;
(c). to promote the generation and distribution of 
electricity with a view to fostering industrial 
development and economic welfare of the people;
(d). to determine and realise the prices, charges and 
other dues for electricity services.
The NEC operated and maintained power stations, 
transmission lines and other facilities transferred to 
its ownership by the ED on agreed valuation. However, it 
had very little contact with the ED during planning, 
design and construction of new works even though the 
facilities were subsequently transferred to it for 
operation and maintenance. It also financed, designed and 
constructed modest reinforcements to its distribution 
network and extended supplies to new consumers; and 
handled relations with its consumers and with consumer 
representative bodies such as the local municipalities.
The NEC as a government-owned SOE was sponsored by 
the MWR and was headed by a civil servant executive
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chairman who was the chairman of the board of directors 
and also the general manager. The executive chairman was 
appointed by the government and was usually selected 
amongst the senior civil servants of the MWR or the ED. 
The board consisted of other five members appointed by 
the government, of which four were civil servants and one 
a representative of the Kathmandu City Council. The chief 
engineer and another staff member of the ED were included 
as members of the board. No internal staff of the NEC 
were eligible to be appointed as members of the board 
because they were not civil servants. A senior staff 
member of the NEC was appointed as the general manager in 
1981 but he was not included in the board and the 
chairmanship was retained by the secretary of the MWR.
The organization design of NEC consisted of four 
departments and the following senior management staff of 
the corporation were directly accountable to the 
executive chairman:
Manager - Transmission and Distribution Department: 
covered construction of transmission and distribution 
system, and maintenance of these systems;
Manager - Planning and Generation Department:
covered generation operations, system control, planning
of transmission and distribution systems.
Manager - Administrative and Commercial Department: 
covered general administration, personnel, materials* 
procurement, and commercial functions.
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Manager - Finance and Economic Analysis Department; 
covered accounts division, revenue division, and internal 
audit.
There were four branch offices which controlled 
operations outside Kathmandu. An organization chart is 
illustrated in Appendix 2. There were no detailed and up- 
to-date job descriptions for the staff.
By 1979, the NEC was the largest and most developed 
electricity supply scheme in the country. Power was 
supplied by five hydropower and four diesel power 
stations with a total installed capacity of 35 MW and 3.7 
MW, respectively. The transmission was at four voltage 
levels: 132 kV, 66 kV, 33 kV and 11 kV, with a total line 
length of about 450 kilometres. Later on, the NEC took 
over the operations in the remaining part of the central 
region and in some parts of the western regions. In 1981, 
the Butwal Power Company in western Nepal was merged 
into the NEC by the government and a year later the 
Eastern Electricity Corporation was also merged. 
Consequently, the NEC represented the largest electricity 
supply network in the country covering all of the central 
and eastern regions and most of the western regions. It 
had a total staff of 3,155 in 1983 of whom 58 were 
qualified engineers.
The performance of the NEC was of special importance 
because it not only represented the largest supply system
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but it was the main source of revenue for the sector 
(through the sale of electricity). An examination of a 
few of the operating results of the NEC from 1979 to 1983 
(during which negotiations were conducted with the 
lending agencies on the reorganization) reveal the 
depressed financial results. The system losses in the 
five years ranged between 28 to 32 per cent and there was 
no significant improvement in spite of various programmes 
initiated. The NEC sustained an operating loss in 1979 
and earned rate of returns of 3.5, 1.1, 0.2, and 1.5
percent during 1980 to 1983 respectively. The improvement 
in 1980 was a result of the discontinuity of the royalty 
surcharge by the government and a 30 per cent tariff 
increase. In spite of these poor operating results, the 
NEC's finance was still manageable because it had very 
little debt, a volume of cash flow just sufficient to 
finance modest distribution expansion, and no call on 
earnings to finance generation and transmission plants. 
The addition of generation and transmission plants was 
provided through bilateral grants and when the assets 
were transferred to NEC, they were recorded as equity. 
However, this began to change in the early 1980's when 
the capital expansion financed by credits and loans were 
gradually transferred to it for operation. The proportion 
of debt began to rise sharply.
The NEC, like many other state-owned enterprises in 
Nepal, was created to allow more autonomy of decision­
making and operations than was possible within a
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government department. But in practice, it was subject to 
influence or regulation by a number of agencies of the 
civil service such as the Ministry of Finance, National 
Planning Commission, PSC, etc. and, in addition, control 
and domination by the MWR and ED in the composition of 
the board and daily operation. Very few engineers from 
the NEC were taken on in secondment to work on 
construction projects. When major electricity facilities 
were handed over to the NEC, a few gazetted ED engineers 
were seconded to the NEC for a short transitional period 
and only the non-gazetted ED project staff were 
permanently transferred. The civil servants preferred to 
stay in the ED where there were more construction 
activities and other attractions.
iii. Eastern Electricity Corporation
The EEC was established by the government in 1974 
under the NEC Act to take over small private entities in 
the eastern part of the country and to manage the eastern 
Nepal power system. This small system consisted of a 33 
kV supply system around the industrial town of Biratnagar 
and three diesel plants with an installed capacity of 3.7 
MW and a mini-hydro plant with an installed capacity of 
240 kW. It mainly distributed electricity imported from 
India, with its own diesel plants maintained mostly on a 
standby basis. In 1978, the EEC supplied a total of 18.5 
GWh of electricity to 9,594 consumers and 64 per cent of
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the total sales was consumed by 356 industrial clients. 
The EEC area included a major industrial centre of the 
country and more than 50 per cent of the industrial 
demand was accounted for by two jute mills. Similar to 
the pattern in the Central Region, 75 per cent of the 
domestic customers consumed less than 100 kWH a month.
The EEC was headed by a board of directors with a 
part-time chairman from the ED (usually of an under 
secretary level). The chairman combined this job with 
that of superintending engineer for the Eastern Region 
and he was stationed in Kathmandu. The NEC owned 25 per 
cent equity of the EEC and the general manager was a NEC 
staff on secondment and was included as a member of the 
board of directors. The other board members were the 
local representative of the National Planning Commission, 
the HMG Factory Inspector for the region, and 
representatives of the town council and the NEC.
There were four divisions in the EEC: 
Administration, Procurement and Stores; Finance; Planning 
and Design; and Generation, System Operation and 
Maintenance; (the organization chart is included in 
Appendix 3) . In May 1980, the EEC had a total staff of 
441, of whom only eleven were qualified engineers, the 
rest being technical and clerical staff. Although the 
EEC, like the NEC, was involved in the sale of 
electricity and was expected to generate revenue, its 
performance remained poor from the very start,
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deteriorating between 1976 and 1980 because of: (i) the
transfer of areas formerly administered by the ED (which 
were all operating at a loss) being handed over to the 
EEC in 1977; (ii) increased use of standby diesel 
generation as a result of frequent power supply 
interruption from the power station in India; (iii) the 
poor condition of the distribution system. As stated 
earlier, the EEC was merged into the NEC by the 
government in June 1982.
iv. Butwal Power Company
The BPC was an isolated, very small supply system in 
the Western Region with an installed capacity of 550 kW 
(run-off-river type). The government owned almost half of 
the equity and the chief engineer of the ED was the * 
chairman of the company. The NEC also had a nominal 
shareholding in the BPC. The supply system covered only 
six square miles and was operated by a total staff of 28. 
Due to its size, it was managed without a formal 
subordinate structure. An engineer supervised the 
operation as the manager of the BPC; and it was merged 
into the NEC in 1981.
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v. Development Boards
The government on occasions started to set up 
autonomous development boards under the Development 
Boards Act to execute the construction of large projects 
in the mid-seventies. The largest construction works 
authorised in the electricity sector were managed by an 
autonomous ad-hoc development board set up under statue 
for that purpose; the board members being politicians and 
civil servants (including representatives from the ED and 
NEC) , the project-in-charge being a board member and 
secretary to the board on secondment from the ED, and the 
rest of the staff being civil servants on secondment or 
recruited by the board. The board was conferred certain 
powers and duties upon it by the Act, and one of its 
initial tasks was to draft proposals for bye-laws and 
regulations which were necessary to enable it to fulfil 
its functions. The construction of some of the small 
power stations was managed by a statutory development 
board with an ED staff member as the chairman and 
representatives from other ministries, the preparatory 
survey and design work having been carried out by the ED. 
A few development projects were also set up under the 
direct management of the donor countries which were 
financing the project, for example, the Gandak Hydro- 
Electric Station built by India.
The Small Hydel Development Board (which looked 
after all mini-hydropower projects in the kingdom) was
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one of the first boards to be set up to construct mini­
hydropower projects in the hills in November 197 6. Later 
on, it was also made responsible for the operation of 
mini-power plants in the hill areas. The Transmission 
Development Board (which looked after the French-financed 
section of the ADB's fourth power project) was 
established to construct large transmission lines. 
Similarly, various development boards were created for 
the construction of large generation projects, for 
example, the Kulekhani Development Board and the 
Marsyangdi Development Board. The members of these boards 
included the minister of the MWR and civil servants from 
various ministries, as well as the secretary of the MWR 
and the chief engineer of the ED. The project managers of 
the boards were senior engineers seconded from the ED, 
they were paid by the boards, were accountable to them 
and were also members and secretaries of the boards. 
Other staff were mostly seconded from the ED (but very 
few from the NEC) . The seconded staff were attached to 
the professional staff of the expatriate consultants and 
contractors for the projects. The development boards 
generally relied heavily on expatriate experts to 
supervise the execution of projects, considering the lack 
of experience of the Nepalese with large projects. The 
chiefs of both the ED and NEC and their supporting staff 
held no executive authority in relation to these 
projects.
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Relationship Between the Electricity Supply Bodies and 
the Government
The various bodies (a government department and 
state-owned enterprises) that constituted the electricity 
industry were closely linked with the government because 
their participation and performance were constantly
influenced by the numerous government agencies. The ED 
was part of the civil service bureaucracy and its 
operation was guided by various rules and regulations of 
the civil service even though it was undertaking
activities related to a public utility. The NEC (now
merged with the EEC and BPC) belonged to the universe of 
state-owned enterprises operating in the country and 
hence was placed within the network of established
relationships for similar bodies. These two principal
entities were related to other government agencies but 
there were marked differences in some of the key
operational areas, especially related to personnel, 
organization and finance.
i. Remuneration
The Pay Commission which was attached to the
Ministry of Finance was the body responsible for
recommending to the Cabinet Secretariat the range of pay 
scales which should be applied to the main range of civil 
service posts, from that of ministerial secretary to the
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lowest job of an office peon. All staff of the ED adhered 
to the salary scale prescribed by the government and 
there was no flexibility to change these rules 
whatsoever. Even when they were seconded to the projects 
and their work involved more risks and responsibilities, 
they still earned the same salary. The only monetary 
incentives provided were the various allowances.
The remuneration scale in SOE's was determined by 
the respective board of directors in consultation with 
the PSC. The government initially allowed the salary 
scale of the SOE's to be higher than that of the civil 
service because it accepted that there were differences 
in their nature of work and responsibilities. The salary 
scale of SOE's was allowed to be adjusted to some extent 
in accordance to the revenue generation and income of the 
individual enterprise - the NEC at one time fixed the 
salary scale of the top management grossly in excess of 
civil service rates. The policy of the government changed 
during the late seventies and the PSC recommended that 
salaries in SOE's should not differ from those in the 
civil service by more than 5 to 15 per cent. The reasons 
advanced for this move were that there would be 
difficulty in attracting the best qualified recruits to 
the civil service and that established civil servants 
would resign if differential in salary became too great. 
This policy was changed again in the mid eighties and the 
salary scale in the civil service and SOE's was kept at
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par to avoid any kind of differences in the two public 
services.
ii. Personnel Procedures
The key body which influenced the appointments, 
promotion, transfer and dismissal of civil servants of 
all grades was the PSC. Under the constitution of the 
country, the PSC was to be consulted on all key matters 
related to personnel, such as legal matters relating to 
conditions of civil service, general principles on 
appointments and promotions, suitability of candidates 
for transfer or promotion from one category to another 
category of civil service, and on matters related to 
departmental punishments for gazetted civil servants.
The recruitment of engineers for the ED was done by 
the PSC and usually there was a representative of the ED 
in the interviewing panel. All recruitment of 
professionals was done at the officer grade which was the 
only entry point. Above this grade, appointments to under 
and joint secretary posts were done by promotion from 
within the civil service and the PSC recommended such 
promotions after reviewing the records of the candidates. 
The promotion committee was chaired by the chairman of 
the PSC. The most senior posts in the civil service were 
called the "selection grades" and for these, the 
promotion committee selected a panel of candidates who 
were referred to the cabinet for final selection. The
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final selection was normally done on the basis of 
confidential consultation between the royal palace and 
the government.
The PSC was not involved in the selection of board
members or staff of SOE's. The chairman of the
electricity enterprise (always a civil servant) was
appointed by a special committee of the cabinet and the
chairman, in turn, was consulted on the appointment of 
other board members. The PSC also laid down compulsory 
guide-lines for the selection, appointment and promotion 
of staff and determined the appropriate salary range to 
be applied to each post. These guide-lines included 
technical qualifications, work experience, age, 
confidential management assessment, etc. and specified a 
mandatory point system for assessment. The SOE's were 
monitored periodically by the staff of the PSC to ensure 
that they were following these guide-lines. The chairman 
of an SOE was empowered to select staff for appointment 
and to promote the regular employees. In the NEC, a 
Promotion and Appointment Committee headed by the 
chairman carried out these tasks.
iii. Structure and Staffing
The Administrative Management Department of the 
government was responsible for authorising and 
determining the structure and staffing of all units of
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the civil service (including the ED). They carried out 
organization and management studies, approved the 
creation of new posts, designed staff trees, wrote job 
descriptions and determined the appropriate levels of pay 
within the pay scales approved by the Pay Commission. The 
recommendations of the Administrative Management 
Department were sent to the Ministry of Finance for 
approval prior to their being released to the department 
being studied. Approved posts were then filled using the 
channels of the PSC. Therefore, applications for 
establishing new units in the ED or the staffing of the 
development boards or for re-arranging ED divisions using 
additional staff, were first placed before a special 
committee which comprised the Secretary of MWR, a 
representative of the Administrative Management 
Department and a representative of Ministry of Finance. 
After the committee supported the application, it was 
sent formally to the Administrative Management Department 
for further examination and approval.
Under the Nepal Electricity Corporation Act, the NEC 
and EEC were self-governing bodies and they could 
formulate and determine their own plans and decide what 
resources, including manpower, they required. Thus they 
were free to decide what their own forms of organization 
and their staffing levels should be. However, as stated 
earlier, they had to follow the non-discretionary guide­
lines prescribed by the PSC on staffing.
138
iv. Finance and Work Planning:
The revenue earned from the sale of electricity by 
the ED was transferred to the Ministry of Finance, while 
finance for capital expenditure and expenditure on 
operation and maintenance was obtained by the annual 
budget procedure. The ED submitted to the National 
Planning Commission its proposal for the work to be 
carried out in the next fiscal year together with an 
estimated budget. Budgetary provisions which were then 
approved as being consistent with the national plan were 
submitted to the Ministry of Finance jointly by the MWR 
and the Planning Commission. The budget which was finally 
agreed was debated by the parliament in the mid-year 
budget sessions. Finance for foreign aided projects was 
channelled through the Foreign Aid Division of the 
Ministry of Finance but was released through the 
Comptroller-General1s Division. The various development 
boards followed the same procedures as the ED for 
approval of their work plans and budgets. However, to 
avoid the delay and cumbersome procedures of the 
bureaucracy, the foreign aid agencies frequently paid the 
contractors directly, on behalf of the development board.
The NEC planned and constructed only transmission 
and distribution reinforcements and supplies to new 
consumers. The NEC's board was authorised to determine 
the nature and level of resources needed for both 
construction and operational works, plan their work, and
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settle their budgets financed out of revenue subject to 
the approval of its parent ministry, the MWR. The NPC was 
informed of NEC's plans so that these could be included 
in the national plan.
Participation of the Lending Agencies
i. Lending Activities
Nepal's electric power system began to expand 
significantly in 1977 as a result of the government's 
decision to increase substantially its capital investment 
in the electricity sector and this development 
necessitated substantial external financial and technical 
assistance. The cost of building power infrastructure in 
Nepal has been high, due to the remoteness of the 
country, its difficult terrain and geological conditions, 
poor communications network, scattered load centres and 
lengthy high voltage transmission lines relative to the 
size of the loads. In addition, the unit size of plants 
has been relatively small, about 30 to 70 MW, and thus 
Nepal has not been able to achieve economies of scale. In 
spite of these difficulties, the government decided that 
the efficient development of power infrastructure was one 
of the nation's most important economic priorities. This 
required a major effort in mobilizing both foreign 
exchange and local funds.
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The development of the electricity sector has been 
financed largely through concessional external aid made 
available to the government. The funds have been "relent” 
to the NEC at rates of interest ranging from 8.5 to 12 
per cent or provided as grants in the form of government 
equity. Bilateral donors have included Canada, China, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, India, Japan, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia; the main multilateral sources were the ADB 
and the WB (IDA). An analysis of sources of finances for 
the development of the sector conducted by the WB (for 
the period 1981-1985) showed that long-term foreign loans 
covered 49 per cent of the capital requirements, foreign 
exchange grants provided 34 per cent, and government 
equity contributions 13 per cent, while net internal cash 
generation only contributed 4 per cent. The annual public 
sector capital expenditure in the electricity sector for 
the same period (the total cumulative expenditure) 
amounted to US $ 145 million and accounted for 9 per cent 
of the government's annual developmental expenditures, 
according to the WB. In the early 1980's, investment 
resources were concentrated on building new hydropower 
stations to overcome the chronic power shortages on high 
voltage transmission facilities. Investment in 
distribution facilities was badly neglected, causing them 
to be generally overloaded. This was one of the major 
causes for the continuing unsatisfactory levels of system 
losses.
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The main source of funds has been the loans arranged 
with the two lending agencies, the ADB and WB - the ADB 
mainly financing the construction of the transmission and 
distribution network, and the WB providing investment for 
the development of generation projects. In addition, the 
two banks have mobilized international finance for large 
development projects and they also acted as the executing 
agency for donors, aid agencies and other lenders. For 
example, they acted as executing agency in various United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-financed projects 
such as feasibility studies, engineering consultancy, 
etc.
The lending programme of the ADB in the electricity 
sector was initiated in 1972 when the government 
approached the bank for a US $2.7 million loan to finance 
the construction of a 132 kV power transmission line to 
link the Gandak Power Station to the central Nepal power 
system. Additional loans from the ADB were taken in the 
subsequent years as the government initiated various 
projects for extending the distribution of electricity to 
different regions of the country, as stipulated in the 
different national plans (discussed earlier). Between 
1979 and 1984, the ADB approved and sanctioned four more 
power projects proposed by the government and by the end 
of 1986 it had provided eight loans for seven projects 
for a total amount of US $103.4 million. Three of these 
projects were completed by 1984 and all of them were 
associated with the expansion of the transmission and
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distribution system comprising 132 kV line connecting 
major cities into the national network and associated 
sub-transmission and distribution work. All the major 
projects related to the expansion of the transmission and 
distribution system have been financed by the ADB since 
its participation in the electricity sector.
The WB*s involvement in the electricity sector began 
in 1978 when it provided a loan of US $40.8 million for 
the construction of the Kulekhani Hydroelectric Power 
Project (60 MW) . The total project cost was US $120 
million and the financing was arranged through a group of 
co-lenders consisting of the World Bank (IDA), Overseas 
Economic Cooperation Fund (Japan), Kuwait Fund, OPEC, 
EEC, and the UNDP. This was the largest project 
undertaken in Nepal at that time and it approximately 
doubled the generating capacity in the country. The 
second loan from the WB was approved in 1984 when it 
agreed to a US $107 million investment to finance the 
construction of the Marsyangdi Hydroelectric Power 
Project. This was a run-of-river hydroelectric power 
project, with an installed capacity of 69 MW, located on 
the Marsyangdi River. The WB was expected to play an 
equally influential role in the future expansion of the 
industry when the government planned to go for larger 
generation projects so as to be able to export surplus 
power to India. The WB was capable of mobilizing 
international resources and meeting the future investment 
requirements of large projects.
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ii. Reorganization Initiatives
The issue of the reorganization of the electricity 
industry was raised by the ADB mission team which came to 
appraise the loan requested by the government for 
financing the construction of a 132 kV power transmission 
line to link Gandak Power Station to the central Nepal 
power system (the second power project) in 1975. The ADB 
team agreed that the initial organization of the 
electricity sector in which a government department (the 
ED) was responsible for the development and operation of 
electricity supply facilities was adequate as the system 
was very small. The team also appreciated that the 
establishment of the NEC in the early 1960's was a 
recognition by the government of the growing size of the 
central system. However, the electricity sector in 
central Nepal was still rapidly growing and required 
substantial investment in the future and, therefore, the 
ADB team envisaged that a further "reorganization” was 
essential and appropriate. It was indicated to the team 
by the officials in the ED that considerations were being 
given to the possibility of converting the ED into a 
separate SOE retaining the same planning and construction 
responsibilities, but acting as the bulk producer and 
seller of electricity to the other SOE's, namely the NEC, 
EEC, or other SOE's that might be set up in the future. 
The other SOE's were to serve as retailers or 
distribution utilities. The ADB team's main concern was 
that all the bodies involved in the electricity sector
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should operate in accordance with "sound utility
practices". This was not possible in the case of the ED, 
a government department, and the team explicitly 
mentioned this point in their report (ADB, 1975) :
"The ED is sound on technical matters and its staff 
is able to conceive new projects, supervise 
construction works and to manage its limited 
operation and maintenance obligations. As a 
government department, its financial management 
practices, however, are poor. They consist of 
accounting for revenue derived from sales, which is 
transferred directly to the Ministry of Finance, 
while operation and maintenance expenditures are 
governed by yearly budget procedures. ED does not 
have a proper framework for financial and managerial 
planning of long-term operational development of the 
country's power sector."
The ADB was concerned about the accounting system of 
the ED even for their first loan in 1973 and they
provided the services of a financial expert to make
changes. This assistance only achieved limited results
because it was neither able to introduce a financial 
planning and control system nor could a financial
management system be organized as envisaged under the 
expert's terms of reference. Therefore, during the 
appraisal of the loan for the second project, the team 
stated that they saw very little scope for any form of 
similar technical assistance before the completion of a 
"thorough study of the institutional arrangements of the 
power sector".
An agreement was reached between the ADB and the 
government of Nepal that the implications of the various
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alternatives should be carefully examined before 
embarking on any reorganization of the electricity 
sector. Hence an "institutional study" was expected to 
determine the most appropriate institutional basis for 
the operation and future expansion of the system as a 
whole from the stand-point of giving the sector and the 
entity or entities running it the necessary 
"responsibility" and "autonomy" in the conduct of 
operations in accordance with "sound public utility 
practices". The ADB agreed to provide a technical 
assistance grant for the study at the recommendation of 
the appraisal team because they argued that the study had 
an "institution-building" character; this implied that 
there was no financial liability on the part of the 
government of Nepal.
The institutional study was to be undertaken in two 
phases and it was planned that two consulting firms would 
assist and provide guidance to the government: an
engineering consulting firm with special experience in 
institutional matters, and a consulting firm with special 
experience in accounting matters and financial 
management. The relationship of both firms was to be 
predominantly with the ED which was to be the executing 
agency for the studies. In the first phase, an 
institutional/management expert was to review the 
existing organization, propose the most suitable future 
organization and develop a comprehensive implementation 
scheme for the establishment of the organizational set up
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to be selected by the government. He would also advise on 
improvement of the NEC's existing organization and 
financial management. At the same time, a distribution 
system engineering expert was to analyze the causes of 
losses in electricity production and prepare a programme 
aimed at reducing the losses. During the second phase of 
the institutional study, experts in the field of power 
facility valuation and accounting/financial experts were 
to prepare the required managerial and financial 
framework. The experts would assist the government in the 
identification and valuation of all fixed assets, and 
develop an appropriate commercial accounting system for 
the entity or entities to be established as a result of 
the first phase. In addition, the financial expert was to 
assist in the preparation of staff training and manuals, 
and if required, participate in the initial 
implementation of system and procedures proposed.
The first phase of the institutional study was 
expected to have produced draft recommendations by the 
end of 1976 and based on these being accepted by the 
government, a detailed plan and timetable for their 
implementation was to be developed. The first phase was 
expected to be completed by the end of 1977. The second 
phase was to be initiated as soon as it was clear as to 
what kind of organization was likely to be adopted and it 
was expected to be completed within one year. The entire 
institutional study and the change was targeted to be 
complete by mid-1978.
147
The first phase of the institutional study was 
conducted by British Electricity International (BEI) in 
accordance with the terms of reference agreed between the 
ADB and the government. However, the terms of reference 
for the second phase of the study was redefined during 
the appraisal of the fourth power project by the ADB (in 
1980) because the ED proposed a counter recommendation 
which called for the creation of two utilities (against 
the one utility proposal of BEI). According to the 
agreement finally reached, the consultants were hired for 
the second phase of the institutional study "to assist in 
implementing the reorganization" of the electricity 
sector and their work was to be carried out in three 
stages:
Stage I: Initial institutional and organizational review
( 6 - 8  weeks);
Stage II: Organizational design (6 months);
Stage III: Development and implementation.
The organizational review was to involve a detailed
examination of the existing institutional relationships 
in the electricity industry and the options for
organization structure and its various functions. This
review was to include options for the institutional 
framework; objectives and statutory responsibilities for 
the proposed authority or authorities; formal 
institutional relationship and interaction with other
government agencies; and options for the organization
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structure of the proposed arrangements. The design stage 
of the study was to involve detailed design of 
organizational and manpower requirements, assessment of 
financial routines and future requirements, detailed 
examination of financial and management information 
requirements and outlines of systems and procedures for 
personnel administration, financial administration and 
operation and maintenance and material control. Following 
discussion on the reports of the second stage, work was 
to begin on the development and implementation of the 
agreed proposals, culminating in the founding of the new 
institutional body. The second phase of the institutional 
study was undertaken by Coopers and Lybrand (C&L) of the 
UK.
The WB as the other leading lending agency was not 
directly involved in any of the initiatives undertaken by 
the ADB towards the financing of the institutional study 
or in interactions with the consultants. However, the WB 
was fully informed about the actions of the ADB and they 
came forward to support the latter's initiative during 
the financing of the Marsyangdi Hydroelectric Power 
Project in 1984. At that stage, the government had 
already made commitments on the reorganization but the 
implementation was progressing very slowly and behind 
schedule. The actions initiated by the WB supported and 
expedited the reorganization process.
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Planned Changes of the Consultants
i. British Electricity International
BEI completed their study in October, 1978 and 
submitted their proposals for the reorganization of the 
electricity sector. They identified various deficiencies 
in the institutional structure, namely: (a) there was a
multiplicity of fragmented bodies responsible for the
planning, construction and operation of a relatively 
small power supply scheme; (b) excessive time and effort 
were needed to coordinate activities, and often there was 
a lack of coordination; (c) engineers were frequently 
switched from job to job and their experience was, 
therefore, not properly utilized; (d) operational
experience was not sufficiently utilized for new
constructions; (e) there was no overall manpower 
planning; and (f) long-term system planning was limited, 
resulting in inadequate overall long-term financial 
planning in the ED, NEC and EEC. Other deficiencies 
identified by BEI in the institutional arrangement 
included: inadequate scope for career development at the 
senior management level because of limited responsibility 
of the various individual bodies; lengthy delays in
decision-making and project implementation because of 
confused lines of communications; and restricted
capability of the individual bodies to mobilize domestic 
financial resources for the development of the system
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because of their individual lack of financial 
accountability.
BEI weighed the merits and demerits of a structure 
which would comprise two public enterprises, one being an 
electricity generating corporation, and the other a
corporation engaged in the transmission, distribution and 
marketing of electricity. They assessed the possibility 
of ED retaining responsibility solely for the 
construction of the generating stations, with a national 
electricity corporation having the duties of operating
all completed electricity producing and distributing 
facilities, extending the distribution network, and 
marketing electricity. They concluded that any of the 
forms of organization considered above or others not 
mentioned by them, could be operated in the industry; but 
"taking fully into account the Nepalese environment", 
they recommended that a single body in the form of a
state-owned enterprise (SOE) should be established to
perform the functions throughout the whole country which 
was being carried out by a multiplicity of bodies. They 
argued that the tasks assigned to the ED, NEC, EEC and 
three Development Boards were, when combined, of a 
magnitude and complexity which would enable them to be 
carried out under a single management building upon the 
expertise gained so far.
The proposed SOE (referred to as the Electricity 
Authority by BEI) was to be developed initially within
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the NEC Act of 1962 and was to be headed by a board of 
not less than four, and not more than eight members, of 
whom one was to be appointed as the Executive Chairman 
and one as Deputy Chairman/Chief General Manager. BEI 
recommended that the board should be encouraged to adopt 
a reasonably commercial attitude towards its operation; 
and if civil servants were appointed to the board, they 
should resign from the civil service. They suggested that 
it would be an advantage to the government if the 
executive chairman was not a civil servant because a 
high-calibre person from outside the ranks of the civil 
service could adopt a "healthily independent commercial 
and autonomous attitude" when presenting the views of his 
board to high-ranking civil servants.
An organization structure with a central head office 
in Kathmandu and four regional offices to manage the 
activities in the development regions of the country was 
proposed:
"The tasks and staff of the Authority should be 
divided into two echelons, namely, a Head Office 
echelon and a Regional echelon. The Head Office 
echelon at Kathmandu should be structured to sub­
divide the principal tasks of the proposed authority 
into expert functional departments, each headed by a 
chief Chief Functional Officer, directly accountable 
to the Deputy Chairman/Chief General Manager. The 
Regional echelon should comprise four regional 
offices, each headed by a regional general manager, 
and each having three sections covering the 
engineering, accountancy and commercial
functions Relationships (between key officers)
should be governed by a formal description of 
working inter-relationships."
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The management structure of the Authority was to 
incorporate management control and systems which would 
permit greater delegation of authority, and would place a 
level of responsible management close to the consumer. 
The growing number of tasks of the Authority were to be 
broken down into more specialist sub-divisions, so that 
each sector would receive more concentrated attention. In 
addition, it was recommended that "the structure, with 
its lines of policy formation and lines of command, must 
be well defined, so that managers can operate with 
confidence within its framework. Responsibilities to be 
attached to individual management posts must be stated, 
and delegated authority be quantified, where possible, to 
promote personal accountability".
BEI highlighted the advantages of a single authority 
for the employees, the government of Nepal, and for 
electricity consumers. The top management would consist 
of a body of persons trained and experienced in all 
aspects of electricity supply, committed to a career in 
Nepalfs most capital-intensive industry, and with a high 
level of specialist expertise. The top management group 
would acquire that "faculty of collective judgement which 
is developed by a team of senior managers who have become 
accustomed to working together under a single leadership 
towards common objectives". The staff of the Authority 
would have a more "rational" job structure on which to 
build a career, with functional expertise or general 
management paths to follow. They would have a permanent
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and experienced management to guide them and assess their 
progress, and a greater choice of locality in which to 
live and work. The government would benefit because many 
tasks of coordination would be transferred from the civil 
service to the Authority's internal management channels 
where "choices of action could more readily be assessed, 
and optimal decisions be made more readily". For example, 
when seeking to make commercial agreements with the 
government of India, the government could draw on the 
appropriate expertise which an all-purpose Authority 
would have developed in the fields of economic analysis, 
purchasing and technological negotiations. The 
international aid and lending agencies would benefit 
because their projects would be handled by an Authority 
with continuity of service in top management. The 
consumers of electricity would benefit in that the 
regional general managers and their staff would have 
delegated power to make decisions locally, and would be 
backed by a high-calibre central management team. The 
local situation would be reported to the head office on a 
detailed and regular basis.
BEI finally proposed the establishment of a Working 
Party to lead the process of reorganization. The Working 
Party would comprise the heads of all the concerned 
existing bodies in the sector and the designated key 
personnel of the Authority; and their main task would be 
to prepare proposals and a detailed programming for the 
re-structuring:
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"The proposals should include method and time of 
making appointments to the top management posts in 
order that the top managers can influence the 
selection of their direct subordinates. The 
programme should allow for determining and execution 
of necessary legal provisions/ the method of 
determining remuneration of senior management posts, 
the initial allocation of premises, equipment and 
other resources. The responsibilities to be 
transferred at all levels should be stated, and 
recommendations should be made as to which posts in 
the new structure would be personally accountable 
for the work involved in an orderly transition to 
the new structure."
ii. Coopers and Lybrand
The consultants from C&L initially undertook an 
institutional review which involved a detailed 
examination and an analysis of the existing institutions 
and their functions, following which they submitted their 
recommendation for a new institutional framework. After 
the governments decision on the reorganization and 
creation of a single authority, C&L developed a detailed 
organizational design and various management systems to 
implement the Authority. The key aspects of their planned 
changes and prescriptions will be discussed here.
C&L examined the strengths and weaknesses of five 
main options as regards the future structure of the 
sector:
(a) a "minimum change" option essentially preserving the 
current organization but with some tidying up;
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(b) a "zonal" option in which some electricity supply 
functions (including distribution) were, so far as 
possible, handed over to the local municipalities;
(c) a "one body" structure with one operational body 
responsible for construction, generation, transmission 
and customer service (but the government responsible for 
certain key policy decisions);
(d) a "two body" structure with two utilities, one for 
generation and transmission, the other for distribution 
and customer service (again with the government 
responsible for certain key policy decisions);
(e) a "hybrid" structure with one board controlling two 
operational bodies.
They recommended a "hybrid" structure - the creation of a 
Nepal National Electricity Board with wide powers over 
planning, disbursement and monitoring of aid/lending 
agency funds and all staff; supported by two executive 
arms, one for generation and transmission, the Nepal 
Electricity Generation and Transmission Agency (NEGA) and 
the other for distribution and customer services, the 
Nepal Electricity Distribution and Customer Service 
Agency (NEDA) (refer to Appendix 4). A single controlling 
board with final responsibility for "good management" of 
the sector was proposed because C&L argued that two 
totally independent public utilities with separate 
controlling boards would not in practice be able to 
coordinate their activities properly. Similarly, with a 
single board, resource allocation decisions and planning
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could be carried out in the interests of the sector as a 
whole. The separation of the two activities was also 
justified because they argued that management and work 
involved in constructing major power stations was clearly 
different from what was involved in the day-to-day 
running of a distribution system. The tasks of designing 
and building power stations and of constructing and 
operating the transmission system were essentially 
carried out at a national level, whereas the work of 
distribution and customer services needed to be organized 
on a geographical basis and the management needed to get 
closer to the public.
Since the board was the principal policy making 
body, C&L suggested various recommendations concerning 
its membership. The chairman was to play a key role in 
maintaining the board's independence as well as providing 
a "strong and distinguished leadership" in giving a 
"dynamic and commercial thrust" to the public industry's 
work. Therefore, they suggested that the chairman should 
be appropriately appointed by the King to reflect the 
vital importance of the sector to the country and to give 
the highest status to the new public corporation. The 
other members suggested for the board were the chief 
executives of the two agencies, the secretaries of the 
ministries of Water Resources and Finance and possibly 
the National Planning Commission, and a maximum of three 
members chosen for their commercial experience and to 
represent customer interest.
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Only the key functional activities to be undertaken 
by the two agencies were identified at this stage and the 
task of preparing detailed organization designs were kept 
for stage two of their consultancy assignment. Three 
divisions were recommended for the NEGA: project design 
and development; construction and operations; services 
and administration. As for organizing the activities of 
the NEDA on a geographical basis, C&L preferred to treat 
the three Western Developmental Regions as one area, the 
Kathmandu valley as a second, the Eastern Region as a 
third, and the rest of the Central Region as a fourth. 
All these recommendations were at a very rudimentary 
stage because they were to be further developed after the 
government's decision on the institutional arrangement.
The second and third stages of the institutional 
study developed specific recommendations for the 
implementation of the organizational design of the Nepal 
Electricity Authority (NEA). C&L's starting point was the 
structure for the NEA outlined in the Memorandum of 
Understanding signed by the government and the ADB on 19 
November, 1982. Their main areas of concern were: the new 
legislation required for the establishment of the NEA; 
the internal organizational structure of the directorates 
in the NEA (including job descriptions for the key 
posts); administrative and personnel systems (including 
arrangements for staff transfer); design of financial 
planning and accounting system for the NEA; and 
inspection and revaluation of the main fixed assets which
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the NEA was to take over from the existing bodies. The 
last two changes have not been analysed in this study 
because they consisted of introducing commercial 
accounting in place of government accounting in units 
operated by the ED and preparing consolidated balance 
sheets for the entire sector. These activities proceeded 
smoothly because it was widely recognized that the
accounting system for the NEA needed to be developed
along commercial principles (as in the NEC) and these 
changes did not affect the majority of staff. 
Furthermore, the new accounting system was to be
introduced over a period of several years and the staff 
were more concerned about changes that affected their 
immediate interest and positions.
(a) Legislation
The main features of the legislation can be 
classified under four sections: responsibilities and
powers of the NEA and powers reserved to HMG; composition 
of the board of the NEA; financial arrangements for the 
NEA; and other matters. The principal objective of C&L 
was to operate the Authority as a "commercial" public 
utility and this was clearly expressed in two sections of 
the legislation, viz. the division of responsibilities 
and powers between the NEA and HMG, and the composition 
of the board.
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C&L attempted to spell out a clear framework for the 
relationship between HMG and the NEA in the draft 
legislation. First, it laid down the NEA's functional 
responsibility for providing a supply of electricity to 
those consumers who were willing to meet the costs 
involved, or in respect of whose consumption HMG wished 
to make special funds available. Second, it imposed on 
the NEA the requirement to report regularly to HMG on key 
aspects of its actual performance and future plans, so 
that both could be viewed in the light of the country*s 
overall development effort. At the same time, it made 
clear that the prime responsibility for electricity 
supply placed on the NEA implied a considerable measure 
of independence in planning and controlling its own 
operation. Third, it reserved certain powers to HMG, 
specifically including power to approve (but not to 
formulate) the NEA's broad strategy, its foreign 
borrowing and its tariff proposals, as well as power to 
appoint or to dismiss the members of the board. More 
generally, the ultimate power to issue directives to the 
NEA was reserved for HMG, but the legislation also 
provided that the commercial implications of such 
directives for the NEA's performance was made public.
The legislation attempted to set out as precisely as 
possible those powers which were reserved to HMG and it 
empowered HMG to issue directives in the following 
areas:
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- to operate any service or to perform any function, with 
or without prescribing any particular area;
to stop performing any function performed by the 
Authority in any particular area, or to make any changes 
therein, or to discontinue it entirely; or
- to refrain from doing anything which the Authority was 
about to do.
C&L generally agreed that such a range of power should be 
exercised by HMG but they also anticipated that such 
power might be used to direct the Authority to do
something which was "commercially unprofitable". 
Therefore, they suggested two balancing safeguards:
the full terms of any HMG directives should be 
published in the Nepal Gazette;
- the board should have the right to pass a resolution 
communicating to HMG its view that a directive was
contrary to the Authority's commercial interest, giving 
an estimate of the extra costs involved . The board 
should also have the right to ensure that the text of
such a resolution be made public through its
incorporation in the Authority's annual report.
C&L recommended a board consisting of about eleven 
members including:
- a chairman, on a part-time basis and supported by a 
full-time vice-chairman;
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four directors responsible for: generation and
transmission, distribution and customer services, rural 
electrification, and planning and finance; and 
- other members determined by HMG.
They considered the appointment of chairman and vice- 
chairman as "crucial" and hence made the following 
recommendations:
"We recognise that on the basis of past practice HMG 
might well appoint as chairman a current minister or 
secretary - almost on an ex-officio basis. We doubt 
that this could lead to the separation of powers 
which we consider to be important and the draft 
legislation we propose specifically excludes serving 
ministers or civil servants. We recommend that the 
chairman should be a distinguished, independent 
figure; perhaps a former army officer, former 
ambassador or former businessman. The key thing is 
that the chairman should maintain the organization's 
independence and provide strong and distinguished 
leadership in giving a dynamic and commercial thrust 
to the public industry's work."
Even when C&L were informed that the minister of the MWR 
himself wished to be the chairman of the board, they 
expressed a strong "preference" for their proposal and 
did not change their recommendation. However, they 
concluded by stating that the alternative preferred by 
the government was "workable as well".
Since the vice-chairman would be responsible for the 
day-to-day management of the NEA, C&L suggested that the 
designated person should have the demonstrated ability to 
manage and develop a large organization. They preferred 
the candidate's experiences to extend outside the 
government and they stated that some knowledge of
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technical matters was desirable. However, it was "not 
essential that the post be filled by an engineer” since 
adequate technical advice would be available from
subordinates. The recommendation on choice of other board 
members was as follows:
"Some will be appointed to represent particular
interests but if civil servants are appointed great 
care will be needed to avoid giving the impression 
that the board is or should function as a civil
service committee. Members from outside the 
government will need to represent such interests as 
industrial and commercial customers, and they will 
also need to bring to the Authority broader
experience, particularly of the private sector.”
(b) Organization Structure
C&L's recommendations included the design of the 
organization structure down to the second tier 
management, lower level organization design for the 
Distribution and Customer Services and Rural 
Electrification directorates, allocation of functions 
between the directorates, job descriptions for top posts, 
and the positions and grading throughout the 
organization.
The structure of the NEA involved four directorates 
responsible for generation and transmission; distribution 
and customer services; rural electrification; and 
planning, evaluation and finance; and a Secretariat 
reporting to the vice-chairman. Appendix 5 shows the
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"first tier" organization structure. The Secretariat was 
a small unit reporting directly to the vice-chairman and 
working for all the board members. It was responsible for 
the inter-related functions of providing various services 
for the board, such as ensuring that the powers given by 
the legislation to the board were exercised and delegated 
legally and providing legal and related administrative 
services. The Planning Evaluation and Finance Directorate 
(PEF) was essentially a corporate planning and resource 
allocation unit; it was given the responsibility of 
developing the planning, finance and accounting, and 
personnel management functions which were considered 
"weak areas" in the old set up. The Generation and 
Transmission Directorate (G&T) was responsible for the 
technical work of project preparation, construction of 
major hydropower projects and of the high voltage 
transmission system, operation and maintenance of
completed power stations, and supply of electricity 
through high voltage transmission system. The fundamental 
principles which guided their recommendation were that 
the construction and operations functions should be
brought together under one directorate, the transmission 
of power from generating stations to major loads should 
be for the G&T directorate and the supply of power to 
particular areas and consumers should be for the
distribution directorate. The Distribution and Customer 
Services Directorate (DCS) was responsible for supplying 
consumers with electricity and collecting revenue; the 
organization was chiefly defined by geography with a
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relatively small headquarters providing central support 
services. The organizational units were divided into the 
country's five development regions with slight
modifications; provisions were made within the 
organization to manage large extension and rehabilitation 
projects. The construction and operation of small 
hydropower units in remote and inaccessible areas in the 
hills was to be taken up by the Rural Electrification 
Directorate (RE), that is, any power stations which were 
not connected to the national grid and which were 
constructed to supply the immediate neighbourhood.
Four main categories of staff were envisaged by C&L,
viz:
senior management, to include the vice-chairman, 
directors and their immediate subordinates, and the
secretary of the NEA;
other management and professionals, to include
engineers, engineering assistants, accountants and senior 
bookkeepers with management responsibility;
- other staff whose job required a certain level of
educational qualification, training or experience;
- unqualified staff, including drivers, cleaners, peons, 
etc.
A number of grades were prescribed within each of these 
categories. Professionals requiring similar levels of 
post-school training were recommended similar rank
whether their discipline was technical or non-technical.
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Beyond this, certain posts required greater post­
qualification experience or responsibility than others 
and this was to be reflected in the grading system. For 
example, the director of the RE directorate was put at 
one grade lower than other directors because of the 
differences in responsibility. Altogether fifteen grades 
were proposed by C&L.
(c) Administrative and Personnel System
The main contributions of C&L in this area were the 
preparation of a Personnel and Administration Manual, 
salaries and secondary benefits for the staff and a 
transitional arrangement for staff transfer. The manual 
on personnel included sections on manpower planning, 
conditions of employment, recruitment, rules of conduct, 
promotion policy and procedures, staff loans, management 
development and training, salary administration and 
personal administration procedures. In proposing this 
package of recommendations, C&L used few of the 
prevailing conventions in the previous organizations but 
also tried to create a "more modern environment" for 
staff to work in and simplified a few of the lengthy 
procedures. Various new systems were proposed such as an 
annual performance review for the analysis of training 
needs, a system of personnel returns for personal 
records, and departmental manpower demand forecasts for 
manpower planning.
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C&L were guided by the conviction that the 
"incompetent or idle" should not succeed and the most 
"able" people should be promoted and provided with 
adequate financial rewards in the NEA. Hence they 
proposed competitive rates of pay to attract suitable 
people to join the NEA, which could then "provide an 
effective and highly motivated public service". Their 
recommendation included a modestly enhanced benefits 
package with moderate pay increases which would allow for 
a "reasonable degree of modernisation of the current 
level of provisions and the addition of some minor 
benefits". Although the proposed grading, salary and 
benefits could enable the NEA to pay staff at a higher 
rate than in the civil service, C&L was aware of the fact 
that a few of the civil servants in the ED might not be 
attracted to the commercially oriented environment within 
the NEA. They proposed the following transitional 
arrangement for the transfer of staff:
- for those staff transferring from the ED with 20 or 
more years of service, full preservation of status and 
benefits until retirement. The right to return to the 
civil service, given a suitable vacancy, following 
receipt of six months written notice, for a period of 
five years from date of transfer.
- for those staff transferring from the ED with between 
ten and twenty years service, a period of three years to 
decide whether to stay with the NEA or whether to return 
to the civil service. If return was chosen, a suitable
167
vacancy should be available and the staff should give six 
months written notice.
- for those staff transferring from the ED with less than 
ten years service, a period of one year to decide whether 
to stay with the NEA or return to the civil service. If 
return was chosen, a suitable vacancy should be available 
and the staff should give three months written notice. 
Those staff could return with fully preserved status and 
benefits.
All staff moving later to the NEA were to be transferred 
on a permanent basis except those on secondment.
All recommendations and the validation of the NEA 
were linked to an implementation programme and timetable 
designed by C&L. Such a programme was proposed to execute 
their consultancy assignment as well as to introduce a 
gradual, orderly transition to the new authority. One of 
the important tasks considered for successful 
implementation and impetus to the change programme was 
the identification of a few key staff, such as the vice- 
chairman and the four directors. C&L suggested that these 
key people should work with them to design and execute 
the change programme, in areas such as legislation, 
personnel arrangements, finance, etc.
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Implementation of the Reorganization
The details of the implementation of planned changes 
and the resulting outcomes will be discussed in the 
subsequent chapters where the process of change will be 
explored and analyzed. In this section, I shall briefly 
state the key decisions taken by the government with 
regard to the reorganization and the establishment of the 
NEA, and indicate the "real" outcomes in relation to the 
planned changes. I should mention here that the 
consultants were not involved in much of the decision­
making at the implementation phase of their prescriptions 
and their proposed transitional strategy and programme 
remained unaccomplished until they handed in their final 
recommendations in January 1984. The following short 
review may adequately reveal the fact that the planned 
changes were greatly modified at the time of adoption.
The first formal decision by the government on the 
reorganization was made on 19 November, 1982 in a 
tripartite meeting of the ADB, the WB and representatives 
of HMG/Nepal (from the ED and Ministry of Finance) . C&L 
were invited as observers. The meeting deliberated on the 
first study report submitted by C&L on the institutional 
arrangements and HMG's decision on the future 
organization of the sector was eventually set out in a 
Memorandum of Understanding signed with the ADB. The 
relevant part of the Memorandum read as follows:
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"It was agreed to establish a Nepal Electricity 
Authority (NEA) which will be responsible for the 
planning, construction, operation and maintenance of 
the power sector on a national basis which will be
managed by members to be appointed by HMG..... The
Authority will consist of about eleven members 
including: (a) a Chairman, who shall be on a part-
time basis and who will be supported by a full-time 
Vice Chairman; (b) four directors responsible for 
generation and transmission, distribution and 
customer services, rural electrification, and 
planning, evaluation and finance; and (c) other 
members as determined by HMG....The organization 
structure of the NEA will consist of four 
directorates and a Secretariat."
The NEA Act was approved by parliament in 1984 and 
the NEA commenced operations on 15 August 1985 when the 
government took a decision to implement the Act. The NEA 
was created following the merger of the ED, NEC and Small 
Hydro Development Board. Several development boards were 
still in operation and executing construction works but 
it was agreed that these boards would be dissolved on 
completion of their respective projects which would be 
taken over by the NEA to become part of its asset base. 
The NEA was kept under the overall supervision of the MWR 
which had general responsibility for all public sector 
activities related to electricity supply.
The NEA Act which was drafted by the government and 
approved by parliament was a replacement of the 
legislation proposed by C&L. The main substance and scope 
of the Act were kept in line with the legislation of 
other SOE's in the country. The Act did not contain clear 
provision for operating a commercial utility because it 
still required the NEA to supply electricity to all,
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regardless of ability to pay. The word utility was not 
mentioned in the Act and the NEA was classified as a 
"corporate body". It was stated that "the Board, by 
taking into account the interest of general people, shall 
follow the principles of trade". There was a provision 
for paying compensation if losses were caused by actions 
on government's directives but none of the balancing 
safeguards were maintained. The NEA's board consisted of 
ten members with the minister of MWR as the chairman. The 
other members were the secretaries of the Ministries of 
Finance, Industry, Law and Order, and Water Resources, a 
representative of the National Planning Commission, one 
government official and one representative of financial 
institutions appointed by HMG, two non-government persons 
appointed by HMG and the managing director of the NEA who 
was to act as the secretary to the board. The Act 
specifically stated that no employees of the NEA could be 
appointed to the board. The managing director, appointed 
by the government, was the "chief administrative officer" 
for managing the affairs of the Authority.
The organization structure of the NEA at the time of 
validation consisted of six directorates: Engineering;
Construction; Operation and Maintenance; Distribution and 
Consumer Services; Planning; and Finance and 
Administration. An organizational design with functional 
departmentation and many more senior management positions 
was adopted (refer Appendix 6) . The middle and lower 
organizations were gradually developed over the few years
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following the inception of the NEA; and many of the 
institutional arrangements of the old settings were 
continued in the NEA. The classification of positions and 
grades was carried out according to the guide-lines 
prescribed by the PSC which were applicable to all SOE's 
in the country.
All the staff of the NEC were transferred to the NEA 
because it ceased to exist as a corporate body after the 
enactment of the NEA Act. Similarly, the staff of the ED 
were transferred because its functions were handed over 
to the NEA and the government decided that the civil 
servants of the ED should be moved permanently. No rules, 
regulations and guide-lines concerning the transfer of 
staff to new grades and positions in the Authority were 
prepared at the time of validation, hence the staff were 
provisionally assigned jobs and positions. The final 
transfer of staff had to be approved by the PSC because 
the general rules of the PSC on SOE's were applicable to 
the NEA; however, the staff of the ED were civil servants 
and demanded special concessions in any kind of transfer. 
The ensuing differences and consultations between the PSC 
and the Authority continued for over two years.
Many of the administrative and personnel systems in 
the NEA were eventually established according to the 
guide-lines prescribed by the PSC. As a SOE, the NEA was 
obliged by the constitution of the country to follow 
these rules and regulations. Therefore, the practices and
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procedures relating to salary scales and administration, 
recruitment and promotion policy, rules of conduct, etc. 
were kept the same as in other SOE's with no preferential 
considerations for the requirements of a commercial 
utility in the case of the NEA.
Summary
In the context of the underdevelopment of Nepal, 
hydroelectricity has been the main resource and the 
government has consistently pursued a policy of 
developing this sector. The two lending agencies, the ADB 
and the WB, provided large sums of capital for investment 
in this sector and they also initiated the reorganization 
to instil public utility principles in its management. 
Although the planned changes of C&L were expected to 
contribute towards such a goal, the implementation of the 
various changes digressed from the consultant's 
prescriptions. The "real" change outcomes will be 
explored in the subsequent chapters in order to 




POLITICS OF CHANGE: PLANNED CHANGE VIS-A-VIS 
IDENTIFICATION OF STAKEHOLDERS AND INTERESTS
The description of the reorganization of the 
electricity industry in the previous chapter included a 
detailed account of the historical background of the 
industry, the planned change programme of the management 
consultants, and implementation of the reorganization in 
terms of the creation of a single electricity authority 
and various change decisions. This chapter will begin to 
draw up major conceptual themes on the process of change 
emerging from the descriptive account which will be 
further developed in subsequent chapters.
The analysis in this chapter can be broadly 
categorised into three frameworks. First, the need for 
reorganization and the planned change programme is 
explained as originating from the planned rational 
approach to organizational development and change. 
Second, the interests and interpretations of the external 
bodies in the process of change are discussed. Third, 
the expectations and interest of individuals from within 
the bodies to be merged will be interpreted. The roles 
and motives of the key individuals and groups will be an
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important focus for understanding the process of change
because, as stated by Dalton (1973) , "values  ^and
interests seem to be the determinants of change behaviour
and not elements". The inadequacy of a rational approach 
to understanding organizational change will be evident by 
the non-adoption and modifications of the planned change 
programme and proposals. Instead, the process of change
and the role played by external and internal individuals 
in its management will be the main focus of 
investigation. It is believed that a processual view will 
lead to a better understanding of change because it tells 
us "how change comes about, what the characteristic 
sequence of event is, how the change becomes stabilized 
in its original locus, how it diffuses to others, how it 
is limited in time and space - and how the stability it 
then represents is in turn upset" (Kahn, 1982) . The 
phenomenon of change in the political process model will 
be explained because this paradigm seems to offer a 
plausible account of the dynamics of change and explains 
how it was managed in the electricity industry. However, 
my intention here is not to come up with a singular 
theory of change by substituting planned, rational linear 
theories with political process theories. My task is more 
in line with Pettigrew's (1985) approach to understanding 
change:
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".... to identify the variety and mixture of causes
of change, to examine the juxtaposition of the 
rational and the political, the quest for efficiency 
and power, the role of exceptional men and of the 
extreme circumstances, the untidiness of the change, 
and to explore some of the conditions in which 
mixtures of these occur."
The Rational Approach to Planned Change
The choice of reorganization of the electricity 
industry by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the 
planned change programmes prepared by British Electrical 
International (BEI) and later by Coopers and Lybrand 
(C&L) can be interpreted as a rational planned change. 
Their assumptions about the structure of the 
organization, the importance of goals and objectives, 
organizational efficiency through structure and goal 
definition, etc. seem to be based on rational thinking. 
In fact the area of organizational analysis has been 
dominated by a paradigm often labelled as the "rational 
model" (Benson, 1977/ Colignon and Cray, 1981), 
"rational selection model" (Benson, 1971), "goal
paradigm" (Georgiou, 1973) , "conventional organizational 
analysis" (Salaman, 1978) and "prevailing rational and 
functional theories" (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Benson 
(1977) describes this model as explaining organizational 
patterns as outcomes of a goal-seeking or need fulfilling 
tendency of the organization. This paradigm has also been 
referred to as the structural perspective on 
organizations because it assumes that structure operates
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to achieve predetermined goals. This importance to goals 
is again common in the bureaucratic theories of 
organization where it is assumed that organization 
"strips its members of their personal motives and
replaces them with those that serve the purpose of the 
organization" (Greenfield, 1973). Similarly a rational 
approach to change takes a structural approach to
organizations and treats them as goal-seeking entities. 
An organizational change focuses on the creation of a 
rational organization in which the following four 
assumptions (Zey-Ferrell, 1981) will generally exist:
i. means end relationship are assumed, i.e. certain 
structure result in certain outcome or performance.
ii. organizational efficiency is maximized.
iii. decision-making follows a certain form of logic 
considered more rational.
iv. the desirability and achievement of certain 
organizational outcomes or goals through a more rigidly 
structured organizations.
The genesis of the reorganization of the power 
industry that took place in August 1985 can be traced 
back to the involvement of ADB in the power industry in 
Nepal. In 1972, the ADB emerged as an important lending 
agency for the power industry and at the same time
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identified shortcomings in operation and performance, 
particularly in financial management and planning
function of the Electricity Department (ED) . The bank
mission which came to appraise the loan for the second 
power project in September 1975 raised serious doubts 
about the institutional arrangements of the industry for 
the first time. This mission saw no scope for 
improvements in the ED and further pointed out the
incongruity of operating the electricity industry as part
of the civil service bureaucracy. The head of the mission 
team of ADB, Sieber, described the feeling of "complete 
uneasiness with the bank giving the loan to the ED, which 
has no accountability financewise with regard to the 
operation of the facility". The team also reiterated the 
financial disorder in the ED. On the technical side, the 
separation of the construction and
generation/distribution functions between the two 
autonomous organizations was regarded as "very
unproductive" and the team stated that the "evidence was 
very clear that it was not in the best interest for 
having an efficient power supply". On the other hand, the 
performance of the Nepal Electricity Corporation (NEC) 
which, as the main generation and distribution 
organization in the industry, was far from satisfactory 
with system losses exceeding thirty percent of gross 
energy generation and had a very high employee to sales 
ratio, twenty employees per million KWH of electricity 
sales. This was one of the highest figures among the bank 
financed utilities in the region. The mission team
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concluded that the institutional arrangement was the main 
cause for many of the woes and shortcomings of the 
industry. In 1975, the industry already comprised four 
separate entities and there was also some thinking in 
government circles that each of the four development 
regions in the country should have their own electricity 
body. The existing set-up and the further fragmentation 
by creation of more bodies were against the notion of an 
appropriate structure envisaged by the ADB team. The 
financial analyst of the mission team, Esperto, recalled 
recommending against such a fragmented structure:
"We thought that such a small country with so many 
authorities was not very efficient... there was a 
need to have a thorough study of the entire 
institutional set-up of the power industry because 
of our experience in the other sectors in the other
countries a need for an overall look at the
institutional set-up and then from there determine 
what is the most appropriate means of reorganizing 
the sector with a view to creating one
authority..... So we convinced the Secretary of the
power industry at that time to approve an 
institutional study".
The bank's definition of an electricity industry was 
a single authority operated as a public utility which was 
more likely to contribute to efficiency in operation and 
generate profit as well. The mission leader spelled out 
the advantages of a single utility:
"We wanted to talk to a utility and not to a
government department  What we really wanted
was to have something like a utility which kept
books about their records .....It is evident that
utilities are more efficient than the civil service. 
The civil service by its nature is inefficient
everywhere."
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The essence of the reorganization effort of the ADB 
was the design of an organization structure which would 
incorporate all the functions previously undertaken by 
several fragmented bodies because a single authority was 
considered the right choice for the electricity industry 
of Nepal. The mission team believed that such an 
institutional arrangement would contribute to operational 
and performance efficiency as in the other member 
countries of the bank and also be more apposite to meet 
the future expansion and investment goals of the sector. 
The position of the ADB on reorganization was clearly a 
structural approach to problem solving. It was guided by 
a presumption that organizational problems can be solved 
"by redefining areas of responsibility and authority, 
enforcing the chain of command and so on" (Leavitt, 
1970). Here, if we refer to Leavitt's four interacting 
variables of all organizations, i.e. task, structure, 
technology and actors, the reorganization focused mainly 
on the structure variable. A rectification of the poor 
performance was sought by optimizing the structure - as 
is common in the thinking of classical organization 
theory. This approach to organizational change is still 
very common and Leavitt (op.cit.) describes it as based 
on abstractions, formal, legalistic, poorly anchored in 
empirical data and almost incredibly naive in its 
assumptions about human behaviour.
In the first institutional study conducted by BEI, 
the key task was to determine the "most appropriate
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institutional basis" for the operation and future 
expansion of the power sector from the stand-point of 
giving it and the entities running it necessary 
responsibility and autonomy in the conduct of operation, 
in accordance with sound public utility praxis. In their 
report, the consultants listed numerous failings in the 
institutional structure and concluded that the causes 
could be put into two main categories: as a result of
excessive demarcation in the roles assigned to the 
various management bodies and excessive involvement of 
the civil service in the managing of the electricity 
industry. Such demarcation precipitated several problems 
such as the separation of the construction and operation 
functions, too many construction bodies by projects, and 
differences in territory and consumer groupings. As for 
the control exercised by the civil service, they stated 
that the electricity supply industry could not be 
operated efficiently in an environment dominated by civil 
service bureaucracy. The BEI consultants recommended the 
creation of a single body to perform all the functions 
because such a structure was taken to be essential for 
overcoming the existent shortcomings and more importantly 
for meeting future challenges in terms of growth in 
supply and expansion of the industry:
"It appears that with a degree of load shedding up 
to (say) 1982, an average growth rate of a little 
over 10 percent could be sustained from now at least 
up to the late 1980's when the load may be almost
three times what it is at present........ In order
to carry out the (future) tasks effectively, the 
Electricity Supply sector must develop 
systematically its marketing and commercial
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negotiating skills, its ability to develop 
engineering projects, its capacities of analysing
and forecasting load growth............ To do these
things, the Electricity Supply sector needs to set 
out to develop its management techniques and 
abilities. It must form an integrated group of 
permanent and competent managers capable of welding 
together the specialists’ knowledge of functional 
groups, and it must set out to build a well-trained 
work force motivated strongly toward serving the 
nation through an efficient public enterprise."
In order to carry out these tasks effectively and thereby 
meet the goals of the sector, no one structure would be 
so befitting than a "single public enterprise corporation 
committed to building power stations and extending the 
distribution network with the continued facility of using 
consultants; to be responsible for operating all 
electricity facilities in the country; and dealing with 
the sale and purchase of electricity both within Nepal 
and across its border" (BEI).
The second institutional study by C&L was conducted 
on the assumptions that the electricity industry 
definitely needed to be reorganized and consultants were 
hired to advise on the most appropriate structure, design 
and implementation. The necessity of a new institutional 
arrangement was, by then, a foregone conclusion, 
according to the leader of the C&L team, Trevor:
"In a sense the acceptance of the consultants to 
advise them on how to reorganize was a recognition 
that reorganization was needed and certainly when we 
got there everybody accepted that the industry had 
got too fragmented. I don't think there was much 
debate about that. My recollection is the debate was 
about how to reorganize and not about whether 
something needed to be rearranged".
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Like the BEI the starting point for C&L was the 
identification of problems and shortcomings of the 
industry which necessitated changes in the institutional 
arrangement. They were particularly concerned about the 
following problems:
i. fragmentation of the industry with no clear 
responsibility for ensuring good electricity supply to 
the consumers; no adequate planning for the future due to 
such fragmentation.
ii. boundary problems in the existing structure due to 
the fragmentation.
iii. widespread concern about the existing organizational 
arrangements by the people interviewed by C&L.
iv. shortage of engineers in the NEC.
v. rules and regulations surrounding civil service and 
government corporations being incompatible with problems 
and responsibilities of operating a service industry 
effectively and efficiently.
C&L supported the reorganization because they saw all 
anomalies as emanating from the structure itself. A major 
change and reform in the institutional structure was 
therefore inevitable for enhancing the efficiency of the 
industry. Trevor who was responsible for preparing the
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first discussion paper for the lending agency and the 
clients, justified the reorganization because "it does 
seem to me looking back on it, that the lot of the 
problems of the Nepalese electricity industry could be 
brought down to the fragmented nature of the industry".
The achievement of future goals and objectives of 
the industry was the other important rationale for 
altering the structure according to the ADB and supported 
by C&L. The power requirement of the country was 
anticipated to have an average growth rate of 13.1 
percent from 1980 to 2000, representing a doubling in 
capacity about every five years. The government was also 
considering the construction of eleven more generation 
projects for the next two decades which would have a 
total capacity of some five to six thousands megawatts 
and a capital cost of US $4500 millions at 1980/1981 
prices. There were ambitious plans for new transmission 
systems and rural electrification. Over and above, it was 
acknowledged by both ADB and the consultants that water 
was the most important resource of Nepal and this sector 
required to make maximum contribution to the general 
economic development of the country. A cheap and regular 
supply of hydro-electricity was considered as not only 
essential to all other development activities within the 
country but the export of surplus power to northern 
states of neighbouring India was conceived as the most 
reliable and promising source of revenue by senior people 
in the industry. Much hope, aspirations and expectations
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were attached to the potential of water resources in 
Nepal. The chief engineer of ED regarded water resources 
as equivalent to "oil" which could generate huge revenue 
much needed by the country in her race for development. 
The significance of the objectives of the industry not 
only to the sector but more importantly for national 
development was often stated by the ADB and the 
management consultants. Indeed if there was one foremost 
expressed reason for the reorganization by the bank, it 
was the vital importance of the industry to the national 
economy. Following this line, the consultants assessed 
the future responsibilities of the industry in terms of 
capital investment and major developmental projects and 
programmes and they concluded that the future challenges 
to the sector made it imperative that the new 
organization should be goal-seeking and need-fulfilling. 
A rational combination of goals and structure was to be 
brought about by the process of reorganization. The 
"dominant perspective" (Zey-Ferrell, op. cit.) on 
organization assumes that an organization is an 
instrument designed for goal achievement while its 
structure enhances such process, that is, certain 
structures result in certain outcomes or performances.
The economic importance of the electricity industry 
for the development of Nepal and the huge capital 
investment required for its growth and expansion were 
taken into account by the ADB and the consultants and 
their common interest was to implement a radical change,
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a breakthrough in the legal position, structure and 
systems of the electricity industry so as to create the 
necessary conditions for better performance and 
efficiency. The setting up of a commercial utility to 
operate this sensitive industry was crucial because this 
would represent a significant break for an economic 
sector that was traditionally operated and exercised 
rigid control by the government bureaucracy. The success 
of this radical change would have enormous implication 
for the management of other utilities which were also 
controlled by the government such as drinking water, 
telecommunication, sewerage, etc. Hence it was
symbolically important for the ADB to successfully create 
and manage this reorganization which in turn would 
determine its future influence and role in other sectors 
where it continued to advance loans.
The electricity industry faced major managerial and 
technical challenges in meeting the projected domestic 
power demand over the next twenty years. Any initiative 
for improvement was to be launched with changes in the 
structure first and Trevor went on to state that "changes 
in management approaches and systems are clearly required 
as well but we are convinced that major institutional 
reform is a necessary condition for Nepal to develop the 
electricity sector it requires. This is not just a 
dislike of the existing structure". Therefore, the 
hybrid-model of organization design was recommended as 
the "best way of giving effect to the structure" and to
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meet the needs of the sector. This structure was expected 
to fulfil all rational characteristics such as goal 
achievement, planning, coordination, efficiency, etc.:
i. sector to be managed in a coordinated way so that 
different activities reinforce and complement each other 
(rather than a sector in which there are conflicts and 
competing interests).
ii. a strong planning function developed to build up data 
and information from geographical and functional units 
and resource allocation decisions to be taken at the top 
in the best interest of the sector and the country.
iii. a delivery of a good, responsive service to the 
consumer and the operation of the industry in an 
economical, efficient and cost effective way.
iv. achieve broader social and economic benefits from 
rural electrification.
The creation of a single autonomous utility 
operating in commercial maxim was the choice of the ADB 
because it anticipated that the existing problems of the 
industry would be removed and additionally the goals of 
the industry and the objectives of the government would 
be fulfilled, that is, a "value maximizing choice" of the 
rational model according to Allison (1971). The same line 
of thinking was endorsed by the two consulting firms in
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their recommendations for the reorganization of the 
industry; they advocated a structural approach to 
institutional change. A new structure would remove and 
solve all the shortcomings and also be conducive to 
attaining goals efficiently. A single variable was given 
high priority to improve the performance of the industry 
and a direct relationship was drawn between structure and 
goal achievement.
The descriptive section on the implementation of the 
reorganization has already emphasized that the planned 
change proposals were considerably modified or rejected 
at the time of decision-making. Such variances in managed 
change have been explained by Tichy (1983) as "intended" 
(explicitly planned for) and "realized" (emerged out of 
the situation). The reorganization process as it took 
place in the electricity industry can be looked upon as 
two different phases. The first phase involved the 
initiative on the reorganization by the ADB and the WB 
and recruitment of the management consultants; the 
achievements were the decision by the government to 
create the NEA and the preparation of planned change 
proposals by the two consulting firms. The second phase 
covered the implementation of the reorganization 
including the process of decision-making on the several 
organizational changes and, furthermore, it provided an 
opportunity for investigation and interpretation towards 
the understanding of why the planned changes were largely 
rejected and how the change decisions were made.
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The planned change was based on rational assumptions 
and offered an overly simple guide for decisions to be 
taken to create the new authority. These prescriptions 
were a rational problem solving sequence of activities 
and did not match the real decisions that were taken in 
the course of the change and the actions of the 
individuals could hardly be described as contributing to 
the rational goals of the planned change. As stated in 
chapter one, many of the theorists working on planned 
change have adopted this linear phasewise approach backed 
by normative, rational prescriptions, e.g. Lippett et. 
al. (1958), Beckhard (1969), Hage and Atkin (1970). The 
limitations and inadequacy of planned rational approach 
to change expressed by Pettigrew (op. cit.) in his 
valuable study of ICI applied in the implementation of 
this reorganization as well:
"...it will be clear that rational problem solving 
approach to planned change and innovation is both an 
inadequate way of theorising about what actually 
happens during change processes and an overtly 
simple guide for action. The field of organization 
change badly needs theoretical development along the 
lines of literature on organization decision making 
where there are now a variety of process models of 
choices which include satisficing views of process 
(March and Simon, 1958) : political views of process 
(Pettigrew, 1973); and garbage can view of process 
(March and Olsen, 1976)".
Since the actual change processes and outcomes were 
very different from the prescriptions set out in the 
consultants' reports, I decided to carry out a process- 
oriented analysis into the processes which occurred 
within the electricity industry during the
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reorganization. The data of this study clearly indicates 
interactions among various individuals representing 
institutions, groups or individuals in the different 
stages of the change process. These individuals were from 
both within and outside the industry and change was a 
result of interactions among them. Identification of 
these individuals and their interests in the change 
implied adopting a pluralistic view of the organization 
(Pettigrew, 1973/ Allison, 1971/ Cyert and March, 1963/ 
Child, 1972/ Crozier and Friedberg, 1980). Such a view is 
in marked contrast with the view adopted in the planning 
of the change where the government was treated as a 
monolithic unit making rational choices and decisions on 
the creation of a electricity authority. Quite to the 
contrary, change was influenced by many agents with 
different interpretations and power and the change 
decisions matched the "political model" of Allison (op. 
cit.) in which there were many players "who focus not on 
a single static issue but on many diverse problems as 
well/ players who act in terms of no consistent set of 
strategic objectives but rather according to various 
conceptions of national, organizational and personal 
goals". The numerous individuals and the differences in 
their interpretations originated from the complexity of 
the reorganization itself. It was a radical planned 
change, i.e. a merger between a government department and 
a state-owned enterprise causing two complications. 
First, both the ED and the NEC were parts of the 
government bureaucracy and have established close
190
working linkages with a host of other government bodies. 
Any changes in this linkage implied redefinition of the 
relationship. Second, the reorganization was a radical 
change for people working within the industry and 
required "redefinition of the nature, scope and purpose 
of particular individuals, groups and even of the 
enterprise itself" (Mangham, 197 9). Since both the ED and 
the NEC were terminated after the creation of the 
authority, the new organization brought about a situation 
where every individual role, job and position had to be 
redefined. The situation had the potential to kindle the 
interests of all the individuals. There was strong 
advocacy for certain line of action from within and 
outside the organization and there was also opposition 
from the others. Since self-interests of the individuals 
were at the core for taking a stand in support of or 
against an issue, a political process was very much part 
of the change. Mangham (op. cit.) states that "every 
trick and resource will be called into service to bring
about or successfully to oppose the innovation under
consideration. Power and politics inform all forms of 
planned change". The process and outcome of
reorganization can be accurately interpreted in terms of 
the diversity of the stakeholders and the different 
positions they took in defining situations. The
multiplicity of interests of the dominant individuals was 
also the cause for a great deal of conflicts, collusion, 
compromises and negotiations.
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Interests and Interpretations of External Stakeholders in 
the Process of Change
The electricity industry constituted not only 
several autonomous fragmented bodies but there were also 
several external organizations which had direct 
influence on its performance, operation and behaviour. 
The lending agencies represented mainly by the ADB and 
the World Bank (WB) were the main financiers for all the 
development activities and they have played a significant 
role in the growth and expansion of the industry. The ED 
as a government department was a wing of the Ministry of 
Water Resources (MWR) and part of the civil service. The 
NEC as a state-owned enterprise with many interrelations, 
constituted a complex organization system that could be 
interpreted as the "ecology of public enterprise" 
(Suarez, 1985), that is, state-owned enterprises exist 
in a milieu of a complex set of interrelationships in the 
economic, social and political domains constituting an 
intricate network of system of interlinkages. The 
consequences of such interlinkages according to Suarez is 
that:
"the behaviour and performance of public enterprises 
are a result not only of managerial processes within 
the enterprise but of managerial processes in those 
external units which are related to the enterprise 
and define its goals and objectives over time. 
Efficiency in public enterprises is therefore a 
function of macro and micro
management......Interlinkages between public
enterprises and their milieu may be of two types, 
formal and informal. Formal intelinkages refer to 
the relationships between the enterprise and the 
formal authorities such as government ministries,
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agencies, parliament Informal interlinkages, by
contrast, are "underground" relationships connecting 
persons, groups and organizations. These types of 
interlinkages are normally developed on a personal 
basis, rather than an institutional one and serve to 
get things done when the formal linkages fail."
The numerous external and internal interlinkages 
operated as a web of established relationships within 
which several organizations of the electricity industry 
operated and performed. The reorganization involved 
severing the established linkages of the old set-up and 
creating a single new state-owned enterprise with its own 
linkages. These linkages referred to as stakeholders were 
represented by individuals who acted on behalf of their 
organizations. Mintzberg (1979) describes "external 
coalition" as made up of participants who vie for control 
and power from outside the structure of the organization. 
Stakeholders are a common feature of all organizations 
and they consist of elements outside the internal 
management control but which affect its behaviour in the 
case of government enterprises. Somasundaram (1985) 
describes state-owned enterprises in developing countries 
as welded into a "organizational anti-world of 
stakeholders" and "stakeholder management has a greater 
impact on public enterprises than the public enterprise 
management itself". He defines the role and influence of 
stakeholders over the enterprises:
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"Stakeholders are those elements outside the 
internal management control of public enterprise, 
but which affect their behaviour and performance. 
Such a superstructure is contrary to the received 
wisdom of organization theory, because most of the 
factors which affect the performance of the 
organization are supposed to lie within the internal 
control of its management. If they were to be 
outside, one of the main functions of its top 
echelon would be to manage them overtly or covertly, 
for success in this field would ensure success for 
the organization. But in the case of a public 
enterprise, the elements outside the control of its 
management are structurally entrenched and 
independent of it and indeed considered to be in 
binary opposition."
The concept of stakeholders constituting a complex 
social system of all organizations is well discussed by 
Mitroff (1983). He describes modern organizations as 
being "buffeted by a disparate array of forces" and 
stakeholders as those parties who either affect or who 
are affected by the organization's policies, actions, 
etc. An interesting difference is made between 
stakeholders and stockholders which is very pertinent in 
the case of state-owned enterprises because the 
shareholder is usually the government but control and 
influence is exercised by a host of government and other 
bodies who operate as stakeholders. These different 
stakeholders need not share a common definition of the 
organization's problems and do not often agree on the 
same solution.
The stakeholders whose interests were affected by 
the reorganization and those who were involved in the 
process of creating a new authority are considered in 
this analysis. The external stakeholders are classified
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into two groups for the purpose of this analysis. The 
first group of external stakeholders includes the all 
important multilateral lending agencies who provide the 
capital for the development of the industry and have also 
played a decisive role in introducing the new 
institutional arrangement. The second group consists of 
those linkages within Nepal that were concerned with the 
implementation of the new authority.
i. The Lending Agencies
Though recommendations for the institutional 
improvement of the power sector were put forward in 
several studies conducted in the sixties and the 
seventies, the concept of a public utility managed along 
the lines of profitability and autonomy was for the first 
time instigated by the ADB after their involvement in the 
sector. The earlier proposals on improvement of the 
management system of the NEC by a group of British 
advisers was to some extent implemented but the proposal 
by Indian experts on major restructuring of the power and 
water sector was shelved and never executed. The 
organization structure of the industry gradually evolved 
from 1962 onwards and was run along the traditional lines 
of a civil service department and a public enterprise. 
The requirement of a power industry as interpreted by the 
ADB did not match with this set-up. I have already stated
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that the main contention of ADB was that a utility should 
be created to manage the industry and the definition of 
such an organization was provided by Sieber:
"A utility for us is something which has to make a 
profit, have books of accounts and make projections, 
budgets for operation for both construction and 
operation and maintenance."
The appropriateness of a utility was endorsed 
because the bank from the very inception regarded the 
power industry as capable of profit generation and cost 
recovery. A joint secretary in the Ministry of Finance 
responsible for foreign aid in Nepal confirmed that the 
prime concern of the ADB was that their investment in the 
power industry should be "productive", that is, generate 
further resources so that it can be reinvested again in 
other sectors of the economy. The investment requirement 
in this sector was already huge and future investment 
potential and demand was very high. The costs of such 
investments needed to be recovered according to Sieber:
"otherwise you can bankrupt Nepal for instance in 
one year if you do not try to have cost
recovery.....So it is related to the principle of
cost recovery that we become so tough. We keep on 
giving money to education and irrigation because 
there is no way but there is a other way with regard 
to electricity. It must work like a factory, like a 
shoe factory. This is the background to why we push 
for this kind of a utility, not because we do not 
trust the Nepalese government".
The emphasis of the representatives of the ADB on a 
single, autonomous utility was partly based on their past 
experiences as a staff member of the bank in other loan
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receiving countries. BEI1s recommendation of a single 
public enterprise was defended by the mission team of the 
ADB for the second power project because it measured up 
to their expectations. Once again Sieber stated the 
congruity of a commercial utility based on their 
experience:
"We have travelled around the world and for any 
culture there is the basic principles which are the 
same. You have to follow it and make adoptions to 
make it work in your culture. There is no N e p a l i  
organization structure as such which some people 
claim. It is a convenient excuse to say it was 
designed for another culture."
Another member of the ADB team supported the creation of 
a utility because it corresponded with their work in 
other loan recipient countries at that time:
"Our own experience at that time was based on the 
system in Thailand in which we had lot of contacts 
and experiences as well as in the Philippines. In 
Thailand, you have EGAT which is the national 
electricity generating agency which sells to 
retailers such as to Bangkok and other authorities. 
The Philippines is also more or less the same 
concept. Nepal was not as large as this system. So 
although the consultant had to study this option 
under the institutional study, the concept of one 
authority which eventually happened probably is the 
right choice."
There was much resistance to this proposal of 
creating one single organization by senior engineers from 
the ED (discussed in later chapters) mainly because such 
a change required a radical adjustment to the existing 
arrangements and, furthermore, the viability of a single
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utility was questioned by many. The deputy chief engineer 
of the ED recalled making alternate proposals:
"I suggested that we still maintained two separate 
organizations, that the ED sold the power house 
after construction to the NEC as done by the CEGB in 
the UK but this proposal was rejected. BEI's one 
organization proposal was too theoretical but 
academically a good idea. It consisted of a unity of 
command, communication and all other advantages but 
we do not have the managerial knowledge or 
expertise. A single large organization needs 
management systems, procedures and practices but
these are nonexistent in Nepal...... In the context
of the socio-political background of the country, 
bringing together two units under the name of one 
organization cannot bring efficiency alone, you 
cannot expect improvements in
organization Moreover, the one unit proposal did
not take into account the complexity of managing two 
groups of staff."
A senior engineer of the ED who resigned after the 
creation of the NEA commented on the structural 
imposition enforced by the bank as a total destruction of 
a set-up that had evolved over the years:
"The banks like to keep on experimenting just to see 
something is being done. They don't build on 
something that is already there but they destroy 
what was already existing. They insist on trying to 
create something new and claim we created it."
The interest of the WB as an another multilateral 
funding agency blended with the initiatives undertaken by 
the ADB and the idea of a single utility was described as 
a "shared belief" by both the technical staff of the WB 
working in Nepal and by their counterparts in the ADB. An 
important meaning attached to the reorganization by the 
WB was the belief that better management practice was
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possible in a single authority, which could result in
improved performance, than in the old set-up. The Deputy
Representative of the WB in Nepal gave a clear account of
their position concerning the advantages of the 
reorganization:
"I think the WB envisaged that if you put all the 
functions together or all the departments and 
divisions that are responsible for the different 
functions together in one organization then it would 
make management easier".
Another very important consideration of the lending 
agencies was the accountability and security of their 
huge loans to the electricity industry. This concern for 
security of loans was different from a commercial bank’s 
assessment of risks of non-payment of the invested money 
because the loan was given to the kingdom of Nepal which 
provided a safer guarantee. The ADB as a developmental 
bank was keen to see that the loans were properly used 
exclusively for the agreed projects and the accounts 
properly maintained and timely audited. However, the 
operation of the ED was lacking in both areas and
although it was the executing agency for loans, it held 
no accountability for repayment which was passed on as 
NEC's responsibility. Furthermore, the financial 
performance of the NEC was distressing in terms of 
recurrent negative profitability, high system losses, low 
return on investment and the low debt-equity ratio. These 
financial ratios were used as indicators of the financial 
health of the industry by the lending agencies and they
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were often concerned and dissatisfied with the weak 
financial position of the NEC. The WB was very concerned 
about the security of its investment and demanded that 
the loans were made prudently without the danger of it 
being eroded and not achieving stated objectives. So, for 
example, if a certain institutional arrangement was weak 
and might be the cause of putting a sectoral loan at 
risk, the WB introduced conditions to correct such 
potential danger to their investment. The Deputy 
Representative stated that the bank took all safeguards 
to protect investments and their principle was "no 
different than if you go to a mortgage bank because it is 
essential to protect our investment, be responsible to 
shareholders which are close to one hundred and sixty 
members".
The joint action and mutual support between the ADB 
and the WB emanated from shared views about the anomalies 
of the sector, the security of their investments and a 
common stake in the future of the industry. As the main 
financiers of development projects, their interest was 
divided between the financing of power projects and 
transmission lines. The two banks were not competitors in 
the sector but shared "very good cooperation at staff 
level as well as at senior levels and exchanged appraisal 
reports, documents and other reports" according to 
Esperto (ADB). Both were development banks and followed 
similar policies and views in their lending programmes. 
Sieber explained that there was risk in adopting
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different views by them because there was a danger that 
"everybody would play one against the other". It was 
these commonly shared goals which led to joint efforts 
for achievement of common interests. Weick (1969) 
describes joint action in which "each actor uses and is 
used by the other person for the accomplishment of 
activities which neither alone can accomplish". The 
establishment of an authority was the creation of a 
social order based on their joint definitions of reality 
to "make the world more predictable" (Mangham, 1979) . 
However, it would be an oversimplification to assume that 
the changes that took place were solely the outcome of 
joint action of the two banks. The other levels of 
interactions which resulted in "interlocked behaviour" 
(Weick, op.cit.) need to be considered as well. For 
example, the interaction between the lending agencies and 
the management of the industry was the other form of 
joint action and this pattern continued with all the 
stakeholders.
An examination of the relationship between the 
borrower and the two lending agencies is important in 
order to understand the choice of one utility as a result 
of preference of the banks. Right from the early 1970's 
when the ADB started to finance the construction of 
transmission projects, the infrastructure of the industry 
was very rudimentary, needing huge investment in the 
construction of power generating projects and 
transmission lines. Only a marginal percentage of the
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population of Nepal was supplied with electricity and the 
government aimed to increase the total supply to 
consumers in all the subsequent development plans. On the 
other hand, the economic reality of Nepal is that she is 
one of the least developed countries and constrained with 
shortage of finance in all her developmental efforts. She 
was and still is totally dependent on aid from donor 
countries and loans from lending agencies such as the 
development banks. The bilateral aid was often inadequate 
to meet the demands of the various sectors and such aid 
was also often dependent upon the political relationship 
between countries rather than the economics of the 
development project. It was with this need for financing 
of her development activities that Nepal joined 
membership of the ADB and the WB. The important element 
of the loan from these multilateral agencies was that the 
conditions were very attractive to the borrowing country. 
For example, there were special concessions for countries 
in the lowest per capita group in which Nepal falls - a 
fifty years repayment period with ten years grace and 
with one percent service charge in the case of an IDA 
loan from the WB. In essence the loan had a "really high 
grant element making it very attractive" according to 
the joint secretary of the Ministry of Finance. Along 
with the power industry, many other different sectors 
have received loans from both the ADB and the WB and 
consequently both agencies now exercise considerable 
clout in the development efforts of Nepal. For instance, 
the currently ongoing "structural adjustment programme"
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of the WB was adopted by the government to remedy the 
anomalies in the economy of Nepal and to reconsider her 
developmental plans and priorities.
The loan to the power industry has to be considered 
in this historical context. The very next loan of the ADB 
to Nepal was for the financing of the first power project
in 1972 and the bank supplied five loans to the power
industry totalling US $35.9 million by 1981. The 
involvement of the WB in this sector started only in the 
late 1970's but the volume of loan was considerably 
larger because it was for the construction of power 
generation projects. The total reliance of the power 
sector on the two banks for loans was explained by the 
joint secretary of the Ministry of Finance:
"Because of the soft loan and the conditions which 
are favourable, we are very dependent on the banks 
for all our developmental activities. As long as we
have to seek loans, this is the only source we can
turn to. Other commercial loans are just too 
exorbitant and the conditions are too harsh."
The dependence of the industry generated a strong 
source of power to the banks. The banks were in control 
of capital which was the most essential resource for the 
industry that was trying to expand and grow fast. 
Obviously this dependence relationship gave power to the 
banks as explained by Emerson (1962):
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"It would appear that the power to control or 
influence the other resides in control over the 
things he values, which may range all the way from 
oil resources to ego support."
This kind of interpretation of power has also been 
presented in the works of Blau (1964) and Thompson (1967) 
and will be discussed at length in chapters five and six. 
The resource dependency perspective on power between 
organizations was studied by Pfeffer and Salanick (1978) 
and has relevancy to the role of the lending agencies. 
The authors treated organizations as open social systems 
requiring continuing provisions of resources and 
transactions with the environment. Those subunits that 
can provide the most critical and difficult to obtain 
resources have power in the organization - the emphasis 
is on social power which is derived from the ability to 
furnish those resources on which the organization most 
depends. A simpler but equally accurate explanation was 
given by Pfeffer (1981) when he wrote "he who has the 
gold makes the rules".
Both the ADB and the WB have extensively made use of 
the dependence relationship to influence the growth and 
development of the electricity industry. The conditions 
and covenants stipulated in all the loan agreements were 
generally the definitions of reality spelled out by the 
banks and pointed towards their desired course of action 
and direction. Subsequent loan requests were approved 
only after assessing the compliance with previously set 
covenants. The consequence of inaction or non-adoption of
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the covenant by the borrower was the threat of 
discontinuity of the present loan or stalemate in
negotiation of future loans which often resulted in more 
stringent conditions. Dependence was not only a social 
relationship but was easily translated into effective 
power as explained by Pfeffer (op. cit.):
"The ability of the actor with power to measure and 
observe the other's compliance with the demands made 
also affects the ability to translate dependence 
into actual power over the other's activities."
Independent consultants like BEI and C&L were 
recruited at the insistence of the ADB not only to
present a neutral recommendation on the institutional 
rearrangement but to further the process of
reorganization in accordance to their preference. Sieber 
admitted that the recruitment of the consultants was 
encouraged because the borrower was not taking any 
initiative towards change and the bank had waited for a 
long time anticipating proposals and actions. The
consultants were expected to expedite the change 
proposals as well as execute them. This hiring of outside 
consultants was similar to the notion of "selective use 
of objective criteria" of Pfeffer (op.cit.) in which the 
outside expert was used to affect decisions in a somewhat 
less visible way and "to legitimate the decision reached 
and to provide an aura of rationality to decision­
making" .
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ii. The Internal Linkages Within Nepal
The notion of interlinkages as stakeholders is a 
more realistic way of looking at government as a decision 
maker because a government may be seen to consist of "a 
conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations 
each with a substantial life of its own" (Allison, 
op.cit.). The stakeholders make up a predominant feature 
of the electricity industry and can also be described as 
a superstructure which has a strong influence on its 
performance. The stakeholders not only have their own 
mandatory area of authority and responsibility but 
constitute individuals who often interpret, defend and 
manage these relationships according to their definition 
of the reality that should prevail and "acting on some 
belief of how things should be" (Mangham, 1987) . A 
decision of the government to create a new state-owned 
enterprise as in this case became much more complex than 
the "standard operating procedure" (Allison, op. cit.) of 
a bureaucracy. It is evident from the data that the 
governmental bureaucracy operated as interlinkages with 
established procedures but more meaningful was the fact 
that individuals who represented these bodies were able 
to interpret, bargain, compromise and make choices to 
pursue their interests and definitions. Therefore, the 
role played by individuals representing these linkages 
was definitive in the process of change.
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a). The Ministry of Water Resources
The Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) was the main 
sponsoring governmental agency responsible for the power 
industry - as parent ministry of the NEC and directly 
involved in construction activities through its own 
department, the ED, and several development boards. The 
most dominant feature of this relationship was described
by BEI (as stated earlier) as a situation of control of
the industry by the government and a reluctance to ease 
this kind of hold by the MWR:
"despite the fact that a developed electricity 
supply industry is one which cannot be run 
efficiently within the customs, constraints and
environment of a civil service bureaucracy in which 
none of the training, experience, practices or
procedures, are specifically designed for managing a
trading enterprise......... Criteria for recruiting,
promoting, transferring and disciplining corporation 
employees, are determined by the civil service. Even 
the organization structure is subject to civil 
service influence."
The creation of an authority confronted the "pre­
existing complicated structure of relationship" (Sarason, 
1972) of an old setting which was dominated by the MWR. 
Individuals representing the ministry played a key role 
in negotiations with the banks on the institutional 
rearrangements, interacted with the consultants, designed 
and executed the reorganization. Although at a 
ministerial level the government decided on t h e  creation 
of the authority, the MWR as the sectoral ministry was 
responsible for drawing up policies and programmes for
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implementation. The interacting individuals were mainly 
concerned with the control of the industry as in the past 
and they were reluctant to resign their traditional 
control and advantages. All the key individuals justified 
the role of the ministry and provisions were made in the 
legislation which ensured future control. For example, at 
the highest level the consultant recommended a full-time 
chairman to be appointed by the prime minister so that a 
distinguished chief executive could resist the 
interference of the parent ministry. Very much
contradictory and paradoxical to this proposal was the 
choice of the MWR minister to be the part-time chairman; 
the minister stated his reasons:
"If you take the Ministry of Water Resources and if 
you take away all the hydro electricity from it, 
there is nothing in the ministry virtually because 
the major part of the decision-making that any 
ministry has to make is concerned with hydro
electricity. Now that's why I thought it was 
appropriate for the minister to be the chairman of 
the board. Otherwise, there is no point in having a 
MWR unless he is the chairman of the authority. As 
the chairman of the board, the minister can have 
much more leeway to act freely, independently and 
effectively on the advice of the board".
The ministry as the influential stakeholder was not 
prepared to minimize its role in the new authority and 
sought to retain the control relationship in the 
legislation. It preferred to keep things as they were.
Lippitt et. al. (1985) describe this as a common
phenomenon in which "change in organization is often
followed by a regression toward the old pattern after the 
pressure affecting change are relaxed". The main
208
rationalization underlying such control according to the 
key players of the MWR was the issue of ownership of the 
industry by the government; and the importance of the 
water resources sector for national development was an 
another argument. Moreover, not only did all the assets 
of the NEA belong to the government but all loans were 
given to Nepal and not to the NEA. The government as the 
sole shareholder was entitled to exercise influence on 
the authority and control was a result of ownership, at 
least so it was claimed. The role of the authority as 
interpreted by key players in the MWR put to question the 
very objective of the reorganization, that is, the 
setting up of an autonomous, commercial utility. Even 
senior staff such as the secretary of the MWR argued that 
the industry could not go "totally commercial" but 
instead follow "a mixture of social and commercial 
objectives". This problem was representative of many 
state-owned enterprises in developing countries according 
to several studies sponsored by the International Centre 
for Public Enterprises (ICPE, 1985):
"There is strong expectation that public enterprises 
should operate as sound business firms generating 
surpluses and providing resources to the public 
exchequer. At the same time, there is an equal 
desire that public enterprises should function as 
instruments of national development and social 
policy."
The exclusion of the consultants from the 
implementation and transition of the reorganization, 
although this was one of the crucial phases in their
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recommendation, was a preference and very significant 
choice of the individuals in the MWR. The same was true 
of the modifications to the planned changes. John, the 
residential consultant of C&L who was in Nepal during the 
setting up of the authority recalled how their 
transitional arrangement was not accepted and they were 
not allowed to plan the implementation:
"We wanted a transition period before the handover. 
As it was what happened was one day the managing 
director was appointed and everybody else was told 
that they were going to work for the
NEA............. The way organizational change took
place in the electricity industry this time around 
has fallen down in the fact that nobody was allowed 
to plan anything before reorganization. 
Consequently, no thought was given to this. It was 
stated that in the Nepalese circumstances, you 
cannot have somebody working for the achievement of 
an organization that does not exist."
The common arguments for the exclusion of C&L from 
implementation and alterations in the planned changes 
were that the consultants failed to take into account the 
reality of Nepal; their concepts were good but not 
"practical"; they proposed an ideal context, etc. For 
example, the secretary of the MWR decided against a 
gradual transition which to him was "unacceptable" and he 
opted for a "sudden break" from the old arrangement 
because "since this was a merger, we decided to bring the 
two organizations together suddenly". Similarly few 
senior engineers of ED who were covertly assigned the 
task of working out the structural details of the new 
authority deliberately avoided the participation of the 
consultants and instead introduced modifications to the
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planned changes. A superintendent engineer of the ED 
provided an explanation for their actions:
"The consultants suggested different models and we 
tried to fit them into our system with some 
modifications. They do not know the actual practical 
difficulties. We know better than them and therefore 
it was definitely subject to some adjustments. They 
can never understand the various difficulties 
inherent in our bureaucracy, in our system. They can 
never grasp these issues."
The minister of the MWR who was an active participant in 
the creation and validation of the authority expressed 
his opinion about the role of the consultants:
"I don’t think there is anything magic about 
consultants. You know if the consultants make a 
suggestion it is up to you to decide whether his 
suggestions are valued or not. One must be very 
clear that they are there to provide suggestions but 
the decision that is taken in any activity must be 
the government's."
It is inadequate to consider only the articulated 
explanations and interests of the individuals from the 
MWR which were usually based on rational and economic 
justifications to legitimatize their choices and actions. 
These may only have been to "cover up" (Stagner, 1969) 
other advantages gained by dominant individuals from the 
control relationship. The power industry as the largest 
state-owned organization and with the highest capital and 
development budget was an attraction to both politicians 
and civil servants. The portfolio of minister of the MWR 
was always held by a full minister and the post was 
considered the number three person in the cabinet.
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Additionally, as the chairman of the NEA, the minister 
was in a position to influence the enormous resources to 
his political advantage if he so chose to make use of 
this. One of the directors of the NEA aptly described the 
minister as wearing two hats at one time, a politician's 
hat and a chairman's hat and the former was always more 
important in the context of Nepal because it was 
concerned with his long-term political career:
"I am not satisfied about having the minister and 
yes the organization is paying for it. This is 
obvious in the over-staffing, tendering, hiring of 
consultants, etc. These are political chaps and they 
will always look into political issues."
The authority provided opportunities to promote such 
political ambitions in many ways and this was clearly 
evident in the recruitment of over two thousand personnel 
by the NEA in the past four years when four different 
ministers took up tenure as chairman at their
appointment by the government. Another director of the 
NEA stated that the recruitment of people was based on 
political considerations rather than technical and 
economic requirements:
"When we were established the total staff was 6500 
and subsequently every year about five hundred staff 
have been added and this too without any addition of 
major generation and transmission projects. Our 
distribution and customer services have remained the
same with only slight increases....... I can recall
the secretary of Ministry of Finance stating that 
state-owned enterprises are the mistresses of 
ministers and this is very true in our case. They 
always demand employment, vehicles, sponsorship, 
etc."
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The opportunity of granting employment to the public from 
the constituency of the minister was a bonus for his 
popularity and future elections, specially when one takes 
into account the high rate of unemployment of educated 
graduates and the lack of opportunity of employment in 
the very small private sector. Agrawal (1978) states that 
such a form of employment is a common problem in all 
state-owned enterprises in Nepal because positions are 
created on an adhoc basis, at times for the sake of 
certain specific persons and pressure is placed upon the 
enterprise even to take staff over and above their needs. 
He narrates how such temporary appointments can turn to 
permanent liabilities for the enterprise :
"Recruitment of relatives, acquaintances and 
favourites on a temporary basis for a period not 
exceeding six months have become a popular game for 
getting around the (PSC) rules. Such appointments 
generally get renewed in some cases stretching even 
up to five years and with the passage of time, 
termination of such long-term temporaries become 
unthinkable and eventually they get tenure by 
getting round the rules."
The cost to the organization was seldom taken into 
account and the threat of such sponsored employment to 
the future of the authority was voiced by John:
"In the end this sort of system is going to kill the 
goose that lays the golden egg because you cannot 
keep loading up, loading up and loading up. 
Eventually you are getting to the situation and I 
hear rumoured in the NEA that there might be toward 
the end of this year a cash flow shortage simply 
because the income is not reaching the outgoings."
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Although the civil servants of the MWR may not
customarily put forth such open claims and demands on the 
authority, as they are to some extent restricted by
various rules and regulations, there were still 
advantages to be gained from the control relationship.
The plentiful resources of the authority and its 
comparatively flexible rules and regulations made it
attractive to the actors in the ministry where there was 
always a constraint on all resources. The relationship 
between the parent ministry and a state-owned enterprise 
in Nepal was summed up in a nutshell by Agrawal (1975) 
where he also describes such enterprises as "a privileged 
domain of the government bureaucrats":
"civil servants get appointed to top positions by 
virtue of their contacts and relationships rather 
than competency in management. Because of their 
allegiance to bureaucracy where they return after 
completion of tenure, they are least concerned about 
organizational performance and effectiveness. Their 
major concern centres around their own survival and 
self-interests."
b). The Ministry of Law and Justice
The government decided to legislate a special 
charter for the NEA rather than constitute it under other 
general acts such as the Company Act or the Development 
Board Act which govern many of the state-owned 
enterprises. Although it is difficult to rationalize on 
the specific policy reasons why certain enterprises are
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created under one set of general acts as opposed to 
another in Nepal, some generalizations can be made about 
special charters. Where greater supervision and control 
is envisaged by the government and where the services 
provided are basic to development needs, enterprises tend 
to be under special charters, e.g. the press; and the 
same case is true when the enterprise is taken up as a 
matter of nationalization, e.g. airlines and electricity. 
However, a research study on the performance of state- 
owned enterprises in Nepal states:
"Despite the vast range of legal instruments 
available in Nepal, it is invariably true that laws 
related to state-owned organizations are only of 
secondary importance. The problem of primary 
importance are undoubtedly extra-legal, politico- 
economic conceptualizations of the role of these 
organizations in the mixed enterprise system, 
ministerial supervision, control and policy guide­
lines, etc. Hence despite the preference for company 
form of state-owned enterprises in Nepal, it is 
generally the case that they are no more than semi- 
departmental instruments of public policy. If 
disadvantages of the departmental form have been 
removed, the advantages of company form have hardly 
been secured." (PPEN, 1980)
The Ministry of Law and Justice (MOLJ) is 
responsible for approving the draft of the legislation 
presented by the various ministries before it passes onto 
the cabinet and the parliament. The MOLJ's main concern 
is to check that a draft legislation matches with similar 
established acts and does not contradict the provisions 
of the constitution of the country. If the sponsoring 
ministry submits a totally new policy calling for a 
radical departure from the conventional, long
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negotiations are held to justify the need for such 
clauses and conditions. In the case of the draft 
legislation of the NEA, the MWR followed a conventional 
framework rather than the draft prepared by C&L and the 
outcome was an act which according to the joint secretary 
of the MOLJ was "the same for all corporate bodies, 
whether it be an authority like in this case or a council 
or other average corporations". A traditional framework 
and contents of the act suited the choice of the MWR as 
well as fitted into the general pattern of legislation of 
other corporate bodies as required by the MOLJ. Although 
due consideration should be given to the fact that as 
bureaucracies both the MWR and MOLJ were "set in their
ways......  and closed to new ideas or outside
influences" (Kanter, 1989) , the traditionally styled 
legislation was not introduced for the simple sake of
conservatism alone. The document conformed with the
definitions shared by the individuals from the two
ministries.
The MOLJ as a member of the civil service
bureaucracy shared and supported the controlling role of 
the MWR over the authority because of the NEA's
financial dependence on the government and for better
liaison with other government ministries and agencies. 
The joint secretary of the MOLJ interpreted the presence 
of the minister and other government secretaries in the
board as essential for providing support and moral
commitment to the NEA:
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"The authority could not operate independently as it 
was going to need constant support from the 
government - for future capital investments and for 
repayment of the huge loan which the government had 
received for construction of power projects that 
were now being handed over to the authority. 
Therefore, the involvement of secretaries of the 
Ministry of Water Resources and Ministry of Finance 
was essential. Legal matters were involved in 
tendering local and international jobs and supplies 
and so the inclusion of the secretary of Ministry of 
Law and Justice. This kind of thinking moved us to a
traditional concept of a board........... The
minister was the chairman because the owner is the 
government and controls the shareholding."
c). The Public Services Commission
Section 78 (3A) of the constitution of Nepal states:
"The Public Services Commission shall be consulted 
in the making of the rules concerning the conditions 
of service of the employees of the government owned 
or controlled corporate bodies or of the 
organizations owned or controlled by such corporate 
bodies and in the matter of general principles to be 
applied in the appointment, promotion, and 
departmental action within the service or posts of 
such corporation or organization. The Public 
Services Commission shall exercise a supervisory 
control to ensure that those rules and the General 
Policy have been complied with."
The cabinet decision of the government and the NEA Act 
clearly specified that the authority was a government- 
owned and controlled enterprise. Correspondingly, the 
task of transferring the staff of the ED and the NEC was 
referred to the Public Services Commission (PSC) after 
the validation. The role played by the PSC in the 
personnel management of all state-owned enterprises
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including the NEA was justified by the secretary of the 
PSC:
"There are no other institutions or bodies in Nepal 
which look after personnel matters of state 
enterprises. Such bodies have been established in
other countries and we at the PSC have been assigned
this role. We have to safeguard the interest of
general staff and that is our reason for involvement 
in the NEA."
There was no prior consultation with the PSC on the 
personnel adjustment and the complexity of the transfer 
of staff even after the legislation of the authority was
finalized. Although the MWR did make several enquiries
concerning personnel rules very close to the validation 
of NEA, no policies or criteria were definite at this 
stage. The senior engineers from within the electricity 
industry claimed that the status of the authority was 
different and higher than the average state-owned
enterprises and thus demanded special considerations in 
the transfer of staff but the PSC strictly resorted to
conditions of their General Policy on personnel
management. The chairman of the PSC argued that there was 
no auxiliary provision for an authority in the 
constitution of the country which allowed special 
concessions or treatment. Accordingly, the rules and 
criteria for the staff transfer were worked out initially 
on the basis of their formal policy.
The staff adjustment was an extremely controversial 
issue because it entailed the interests of each and every
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individual and there were claims and counterclaims from 
different groups of staff. The staff of the civil service 
and the state-owned enterprises were guided by different 
sets of personnel rules and the PSC was authorized and 
responsible for integrating them into a single entity. 
Soon after their first set of recommendations was 
presented to the NEA, the key staff in the PSC realized 
that their rules would not solve the differences in this 
situation because various demands were made by the 
stakeholders and there were genuine problems in merging 
the two groups of staff together. In addition, 
politicking by interest groups was a regular feature and 
conflict was rife. There followed long negotiations 
between the PSC and key players representing the NEA and 
it took over two years to come to an agreement and both 
the interacting groups have had to make compromises and 
concessions to their interests. The key concern of the 
PSC as an august, constitutional body was that its 
decisions should be seen as fair, just and safeguarding 
the interests of all employees and, therefore, it claimed 
to have played a balancing role in the proposals and 
demands put forward by the management of the NEA. But 
there were also many staff within the NEA who cast doubts 
on the impartiality of PSC'S actions and decisions.
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Interests and Interpretation of Internal Actors From 
Within the Industry
The internal actors are members of the old setting
NEC and ED who were to be merged into the authority. Much
was at stake for these people because their long 
established order, job and career were being replaced by 
a new and uncertain situation. The change affected all of 
them and the costs were directly and immediately felt. 
This feature of change is explained by Wilson (1966):
"The proponent of a change is likely to see the
benefits of the proposal in personal terms and the 
costs in organizational terms; everyone else is 
likely to see the benefits in organizational terms 
and the costs in personal terms."
The starting point of this analysis will be the role 
played by the managing director (MD) of the NEA in the 
process of reorganization. The contribution and
importance of the leadership role in the successful 
management of change is a frequently highlighted theme in 
the literature on organizational change (Guest, 1962; 
Pettigrew, 1985; Quinn, 1980). In the case of this
reorganization, the contribution of the MD was important 
because of his prior leadership role in the industry as 
the chief engineer of the ED for a long time which 
continued with his appointment as the managing director 
of the NEA. As chief engineer of the ED, HM was the most 
senior and experienced member of staff in the industry 
and was very well acquainted with and engaged in the
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planning of the reorganization. He was the chief 
representative of the MWR on all discussions and 
negotiations with the banks and the consultants and he 
played a major role in the design of the legislation and 
the composition of the board.
The relationship between HM and the MWR needs to be 
examined in terms of the nature and conditions of his 
appointment. He was a joint secretary in the MWR and 
appointed to the post of the MD by the government at the 
recommendation of MWR for a term of four years. His 
permanent post was retained in the ministry which implied 
that he was not transferred as the other staff of the ED. 
His career remained with the ministry as he was to return 
back after the expiry of his term. His direct superiors 
were the minister and the secretary of the MWR who not 
only played an instrumental role in his appointment to 
the post of MD but were to exercise constant influence in 
his performance in the NEA and much later still in his 
career progression in the civil service. They were his 
foremost and powerful superiors and he needed to take 
account of this fact throughout his term as MD.
HM was a technical man who had long working 
experience in the ED, mainly as chief of various 
development projects. His job as the chief executive of 
the authority was his first experience of a purely 
managerial role and leadership of a state-owned 
enterprise, in this case the largest corporate body in
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Nepal. On his appointment, he faced two very important 
tasks: first, to manage the technical aspects of the
industry and to keep the power supply flowing
continuously/ second, to manage the implementation of
the reorganization in terms of structure, staff, and 
administrative/financial systems. HM stated that his 
choice was to let the generation and distribution
operations managed by the old NEC to continue as in the 
past because there were risks of disruptions in the
supply of electricity if changes were introduced.
Moreover, his own performance would be assessed in terms 
of the reliability of the power supply and services by 
important external individuals and the general public. 
The remaining decisions on the reorganization were the
keenly contested and controversial issues about the
organization structure, transfer of staff from the old 
organizations and formulation of administrative rules and 
regulations. HM's prime interest area in the NEA was the 
future development and expansion of the electricity
generation and distribution functions and he took pride 
in achievements in these areas, such as loans negotiated 
for the next hydro power projects, loans for transmission 
projects from the ADB and improvements in the technical 
design capability, load demand forecasts, and the
systematic selection of projects. As for the remaining 
issues related to the reorganization such as the staff 
transfer and administration, he regarded these as only a 
"small part" of the authority which would be sorted out 
slowly:
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"The NEA's prime concern was to provide a continuous 
power supply and to produce electricity accordingly
in time. Therefore on the technical side we have 
progressed considerably....the remaining
administrative part concerns the management of the 
authority and it will be sorted out in time 
gradually. We are now considering how to improve the 
managerial side and develop the organization
efficiently."
This kind of disposition on the part of the leadership 
meant that the implementation of the financial and 
administrative systems were floundering four years after 
the setting up of the NEA. This state of affairs led the
WB to initiate a new effort at organization development
in late 1989 which was classified as the "twinning 
programme" - a collaboration with the electricity utility 
of France to strengthen the technical, organizational and 
managerial capability of NEA and financed by the WB under 
the terms of a loan for the Arun Hydro-power Project.
Although the secretary of the MWR also participated 
in the interactions on criteria for staff adjustment with 
the PSC, it would be naive to assume that he was the sole 
arbiter to present the case of the NEA. HM as the leader 
of the authority and directly faced with the problem of 
staff adjustment was allowed to present his conditions 
and requirements. HM was keen to protect and promote a 
few of his very close associates from the old setting in 
the new authority in the staff adjustment. All the 
background papers and the proposals for discussion with 
the PSC were prepared by HM and his few trusted ex-ED 
subordinates in total confidence and secrecy. Such
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stratagems went to the extent of excluding eligible NEC 
personnel from the posts of director-in-chief and 
director in the Administration directorate during the 
period of the provisional staff arrangement which lasted 
for over two years. The confidentiality maintained by HM 
and his associates was described by a manager of NEC who 
was an active protester against the criteria designed for 
staff adjustment:
"Very few people knew anything about the 
recommendations proposed by the PSC. It was kept a 
total secret. At least the directors-in-chief should 
have been informed but even they were not. We used 
to know something only at the last stage when they 
had decided on a certain course of action and this 
decision was passed at the execution level. Even the 
manager of central administration was not informed 
because everything was confidentially handled by the 
managing director and chief of corporate
planning......They had no experience of personnel
management because the Ministry of General 
Administration would always look into the personnel 
matters of the ED."
The confidants of HM who were working with him on the 
design of the criteria for staff adjustment were all 
engineers with technical jobs in the NEA and they had no 
previous experience or knowledge about personnel rules 
and regulations of state-owned enterprises. An under 
secretary of the Ministry of General Administration who 
was contracted to advise on staff policies recalled his 
disapproval at the manner in which the top management 
organized the staff adjustment:
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"The most important thing was that they never 
considered the necessity of proper personnel 
management. I do not think they felt personnel 
management was an important function. Anyone in the 
organization was considered capable of managing the 
personnel activities and duties. There was a 
director for personnel but I doubt if he was capable 
of doing his work."
The associates of HM consisted of five very close 
and trusted subordinates who had worked with him earlier 
in the ED and formed a staunch affiliation. These close 
associates were given the title of "pancha pandav" by 
others in the industry, a metaphor referring to the five 
united and devoted brothers who were the heroes in the 
epic Hindu myth "the Mahabharat". The MD did well to 
protect his associates in the new authority as well. It 
was alleged by many employees of the NEA that the 
criteria for the lateral entry and performance evaluation 
in the staff adjustment were designed to match the 
qualifications of these candidates and to debar any other 
competitors at the same time. A senior superintendent 
engineer of MWR who was one of the main critics and 
opposed to the actions of HM disapproved the favour done 
to these people:
"What happened with staff adjustment was not
institutional development but rather staff 
development for special people. The main problem
with HM was that he trusted only these five people 
and not anyone else. These five had worked with him 
very closely in ED and were his trusted and
favourites since then. He would not trust anyone
else. Maybe because of these five people he managed 
to survive for the past four years but it's not 
right not to trust anyone else and doubt the rest of 
us. Doubt is such a dangerous thing, take the case 
of Stalin who even killed his own wife."
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These associates were also favoured in the allocation of 
"attractive" and sought after jobs including 
developmental projects in which HM shared special 
interest. It was not uncommon for them to manage several 
important projects while other colleagues of equivalent 
status complained of inadequate work or were not allowed 
to undertake the work that was within their sphere of 
responsibility. For example, one of the "favoured" 
directors was assigned responsibility for five major 
development projects in addition to his functional job/ 
whereas a few of the other directors (from the NEC) 
complained that they did not have enough work load to 
keep them occupied even during the office hours and were 
not allocated additional work in spite of requests made 
to the MD. Likewise, the director of the Generation and 
Transmission Construction Department pointed out that 
although it was his responsibility to appoint managers 
and undertake the construction of projects, he was not 
allowed to execute his authority and his department was 
"being assassinated by taking away our key tasks and 
functions". The MD was a powerful figure within the 
context of internal matters of the authority.
I now turn to the interests of other members of the 
old organizations and start with the role played by 
individuals from the ED in avoiding the reorganization 
for such a long period. The resistance to any kind of 
reorganization and a new institutional rearrangement by 
senior engineers of the ED was the primary reason for the
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long delay and inaction. As the dominant group in the 
industry, they were satisfied with the status quo whereas 
the change was confusing, disturbing and risky. The 
validation of the NEA took place ten years after the 
government first agreed that the institutional 
arrangement was not appropriate for the power industry. 
This delay compared with Pettigrew's (1980) statement 
that "one indicator of the amount of political energy 
released might be the amount of time taken in making the 
decision to go ahead with the change". Although it was 
agreed with the ADB mission very early on that a 
reorganization was essential for the better operations of 
the industry, the reluctance to change was greater than 
what either the ADB or the consultants had anticipated or 
comprehended. The senior people who were responsible for 
executing the covenants of the loan agreements were 
themselves the main forces against change. The reasons 
for such resistance were sometimes shared with the 
lending agencies and the consultants but the deeper 
motives for maintaining the status quo were not always 
appreciated by them. There were two very serious threats 
to the interests of the senior engineers from any kind of 
reorganization. First, the reorganization would alter 
their status from a civil servant to a state-owned 
corporate employee and the negative consequences of this 
change to them were several:
i. loss of status and prestige which was related to the 
emotional and social importance of the civil service job
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in Nepal/ the civil service was regarded as the "King's 
service" and looked upon by the entire society;
ii. loss of mobility because as a civil servant one could 
be transferred to any ministry, department or any other 
government agencies;
iii. loss of career progression because hypothetically 
any civil servant could rise through the ranks to the 
post of a secretary of a ministry;
iv. drop in status as a corporate employee because the ED 
regarded and treated the NEC as only subordinates and 
never equals.
Secondly, the ED always maintained and controlled 
the "glamorous" jobs in the power industry which was 
basically the development function and the NEC was always 
assigned the "dirty task" of consumer service and 
distribution. The NEC engineers were cynically referred 
to by their counterparts in the ED as "engineers who 
visit the house of ministers to repair and mend fuses". 
The development activity such as the construction of 
projects was an attraction to all the engineers in the 
industry because it offered opportunities for valuable 
construction experiences, working with expatriate 
consultants, foreign visits, flexible rules and 
regulations, recognition and rewards for successful 
completion of projects by the King, abundance of
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resources, and last but not definitely the least, plenty 
of scope for monetary benefits and fringes. The ED was 
virtually in exclusive control of all these benefits and 
advantages, and senior officers from the MWR such as the 
minister and the secretary were associated as members of 
the development boards for projects. It was an 
arrangement mutually beneficial to all the participants 
and thus the reasons for resistance against any kind of 
threat. At a later stage when the reorganization was 
inevitable, the same individuals from the ED were 
interested in preserving the old benefits in the new 
arrangement.
The senior engineers of the ED resisted the 
reorganization but it was not done as direct 
confrontation with the banks or the consultants. Instead 
they did not take any initiative to embrace the change. 
The resistance was asserted in subtle ways rather than by 
an expression of negative denial to what were logical 
propositions on organizational development. At least four 
instances of resistance were discernible:
i. rejection and disconcern for the proposals of BEI;
ii. counterproposal to create two bodies rather than a 
single utility after acceptance of the BEI report;
iii. deliberately delayed decisions as in selection of 
consultants, response to consultants' reports, etc.
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iv. no seriousness and inaction even after submission of 
final report by C&L resulting in delay in the passing of 
the legislation, non-appointment of key staff, rejection 
of the implementation programme. A senior engineer of the 
ED described the general feeling towards the 
reorganization at that time:
"Even at the stage of the final report, there were 
groups of senior people for and against the 
reorganization of the industry. The government had 
given commitment to the bank but nobody thought of 
this seriously. It was only after the decision of
the cabinet to execute the NEA act  then
everybody was concerned about securing positions."
The ADB mission members were often displeased at the 
lack of action from the ED in spite of early commitment. 
It would be an understatement to interpret the resistance 
of these actors as their "inability to know what they 
would gain from the reorganization" as was expressed by 
Sieber. Certainly these actors knew what they were to 
lose in the changed situation and therefore it was in 
their self-interest "to keep the organization doing the 
things they have been doing in the past, and doing them 
in the manner to which they have become accustomed" 
(Mangham, 197 9).
Interestingly there was unanimous support for the 
planned reorganization of the sector from the NEC and the 
logical and rational reasons expressed were in terms of 
performance efficiency of the industry, that is, 
improvement by bringing together all related functions
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within one body. The majority of NEC staff supported the 
single authority concept and a simple and comprehensive 
explanation was provided by one of the managers of NEC: 
"for us, we could not go worse than this in any change 
programme." This statement sums up the feeling of "no 
loss" experienced by the NEC personnel as a result of the 
change. Their interest was not threatened and instead the 
change would usher in opportunities to share the 
developmental activities monopolised by the ED for a long 
time and the area of operation would be expanded offering 
people more mobility. Even the board members of the NEC 
considered the reorganization as an opportunity for 
people to move into a bigger corporation with more scope 
than in the past.
The general manager of the NEC supported the idea of 
a single authority because he agreed with the lending 
agencies that the electricity industry has "a commercial 
character, everything of this industry has to be operated 
in commercial principles". He was particularly unhappy 
about the capital loans taken and used by the ED and his 
organization being held responsible for the repayment. He 
conceded that only a single commercial utility could make
effective use of the loans and operate the industry
profitably:
"Whenever we take a commercial loan for investment 
from the two main lending banks, we should have the
capacity and capability to pay it back. We were
unable to display such capability and we were 
constantly told to increase our efficiency, increase 
our tariffs, etc. ... In the context of Nepal,
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hydro-power is the only tangible and perennial 
resource and it could generate huge earnings if the 
electricity industry was operated commercially."
The deputy general manager also lent his support to 
the creation of a single utility because of the 
difficulties faced by the NEC in recruiting new engineers 
and the poor coordination in the activities between the 
ED and the NEC:
"One of the major problems we faced was that none of 
the younger engineers used to come to the NEC, they 
all preferred the ED. The NEC was only a corporate 
body, didn't have a future, didn't have any projects 
either. All big projects were grabbed by the ED. If 
we had one organization, this problem would not 
exist....The other thing was the ED undertook the 
projects and handed them back to us after completion 
for operation. In case of any problem there was 
always finger-pointing and blaming the faults on the 
other. We may be blamed for poor maintenance of 
plants and we claim that faults existed during the 
construction period or commissioning time. This kind 
of passing on the buck was frequently there."
The support and preference for one authority from the 
majority of middle and junior level managers of the NEC 
was lucidly interpreted by a regional manager:
"The engineers in the ED were most unhappy about the 
reorganization whereas we at the NEC were quite 
pleased. After completing our engineering degrees, 
we were always restricted to service-oriented work 
such as consumer service, payments from customers, 
extension of transmission lines, etc. and our career 
was restricted to these small jobs. The ED engineers 
were appointed project managers, rubbed shoulders 
with foreign consultants, got almost all overseas 
training and travel, and they had infinite scope in 
their job. We got the leftovers from them, after 
they completed a project. We were waiting the chance 
and the reorganization was naturally preferred by 
us . "
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The two organizations, the NEC and the ED represented two 
opposing stances within the power industry, i.e. 
stability versus change, and the stand taken by each was 
motivated by self-interest.
After the decision of the government to create a 
single authority and the choice made by the MWR on the 
legislation, board composition and the chief executive, 
the changes concerning the internal details of the 
organization in terms of structure and staff adjustment 
were left to the internal stakeholders. The structure was 
designed by the senior engineers because they were the 
top management of the old setting and the staff 
adjustment was worked out by the management of the NEA. 
These two issues were the focus of attention of all the 
staff because security of posts was the main interest of 
all in this merger situation. A higher position in the 
authority could ensure "personal aggrandizement resulting 
from upward mobility and increased status" (Schein, 
1977) . Since nothing was defined yet in terms of rules 
and regulations, the fluidity of the change situation was 
open to competitive interests and interpretations. The 
situation was a "golden opportunity for a phase of
limbo", in the words of John (C&L).
An alternate view which looks at organization
structure as an outcome of contest for control and
advantage can be used to explain the design of the NEA.
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Such an approach is interpreted as the politics of 
organization structure by Pfeffer (1978) :
"The design of an organization, its structure, is 
first and foremost the system of control and 
authority by which the organization is controlled. 
In the organizational structure, decision discretion 
is allocated to various positions and the 
distribution of formal authority is
established....Thus, organization structures create 
formal power and authority by designing certain 
decisions and create informal power through the 
effect on information and communication structures 
within the organization. Organizational structure is 
a picture of the governance of the organization and 
a determinant of who controls and decides 
organizational activities."
The selection made by individuals belonging to the 
"dominant coalition" (Pfeffer, 1981) of the organization 
prevailed in the design of the authority as well. Arguing 
along the same lines, Child (1972) mentions that neither 
size and technology nor environmental requirements are so 
binding in most organizations as to remove the potential 
for choice of the structural arrangements by those in 
power in the organization.
The process of staff adjustment was permeated by 
actions of individuals who were trying to promote and 
secure positions in the organization structure. All in 
all this process was marked by conflicts, contests, 
pulling and hauling, compromises, etc. Right from the 
very inception of the NEA, there was a concerted claim 
from the engineers of the ED that they should not be 
equated with the NEC in staff adjustment. This feeling 
was also shared by their colleagues in the MWR and hence
234
a large number of ED employees were assigned to higher 
posts during the provisional staff arrangement. Their 
demand for preferential treatment was based on the 
following reasons shared by majority of the ED employees:
a. The ED was guided by the civil service personnel rules 
in which promotion was very slow and less frequently 
done. A creation of a new post had to be approved by the 
MWR, Ministry of General Administration, Ministry of 
Finance and finally the promotion was conducted by the 
PSC. The entire process was lengthy and rigourous. 
Whereas the NEC as an autonomous body only needed the 
approval of its board to create new positions and the 
management could execute the promotion procedures; people 
were promoted faster in a corporate body.
b. Contemporaries who joined the industry at the same 
time were in different grades in the two organizations. 
Although both organizations followed a similar grade 
system, the ED refused to accept that the civil service 
grading pattern was equivalent to that of a state-owned 
enterprise.
c. The transfer of their service into a corporate body 
was looked upon as a personal loss by the employees of 
the ED because they would lose the status, prestige, 
opportunities, etc. associated with the civil service. 
Although there was no commensurate compensation for this 
loss, it was argued that the transfer could be made
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"slightly attractive" by offering higher levels, as 
consolation to them. In the case of the NEC, they saw no 
loss at all because the move was from one corporate body 
to another.
d. The ED was always responsible for the more important 
development functions as compared to the "secondary" 
functions performed by the NEC. They claimed that the 
people doing the more vital work should be treated 
favourably.
e. Probably the most serious grievance was raised against 
the promotion executed by the NEC prior to the validation 
of the authority. The promotion process which began about 
fifteen months before the inception of the NEA continued 
until the very last day of the NEC. Altogether some one 
hundred professionals were promoted and about half of 
them were in senior and middle level positions. The ED 
staff treated this as a deliberate "game" played by the 
NEC to put themselves in an advantageous position in the 
authority.
The NEC keenly pursued a programme of restructuring 
and carried out a series of staff promotions while C&L 
was still working out the details of the NEA. The general 
manager proposed an expansion and changes in the 
structure which created new positions (including one for 
himself and many of his senior staff) . He argued that
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such a structural change was absolutely essential for 
operation and better performance of the NEC:
"I prepared an organization structure which I as the 
chief executive believed was essential for the 
operations of the NEC and I wanted to implement it. 
It is not for me to put restrictions on my own 
organization because the NEA was being established
in the future......I made an organization which
fits into the NEA, that can be easily assimilated. 
Whereas the ED has taken the attitude that the NEA 
will not be created and they did not take any 
initiative.1
This proposal for restructuring was approved by the board 
of directors of the NEC because its main concern was the 
requirement of the organization as requested by the 
general manager. One of the board members who was in 
charge of a sub-committee established to study the 
proposed changes explained their support for the redesign 
of the structure and the promotion of staff:
"The NEC did not follow any form of manpower 
planning and there was a feeling that something had 
to be done. I think to that extent I made my
contribution telling them that people should be 
promoted, people should be trained. We stressed 
mobility and career progression. We were confident 
that this would be adjusted later in the
NEA..... The rationale, articulation and
paraphernalia of the creation of the NEA by merger 
was not well known to us all. We said why shouldn’t
the NEC be on its own till it was really merged. Let
us take care of our own organization because there 
is so much to be done in terms of manpower
development and career progression. There was lot of 
frustration due to lack of promotion and this took 
priority."
The chairman of the NEC who was also the secretary of the 
MWR supported the redesign and promotion for all these 
reasons and, in addition, he argued that the ED employees
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had taken "all advantages and benefits in the industry in 
the past". He was convinced that the changes in the NEC 
were justifiable. A series of promotions was initiated 
which became a big issue of conflict and grievance among 
the ED staff later on in the NEA. Fortunately for the 
employees of the ED, they were given sympathetic support 
by their new minister who seemed to disapprove the 
promotion that had taken place:
"The promotion that took place in the old 
electricity corporation was I think a bureaucratic 
trick. They did try to get an advantage for 
themselves but in the actual appointment that took 
place in the NEA the ED people were given a lot of 
leeway."
The final staff adjustment was made in the context of all 
these conflicting interests and the outcome was a 
negotiated settlement. It was a compromise solution in 
which the demands of both groups were to some extent 
taken into account; the solutions were interpreted by the 
decision-makers who in turn were influenced by pressures 
from both sides.
All the actors were not satisfied with the outcome 
of the staff adjustment even though most of them were 
transferred into higher levels in the final settlement. 
There was a persistent demand from a large number of ED 
employees to return back to the MWR rather than transfer 
their services and careers into a state-owned enterprise. 
There was no alternative option to the disgruntled NEC 
staff but to remain in the authority because their old
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organization ceased to exist after the validation of the 
NEA. The case was different for some of the ED employees 
who had the "option to exist" (Hirschman, 1970), to 
escape from an objectionable state of affairs because as 
civil servants their employer was the government. The 
creation of a special unit, the hydro-power project pool, 
in the MWR was an outcome of interests of engineers from 
the ED who mobilized and induced the government and other 
external authorities to take such a decision. In the 
context of the creation and operation of a state-owned 
enterprise, there were other external centres and sources 
of influence who were able to substantially affect or 
change management’s decisions.
Summary
The reorganization of the electricity industry as 
envisaged by the two lending agencies for improved 
efficiency and performance, and achievement of both 
sectoral and national goals has been interpreted as a 
"rational model" to organizational change and 
development. The management consultants supported and 
shared the assumptions of the lending agencies and their 
planned change proposals were guided by "rational problem 
solving" objectives. A structural approach to 
organizational change was recommended for the achievement 
of efficiency and goals. Their prescriptive planned 
changes could not explain what actually happened during 
the change and the dynamics behind the process of change,
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especially in view of the fact that all their 
recommendations were considerably modified during the 
implementation. My analysis has identified the key 
stakeholders who were directly involved in the 
reorganization, and their interests and definitions which 
they tried to promote and protect. The stakeholders have 
been broadly classified into two categories: external and 
internal. The external stakeholders were the "outsiders" 
in the electricity industry and comprised the lending 
agencies, the parent ministry, and other related 
government ministries and agencies. The internal 
stakeholders were the members from within the industry, 
that is the staff of the ED and the NEC. The change 
process and the outcomes can be interpreted as the 
results of actions and interactions among these 
stakeholders who upheld very different definitions as 
they tried to secure their interests. Thus, the analysis 
suggests that a political model may be more appropriate 
to explain the dynamics of process of change in the 
context of the state-owned enterprise. The next chapter 
will review the negotiated order perspective and relate 
it to the political model of change.
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CHAPTER FIVE
NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND NEGOTIATED ORDER THEORY
The discussion of the previous chapter clearly 
suggests that the process of organizational change in the 
electricity industry was far divorced from the planned 
rational goals and programmes and instead change was more 
accurately explained and understood in terms of political 
processes. I have stated that the planned change 
programmes as prepared by the consultants were guided by 
"structural determinism" in the sense that their main 
focus was on structural modifications for improved goal 
achievement. In line with the perspective dominating the 
rationalistic and functional paradigm, they adopted 
"static structural-functional and rational-bureaucratic 
explanations" (Day and Day, 1977) of complex
organizations and consequently an equally rational model 
for explaining human behaviour in the context of change. 
Even in the situation of a major radical change such as a 
merger and a reorganization of the electricity industry, 
the participating people were treated as relatively 
deterministic and passive characters positively 
responding to the demands and conditions of the new 
situation.
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Although government decision-making in Nepal is 
usually seen as a form of unilateral decree and such was 
the case in this reorganization, the process of such 
decision-making cannot be interpreted as guided by 
planned rational objectives. It was stated in the
previous chapter that the government could not be 
considered as a single monolithic unit making value 
maximizing decisions and choices among several 
calculated alternatives and in accordance to the 
rational recommendations prescribed by the consultants. 
A rather different picture emerged where several legal 
bodies, groups and individuals from both within and
outside the industry have direct interests in the
outcome of the change programme and in its 
implementation. Additionally, the people from inside the 
industry were not passive individuals just because they 
were employed in a government-owned and controlled 
industry. The process of change was influenced by these 
bodies and individuals who were explained as stakeholders 
and, consequently, the change decisions and choices may 
be seen as being a process of negotiation. Given the 
political character of change in which there was the 
presence of several vested interests and conflicts over 
different interpretations, it was inevitable that any 
final outcome would have to be negotiated. This chapter 
will present further theoretical discussions into the 
politics of change, undertake a review and critique of
the negotiated order theory, and lastly suggest a 
conceptual framework for the development of the
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negotiated order theory. The negotiated order is 
explained here in relation to an organizational change 
situation in the context of a state-owned enterprise
rather than the common application of this theory to the 
study of creation of a social order at a particular point 
in time by most of the other researchers. I look upon 
negotiation as an important feature in the process of 
change which arises from the political dynamics of a
change situation. Such a relationship is mentioned by 
Mangham (1978):
"Order and change may thus be seen to be the 
products of negotiation, the result of pulling and 
hauling that constitute the political bargaining 
process which occurs between individuals and groups 
as they struggle to achieve their goals and 
objectives in association with, or at the expense 
of, others."
The Politics of Change
A framework of analysis which takes into account the 
role and interests of the external and internal
stakeholders seems to present an accurate descriptive 
account of the change process and highlights the 
overwhelming prevalence of political dynamics in change. 
The change process can be explained in terms of
organizational politics which according to Morgan (1986) 
arise from the "relations between interests, conflicts 
and power". Organizational politics arise when people 
think differently and want to act differently and this
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diversity in turn creates a tension that must be resolved 
through political means. Cyert and March (1963) viewed 
organizations as a coalition of different interest groups 
in which there is the potential for internal goals
conflict inherent in a coalition of diverse individual 
groups. Pfeffer (1981) states that organizational
politics emerge out of interests and involve various
activities to obtain one's preferred outcome. Similarly, 
the interest of the stakeholders was the main determining 
factor in the situation of uncertainty created by the 
reorganization and individuals resorted to various 
actions and interactions to secure their desired
outcomes.
Two conceptual assumptions are fundamental to 
understanding and explaining organizational politics and 
politics of change:
(i) a pluralist view of organization
(ii) a model of man: an anti-deterministic stance.
(i). A Pluralist View of Organization
I have already explained that the government was not 
a single body but rather constituted several independent 
units with legal power and responsibilities; likewise, 
many other interest groups from within the industry made 
divergent claims in the preparation and execution of the
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planned changes. Burrell and Morgan (1979) refer to the 
development of a pluralist theory of organization which 
lays the basis for the analysis of an organization as a 
pluralist political system in which "organizations and 
their environment are viewed principally as arenas of 
conflict between individuals and groups whose activities 
are oriented towards the achievement of their personal 
goals, values and interests". They draw a sharp contrast 
between the pluralist and unitary views as reflected in 
three sets of assumption relating to interests, conflicts 
and power. Of particular relevance are the features 
attributed to the unitary view of organizations which 
tend to be adopted in rational planned change by 
management consultants.
"The unitary view of organization is epitomised in 
the classical theory of organisation which tends to 
view the organization as a machine geared to the 
achievement of formal goals. From this point of view 
the organization is an instrument of purposive 
rationality, which directs its members in an 
effective and efficient manner. The members of the 
organization are viewed as responding to incentives 
which secure their commitment to the formal goals of 
the organization. The enterprise is thus envisaged 
as a unitary phenomena in which the goals of all 
members can be simultaneously satisfied/ the task of 
management is to ensure that the organization is 
appropriately structured, directed and controlled so 
that effective operation is achieved." (Burrell and 
Morgan, op.cit.)
Fox (1966) differentiates between the unitary view 
of organizations which tend to stress that an 
organization is a cooperative enterprise united in the 
pursuit of a common goal and the pluralist view which 
stresses the diversity of individual interests and goals.
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Burrell and Morgan (op. cit.) state that the formal goals 
of an organization from a pluralist view have the status 
of "little more than a legitimising facade, an umbrella 
under which a host of individuals and group interests are 
pursued as an end in themselves". Conflict must be 
institutionalised in some way so that it plays a 
constructive role within the context of the organization 
as a whole. In conclusion, they view the organization as 
a "plurality of power holders who derive their influence 
from a plurality of sources" and the power of various 
groups as a crucial variable for understanding what
happens in everyday affairs/ how conflicts of interests 
are solved. Morgan (op.cit.) continues with the 
comparison between the pluralist perspective as opposed 
to the unitary and radical views of organizations. The 
unitary view pictures society as "an integrated whole 
where the interests of individuals and society are
synonymous........... and the individuals should place
the interests of the state above all else" and the
radical view presents society as comprising "antagonistic 
class interests, characterized by deep-rooted social and 
political cleavages, and held together as much by
coercion as by consent". In contrast, the pluralist 
vision of society emphasizes the plural nature of the 
interests, conflicts and sources of power that shape 
organizational life. The term "pluralism" is borrowed 
from political science to characterize "idealized kinds 
of liberal democracies where potentially authoritarian 
tendencies are held in check by the free interplay of
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interest groups that have a stake in government". The 
planned reorganization proposals of the consultants tend 
to match with the unitary view because the electricity 
industry was symbolised as an instrument of "purposive 
rationality" and its members were considered as 
responding to incentives and their commitment to 
organizational goals were assumed to be secure.
Although a critique of the development of the 
pluralist theory is beyond the scope of this research, 
the relevance of this perspective to understanding the 
process of change is meaningful. More importantly this 
view presents a contrary picture against the unitary 
framework which seems to have guided the work of 
organization development practitioners generally. They 
assume that formal goals are mutually accepted by 
everyone and interpersonal relationships are harmonious, 
a situation which is a far cry from the reality of most 
organizations. Many organization theorists have 
traditionally adopted a unitary view of organization and 
it is only since the early 1960's that an increasing 
number of social theorists have concerned themselves with 
the development of theoretical perspectives which are 
essentially pluralist in nature according to Burrell and 
Morgan. The works of Peter Blau, Michel Crozier and 
Etzioni all touch upon some aspects of the pluralist 
perspective and they are critical of the assumptions 
underlying the unitary view. Fox (op. cit.) has been 
prominent in advocating a pluralistic framework in order
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to understand organizations and he doubts the unitary 
assumption of commonly shared goals by members of the 
organization:
"In the sense that the groups are mutually dependent 
they may be said to have a common interest in the 
survival of the whole of which they are parts. But 
this is essentially a remote, long-term 
consideration which enters little into the day-to- 
day conduct of the organization and cannot provide 
that harmony of operational objectives and methods 
for which managers naturally yearn."
Mangham (op.cit.) states that a pluralistic view of 
organization is essential for an appreciation of the 
politics of change:
"Pluralism is a fact of organizational life just as 
it is a fact of life in society. People bring 
different perspective and different experiences to 
bear in any particular social situation; they also 
bring different expectations and seek to achieve
different goals and objectives..... Industrial
societies are composed of such a profusion of 
groups, societies, alliances, coalitions and 
organizations that pluralism is the order of the day 
and no one world view is capable of totally shutting 
out all others."
Similarly Pettigrew's work is focused on explaining 
organizational change as a result of actions of interest 
groups and his various works present a pluralist theory 
of decision-making. On interest groups and change, he 
writes:
"The possibilities and limitations of change in any 
organization are influenced by the history of 
attitudes and relationships between interest groups 
in and outside the firm, and by the mobilisation of 
support for a change within the power structure at
any point of time Changes are also a product of
processes which recognise historical and continuing 
struggles for power and status as motive forces, and 
consider which interest groups and individuals may
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gain and lose as proposed changes surface, receive 
attention, are consolidated and implemented, or fall 
from grace before they ever get off the ground." 
(Pettigrew, 1985)
A pluralist view of organization for the analysis of 
the processes of reorganization and the creation of the 
NEA is adopted because it not only recognises the 
multiplicity of stakeholders but also legitimatizes the 
divergent claims made in the context of change. A 
pluralist view justifies the processes by which the 
diverse claims were incorporated into the change 
decisions. These claims were the reasons for much of the 
disagreement and conflict which led to negotiations for 
final decisions and choices.
(ii). A Model of Man: An Anti-Deterministic Stance
Every social-scientific theory makes certain 
assumptions about human nature, that is, they assume a 
specific model of man. Burrell and Morgan (op.cit.) refer 
to this as the voluntarism - determinism debate:
"At one extreme we can identify a determinist view 
which regards man and his activities as being 
completely determined by the situation or 
'environment* in which he is located. At another 
extreme we can identify the voluntarist view that 
man is completely autonomous and free-willed."
Hollis (1977) writing exclusively on models of man 
comments:
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"All social theorists and philosophers who seek to 
explain human action have a 'model of man1, a 
metaphysical view of human nature. Some make man a 
plastic creature of nature and nurture, some present 
him as the autonomous creator of his social world, 
some offer a compromise."
Much of the traditional organization theories originating 
from the functional paradigm have adopted a deterministic 
view on human nature. Zey-Ferrell (1981) reviews the
"dominant perspective" on organizations by the 
structuralist theorists and suggests that they treat 
humans as "nonvolitional, spongelike, malleable 
organisms, who absorb and adapt to their environments
rather than volitional actors pursuing self- 
interests .... humans are further implicitly viewed as 
relatively powerless, and as determined and controlled by 
organizations". The importance given to the organization 
rather than the people is another feature of the 
predominant view according to Greenfield (1973). Two 
critical assumptions underlie this view of organizations: 
one, organizations exist apart from people; two, the 
goals of an organization are independent of those held 
by individuals within it. He sees many organization
theories as dealing "with human response to organization 
rather than with human activity in creating 
organizations". Based on these assumptions, a line of 
reasoning emerges which proposes that the way to improve 
organizations is to redesign and direct them toward 
goals. Organizational change, therefore, becomes focused 
on the shape of the organization for organizational
improvement, according to Greenfield (op. cit.):
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"Although there is dispute about what to change 
within the organization, there is usually agreement 
that organizations are entities capable of 
improvements and that organizations and individuals 
have goals which would be better achieved if the 
organizations were smaller, less bureaucratic, 
healthier, more structures, or more something, which 
would change their internal structure or
processes."
Criticism against the "determinist" assumptions on 
human behaviour of the structuralist approaches has been 
raised by theorists who have supported a "voluntary" 
model of man. Weick (1969) finds fault in treating human 
beings as passive and deterministic. Argyris (1972) 
comments that the structuralist cannot develop a theory 
of organization without a theory of human nature and 
without assumptions and principles of the psychology of 
individual participants, specifically an analysis of the 
meanings of actions. Silverman (1970) states that "the 
positivistic explanations, which assert that action is 
determined by external and constraining social and non­
social forces, are inadmissible".
A model of man which gives due respect to the social 
reality that humans can shape and mould their destiny as 
well as the social structures in which they exist has 
been developed in the intellectual traditions of the 
action frame of reference and interactionism. The action 
perspective holds that organizations cannot be understood 
unless the social actions which constitute organizations 
and the meanings behind these actions reflected by 
analyzing attitudes, beliefs, and values of the
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participants are studied (as reflected in the works of 
Schutz, 1962/ Berger and Luckmann, 1967/ and Goffman, 
1959) . Blumer (1969) holds a view of man as capable of 
interaction, choice, appraisal and decision. Developing 
on the idea of Mead, Blumer (op. cit.) defined symbolic 
interactionism as involving "interpretation, or 
ascertaining the meaning of the action or remarks of the 
other person, and definition, or conveying indications to 
the other person as to how he is to act. Human 
association consists of a process of such interpretation 
and definition. Through this process the participants fit 
their own acts to the ongoing acts of one another and 
guide others in doing so". Man is, therefore, a creator 
of his own world. Looking from this paradigm human action 
is not caused or released but actually emerges from the 
meaning given to a situation by the individuals "as a 
result of the interpretive process which occurs 
continuously and constantly as the individual moves from 
situation to situation" (Hall, 1972).
A political perspective to human behaviour is based 
on a model of man with an ability to interpret a
situation and create behaviour in response accordingly.
Thus, man is able to strategize, to manipulate, to cheat 
and to deceive other people and also to cooperate, to 
help, to guide and to advice other people, according to
Mangham (op.cit.) . He advocates a model of man for the
study of organization which is an accurate reflection of 
man experienced in everyday life:
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"My metaphor for man is man; I am proposing that in 
order to understand organizations and in order to 
develop ideas for action people should be treated as 
if they were human beings as we know and understand 
them in everyday life. I submit that we do not know 
and understand people as machines, as plants or as 
systems, rather we know and understand them as 
unique entities, as specifically human beings". 
(Mangham, op.cit.)
Such a simple but precise assumption of human nature also 
allows an understanding of man as a self-interested 
operator which is naturally reflected in his political 
behaviour. People frequently take actions to make self­
benefits and gains because they are able to sense, 
perceive, interpret, choose and adapt in social 
situations. People decide what is the best course of 
action to be taken in a situation not on the basis of 
sanctioned behaviour norms or rules or regulations. 
Boissevain (1974) describes that man, in addition to 
being a moral person, is also out for himself and 
essentially this is no more than a "common sense" model. 
He particularly stresses the self-interest motive o>f man:
"Within the social, cultural and ecological 
framework so established, people decide their course 
of action on the basis of what is best for 
themselves, and not only, as struotural- 
functionalists would have us believe, on the basis 
of accepted and sanctioned norms of behaviour. Man 
is thus also a manipulator, a self-interested 
operator, as well as a moral being. He is constantly 
trying to better or to maintain his position by 
choosing between alternative courses of action. But 
since he is dependent on others, it is impossible 
for him to achieve his own self-interest unless he 
takes others into account and can demonstrate that 
his action in some way benefits or does no>t harm 
them. Naked motives of crude self interest cam never 
be brought forward to justify action to others. 
Pragmatic action is dressed up in normative olothes 
to make it acceptable." (Boissevain, op. c;t.)
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Referring to the process of reorganization, these 
two fundamental assumptions offer further explanation to 
the political nature of change. Several stakeholders 
existed within and outside the electricity industry and 
they all had direct interest and influence in the 
operation and reorganization of the industry which is a 
clear manifestation of the pluralistic nature of 
organizations. The stakeholders were represented by 
individuals who confronted the change situation with 
their own interpretations and definitions of the 
situation. Their political roles and behaviour can hardly 
be contained in deterministic explanations and 
assumptions of the traditional school. The non-acceptance 
of the planned changes and the final change decisions and 
outcomes can be explained in terms of the social actions 
and choices of the dominant actors in the industry.
How were the stakeholders able to implement the 
planned reorganization in spite of the divergent claims 
and often contradictory positions and expectations? How 
did the diverse group of individuals come to terms with 
each other's actions in spite of the conflicting 
interests? The answers to these questions are found 
within the pluralist perspective which also sets 
limitations to political actions. A pluralist view need 
not necessarily imply antagonistic class interests 
leading to total disorder and chaos. It accepts the 
inevitably of conflicts and politics but conflict is seen 
as having its limits. Crozier (1964) sees power
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struggles in organizations being limited by certain 
stabilising factors, such as the need to maintain minimum 
standards of performance efficiency, to maintain working 
interpersonal relationships, to live together and finally 
to share mutual privilege, which ensures that 
organizations continue as on-going concerns. Such 
continuity and creation of unity out of diversity is 
attained through a process of bargaining and negotiation 
and this issue is well expounded by Morgan (1986) :
"The organization as a whole is thus often obliged 
to function with a minimum kind of consensus. This 
allows the organization to survive while recognizing 
the diversity of the aims and aspirations of its 
members. The organization often has to be content 
with satisfactory rather than optimal solutions to 
problems, with negotiation and compromise becoming 
more important than technical rationality... The 
pluralist vision is of a society where different 
groups bargain and compete for a share in the 
balance of power and use their influence to realize 
Aristotle’s ideal of politics: a negotiated order
that creates unity out of diversity."
In the case of this reorganization, I shall argue 
that every decision seemed to be couched in politics, and 
negotiation among agents representing stakeholders was 
the key process in the formulation and implementation of 
the change. The dominant role of negotiation in 
organizational change is discussed by Warmington et al. 
(1977) :
"Changes in the organization are the observable 
consequences of a complex process of negotiation, 
compromise modification... (changes) are the outcome 
of a long series of constrained but vaguely defined 
strategies negotiated between various groups and 
coalition with frequently conflicting interests and 
outlook."
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The reorganization not only raised a diversity of 
interests and conflicts but it terminated a social order 
that had long prevailed and been accepted by the main
members of the industry. The change demanded radical 
departure from the established structure and practices. 
Kanter (1989) identifies discontinuity, disorder, and 
distractions as the by-products of significant 
organizational restructuring which produces a "window of 
vulnerability". The reorganization, while destroying an 
order of an old setting, also created the need for a new 
order to be worked out by the old constituents. The
relationship between change and order was discussed by 
Mead (1936) when he stressed the need to create orderly 
and directed social change:
"To bring about change is seemingly to destroy the 
given order, and yet society does and must change. 
That is the problem, to incorporate the method of 
change into the order of society itself".
Negotiated Order Theory
A few of the earlier studies contained selected 
issues that had a direct bearing on the negotiated order 
theory (Becker, Geer, Hughes, and Strauss, 1961/ Bucher
and Strauss, 1961/ Davis, 1963/ Hall, 1946, 1948, 1949/
Hughes, 1945, 1958/ Roth, 1963/ Smith, 1955). Charlton
and Maines (1984) traced the treatment of the negotiated 
order concept in the work of various theorists prior to 
Strauss: Mead (1932) in his chapter on "Society" in
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Mind/ Self and Society and in his discussion of the 
linkage between past and present (Mead/ 1929); Hughes
(1958) in his discussion on occupations/ Long (195-8) in 
his analysis of community as an ecology of games/ Dalton
(1959) in his examination of the ways managers manage/ 
and Goffman (1961) in his treatment of the role of total 
institutions. However, the pioneering work of Strauss and 
friends (Schatzman, Bucher, Ehrlich, and Sabshin) which 
was published in 1963 is merited as the most 
comprehensive presentation of the theory. They drew their 
inspiration from Mead who had written about the 
relationship between change and order and thus they 
stated in their work:
"..order is something at which members of any 
society, any organization, must work. For the shared 
agreements, the binding contracts - which constitute 
the grounds for an expectable, nonsurprising, talken- 
for-granted, even ruled orderliness - are not
binding and shared for all time. Contracts, 
understandings, agreements, rules - all have 
appended to them a temporal clause. That clause may 
or may not be explicitly discussed by the
contracting parties, and the terminal date of
agreement may or may not be made specific/ but none 
can be binding forever - even if the parties believe 
it so, unforeseen consequences of acting on the 
agreements would force eventual confrontation. 
Review is called for, whether the outcome of rewiew 
be rejection or revision, or what not. In short, the 
base of concerted action (social order) must be
reconstituted continually/ or as remarked aboove,
"worked out". Such considerations have led us'- to 
emphasize the importance of negotiation - the
process of give-and-take, of diplomacy, of
bargaining - which characterizes organizational 
life." (Strauss and Others, 1963)
Strauss et al. maintain that social organizations are 
negotiated order from their study of two psychiattric
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hospitals. They maintain that order is not automatic but 
instead "must be reconstituted continually". They were 
concerned about explaining how elements and processes of 
change fit together with those of stability and the "way 
order and change fit together, they argued, is through 
processes of negotiation" (Maines and Charlton, 1985) . 
They recognized the stable features of an organization 
and those features such as rules and policies, work 
groups, hierarchies and divisions of labour, ideologies, 
career lines and organization goals were regarded as the 
organizational background through which and within which 
people interact on a daily basis and attempt to get the 
work done. There were ambiguities inherent in an 
organization which required negotiations for 
organizational work to take place. As a consequence, they 
noticed that everyone seemed to be negotiating about 
something - they give and take, make margins, stake 
claims, make counter demands and so forth. Maines and 
Charlton (op. cit.) describe the nature of negotiation 
considered by Strauss and friends:
"The negotiations may be explicit or implicit, but 
through them the participants reach understandings 
about how work will be done. If the structure of the 
organization is the background, then these 
negotiation processes are seen as the foreground. 
Negotiations occur when rules and policies are not 
inclusive, when there are disagreements, when there 
is uncertainty and when changes are introduced. And, 
negotiations can breed further negotiations. When 
new understandings are reached, they inevitably 
affect previous tangential agreements. These 
negotiative processes are the means by which the 
features of an organization are created."
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So central did this negotiation seem to the events being 
studied that Strauss and friends specifically identified 
negotiation as a key concept and coined the term 
"negotiated order". They concluded that the social order 
of a hospital was a combination of rules and policies, 
along with agreements, understandings, pacts, contracts, 
and other working agreements. Their focus of 
organizational analysis was on the negotiative processes 
and particularly on the interactions between people which 
constituted the hospital structure and the hospital 
order.
The acclaimed review of negotiated order theory by 
Day and Day (1977) acknowledges two major components of a 
social theory that are lucidly accounted for in the work 
of Strauss et al., that is, the philosophical assumptions 
regarding the nature of man and the nature of social
reality. People are guided by different orientation and 
interests and given the inadequacy of formal rules and
structure to govern the organizational activities, they
develop tacit agreements and unofficial arrangements that 
enable them to carry out their work. The individuals in 
organizations play an active, self-conscious role in the 
shaping of the social order and their day-to-day 
interactions, agreements, temporary refusals and changing 
definitions of situations are of paramount importance. As 
for the social reality, the negotiated order theory 
downplays the notion of organizations as fixed, rather
rigid systems which are highly constrained by strict
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rules, regulations, goals and hierarchical chains of 
command in contrast to the assumptions of the structural- 
functional and rational bureaucratic theories of complex 
organizations. Instead it accentuates the following 
characteristics of organization according to Day and Day 
(op. cit.) :
"the fluid, continuously emerging qualities of the 
organization, the changing web of interactions woven 
among its members, and it suggests that order is 
something at which the members of the organization 
must constantly work at. Consequently, conflict and 
change are just as much a part of the organizational 
life as consensus and stability. Organizations are 
thus viewed as complex and highly fragile social 
constructions of reality which are subject to the 
numerous temporal, spatial, and situational events 
occurring both internally and externally."
Strauss (1978) writing almost twenty years later 
continues to maintain that negotiation is of much 
importance in human affairs and that it is at the "heart" 
of studying social order. He reiterates that no social 
order would be conceivable without some form of 
negotiations. He reviews the work of established social 
scientists such as Goffman, Gouldner, Blau, etc. who have 
all written about social order and analyses their 
assumptions on order and negotiation in their respective 
studies to prove his own position. He argues that it is 
important to recognize that their conception leads them 
either to overlook or misconstrue their data on 
negotiation and consequently one could question the 
contemporary perspectives on social order and social 
change. He goes on to recommend three points for any
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"far-reaching" study of negotiations: first, data on
negotiation can offer a useful critique of the theorizing 
done; second, negotiation has to be analyzed in relation 
to social order; third, negotiation processes are 
entwined with other processes and must be studied 
together. It is essential to point out that Strauss was 
not stating that everything in an organization is always 
being negotiated but that an understanding of negotiation 
processes and their bearing on social orders might 
provide important insights into how social orders are 
maintained, how they change and how structural 
limitations interact with the capacity of humans to 
reconstruct their worlds creatively.
Strauss (op. cit.) developed a paradigm, that is, a 
theoretical scheme through which negotiations and the 
negotiated order might be better examined and understood. 
In presenting such a paradigm, he was reviewing and 
developing concepts that were first presented two decades 
earlier and he was also responding to criticism of his 
original work. Strauss uses three central concepts in his 
paradigm through which the negotiated order can be 
investigated:
a. Negotiation: refers to the actual types of
interactions engaged in by participants and the 
strategies used;
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b. Structural Context: refers to the larger salient 
structural properties that bear on the negotiation, such 
as the law, state, social class, etc.
c. Negotiation Context: refers to the structural 
properties entering very directly as conditions into the 
course of the negotiation itself, such as the dimension 
of power, status, options, etc.
He emphasizes that although the structural context is 
larger and more encompassing than the negotiation 
context, the lines of impact can run either way. Changes 
in the former may impact the latter and vice versa. 
Contexts or the results of negotiations can bring changes 
in the negotiation context and set the tone for future 
negotiations. Strauss demonstrates the application of 
this paradigm by using it in the analysis of eleven case 
studies drawn from various research publications. These 
cases vary considerably in social settings, 
organizational scale, time scale and the types of 
negotiations. For example, international negotiation for 
a durable structure of Benelux/ antagonistic negotiations 
between the U.S.A and the Soviet Union over the Balkans/ 
negotiations between insurance companies and claimants/ 
and silent bargains in geriatric wards.
The negotiated order theory has generated meaningful 
research and writings and Fine (1984) acknowledges that 
few images have had a more profound and sustained impact 
on the sociological writings than Strauss and colleagues'
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depiction of the negotiated order in two psychiatric 
hospitals. Many research studies carried out after the 
publication of the negotiated order theory in 1963 have 
concentrated on refuting the deterministic stance taken 
by the traditional functionalist view of organization and 
the notion of structurally-determined behaviour in 
organization. In its place they have proposed 
negotiations by actors as the important organizational 
process. Stelling and Bucher's (1972) examination of 
several hospital wards challenged the traditional 
rational-bureaucratic conception of organizational 
authority and argued that the bureaucratic model could 
not explain day-to-day processes of social control. They 
recommended political processes as more important for 
explaining social control and they propose the concept of 
elastic autonomy, accountability, and monitoring as 
building blocks of a framework for analyzing social 
control in organization which is similar to earlier 
research on negotiated order of organizations. Mannings' 
(1977) analysis of two police departments showed that 
rules have a fictional character and thus negotiations 
were used in decision-making by members to manipulate the 
situations to their advantages. Freidson (1976) contended 
that divisions of labour are made up of social 
interaction consisting of negotiations. Denzin's (1977) 
study of negotiation in American liquor industry 
addresses two important elements of the negotiated order 
perspective. He shows how a current set of structural 
arrangements came about through a historical process that
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involved negotiations as a central feature. He then 
describes how negotiation processes serve to maintain the 
social order in the industry. The structural context of 
the industry is a consequence of previous negotiations 
involving the distillers, the government, the public, the 
wholesalers and tavern owners, i.e. the five tier system.
The feature of the structural context was different at
various points along the historical process.
The best part of the research carried out after the 
publication of Strauss' book Negotiations has taken up
certain specific issue/issues corresponding to his 
paradigm. In a special issue of Urban Life (Volume 11, 
Number 3, October 1982), Maines (1982) refers to the 
work done so far and also introduces seven research 
articles contained in the issue. Maines acknowledges that 
the greatest utility of the paradigm is in linking 
negotiations and their contexts to social orders, that 
is, "it is a sociological framework that attempts to
improve our understanding of social orders and social 
organizations". He also credits the paradigm for 
stimulating a significant amount of further research and 
for studying issues of power, organization structure, 
historical processes, resource mobilization as aspects of 
negotiated order. Maines and Charlton (op. cit.) identify 
four empirical investigations which illustrate the 
application and potential of the perspective for analysis 
of organizations other than research on hospitals. The 
utility of the perspective is its capacity to highlight
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the unique features and the setting of the four varied 
case studies. Several empirical studies that have 
contributed to the paradigm and have particular relevance 
to understanding negotiations in change are discussed 
here.
Busch's (1982) research on the history of publicly 
supported agricultural research and experiment station 
show how inextricably negotiation and their contexts are 
linked. A dialectical relationship prevailed between 
negotiations and historically produced and embedded 
structures and contexts. The structural conditions 
stimulate negotiations which then shape subsequent 
negotiations. Busch made four concluding observations:
a. Negotiations might lead to forming or modifying 
structures that provide little or no opportunity for 
later negotiation.
b. Once a formal organization is created, it enters into 
the negotiation process itself and in ways different than 
intended.
c. Dominant parties may restrict the range of topics 
subject to negotiation.
d. Creating a formal organization may shift the location 
of certain negotiations from the outside to the inside.
Hall and Spencer-Hall (1980) study two school 
districts in order to investigate the extent to which the
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negotiated order framework can explain the organizations 
of these two school systems. Their study contributes to a 
general understanding of conditions that give rise to or 
resist negotiations. They look at both the structural and 
negotiation contexts of negotiations over several issues 
but pay particular detail to negotiations over salaries 
for teachers in both districts. They find differences in 
the overall pattern of negotiations in the two school
systems and go on to suggest the circumstances that
affect the occurrence and extent of negotiations:
a. Negotiations will occur in situations characterized by 
change, uncertainty and ambiguity, disagreement,
ideological diversity, newness and inexperience, and
problematic coordination.
b. Activities that are variable, individualized, publicly 
performed, and that involve team-work and coordination 
will show more negotiation than those that are routine, 
performed individually, and in isolation.
c. The greater the size and more complex the 
organization, the greater the degree of
negotiation.....greater complexity will probably create
more sub-interests that differ with those at the top.
d. Equality, broader division of power and 
efficaciousness are conducive to negotiation while strong 
degrees of asymmetry, concentration of power and fatalism 
are not.
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e. Leadership that delegates authority, tolerates 
individuality and the development of semi-autonomous 
programmes, favours compromise over confrontation, and 
defines itself as a mediator will encourage negotiations 
more than leadership that centralizes authority, 
discourages innovation and development, and practices 
domination.
f. Professionals in organizations are more likely to 
engage in negotiations than semi-professionals.
g. The greater the focus of organizational attention and 
commitment of resources, the less the degree of 
negotiation, particularly if the issue involves the 
external environment.
Maines (1982) commends Hall and Spencer-Hall1s conclusion 
on conditions giving rise to or preventing negotiations 
because he believes that such an approach has the most
promising potential for contributing to the development
of a general theory of negotiation.
Kleinman's (1982) study of a holistic health centre 
addresses Strauss's suggestion that actors have implicit 
theories of negotiation which they bring to the 
negotiation arena and these assumptions have real
consequences on the process of negotiation, on the very
structure of negotiation context. The negotiations of the 
board members of a holist centre were examined. These 
members were split ideologically between those who
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embraced an alternative conception and those who embraced 
a conventional conception of what the organization was 
and should be. These differences led to problems in
deciding who has a legitimate right to negotiate, the
proper form of negotiation and the issues over which 
negotiation should be conducted. Kleinman remarks that 
since members were holding on to two discrepant
conceptions of negotiations, "they could not create, once 
and for all, an assumed context in which to negotiate, a
set of assumptions that they could use as a basis for
getting on with other business". In addition, the 
persistence of these dual conceptions and the 
dissatisfaction they produced were also the causes of a 
high turnover rate among the board members.
Strauss (1982) applies his own principles of the
paradigm to the field of interorganizational relation and 
extends the concept of structural context. He includes a 
broader definition of social world, intersection of units 
of organization and industries encompassing 
organizations. He asserts that "every organization 
requires other organizations to implement its projects, 
programmes and even routine activities: to get itself
serviced, perhaps to get itself financially or
politically off the ground, to swap technology and ideas, 
to have others purchase its products or services, perhaps 
to fight against common enemies". All such 
interorganizational arrangements can be instituted and
maintained only through negotiations, as also indicated
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by O'Toole and O'Toole (1981). Strauss explores 
negotiations by examining the lines of work that 
constitute interorganizational linkages, the matrix of 
organizations in which the organization is embedded and 
the arenas of participation in which the organizations
are related to each other. With this framework, he 
examines the interorganizational arrangements and the 
negotiations among Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 
agencies of the federal government, subunits of these 
agencies and the U.S. senate. His findings state that the 
various lines of work such as legislature, agency, lab, 
programmes, etc. were furthered through a mixture of 
discussion, persuasion, perhaps threats or other 
coercion, but above all through negotiative processes. 
The negotiations occurred at and between various
organizational levels linking the coordinating or
complementing interests of several organizations or their 
subunits.
Thomas' (1984) research into maximum security 
prisons is designed along Strauss' statement that even 
the most repressive of social order is inconceivable
without some form of negotiations. He utilizes the 
concept of the negotiated order to study a total 
organization such as maximum security prisons where staff 
and inmates negotiate their own interpretation of the 
social world, often creating an alternative that they may 
be just as formal although tacit. He acknowledges the 
fact that many other studies have "discovered" that
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prison staff and inmates negotiate arrangements, 
obligations and relationships but these "conventional 
studies stress the informal relationship that exist". His 
argument is that such arrangements are more than informal 
in that they recreate "mesostructures" that co-exist and 
often compete with the authorized structure. This gives 
rise to a social order which is coloured by the form of 
negotiations that occur. Consequently, "many negotiation 
strategies have the ironic effect of further decoupling 
organizational rules from their intent. This dramatically 
alters the hegemonic power structure and generates as 
well a set of conditions requiring continual interaction 
for successful perpetuation of social order".
Altheide's (1988) recent study looks at the nexus 
between the social world of non-profit service 
organizations (NPO) and their environment, that is, how 
organizations adjust to changes in their funding 
environment, the relative impact of governmental 
retrenchment on non-profit organizations in Maricopa 
County, Arizona. Interpreting the data from the 
negotiated order perspective, he suggests that "agencies' 
adjustments were mediated by an awareness of the local 
and national contexts, the services they offered, the 
clients they served, and their general capacity to 
maximize their resource mobilization potential". The 
impact of reductions from the government was mediated 
through community, symbolic and organizational contexts 
which resulted in a new definition of legitimacy. The
270
successful agencies did not fight the battle head-on; 
they avoided confrontation by negotiating a different 
order with its own parameters for success and failure. In 
general/ the NPOs studied survived the budget cuts but 
they shifted social worlds into an another symbolic 
structure:
"The agencies* adaptations show reflexively the 
impact of structure through interpretive process/ 
social order through social control, and the 
construction of a negotiated order."
Negotiated Order Theory and Symbolic Interactionism
I shall make a brief reference to ideas developed in 
symbolic interactionism because the concept of 
organization adopted by the negotiated order and the 
political paradigms originated from the writings of the 
interactionists. Maines (op. cit.) states that the 
negotiated order theory was born from the "domain 
assumption" of symbolic interactionism and Day and Day 
(op. cit.) refers to it as its "roots". Strauss (1978) 
admits that interactionism as an intellectual tradition 
is more hospitable to considering negotiations as among 
the central processes in organizations. He specifically 
refers to the interests shown by the interactionists in 
social processes in the context of social change and the 
intermediate role assumed by people as active creatures 
in not only shaping their environment and future but also 
facing the constraints on their actions. Although the
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earlier interactionists did not underline the importance 
of negotiations, Strauss states that this was changing 
largely because of "heightened search by some 
interactionists for joining social structural and social 
interactional considerations but with the anti- 
deterministic stance still intact". This search was to a 
large extent instigated by the inadequacy of the 
prevailing dominant perspective to provide explanations 
for interactions in organizations. The literature on 
formal organizations was dominated by Weber's rational- 
bureaucratic arguments and structural functionalism.
Weber's model of a bureaucracy was characterized by a 
hierarchical chain of command in which status and
authority were conferred into specific positions and 
rules and regulations dictated how work was to be done in 
the organization.
Symbolic interactionism as a social theory can be 
interpreted in terms of its fundamental assumptions on 
the nature of man and social reality which Day and Day 
(op. cit.) refer to as significant components of a theory 
(as discussed earlier) and one can clearly notice the 
similarities with the negotiated order theory. The
interactionists treat individuals as choice-making and 
possessing greater freedom in their actions rather than 
passively reacting to external or internal stimuli and 
forces. People actively participate in the making of 
their environment and construct their activities with
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some degree of freedom. Shibutani (1973) elaborates this 
characteristic of human nature:
"Human beings are neither creatures of impulse nor 
heedless victims of external stimulation; they are 
active organisms who guide and construct their line 
of action while continuously coming to terms with 
the demands of an ever-changing world as they 
interpret it. Of particular importance is the object 
each person forms of himself, for the capacity of 
man to interact with himself makes some measure of 
self-control possible."
Blumer (1969) describes a human being as "an 
organism that not only responds to others on the non- 
symbolic level but as one that makes indications to 
others and interprets their situation". Thus, human 
actions and behaviour in organizations have to be 
expressed in terms of meanings to the actors. Hewitt 
(1984) maintains that meaning is related to these 
questions: "what we are going to do, what others will do 
in return and what we will do in response.. .Meaning in 
this sense is triadic (Mead): when an individual acts she 
indicates to the other what she plans to do, what the 
other is expected to do in return, and what social object 
is being created by them". All of this process is related 
to the concept of "definition of situation", one of the 
key contributions of the interactionist thought and 
explained by Thomas (1923) :
"Preliminary to any self-determined act of behaviour 
there is always a stage of examination and 
deliberation which we may call the definition of the 
situation. And actually not only concrete acts are 
dependent on the definition of the situation, but 
gradually a whole life-policy and the personality of
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the individual himself follow from a series of such 
definition."
In reference to the ideas of Thomas, Ball (1972) explains 
that actions and interactions are the consequences of the 
way actors define their situations and actors do things 
on the basis of what they see is to be done, can be done, 
will be done by others. Ball underlines the choice-making 
role of the actor in formulating a definition of a 
situation:
"the sum of all recognised information, from the 
point of view of the actor, which is relevant to 
locating himself and others, so that he can engage 
in self-determined lines of action and interaction."
Hewitt (op. cit.) states that human action, 
including conduct, is based on definitions of situation 
and this is applicable in both familiar and unfamiliar 
situations:
"Where a situation is familiar and its configuration 
of meaning is known, people organize their own 
conduct and their expectations of others in relation 
to its definition. Where there is no definition of a 
situation to start with - where people find 
themselves acting without confident knowledge of the 
situation they are in - individuals first focus on
establishing a definition......We know what is
permitted and what is not, and this knowledge is an 
important part of the definition we bring to a 
situation. Definition of the situation encompasses 
roles, objects and joint actions.... knowing these 
things enables us to define the situation 
appropriately and to make more or less correct 
interpretation of others' acts."
Blumer (op. cit.) asserts that interactionism is 
able to explain divergent human behaviour such as harmony 
and disagreement or cooperation and conflict because it
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focuses on the processes of interpretation and 
definitions of the actors. Since actors construct acts 
by a process of interpretation and definition of each 
other's actions, organization, to Blumer, essentially 
consists of the fitting together of individual lines of 
action to form joint actions:
"The participants may fit their acts to one another 
in orderly joint actions on the basis of compromise, 
out of duress, because they may use one another in 
achieving their respective ends, because it is the 
sensible thing to do, or out of sheer necessity."
The actors' definitions are important elements in 
negotiations because they are involved in a process of 
presentation of self and of altercasting and they are 
suggesting identities to be assumed and the roles to be 
played. They are involved in interactions but such 
interactions cannot proceed any further if neither of the 
two are willing to make changes to their definitions. 
Negotiations of compromises then become the only possible 
alternative according to McCall and Simmons (1966):
"The two parties will negotiate some sort of 
compromise, each acceding somewhat to the other's 
demands, though seldom in equal degree... this 
compromise definition of the role and character of 
each is not executed in a single step but is the 
eventual result of a complex process of negotiation 
or bargaining."
Interactionism holds a distinctive view of social 
reality, that is, the actions of people as they meet 
their life situations and their actions as reality 
itself. Social action is created by a collection of
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individuals who fit in their actions together through the 
process of interpretation and exchange of definitions. 
Thus, there is no organization except in the actual 
actions and behaviour of the people and organization is 
what people think, do and say. The social reality of an 
organization can be explained only in terms of actions of 
the actors and the processes through which the 
organizational patterns have been generated and
sustained. Blumer (op. cit.) emphasizes the study of 
actions to understand any form of social order or social 
reality:
"Without action, any structure of relations between 
people is meaningless. To be understood a society 
must be seen and grasped in terms of the action that
comprises it........... The picture is composed in
terms of action. A society is seen as people meeting 
the varieties of situations that are thrust on them 
by their conditions of life. These situations are 
met by working out joint actions in which 
participants have to align their acts to one 
another. Each participant does so by interpreting 
the acts of others and in turn, by making 
indications to others as to how they should act. By 
virtue of this process of interpretation and 
definition, joint actions are built up, they have 
careers."
Hall (1972) states that the attention given to 
action, living and ongoing activity is "to orient away 
from the standard sociological notions of society as a 
structure, as the mechanical or automatic exchange 
between positions, and to focus on the level of what 
people actually do". Joint action is the process by which 
actors are able to interact and fit together their 
activities and organizational decisions emerge from the
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alignment of interpretations and actions of members of 
group who hold shared responsibility. All joint actions 
arise from a background of previous actions of 
participants because they "bring to that formation the 
world of objects, the set of meanings and the schemes of 
interpretation that they already possess" (Blumer, op. 
cit.) . Even a new joint action in a new situation can 
only be understood by incorporating it with what went 
ahead before, i.e. its context in a historical sense. In 
the complex interdependent situation of most 
organizations, Weick (1969) argues that an individual 
cannot produce "closure" by his solitary act and 
therefore has to take account of other persons as well. 
This calls for mutually "reciprocal behaviour" after 
which a cycle of events can be established. A set of 
interlocking behaviour results in collective structure 
and joint actions become the main basis for social 
actions. Hall (op. cit.) describes joint actions as a 
"basic social fact" but one which is very difficult to 
understand because:
"the quality of social life is characterized by 
greater degrees of uncertainty and requires stronger 
conscious effort than normally described. Joint 
action is all of these because it is like a chemical 
compound rather than a mixture. It is more than the 
aggregate of its parts/ it is a synthesis that 
results from inter-subjectivity, feedback, 
consensus, and co-ordination. It is a merging, an 
alignment of actions that develop in the course of 
assessing the situations, determining what has to be 
done, assigning tasks, and carrying them out. It is 
clearly a complicated process."
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Critique, Limitations and Future Development of the 
Negotiated Order Theory
Notable critiques to the negotiated order 
perspective are extended by Day and Day (1977) , Benson 
(1977) and Benson and Day (1976) in response to the major 
research work of the proponents of the perspective which 
were published during the sixties and the early 
seventies. These critiques point out the limitations and 
weaknesses of the perspective and offer suggestions for 
possible development in future investigations.
Day and Day (op. cit.) accept the negotiated order 
perspective as an interactional model involving 
processual and emergent analysis in which informal 
aspects of organizations are emphasized as much as the 
formal and they credit it for challenging the more static 
structural-functional and rational bureaucratic 
explanation of complex organizations. They state that 
although the perspective qualifies as a revolutionary 
change-oriented approach, it is never completely 
developed. The perspective suffers from the same problems 
as identified in the work of other symbolic 
interactionists and they list three main weaknesses which 
need to be reckoned with:
a. The negotiated order studies, like other work in the 
symbolic interactionist school, have deteriorated to 
little more than a non-critically oriented descriptive 
account of participants' own account of certain
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situations. Such an approach clearly ignores alternative 
and sometimes contradictory explanation of the same 
situations and fails to verify these interpretations by 
means of using additional sources of data such as 
records, documents, observation of others, etc.
b. The perspective studies only a limited sector of 
reality, that is, detailed descriptions of interactions 
among actors in an organizational setting but only a 
restricted view of the world outside and how it impinges 
upon what goes on inside it. It gives very little insight 
into how large structural features of society influence 
and perhaps predetermine the limits of negotiations. 
Consequently, one of the end results is the failure of 
the negotiated order theorists to critically examine the 
hard realities of power and politics and the influence 
they exert upon negotiative processes.
c. The perspective makes only a limited attempt to 
understand the broader historical forces at work in our 
society and most of the research represents "something 
akin to a snapshot of a group or organization at one 
fairly delimited point in time". There is also no 
examination of those activities which have been and 
continue to be non-negotiable historically and why this 
is indeed the case.
They conclude that the most serious limitation to the 
theory of negotiated order is its failure to place
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specific negotiative processes within a contextual 
framework:
"This characteristic has served to restrict the 
theory's level of analysis primarily to micro and 
raiddle-range processes, and, as a consequence, it is 
quite possible that we may be getting a distorted 
picture of the actual nature and scope of some of 
these negotiations". (Day and Day, op. cit.)
Day and Day (1978) defend their original position in 
reply to comments by Maines (1978) on their critique and 
continue to stress the need of the perspective "to 
grapple with the issues of structure and process". They 
specifically state that more attention has to be 
directed to the central issues of power, politics,
history and macro level structures.
Benson (op. cit.) accepts the negotiated order
perspective as an improvement over the
rational/functionalist approach to organizational 
analysis because it is a process-oriented perspective 
stressing the continuous emergence of organizational 
arrangements out of interactions of participants. Similar 
to the views expressed by Day and Day, Benson also finds 
this perspective undermining the fixed features of
organizations and disregarding the structural limits but
rather showing too much concern for micro-processes of 
interaction between participants. He states that the 
perspective has emphasized:
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"the small scale adjustments possible within the 
limits imposed by the more encompassing structural 
arrangements, and has not dealt convincingly with 
the latter. The negotiated order theorists have a 
basic difficulty in grappling with social structure, 
which in their framework concerns the relations 
between distinct context wherein negotiation
occurs The structure problem is to grasp the
relations between situations - the way in which some
negotiations set limit upon others." (Benson, op. 
cit.)
Benson (1978) in reply to comments by Maines (op. cit.) 
reiterates the limitations and neglected agendas of the 
negotiated order perspective and clarifies the concepts 
of "social structure" and "limits". His fundamental
criticism of the theory is that it sets aside or 
indefinitely postpones the analysis of social structure 
and does not provide a way of dealing with limits other 
than as a context, that is, "it remains a boundary and 
out of focus". He argues that since negotiations take 
place within limits there is the need to examine the 
relation between sets of limits because social structure 
consists of relations between sets of situational-
contextual limits.
Benson and Day (op. cit.) follow the same line of 
argument as the previous critiques and state that the 
perspective is singularly unable to deal with the larger 
set of constraints or limits within which negotiation is 
possible, nor with the processes leading to radical 
breaks with the presented negotiated order.
Strauss (1978) expounds a more fully developed line 
of argument of the negotiated order in Negotiations. He
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tackles the main criticisms generated against the 
perspective and presents clarifications to the "typical 
objections" to the earlier work. Farberman (1979)
describes the book as a "reflexive pause" because Strauss 
must have begun to identify the shortfalls in his work 
and noted that key elements internal to negotiation
process have been overlooked and key elements outside the 
process neglected, for example, the actor's own theories 
of negotiation, the subprocesses of negotiation, the
dimension of negotiation, etc. Thus Strauss tries to set 
a sense of where things are and where they are going. One 
of the main designs of Strauss is to counter the 
objection that negotiation is useful only to 
microsociology and that it has no relevance for 
macrosociology. Scanzoni (1979) in his review of Strauss' 
paradigm states that he has invested heavily in that
particular aspect apparently anticipating the criticism 
that negotiation theory is divorced from structural 
consideration. The paradigm maintains that negotiations 
are to be considered in terms of the negotiation context 
which in turn must be dealt with in the more encompassing 
structural context. Maines (1979) appreciates this kind 
of linkage which is neatly developed in the case analyses 
in part two of Strauss' book because he considers that 
such linkage takes into account the possibility of 
changing structural context "bringing into the paradigm 
an historical perspective in which new negotiation 
contexts may appear and others disappear with 
historically changing structure".
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Strauss is specially concerned with the criticism 
pertaining to the inability of the negotiated order 
perspective to come to grips with relevant social 
structure. He identifies five relevant impingements on 
negotiations from the critiques to the perspective: (a)
the organizational setting with its intraorganizational 
properties, (b) the external setting "within" which the 
organization is located, (c) the large-scale setting, (d) 
historical as well as contemporary considerations, and 
(e) power, dominance, and political considerations. He 
defends the recommended paradigm as an analytical 
framework for taking all these issues into account and 
admits that the case studies in his book may not be the 
most comprehensive analysis possible but represent a 
"good, beginning effort".
Another frequent criticism of Strauss1 paradigm is 
that he does not adequately define the concept of 
negotiation and that he uses the term inconsistently. 
Mather (1979) asserts that although Strauss' book 
rightfully commands a good deal of favourable attention, 
its theoretical paradigm is seriously weakened by the 
imprecision and ambiguity in definitions of key concepts. 
Even the concept of negotiation is not clearly explained 
and there is no clear distinction between negotiations 
and agreements arrived at without negotiations. Similarly 
there is no distinction between negotiation and its 
alternatives such as persuasion, education, manipulation, 
coercion, etc. Couch (1979) states that there is no
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effort to specify how the processes referred to by 
Strauss’ thirteen synonyms to negotiation differ from or 
are similar to negotiation:
"Nor does Strauss attempt a formal definition or an 
operational specification of either negotiation 
process or any of the other social processes that 
are often intertwined with negotiation processes. 
Instead the water is thoroughly stirred and left 
extremely opaque."
Farberman (op. cit.) also acknowledges the ambiguity in 
definition but he interprets the concept of negotiation 
in terms of a pragmatic image of man who makes
"adjustment" to insure his survival and in the process 
creates, maintains and transfers the social order.
Maines and Charlton (1985), both steadfast 
proponents of the negotiated order theory, attempt to 
define the nature of negotiation because they admit that 
such ambiguity creates problems in determining the
conceptual usefulness of the perspective and in 
conducting research on negotiated orders. For example, 
they state that "what the perspective is to scholars 
frequently stems from what they think negotiations are". 
They accentuate the fact that the negotiated order 
perspective is a "sociological" framework which attempts 
to improve understanding of "social orders" and "social 
organizations", and thus sociological study of 
negotiation must in some way be linked to "overall
patterns of participation and the structured patterning 
of social orders". They disapprove the definition of
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negotiation to be restricted to only situated 
negotiations and situated conduct and alternatively 
recommend a broader definition which includes a variety 
of interactional events and a link between negotiation 
processes and social orders. Such a definition of 
negotiation should include three dimensions which are 
capable of variation. The first dimension is the d e g r e e  
o f  c o n s e n s u s  - that negotiations take place under varying 
degree of consensus, disagreement not necessarily being 
an essential element of negotiation. The second dimension 
is that negotiations involve the u s e  o f  s t r a t e g i e s  and 
such strategies could be coercive, formal, manipulative, 
persuasive, etc. Lastly, all negotiations must include 
some d e g r e e  o f  e x c h a n g e  without which there cannot be 
negotiation.
The key role of exchange in the creation of human 
association and social relations is developed in the 
literature on exchange theory which has relevance to this 
discussion on negotiations. Thibaut and Kelley (1959) and 
Homans (1961) have theoretically analyzed interpersonal 
relation based upon an exchange view of human 
interaction. An exchange is conceived as a social process 
of central significance in social life. When people come 
together or are put together, they often see the 
advantages to be gained from entering into exchange 
relations and the situation provides incentives for 
social interaction. The main argument for exchange is 
that people associate with one another with the intention
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of receiving rewards and benefits. The main assumption 
underlying Thibaut and Kelley’s analysis is that "every 
individual voluntarily enters and stays in any 
relationship as long as it is adequately satisfactory in 
terms of his rewards and costs". Homans conceptualises 
the process of social association as "an exchange of 
activity, tangible or intangible, and more or less 
rewarding or costly between at least two persons". Blau 
(1964) , writing on the profit-seeking purposive behaviour 
of people, states that social exchanges are voluntary 
actions of individuals who are motivated by expected 
returns from others. Human behaviour and association is 
guided by the desire to obtain social rewards and social 
interaction is a process of exchange of rewards. Blau 
(op. cit.) states that two conditions must be met for 
behaviour to lead to social exchange:
"It must be oriented toward ends that can only be 
achieved through interaction with other persons and 
it must seek to adapt means to further the 
achievement of these ends."
In every exchange transaction participants need to 
ccme to an agreement because each of them hopes to gain 
maximum at the minimum cost. This creates a situation 
where there is the coexistence of conflicts and common 
interests and both parties must come to some form of an 
agreement. Their preferences are continually modified 
which involves a "process of maneuvering between 
partners and exploring alternative opportunities until 
seme stable social relations have become crystallized"
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Blau (op. cit.). In other words, negotiation constitutes 
a key element of the exchange process as parties 
continually interact with one another.
Exchange theory postulates that human interaction
and behaviour is significantly guided by goals,
interpretation and meanings and thus this theory bears
close conceptual adherence to symbolic interactionism. 
Singlemann (1972) explored the convergences between the 
two theoretical perspectives in four major areas, that
is, constructive mental process, conception of others, 
fitting acts to one another, and social dynamics in 
dialectic terms. He argues that exchange theory is a 
process of symbolic interactionism because:
"...Social action is subjectively meaningful and 
purposive/ knowledge of the "objective" bargaining 
positions of interactants does not enable us to 
predict their behaviour satisfactorily unless we 
know how they interpret their situation and what 
value they assign to that which the others have to 
offer. The dynamics of social organizations rests in 
the paradox that "realities" have subjectively 
assigned as well as objectively given significance 
for human actors. "Objective" realities constrain 
behaviour, but the subjective interpretation of such 
realities direct actors to change these boundaries. 
There is a continuous dialectical process in which 
objective realities become "subjectified" by human 
actors."
Mangham (198 6) places exchange theory at the heart 
of the symbolic interactionist thought because 
"interactionists consider that, for the most part, why 
people do what they do is the result of judgement: 
cognitive but not always conscious deliberation about
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alternative courses of action". His study of interactions 
between a group of executives is based on the premise 
that interaction is a function of what each person gets 
out of the relationship: "no pay off, no relationship",
that is, exchanges of mutual benefits. His research also 
included interviews carried out with the organizational 
actors to determine their perspective on their own 
interactions and interestingly they recognized and agreed 
that exchange and interactionist perspectives applied to 
much of the interaction carried on between them.
The main critique against the negotiated order 
perspective concerning the relationship between 
negotiations and social structural context seems to have 
been largely resolved after the presentation of the 
analytical paradigm by Strauss (1978) . The theory has 
progressed from its original concern with 
interorganizational study of micro-interactions among 
actors. There are several significant research studies 
which have focused on the relationship between structural 
contexts and negotiations, for example Busch (1980), Hall 
and Spencer-Hall (1980), Gilmore (1979), Maurin (1980), 
O'Toole and O'Toole (1981), Strauss (1982). Busch sums up 
one of the central significant points by relating history 
and negotiated orders. Hall and Spencer-Hall analyse 
conditions that give rise to negotiation and conclude 
that the extent and nature of negotiation is subject to 
contextual constraints. Gilmore's analysis of the 
changing social worlds of art in seveinteenth, eighteenth,
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and nineteenth century France expresses the centrality of 
historical dialectic between structure and negotiation. 
Maurin raises various issues relating to the analysis of 
structural parameters. The research studies of O'Toole 
and O'Toole and Strauss extend the analysis of structural 
contexts to the field of interorganizational relations. 
Mather (op. cit.) reviews Strauss' book and evaluates 
the analytical paradigm as "very suggestive and 
promising" for future investigation into the properties 
of structural and negotiation contexts and to improve 
greatly one's analysis of specific negotiations. He 
commends the contribution of Strauss:
"What Strauss does contribute is an excellent 
formulation of the interplay between structural and 
negotiation contexts and between negotiation 
outcomes and contexts....Negotiation outcomes can 
contribute to changes in negotiation contexts which 
in turn may affect future negotiations, and perhaps 
even shape the structural context itself."(Mather, 
op. cit.)
An appreciation of the structural and negotiation 
contexts of Strauss' paradigm is extended by Fine (1984) 
who disapproves the "caricature" on the negotiated order 
theory by Kanter (1972) and Day and Day (1977) . Fine 
states that these critiques have taken what is 
distinctive about the perspective and ignored the rest, 
and he defends the advocates of the theory by arguing 
that they "do not claim that structures do not exist or 
affect other relationships, nor do these theorists 
believe that formal rules make no difference". He upholds 
the effects of the structural factors on negotiations as
289
a priority area for future research and he examines the 
conceptual linkages between the negotiated order and 
organizational culture.
A Political View of Negotiation
It may be apparent that the proponents of the 
negotiated order theory seem to have been largely 
concerned with tackling a single criticism. My argument 
is that the political and power dynamics of the 
negotiation process is not properly conceptualized in the 
negotiated order theory and I feel this remains one of 
the main limitations for its development. As stated 
earlier, Day and Day (op. cit.) comment that the 
perspective fails to examine the hard realities of power 
and politics and the influence it exerts upon negotiative 
process. They recommend that the perspective has to be 
much more politically grounded than in the past because 
the conceptualization of negotiation that is presented 
suggest "a cooperative and usually smooth process 
involving temporary disruptions in normal routines, new 
tacit understandings and so forth with little actual 
domination or oppression emanating from different bases 
of power with and without the organization". Although 
Strauss (1978) specifically state that anyone interested 
in negotiations ought to pay close attention to related 
issues of politics and power in future research and he 
also included these elements in the negotiation context
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of the paradigm, a political analysis of the negotiation 
process is distinctly lacking in his presentation of the 
case studies. Scanzoni (op. cit.) notes that Strauss does 
not attempt systematic conceptualization of the "slippery 
subprocess" of negotiation such as the bargaining power 
or capability to achieve modifications from the other 
party and the complex dynamics of balance of power of the 
respective partners. Among the main proponents of the 
negotiated order theory, the writings of Hall and 
Spencer-Hall (op. cit.) make reference to the
overwhelming importance of power in the relationship 
between social conditions and negotiation, that is, 
"equality, broader dispersion of power within an 
organization and efficaciousness are conducive to 
negotiation... Power constrains the occurrences as well 
as the results of negotiation". Although power is 
interpreted as a determining condition for negotiations, 
their main concern was to identify differences in the 
extent and circumstance of negotiation activities in the 
two school systems and the limits of structure, 
organization and interpersonal relationship. An analysis 
of the political process and exercise of power in 
negotiation is not included in their research.
The power and controls exercised by individuals in 
the negotiation process is covered in several research 
publications. Scheff (1968) argued that lawyers and 
psychiatrists have great deal of power in shaping the 
definition of the situation with their clients, more than
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their clients do. Hosticka (1979) closely matched 
Scheff's position by showing how lawyer-client 
interactions involve negotiation over "what happened" and 
"what will happen" and how patterns of negotiations are 
linked to power and authority, that is, definitions are 
negotiated between the helper and the client, and the 
relative power over the negotiation process reflects 
power over the resulting definitions. Lawyers attempt to 
control what should be done and clients control when and 
how much would be done. Although both these studies 
provide a useful relationship between the negotiation 
process and power, there is a distinct lack of connection 
between negotiations and social orders. Maines and 
Charlton (op. cit.) state that these studies "flesh out" 
the details of the negotiation process among participants 
in a specified situation but offer only restricted 
analysis of the nature of the negotiated orders. They 
contend that the "larger negotiation and structural 
contexts are at best left out in the shadows of their 
analysis" .
My position is that organizational change is 
political, as argued in the previous chapter and that 
change is negotiated in a situation characterized by 
ambiguity, uncertainty, newness and disagreements. The 
process of organizational change is political because of 
the interpretations and expectations of internal and 
external stakeholders and the corresponding differences 
in their interests. Such an exposition corresponds with
292
the "governmental politics model" of decision-making 
developed by Allison (1971). Stakeholders are players and 
actors who have independent bases and are conferred 
separate responsibilities and power, that is, a situation 
of dispersion of power which is conducive to negotiations 
as proposed by Hall and Spencer-Hall (op. cit.). 
Consequently, players have different views on what they 
see and judge to be important and they are obliged to 
fight for what they conceive as right. They are involved 
in a competitive game and the name of the game is 
politics. Allison's (op. cit.) characterization of the 
political model is best summed up in his own writing:
"Men share power. Men differ about what must be 
done. The differences matter. This milieu 
necessitates that government decisions and actions 
result from a political process. In this process, 
sometimes one group committed to a course of action 
triumphs over other groups fighting for other 
alternatives. Equally often, however, different 
groups pulling in different directions produce a 
result, or better a resultant - a mixture of 
conflicting preferences and unequal power of various 
individuals - distinct from what any person or group 
intended. In both cases, what moves the chess pieces 
is not simply the reasons that support a course of 
action, or the routines of organizations that enact 
an alternative, but the power and skill of 
proponents and opponents of the action in question."
The negotiation of the reorganization of the 
electricity industry is committed to be political 
because different stakeholders who share interlocked 
relationship are involved in trying to secure and promote 
their interests and definitions, conflicts arise where 
interests contradict and compete, and power is utilized 
for pursuance of self-interest. This kind of dynamics in
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the negotiation process conforms with Pfeffer's (1981) 
definition of politics which involves "activities taken 
within an organization, to acquire, develop and use power 
and other resources to obtain one's preferred outcomes in 
a situation where there is uncertainty or dissension 
about choice". A political model of choice presumes that 
when preferences conflict, the power used by the key 
actors will determine the outcome of the decision 
process. Those individuals and groups within or outside 
the organization who can exert the greatest power will be 
able to secure maximum rewards from the interplay of
organizational politics. In this sense organizational 
politics is the study of power in action, power in use. 
Bacharach and Lawler (1980) treat politics in 
organization as the "tactical use of power to retain or 
obtain control of real or symbolic resources". Pfeffer 
(op. cit.) draws attention to the close association
between the two when he describes politics as the 
exercise of power to get something accomplished or expand 
power that is already possessed.
The political analysis of negotiations in this
research will be mainly concerned with the nature and use 
of power employed by the actors to promote their 
interests in a conflict situation and the establishment 
of social order in organizational change. An analysis of 
power will provide the explanation for participation and 
effectiveness in negotiation situations. This kind of 
analysis has been generally missing in the work of
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negotiated order theorists and this may be partly due to 
the fact that the concept of politics and power has been 
neglected in symbolic interactionism for a long time. 
Hall (1972) states that the concept of power has been
noticeably absent in the writings of the interactionists 
and this absence "may be due to its typical definition in 
non-symbolic terms". Although few interactionists such as 
Rose (1962, 1967) and Scheff (1967) pointed out the
neglect of power relations in symbolic interactionism, 
they have not included any discussion of power in their 
own research work. Hall (op. cit.) strongly advocates the 
introduction of power to understand the outcomes of 
negotiated interactions. He states that power influences 
the entire negotiation process and the analysis of power 
can explain "how a given bargain is made/ why a 
particular group is essential; how a given definition of 
the situation is developed; why a particular norm 
emerges; and why some groups are self-conscious and
assertive" .
The stakeholders can be expected to become actively 
involved in the case of a radical change such as a 
reorganization where a new order has to be negotiated by 
a host of actors and new arrangements installed. The 
negotiation process and outcomes will depend on the
relative power and influence of the interacting actors 
who need to be treated as purposive in their lines of 
action. The negotiated order perspective, in theory, 
assumes that everything is negotiable but it is not able
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to explain adequately how a particular decision came 
about. It does not consider the power of the interacting 
individuals which is the indicative factor that explains 
why everybody does not have equal say in the negotiation 
process and some get what they want and some may be 
totally banned from participation. My interpretation of 
politics in negotiation will accentuate the 
identification of key individuals and their interests in 
the form of definitions of situation, conflicts, 
bargaining and compromises, and the power employed by the 
key actors to promote and protect their desired results.
The distinct organizational feature of a state-owned 
enterprise is conducive to political games because unlike 
in the average private sector enterprise, it usually has 
no clearly defined principal and agent relationship or a 
single responsible principal; the economic and financial 
goals are virtually overshadowed by a confusion of social 
objectives and usually conflicting and mutually 
inconsistent goals. There are usually several government 
bodies, interest groups and internal management who as 
stakeholders define the goals of the enterprise and 
exercise a complex set of influence and pressure in its 
operation (as discussed in chapter one) . The macro-level 
structure is of special significance because it exercises 
influential control on the enterprise. Vernon (1981) 
mentions that the principal disappears in the case of a 
state-owned enterprise and becomes instead a babel of 
voices and unrelated pressures. Taking a similar line of
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argument, Aharoni (1981) agrees that the principal cannot 
be identified because the owner is not a person, not even 
a single organization. The state acts through ministers, 
legislators, and civil servants who are themselves agents 
of the general public. Often these different agents have 
different perceptions of their jobs and state-owned 
enterprises frequently find themselves struggling with 
generalized, vague and conflicting interests. Thus, each 
ministry and each interest group uses power to influence 
the firm's behaviour and to reward or punish the firm as 
the firm responds to its needs.
I have stated that the negotiated order theory is 
chiefly concerned about explaining a slice, a snapshot of 
organizational life which makes up the social order at 
one limited point in time and hence it treats the 
definition of situation as a static and fixed feature of
social interaction. It does not explain how a particular
definition of situation came to be accepted and what 
order preceded it but generally suggests a "cooperative 
and usually smooth process" (Day and Day, op. cit.) . I 
have argued that actors express their interests in the 
form of definitions of situations which in turn are 
negotiated with other individuals. In a situation of
radical organizational change, stakeholders prescribe 
diverse definitions that form the basis of negotiation 
which eventually lead to decisions or nondecisions. A 
negotiated order should be treated as temporal and 
applicable for a particular moment in time because it
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will hold together only as long as it meets the needs of 
the main actors and incorporates their definitions. For 
example, the replacement of key individuals can bring 
forth modifications in the position pursued by old guards 
because new incumbents import new meanings. Therefore, 
the definition of situation becomes an integral part of 
the political interaction where actors have to 
continually take into account others' positions, demands, 
power and often compromises will be made. The concept of 
definition of situation needs to be treated as dynamic 
and tentative.
Johnson (1982) underscores the necessity of 
understanding the dual nature of the definition of 
situation so as to allow more explicit attention to the 
process of negotiating order - a definition of situation 
guides and directs the course of interaction and
simultaneously exists as the product of such interaction. 
He argues that such an interpretation offers a better 
understanding of particular outcomes of negotiated 
interactions because it recognizes people as continuously 
engaged in the process of defining situation and
constructing their actions. Thus, the definition of 
situation is "changeable" and "mobilizable". Johnson 
bases his arguments largely on the writings of
Perinbanayagam.
Perinbanayagam (1974) undertakes an interesting 
analysis of the ethnomethodological and dramaturgical
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views of the definition of situation and argues that 
interactions with the other constitutes the very essence 
of definition of situation. He acknowledges the 
contribution made by Thomas' (1923) famous proposition 
that "if men define situations as real, they are real in 
their consequences" but he states that Thomas never 
explained how meanings are created. There is a suggestion 
in Thomas' writing that an individual defines situations 
alone and there is no conception of any interaction with 
others. Merton (1968) and Stebbins (1967) have attempted 
to unravel some of the problems of the concept of the 
definition of situation but Perinbanayagam finds their 
work very narrowly limited. Their main fault is that they 
look upon human conduct from two dimensions: one as
responses to objective situations and another as 
responses to meanings. Such a distinction between 
objects and meaning is opposed because it is an 
"untenable and indefensible one in terms of human 
conduct" and it goes against the very position which Mead 
refuted so strongly.
Perinbanayagam suggests that the best explication of 
the concept of the definition of situation is possible 
when it is considered in association with Mead's concept 
of "social act". Mead (1932) defines "social act" as a 
social process:
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"The social process relates the responses of one 
individual to the gestures of another, as the 
meanings of the latter, and is thus responsible for 
the rise of and existence of new objects in the 
social situation, objects depending upon or
constituted by these meanings....... The response of
one organization to the gesture of another in any 
given s o c i a l  a c t is the meaning of that gesture."
A meaning is established when individuals respond to one 
another in the social process which involves a kind of 
transaction. The interactions between individuals create 
the definition of situation and there is every 
possibility that they can differ widely in their 
meanings. Perinbanayagam states that people often have to 
make compromises in their interactions:
"Definitions of situations are serialled and
mutually sensitive acts of negotiations and not 
psychologically conducted inferences arrived at 
alone and unaided."
Goffman (1967) uses the vocabulary of the theatre to
explain the concept of the definition of situation and
draws attention to the relationship between the
definition of situation and interaction. He treats 
interaction as the management of impression between 
actors, where one proposes a certain definition of the 
situation and the other accepts this proffered definition 
and thereby creates a smooth interaction and a consensual 
definition of the situation. Even where differences 
exist, the key point is that interaction prevails and 
actors participate in announcement, articulation and 
dramatization.
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It is perhaps appropriate at this stage to discuss 
my interpretation of the concept of power. Power is 
frequently referred to as a difficult concept and there 
is no clear and consistent definition although more and 
more organization theorists have become increasingly 
aware of its importance in explaining organizational 
processes. Ryan (1984) reviews the theories of power as 
covered in the literature of the social sciences and 
draws together the main ideas. She divides the writers on 
power into three categories - those who deal with the 
subject primarily in the context of society and the 
state/ those who are mainly interested in the 
organizational setting/ and lastly those who are mainly 
interested in power at the level of the individual. 
Although these three groups discuss the concept 
extensively (and particularly what it consists of) , Ryan 
states that when it comes to the question "what do you 
mean by power?" the boundaries of the concepts are rather 
vague and consequently it is not easy to grasp all the 
aspects and levels of power simultaneously. Morgan (1986) 
also mentions that there is no clear and consistent 
definition of power although organization and management 
theorists have become increasingly aware of the need to 
recognize its importance in explaining organizational 
affairs. Some view power as a resource, that is, 
something one possesses and others view it as a social 
relation characterized by some kind of dependency, that 
is, as an influence over something.
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Bacharach and Lawler (op. cit.) assert that the 
confusion or the lack of consensus about the meaning of 
power or its application to concrete social circumstances 
is due to the distinction between the epistemological 
assumptions underlying power constructs at the conceptual 
and empirical levels. There is a marked difference in 
orientation between those who theorize about power and 
those who conduct research, and as a result, there are 
irreconcilable debates over the nature of power. They 
suggest that the main reason for confusion in the 
literature is due to the fact that power is a "primitive" 
term rather than a "derived" term, that is, concepts 
borrowed from the theory-construction literature. Derived 
terms are less abstract and allow fairly precise 
definition. A primitive term is primarily heuristic and 
should sensitize the researchers to a series of issues 
rather than offer full clarification of the phenomenon to 
which it refers. They suggest that the "form" and 
"contents" of power relationships are concepts which 
sensitize and clarify the term "power".
Contrary to prevailing differences and difficulties 
in defining or conceptualising power, the amount of 
literature on the subject is impressively vast. My main 
interest is to identify and explain the power used by 
actors in the process of negotiation and hence I will not 
adhere to a singular definition which I fear can limit my 
analysis. Power will be used as a conceptual tool so that
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the politics of the negotiations of the reorganization 
can be interpreted. Since my intention is to study power 
in use, I have been greatly influenced by the conceptual 
work of Lukes (1974) on power and the empirical
application of it by a few other writers such as Gaventa 
(1980) and Brown (1986) . Lukes developed a view of power
consisting of three dimensions which takes into
consideration the contributions of the traditional 
pluralists, the "two faces" model of power developed by 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and his own "radical" view of 
power. This framework incorporates a wide range of
behaviour when the three different dimensions are
employed and it collectively takes into account the 
various manifestations of the use of power. It offers a 
much more comprehensive interpretation of power 
relationships in organizations than in the pluralist view 
which has dominated much of the organizational research. 
Although the contribution of the pluralist view to the 
understanding of power relations is commendable, my 
contention is that it leaves out other forms of power
which are significantly important in the politics of 
negotiation.
Power is an integral feature of all human 
interaction including the negotiation of order and
change. Hall (1972), as stated earlier, recognizes this
lacuna in the literature of the symbolic interactionists 
and he supports writers like Buckley (1967) who have 
attempted to merge together symbolic interactionism and
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negotiated order with power. This close juxtapositioning 
of power and interaction has a very profound implication 
for the concept of power. Power is viewed here as a mode 
of relationship, that is placed in an interactive 
context, rather than as a structural characteristic that 
stands independent of or in opposition to the interacting 
individuals. Lukes (op. cit.) reviews the 
conceptualisation of power offered by Arendt and Parson 
and states that they are of "less value" because:
"they focus on the locution 'power to', ignoring 
'power over1. Thus power indicates a 'capacity1, a 
'facility', and 'ability', not a relationship. 
Accordingly, the conflictual aspect of power - the 
fact that it is exercised over people - disappears 
altogether from view. And along with it there
disappears the central interest of studying power 
relations in the first place..."
Bacharach and Lawler (op. cit.) warn that there is a
tendency in the sociological literature on organizations 
"to anthropomorphize and reify elements of social
structure" and this is particularly true in dealing with 
power. People often speak of things like the power of the 
organization, the power of the particular structure, etc. 
but such interpretations result in neglect of 
organizational politics. Politics must be understood 
through an analysis of the power relations among
conscious individuals or groups of individuals. Mangham 
(1986) echoes a similar view of power in organization:
"Power is something that occurs between people; it 
is a relational concept. One individual - the source 
of control - announces his or her intent, demands 
support or compliance with it and manipulates or 
threatens to manipulate valued resources to secure
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such support or compliance. The other individual - 
the target of control - interprets the source's 
intent, assesses the consequences of non-support or 
non-compliance and constructs what he takes to be 
appropriate action."
I shall review the conceptualisation of power as 
developed by Lukes in the next section.
Pluralist View of Power
The traditional approach to the analysis of power, 
also referred to as the pluralist view, has largely grown 
from the thoughts of Max Weber (1947) and it greatly 
influenced American political scientists in the 1960's. 
Weber's definition of power:
"is the probability that one actor within a social 
relationship will be in a position to carry out his 
own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis 
on which this probability rests."
Weber treats the concept of power as highly comprehensive 
from the point of view of sociology, and hence all 
conceivable qualities of a person and combinations of 
circumstances may put him in a position to impose his 
will in a given situation. Weber's conceptualisation of 
power as a social relationship rather than a personal 
attribute or resource is significant as well.
The American political scientist Robert Dahl (1957) 
was influenced by the ideas of Weber and this is 
reflected in his definition of power:
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" A  has power over B to the extent that he can get B  
to do something that B  would not otherwise do."
Although this exposition treats power as the capacity of 
the power holder, Dahl subsequently makes a distinction 
between the possession and exercise of power and it is
the latter which is central to his view of power
relations. Power is not power unless it is used; and 
power affects the behaviour of another person or party. 
Dahl introduces amendments to his original definition and 
describes power relations as involving:
"a successful attempt by A  to get B to do something 
he would not otherwise do."
Dahl proposes a theoretical analysis of power relations 
for the study of overt actions. Power actions are to be 
studied by using probability functions and mathematical 
formulae and Dahl (1961) demonstrates their application 
in the measurement and ranking of power of U.S. senators 
in terms of their comparative influence over the senate
on question of foreign affairs. His preference for
studying concrete, observable behaviour to determine the 
use of power is clearly reflected in the method described 
in his book Who Governs? where he recommends:
"determine for each decision which participants had 
initiated alternatives that were finally adopted, 
has vetoed alternatives initiated by others, or had 
proposed alternatives that were turned down. These 
actions were then tabulated as individual 
"successes" or "defeats". The participants with the 
greatest proportion of success out of the total 
number of successes were then considered to be the 
most influential."
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Polsby (1963) has closely adhered to Dahl in his 
definition of power and methodological approach. He 
states:
"one can conceive of power, influence, and control 
as serviceable synonyms - as the capacity of one 
actor to do something affecting another actor, which 
changes the probable pattern of specified future 
events. This can be envisaged most easily in a 
decision-making situation."
Polsby suggests that the best way to determine which 
individuals and groups have more power in social life is 
to identify who dominates in a decision-making situation 
because such a situation will raise conflicts and test 
the capacity of individuals to influence outcomes.
The majority of organization theorists seem to have 
built their concepts of power from the definitions 
offered by Dahl and other early pluralists. Their main 
concern with power has been the study of parties 
contesting a decision, each using available resources to 
influence the outcome. The focus is on explicit conflict 
in a decision-making situation and the use of power 
resources. Organizational researchers have shown much 
interest in power sources, that is, bases and sources of 
power in power relations, because such resources and 
their use are considered as important determinants in 
conflicts. The literature on bases of power depicts a 
vast and varied account of features of power relations 
and it also reflects numerous similarities and disputes 
among the writers.
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Dahl (1957) made reference to an individual's power 
base in his pioneering work on the concept of power and 
he mentioned that it consisted of all the resources an 
individual could exploit in order to affect the behaviour 
of others, such as opportunities, acts, objects, etc. 
Dahl cited the potential base of the U.S. president's 
power over a senator as an example, that is, his
patronage, his constitutional veto, the possibility of 
calling White House conferences, his presidential 
influence on the national electorate, his charisma and 
charm, etc. In a study of politics in New Haven, Dahl
(1961) investigated the opportunities and resources 
available to a person for gaining influence and his
exploitation of political potentials. He defines 
resources as anything that can be used to sway the
specific choices or strategies of another individual and 
elaborates upon the kind of resources:
"A list of resources in the American political 
system might include an individual's own time; 
access to money, credit, and wealth; control over 
jobs; control over information; esteem or social 
standing; the possession of charisma, popularity, 
legitimacy, legality; and the rights pertaining to 
public office. The list might also include 
solidarity: the capacity of a member of one segment 
of society to evoke support from others who identify 
him as like themselves because of similarities in 
occupation, social standing, religion, ethnic 
origin, or racial stock. The list would include the 
right to vote, intelligence, education, and perhaps 
even one's energy level."
French and Raven (1959) develop a typological 
analysis of social power which has influenced many 
subsequent writers. They define social power in terms of
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influence which is "a change in person's cognitions, 
attitude, or behaviour which has its origin in another 
person or group". Power is the potential influence that 
an agent can exert on the person. They distinguish five 
major bases of power: coercion, rewards, expertise,
legitimacy and referent power. Coercion power implies the 
threat of decreasing another's outcome and ability to 
impose punishment. Reward power is the ability to reward 
the recipient. Expertise power stems from an attribution 
of superior knowledge. Legitimacy power is based on the 
rights of control and concomitant obligation to obey by 
the other. Referent power is based on identification and 
association with another person who is powerful, e.g. 
when a person uses another person or group as a "frame of 
reference". Information is added as the sixth basis of 
power by French and Raven in their subsequent writings 
(Raven and Kruglanski, 1970/ Raven, 1974). Information 
power is based on access to or possession of important 
information concerning the organization which the other 
party does not know about.
Bacharach and Lawler (op. cit.) contend that the 
repertoire on bases of power developed by French and 
Raven do not follow a cogent theoretical framework and 
suffer from three inconsistencies. There is an overlap 
between a few of the categories, for example, legitimacy 
and expertise, information and expertise, referent power 
is used as a "catchall", and what is being controlled by
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the party with power is not clear in all cases. They 
argue that this kind of ambiguity (in the writings of 
French and Raven) results from a confusion between 
"bases” of power and "sources" of power and they propose 
a distinction between the two:
"In dealing with the bases of power we are 
interested in what parties control that enables them 
to manipulate the behaviour of others; in referring 
to the sources of power we are speaking of how 
parties come to control the bases of power".
They suggest four primary bases of power based on the 
schemes developed by Etzioni (1961) and French and Raven, 
that is, coercive, remunerative, normative and knowledge. 
The first three bases of power are adopted from Etzioni: 
coercive power rests on the ability to apply the threat 
of physical sanctions; remunerative power is based on the 
control of material resources and rewards; and normative 
power is based on the control of symbolic rewards. The 
information power of French and Revan is accepted as the 
fourth base of power but classified as knowledge power 
which is "access to information, that is, knowledge also 
becomes a basis of power. When an actor in an 
organization controls unique information and when the 
information is needed to make a decision, the actor has 
power". Any power relationship in an organization can 
encompass all of these four bases and each relationship 
may well be characterized by one of them rather than 
another according to Bacharach and Lawler. They identify 
four "sources" of power in a social relation, that is, 
office or structured position, personal characteristics,
310
expertise, and opportunity. The structural position of a 
person can provide access to various bases of power such 
as information, or coercive resources, or capacity to 
manipulate symbols, etc. Personal characteristics can be 
a source of power such as charisma, verbal skills, or 
even physical attributes. Expertise is a source of power 
because it is a means by which one party comes to control 
specialized information. The opportunity source of power 
is embedded in the informal structure of the organization 
so that people who occupy critical positions have greater 
capability of influencing the productivity of an 
organization, as illustrated by Mechanic's (1962) 
analysis of the power of the secretarial staff.
The patterns and degrees of dependence are the 
parameters within which individuals affect each other. 
Dependence can be a base of power contingent upon what 
each party can control that enables it to influence or 
manipulate the other's behaviour. The dependence aspect 
of power is developed in the social exchange theory 
(Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962, 1972; Homans, 1974; Thibaut
and Kelley, 1959) and the exchange element in all social 
relationships has been briefly discussed earlier. Thibaut 
and Kelley state that a dependence relationship exists 
when an individual's actions and the outcomes are 
dependent not just on his own behaviour but also on what 
others do or how they respond to his behaviour. A 
dependence implies that the outcomes of an individual's 
actions are determined by the interrelationship between
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his behaviour and the other's behaviour and a social 
exchange originates from such a relation. Any kind of 
conflict between two or more parties in a power 
relationship also implies that they are engaged in a 
dependence relationship.
The power-dependence theory of Emerson (1962, 1972)
and Blau (1964) considers the power of an individual as a 
function of other person's dependence on him. Emerson
(1962) treats power as a property of the social 
relationship which entails mutual dependence, that is, 
dependence of one party provides the basis of power to 
the other. A power dependence relationship means that:
"A d e p e n d s  upon B if he aspires to goals or 
gratifications whose achievements are facilitated by 
appropriate actions on B's part. By virtue of mutual 
dependency, it is more or less imperative to each 
party that he be able to control or influence the 
other's conduct. At the same time, these ties of 
mutual dependence imply that each party is in a 
position, to some degree, to grant or deny, 
facilitate or hinder, the other's gratification... 
In short, p o w e r  r e s i d e s  i m p l i c i t l y  i n  t h e  o t h e r ’s  
d e p e n d e n c y ."
Emerson enhances the concept of dependence and identifies 
two variables which jointly influence the dependence of 
one actor upon another (also discussed by Blau, op. cit./ 
and Gergen, 1969):
"The dependence of actor A upon actor B is (1) 
directly proportional to A's m o t i v a t i o n a l  i n v e s t m e n t  
in goals mediated by B, and (2) inversely 
proportional to the a v a i l a b i l i t y  of those goals to A 
outside of the A - B relation."
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The motivational investment of an actor is the degree of 
value attached to the goal or outcome and is a measure of 
the importance of the outcome in the relationship. The 
greater the value attached to the outcomes in such a 
relationship, the greater the power of the other. The 
availability of other alternative sources is the 
probability that an actor can secure similar goals from 
other relationship which reduces the other’s control over 
him. Hence, power has to be examined in terms of other 
networks of relationship that influence the dual A - B 
relationship.
Blau (op. cit..) states that the most prevalent way 
of attaining power is to provide services which others
cannot easily do without in an exchange relationship. If 
a person regularly renders services to others which 
cannot be readily obtained from elsewhere, they become 
dependent and obligated to him for these services, unless 
they can furnish other benefits to him that can produce 
an interdependence by making him equally dependent on
them. Blau defines four conditions that can produce an 
imbalance of power in a power-dependence relationship, 
that is, four basic alternatives to power:
"Individuals who need a service another has to offer 
have the following alternatives. First, they can 
supply him with a service that he wants badly enough
to induce him to offer his service in
return Second, they may obtain the needed
service elsewhere Third, they can coerce him to
furnish the service, provided they are capable of 
doing so in which case they would establish 
domination over him....Fourth, they may learn to 
resign themselves to do without this service."
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If people are not able or willing to choose any of these 
alternatives, they have to comply with the wishes of the 
supplier of the services. The continued supply of 
services inevitably generates power and "their 
subordination to his power is inescapable".
Bacharach and Lawler (op. cit.) extend their 
appreciation to the power-dependence theory because it 
conceives dependence as inherent in social life, treats 
dependence as a formal dimension of power, and makes 
power a central concern of a sociological analysis. In 
addition, the theory incorporates important distinctions 
that have been overlooked by other authors who have 
followed the standard Weberian definition of power, such 
as Bierstedt, 1950/ Dahl, 1957/ Etzioni, 1961/ French and 
Raven, 1959/ Tedeschi and Bonoma, 1972/ and Wrong, 1968. 
First, the majority of these authors do not directly link 
power to dependence and social exchange. Second, the 
power-dependence theory makes an important distinction 
between an actor's stake in a relationship and the 
ability of each party to manipulate the other's outcomes. 
Most theories on power emphasize the coercive aspects and 
neglect the underlying stakes of the actors. Third, the 
power-dependence theory states that the use of power is 
almost always based not on the objective conditions of 
dependence but on judgements which actors make about 
these conditions, i.e. the cognitive aspects of power 
relationships.
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Bacharach and Lawler (1976, 1979, 1980) conduct a
series of experiments on the cognitive implications of 
the power-dependence theory and specifically study the 
different cognitive processes in conflict settings. The 
research findings affirm their assumptions that the level 
of dependence will provide a basis for the individual’s 
perception of their own and others' power, the likelihood 
of the other using power, and the evaluation and 
selection of multiple tactical options. Their support to 
the theory is well expressed in their conclusion:
"Thus, we can say that power-dependence theory 
identifies the basic parameters that constrain a 
power relationship. These parameters are 
simultaneously a source of integration and conflict. 
The dimension of dependence determines whether 
parties stay in a given relationship, attempt to 
change it by tactical action, increase the amount of 
distance in the relationship, or simply abandon it."
The pluralist view of power starting from the
contributions of Dahl and further subsequent
developments by others as examined above has been
labelled the "one-dimensional view" of power by Lukes
(op. cit.). He provides a succinct summary of the
conceptual and methodological approach of the pluralists:
"one-dimensional view of power involves a focus on 
b e h a v i o u r  in the making of decisions on i s s u e s  over 
which there is an observable c o n f l i c t  of
(subjective) i n t e r e s t s , seen as express policy
preferences, revealed by political participation."
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The Two Faces of Power
Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963) maintain that a
fresh approach to the study of power is necessary and 
develop the concept of "two faces of power". They are 
critical of the conceptualization of power of both 
sociologists and political scientists/ and the sharp 
differences between the two schools is attributed to the 
fundamental differences underlying their assumptions and 
research methodologies. They generally support the 
pluralists1 criticisms and disagreements with the 
assumptions of the elitists/ viz. every human institution 
consists of an ordered system of power structure which is 
an image of the organization's stratification/ the power 
structure is stable over time, and reputed power is equal 
to actual power. Although pluralists such as Dahl expose 
the main weakness of the elitist, Bachrach and Baratz 
continue to find faults with the former's definition of 
power and their methodology, that is, power defined as 
participation in decision-making and analyzed by 
examination of a series of concrete decisions. The two 
critical weaknesses with such an approach to power are: 
the pluralists do not take account of the fact that power 
can be exercised by confining the scope of the decision­
making to relatively safe issues and they provide no 
objective criteria for distinguishing important and 
unimportant issues.
316
The pluralist concept of power is plainly evident in 
a situation where A participates in the making of a 
decision that affects B. There is also an another "face" 
of power which exists in the following situation 
according to Bachrach and Baratz:
"A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing 
social and political values and institutional 
practices that limit the scope of the political 
process to public consideration of only those issues 
which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the 
extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is 
prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing 
to the fore any issue that might in their resolution 
be seriously detrimental to A's set of preferences."
A has exercised power over B and this is the second face 
of power. The authors contend that of the two faces of 
power, the sociologists see neither and the pluralists 
see only the first one.
The concept of nondecision-making is the key concept 
in the second face of power. When some people can limit 
decision-making to relatively non-controversial matters 
by influencing community values, political procedure and 
rituals, or create barriers to the public airing of 
policy conflicts, or effectively prevent certain 
grievances from developing into full-fledged issues which 
call for decisions, a nondecision-making situation 
exists. The decision-making will be limited to issues 
that are considered safe and latent issues will be 
prevented from becoming a question for decision. All of 
this is done and achieved through a process of
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"mobilization of bias", a concept adopted by Bachrach 
and Baratz in their analysis from Schattschneider (1960) :
"All forms of political organization have a bias in 
favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict 
and the suppression of others because o r g a n i z a t i o n  
i s  t h e  m o b i l i z a t i o n  o f  b i a s .  Some issues are 
organized into politics while others are organized 
out."
Lukes (op. cit.) refers to the "two faces of power" 
as the two-dimensional view of power and commends it as 
an improvement over the pluralist approach to power. He 
credits it for incorporating into the analysis of power 
relations the question of control of the political agenda 
and the ways in which potential issues are kept out of 
the political process. The analysis of power from the 
two-dimensional view will need to identify potential 
issues (which nondecision-making prevents from being 
actual) over which there is an observable conflict 
(either overt or covert) between different interests (of 
those engaged in nondecision-making and the interests of 
those they excluded).
The Three-Dimensional View of Power
Lukes* three-dimensional view of power takes into 
consideration the inadequacies of definitions and 
contributions of the pluralist approach and their 
critics, namely Bachrach and Baratz. The pluralists tend 
to focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on
318
issues over which there is overt conflict of interests 
and Lukes states that such implication is not required 
by either Dahl's or Polsby's definitions of power because 
power exists where A can or does succeed in affecting 
what B does. However, their approach is in contradiction 
with their conceptual framework and methodology; and 
therefore "it represents an insight which this one­
dimensional view of power is unable to exploit".
The two-dimensional view of power is a major 
improvement over the pluralist view because it reveals 
the less visible ways in which a political system can be 
biased in favour of certain groups and against others. 
Lukes still regards it as inadequate on three counts:
First, the two-dimensional view like the pluralists is 
too committed to behaviourism because it stresses the 
study of overt behaviour in decision-making and conflict 
situations. It tries to put together all cases of 
exclusion of potential issues to a paradigm of decision. 
It presents a misleading picture of the ways in which 
individuals and above all groups and institutions can 
succeed in excluding potential issues from politics. 
Decision-making and mobilization of bias operate 
differently because the latter "are neither consciously 
chosen nor the intended results of particular 
individual's choices" (Lukes). Bachrach and Baratz adopt 
an individualistic view of power like the pluralist but 
the power to control the agenda of politics cannot be
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analyzed unless it is seen as a function of collective 
forces and social arrangements. The power exercised by 
collective actions and social groups cannot be simply 
conceptualised in terms of individual action or 
behaviour.
Second, the two-dimensional view associates power with 
actual, observable conflict. Power and conflict is 
expected to go hand-in-hand, that is, an exercise of 
power exists only where there is conflict. Such an 
assumption is not valid for two reasons according to 
Lukes: manipulation and authority are two types of power 
included in Bachrach and Baratz's own analysis but their 
use does not necessarily involve any kind of conflict; 
power can be exercised without conflict when a person can 
influence, shape or determine other's wants. Examples of 
such phenomena are given in Skinner's work and even in 
Dahl's book, Who Governs?
Third, the two-dimensional view holds that nondecision­
making power only exists in situations where there are 
grievances that are denied entry into political process 
and there is always genuine consensus in the absence of 
grievance. Lukes insists that this is too narrow a 
definition of grievance because consensus can be 
manipulated. A definition of grievance should include an 
articulated demand or a directed complaint or a vague 
feeling of unease or even a sense of deprivation. Power 
can be exercised by shaping people's perceptions,
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cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept 
their roles and grievance is prevented from arising.
Lukes upholds that his three-dimensional view of 
power overcomes the limitations of the two-dimensional 
view and offers:
"the prospect of a serious sociological and not 
merely personalized explanation of how political 
systems prevent demands from becoming political 
issues or even from being made."
Power is exercised by keeping potential issues out of 
politics without causing or averting to actual conflict. 
Even when there is a potential for conflict, it may never 
be actualised and remain only a latent conflict. In most 
cases the people upon whom power is exercised may not 
express or even be conscious of their own interests. The 
less powerful parties accept myths promulgated by the 
more powerful parties and even support decisions that 
contradict their interests.
Lukes is conscious that the pluralists object to 
studying something which does not happen and is not 
observable. His argument is that it is possible to study 
the power relation of the three-dimensional nature by 
identifying what exactly is involved in an exercise of 
power:
"...any attribution of the exercise of power 
(including of course, those by Dahl and his 
colleagues) always implies a relevant
counterfactual, to the effect that (but for A, or 
but for A  together with any other sufficient
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conditions) B  would otherwise have done, let us say 
b ."
The counterfactual is clearly visible or "ready made" in 
actual, observable conflict situations, for example, 
where A and B are in conflict with A wanting a and B 
wanting b, then if A prevails over B, then it is easy to 
assume that B would otherwise have done b, which is the 
counterfactual. In situations where there is no 
observable conflict between A and B, the relevant 
counterfactual needs to be asserted to locate the 
exercise of power:
"....we must provide other, indirect, grounds for 
asserting that if A  had not acted (or failed to act) 
in a certain way then B  would have thought and acted 
differently from the way he does actually think and
act........ and we also need to specify the means or
mechanisms by which A  has prevented, or else acted 
(or abstained from acting) in a manner sufficient to 
prevent B from doing so."
Lukes does not include any empirical work of his own 
as examples of the three-dimensional view. In fact, this 
view of power remains relatively unexplored in 
organization and management literature. A few 
organizational theorists have investigated the use of 
myths (Cohen, 1975) and symbols (Pfeffer, 1981) to manage 
meanings (Pettigrew, 1977, 1979) and control awareness.
Hardy's (1985) analysis of power looked into 
"unobtrusive" power which is used before overt 




The political analysis of organizational change in 
state-owned enterprises initiated in the previous chapter 
has been further developed here, I have pursued the 
argument that change and order are created by 
negotiations which consist of political bargaining 
processes among key actors and stakeholders, rather than 
change decisions being taken on the basis of rational 
goals, objectives and assumptions. The reorganization of 
the electricity industry was characterized by conditions 
of ambiguity, uncertainty, newness, conflicts and 
disagreements and hence joint actions among the principal 
actors were characterized by bargaining and negotiations. 
The importance of negotiation as a key social act is
recognized and developed in the negotiated order theory 
and Strauss (1978) even poses the question, "are there 
any social orders that are not also negotiated orders?". 
I am in agreement with many of the proponents of the
negotiated order theory that Strauss' analytical paradigm 
is a very useful framework for investigation into 
negotiations and negotiated orders. But I have argued 
that although the negotiated order theory provides a
processual view of organization, it is still unable to
explain individuals' participation and effectiveness in 
negotiations and provide reasonable answers to questions 
such as how a particular decision came about, why an 
actor or group is successful, or how and why people form 
a definition of a situation and how it changes. The
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perspective does not present adequate explanation of the 
processes of negotiation and how negotiated outcomes are 
achieved because it has undermined the power dynamics in 
negotiation. People share power in organizations and thus 
power relationships may not be equal/ and power
influences what happens in organizations including 
negotiations. This implies that a "political" 
interpretation of negotiation has to be undertaken 
because power relationships influence processes and 
outcomes of negotiations. The power relationships in 
negotiations can be explored and analyzed along the 
"three dimensions of power" developed by Lukes which
represents a comprehensive framework for identifying the 
various forms of power in use. The next chapter will
study the various key organizational changes that were 
introduced as important aspects of the reorganization of 
the electricity industry. I shall argue that these
changes were negotiated by the key actors and that they 
were "resultants" (Allison, op. cit.), that is, the 
outcome of "powerful" individuals pulling in different 




NEGOTIATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES: A POLITICAL
INTERPRETATION
The organizational changes which were introduced as 
part of the reorganization of the electricity industry 
are analyzed in terms of actions and interactions among 
the various stakeholders. The change process can be 
explained in the actions of the actors, that is, the 
process of negotiation between the representatives of the 
stakeholders. What we seem to have is a model of 
interaction characterized by a complex network of 
competing groups and individuals acting to control, 
maintain or improve their situations, motivated by their 
self-interests, beliefs and judgements. These actors 
shared authority and responsibility for the 
implementation of various changes and some of them had 
the power to define the goals of the new organization. 
The final results of the reorganization may be 
interpreted as a change process in which all the external 
and internal stakeholders managed to secure their 
interests through compromises, agreements, deals, and 
generally other forms of negotiation, that is, the 
creation of a social order by negotiation. Except for the 
lending agencies, the other stakeholders did not see 
their interests protected or incorporated in the planned
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change proposals of Coopers and Lybrand (C&L) and thus 
proceeded to redesign and implement changes more suited 
to their expectation and intent, their definition of the 
situation. In the course of events, organizational 
changes were created through a process of joint action 
which involved the fitting together, the merging, the 
alignment of separate lines of actions of the actors. The 
situation draws a very close parallel to Hall's (1972) 
interpretation of joint action which he described as "a 
complex process involving all the manifestation of 
bargaining and negotiating - strategy, tact, 
intelligence, manoeuvreing, persuasion, inducement, 
constraint, threat, and exchange".
The key stakeholders seem to have largely secured 
their interests in the reorganization. The two lending 
agencies, ADB and the WB, were the initiators of the 
reorganization of the industry and called for the 
establishment of a single utility by merging all the 
fragmented bodies which eventually brought about the 
creation of the NEA. Sieber (ADB) stated the position of 
the bank on the achievement:
"From our point of view it is satisfactory because 
the reorganization did take place and one 
organization was created. To make it work we can 
never do, it is always the responsibility of your 
country and those people."
The Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) as the controlling 
body of the industry managed to retain its strong 
influence and control over the new autonomous authority
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as they did prior to reorganization. The Ministry of Law 
and Justice (MOLJ) agreed on a NEA Act which matched 
their pattern of legislation designed for all other 
state-owned enterprises. The Public Services Commission 
(PSC) developed a criteria for staff adjustment which 
suited the interests of special individuals representing 
the authority but also included conditional compromises 
in its implementation so as to make its decisions look 
fair and just to all the other concerned staff. The 
internal actors of the industry were mainly concerned 
with securing positions in the new organization structure 
of the NEA and a maximum number of posts were created 
and majority of staff were fitted into higher levels. The 
creation of a project pool in the MWR was undertaken to 
accommodate the interests of an influential group of ED 
engineers who were reluctant to transfer their services 
to the authority. All these achievements in the 
reorganization were negotiated by the key actors in 
accordance to their meanings and definitions of the 
situation and these cases can provide the basis for 
understanding organizations as suggested by the 
negotiated order perspective.
I have argued that the negotiation of change can be 
political because it involves social relationships in 
which exchanges take place among the interacting 
individuals in a situation usually marked by uncertainty, 
ambiguity, competition and self-interests. Many others 
have advocated that politics is negotiation and "politics
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is an art of compromise" is a frequently repeated 
aphorism. Pfeffer (1981) asserts that organizational 
politics is an analogue to negotiative activity. Hall 
(1987) continues to maintain that negotiations should be 
related to politics and states that "the analysis of 
negotiative activity is markedly processual and dynamic, 
yet grounded in the political realities of social life". 
My main contention is not only to explain that the 
several key organizational changes were negotiated among 
the stakeholders at both macro and micro-levels and such 
changes were negotiated orders as proposed in the 
negotiated order perspective but I shall also undertake 
an analysis of the power used in the change process and 
its outcomes. I am arguing that the use of power and 
politics was present in the macro interactions between 
institutions at the higher level and equally so in the 
micro interactions among members of the industry at a 
lower level. Power in this study is considered as a key 
property of the structural relationship in social 
settings as well as of the negotiation context, that is, 
as an important condition in negotiations and negotiated 
orders. My main concern will be to locate and explain the 
use of power in the process of negotiation of the 
organizational changes because power, I believe, can 
explain the results and the process by which such results 
were determined. I hope to justify using the "three 
dimensional view" of power because such an analysis can 
reveal that power was frequently exercised in other less 
obvious and less visible forms than the study of power in
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overt conflict and decision-making situations which is 
the main focus of organizational studies. The discussion 
on power may appear to be repetitive in the several 
organizational changes but I wish to state at the outset 
that negotiation was an iterative process taking place at 
various levels and involved many different individuals; 
power relationships were a common feature in all 
negotiations.
In addition, a political analysis of negotiation 
will take into account the identification of key 
individuals representing the stakeholders, their 
interests and interpretations, conflicts and 
disagreements, etc. Few of these issues have been 
introduced in the earlier chapters where I identified the 
multiplicity of stakeholders and discussed the variety of 
definitions of situations they imported to the 
reorganization. The definition of situation is an 
especially important concept in the negotiated order 
perspective because it undertakes the study of human 
actions from the point of view of the actor. Actions 
emerge from the actor's meaning and choices are made on 
the basis of perception, interpretations and judgements; 
thus an examination of the actors' definitions of 
situation is essential to the study of behaviour in 
organizational change. I shall continue my study with 
this background and devote this chapter to the detailed 
analysis of four key changes: the new institutional set­
up and creation of the NEA; the legislation of the NEA
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including the composition of the board; organization 
structure; and staff adjustment including the creation of 
the project pool. These organizational changes resulted 
from the process of planned institutional rearrangement 
of the electricity industry and were considered the most 
significant by the people from within the industry.
I. Institutional Rearrangement and the Creation of the 
NEA: Structural Context and Negotiations
The decision to restructure the electricity industry 
was a direct result of long and arduous negotiations 
between the lending agencies and the government of Nepal, 
represented chiefly by the ED of the MWR. The lending 
agencies, the ADB and the WB, were the influential 
structural context of the industry as they provided loans 
and managed international financing for all key 
developmental projects (in other sectors of the economy 
as well) at concessionary rates which was very attractive 
to the capital-starved borrower. The concern for 
institutional change originated from this relationship 
in the early seventies when the country joined 
membership of the ADB. The fragmented electricity 
industry which constituted several bodies and operated as 
a civil service, state-owned enterprise and development 
projects was considered inappropriate for a utility 
industry by the ADB. The bank envisaged a single utility 
operating on commercial principles as in developed 
countries.
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Negotiation seemed to be an integral process in the 
relationship between the banks and the borrower. Each and 
every application for a project loan to the ADB and the 
WB passed through a project cycle and this cycle was a 
standard context to which the industry responded and 
adjusted as it continued to receive finance. It formed 
the basis of an interorganizational relationship to which 
both the parties continually responded through processes 
of negotiations (Strauss, 1982/ O'Toole and O'Toole, 
1981). The project identification as the first step in 
the project cycle involved choosing a project for 
possible bank financing within the context of national 
and sectoral plans. The project preparation was done by 
carrying out a feasibility study of the project. Although 
project preparation was in principle the responsibility 
of the borrower, in practice the bank staff played a very 
active role and feasibility studies were mostly prepared 
by outside consultants funded by the banks under a 
technical assistance grant. The appraisal of the project 
was largely based on the feasibility report and the banks 
were chiefly concerned with the technical, economic, 
institutional and financial aspects of the project. In 
addition, the banks also raised other issues concerning 
the borrower such as organizational and management 
aspects before the loan for the project was considered. 
The main negotiations were conducted between the 
appraisal team and the representatives of the government 
and an appraisal report was prepared by the team from the 
bank which included a report on the project and a loan
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document that spelled out all the terms and conditions 
agreed with the borrower. The appraisal report was 
specially important because it formed the basis for the 
final loan agreement between the bank and the borrower. 
The report was submitted to the bank's board for formal 
approval and became an integral part of the loan 
agreement. The new loans for future projects were 
negotiated on the basis of compliance to conditions
stipulated in the previous loans and any differences 
between the two parties were issues for renegotiation.
From the very inception, the negotiation strategy 
followed by the ADB was to tie-up the reorganization
issue with the appraisal of the development projects. 
The appraisal teams of the ADB negotiated project loans 
along with securing agreements on future steps to be 
initiated for execution of the reorganization. The
lending agency and the industry were in an exchange 
relationship but the bank was in a controlling position 
because of the dependence of the industry. Dependence was 
the cause of exchange relationship as stated by Blau 
(1964) and Emerson (1962, 1972); Emerson states that
power is a function of dependence. I have mentioned that 
the electricity industry was totally dependent for 
finance on the two banks and there were no alternative
sources of finance that were equally attractive in terms 
of interest rates and other conditions. The ADB often 
exercised its advantage over the borrower to influence 
the bargaining in line with its definitions and
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interests. The strategy adopted by the ADB was to relate 
project loans to progress and commitments on the 
institutional changes and Sieber admitted to advantages
of such a tie up:
"We have to apply pressure at the time of the new 
project. The only time when we can and do anything 
is at the time of giving the new loan. Each time we 
give a new loan you must show some progress even if 
it is a very little. Because initially you have said 
you want to change, the bank has not forced you to 
change and you have accepted that you wish to
change So once you have started, it is
difficult to stop because that is also the whole 
idea."
I am stating that the reorganization of the 
electricity industry did not take place swiftly and
smoothly with the ADB propounding the advantages and 
benefits of a single commercial utility and the 
government of Nepal readily conceding to such requests. 
Individuals representing the MWR and ED resisted any 
radical changes in spite of agreeing to the presence of 
numerous weaknesses in the prevailing set-up. The 
stakeholders held very different perceptions and opinions 
on the change programme which corresponded with the 
underlying assumption of the negotiated order perspective 
that individual members of the team can impose their 
preferences and judgements in a choice situation. An 
order will be negotiated and Strauss states that life in 
organizations, groups and other social structure cannot 
conceivably go on without tacit agreements and the more 
or less implicit negotiations that often lead up to them. 
In the same sense, I am arguing that the reorganization
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of the power industry took place through a long process 
of negotiation between the ADB and the borrower. There 
were three key working arrangements negotiated between 
the two parties which affected an incremental progress 
towards the final creation of a single authority. These 
sequential agreements were: the institutional study of
the industry by the expatriate management consultants; 
the choice of a one-body structure as opposed to a two- 
body structure; and the validation of the new authority. 
I should clarify the concept of incremental change as 
used above because I do not visualize the process of 
reorganization as the "logical incrementalism" of Quinn 
(1980). The progress towards any form of reorganization 
and the final validation of the NEA was forced to be slow 
and gradual because of the politics of conflict, 
disagreements, resistance, and differences. None of the 
essential characteristics of incrementalism, as put forth 
by Quinn, seemed to be the key processes applicable to 
this reorganization, such as testing out the small 
changes to be gradually developed as more information 
becomes available for decision or the organization 
probing the future and learning from partial commitments 
or cautious step by step activity of building awareness 
of the need for change.
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i. Agreement on Institutional Studies by the Consultants
The bank mission of the ADB which came to appraise 
the second power project was responsible for initiating 
negotiations on a new structure for the electricity 
industry. Although the mission expressed their preference 
for institutional changes during numerous meetings with 
members of the government and the industry, they were
aware of the resistance from many senior engineers of the 
ED and the MWR. There were several senior engineers who 
realized that the future bank finance was tied-up to the 
issue of institutional change but they were still 
reluctant to support the line taken by the mission mainly 
because of the personal risks and threats in a major
change programme. Sieber summed up the resistance he 
faced at the initial stages:
"There was a large group of civil servants and
people in the ED who did not want the change. There 
were people from the ED who wanted change but did 
not say so. It became quite clear that it is human 
nature for the reluctance, the fear of losing 
importance. If you are a higher officer in the ED 
dealing with all new projects you have some status 
which then you are afraid to lose. They did not
fully understand and we tried to explain that the 
importance is not lost."
The crucial turning point was a covert deal reached 
between the mission team leader, Sieber and PP, who as 
the chief engineer of ED, was the most senior technical 
person in the industry and the key person interacting 
with the officials of the bank. PP was in favour of
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creating a single body and his preference was based on 
his working experiences in a western power utility:
"In 1957 I wrote a report while I worked in Canada 
in the Hydroelectric Commission of Toronto. I was 
thinking of a similar type of organization as in 
Toronto and I recommended the creation of a single 
organization in Nepal. Such an organization would be 
a completely autonomous body under one management 
but operating within the framework of the 
government. It would operate with a demand and 
supply concept based on market principles."
Sieber recalled how he was encouraged by the chief
engineer "to push ahead" with the organizational change
at a private level and he admitted that such support did 
not "kill" their initiative for reorganization at the
very early stage. Sieber was also requested not to 
disclose PP's support to the other engineers because of 
the resistance to reorganization from the majority of ED 
staff. The mission agreed the need to approach this issue 
cautiously and an understanding was reached with the 
chief engineer: an institutional study to be undertaken
so as to have an overlook at the entire set-up of the
industry and to determine the most appropriate approach 
for the operation and future expansion of the system as a 
whole. The study was to be financed by the bank as part 
of their technical assistance and not as loan, and would 
not incur any financial liabilities to the borrower. This 
was arranged as an additional incentive to the borrower 
as a free service. The mission also undertook the task of 
convincing the secretary of the ministry about the 
institutional study because his support was essential. 
This was not much of a difficult task because the service
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was being freely supplied by the bank and the key
technical person PP already supported the benefits of
such a study. Esperto, another member of the ADB mission 
team, recalled the meeting with the secretary and
credited him for his approval:
"You need people with a bigger vision like the
secretary of the power ministry who supported us
although the operational people at that time were
not supportive...... I think we managed to convince
the secretary during a cocktail
party....... (convinced) to have an institutional
study financed under a technical assistance grant."
It is interesting to note that there was little 
resistance to the institutional study at this stage
because the senior engineers did not anticipate any
direct threats or consequences from the study itself. The 
general feelings expressed by the ED staff at that time
were "it was only a study" or "so many studies were
conducted before without any effect". Furthermore, the
undertaking of the institutional study to many in the
industry was a way of postponing or even avoiding the 
call for changes by the ADB.
The recommendations on institutional changes by BEI 
not only matched the preferences of the bank but now two 
influential structural contexts were imposing identical 
definitions of the situation. They anticipated 
improvements in the performance of the industry, only 
after radical changes were introduced into the prevailing 
structure. The consultants' proposal was treated as a
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neutral, expert view and it only strengthened the 
position of the bank in the negotiations because they 
could make direct references to particular weaknesses in 
the organization and provide justifications for doubting 
the capacity of the borrower. Moreover, PP was promoted 
to the post of the secretary of the MWR in 197 9 and the 
bank found in him not only a covert supporter but now an 
influential one because he headed the entire power 
industry. Thus when the appraisal team came to negotiate 
the loan for the third power project in May 1979, they 
were able to work out a more specific agreement on the 
reorganization. PP was willing to take a more overt and 
favourable position on the reorganization because he 
could now refer to the BEI report and the demands made by
the bank. A senior engineer with the ED recalled how PP
"called all the heads, superintendent engineers, deputy 
general managers from the NEC and asked our views on the 
report but then decided on the reorganization by
himself". The institutional study by BEI contributed to
the first formal agreement on a new structure by the 
government and such a decision triggered off the 
reorganization process leading to inevitable progress in 
the subsequent loan negotiations.
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ii. A One-Body Versus a Two-Bodies Structure: A
Negotiated Decision
The bank mission which came to appraise the loan for 
the fourth power project in September 1981 found that the 
borrower had failed to comply to each and every loan 
covenant concerning the reorganization agreed upon 
earlier. For example, neither the "restructuring working 
party" had been formed nor consultants hired to implement 
the second phase of the institutional change. The 
inaction on the part of the borrower can be understood as 
their resistance to the change and creation of a single 
organization. The senior engineers from the ED felt 
threats to their desirable status quo. The reality of the 
change to a single state-owned enterprise and its 
possible effects at the individual level started to sink 
in and people started to interpret the changes in terms 
of personal gains and losses. Sympathetic support was 
given to their anxiety by the new chief engineer of the 
ED and a new secretary of the MWR, both of whom were more 
concerned about developing a favourable response to the 
change among their staff rather than considering the 
operational benefits of a single utility. The chief 
engineer of the ED was anxious about the grievances 
expressed by the senior engineers and other staff:
"As soon as there is the question of merging the two 
organizations, this has many implications. Every 
change has positive and negative aspects and there 
was the need to consider all this. We had to look 
into the matter of staff interests. There are 
certain reservations about going to a state-owned 
corporation and people prefer to remain as civil 
servants. Let us not get into what is the attraction
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of the civil service but at that time there were 
strong reservations among middle and top level staff
of the department....... They said that they wanted
to remain in the government. What is the point if we 
introduce such a massive change but if people stay 
with the government. The government will not be able 
to provide jobs and on the other hand the new 
corporate body would suffer from insufficient 
manpower. This was one of the main reasons for 
delay. For a radically different way of doing things 
and for change to be smooth, there should be 
consensus among the people who work there.”
A proposal for creating two separate bodies within 
the industry was finally put forth by the engineers of 
the ED who were trying to work out specific roles for 
themselves in the new structure. They proposed that the 
ED should still retain all the same functions and remain 
a government organization with the status of civil 
service. The deputy chief engineer of the ED who was the 
key architect of this proposal explained the advantages:
"I floated the idea of two bodies. The ED would be 
given the shape of the CEGB as in the UK pattern and 
the NEC would be like the area boards. The ED was 
doing more activities and working in more areas and 
therefore should take the CEGB role. This approach 
would also entail minimum change from the existing
set-up.....But the banks do not always listen to
our point of view and they stressed the recruitment 
of other consultants for further study."
The bank was sceptical about the two-bodies proposal 
because the fragmentation in the industry would still 
prevail and the discrepancies in loan execution and loan 
repayment would be extended and this was directly against 
the security of their investment. They suspected that the 
main reason for this proposal was the underlying 
interests of ED staff to safeguard their jobs and 
positions. Sieber summed up the thinking of the bank:
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"In my perception the two instead of one 
organization was produced to provide job positions. 
The whole 'starter' was always finding positions for 
people to be retired and that is always very
difficult. I think the two utility kind of proposal 
was merely because they could not agree on who has 
what."
A direct conflict of interests and opinions prevailed and 
this deadlock was resolved by agreeing on a second
institutional study during negotiations for the fourth 
power project. The bank tied up the effectiveness of this 
loan to a final decision by the borrower on the
reorganization. The new management consultants, C&L, 
designed a hybrid-model which cleverly incorporated the 
concept of two utilities as preferred by the ED and also 
recommended a single controlling board for both utilities 
to organize the planning, control and monitoring of the 
main strategic decisions, in line with the ADB's 
preference for one body. C&L stated that it would be 
"logical and sensible to establish a single authority" if 
no structure had existed in the industry and the hybrid 
model was considered appropriate, given the existing 
industry whose current structure and operations imposed 
some constraints.
The decision to create a single authority was taken 
in the tripartite meeting and the context of the meeting 
especially in terms of the historical position taken by 
the two banks on the creation of a single utility is 
important for understanding the outcome of the 
negotiations. Trevor, team leader of C&L, recalled that
the government was under immense pressure for a decision
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that had deeper implication upon the funding of 
subsequent major hydro-projects and both the banks 
preferred "one agency" because "at that stage it was 
still a very small industry by world scale and there was 
no particular agreement for not having one industry". The 
chief engineer of the ED who represented the borrower in 
negotiations agreed that a single authority was a 
compromise solution in which the preferences of the banks 
were taken into account:
"The banks did not say there should be one 
organization in the tripartite meeting but requested 
that all the previous functions done separately by 
the NEC and the ED be put in one organization."
The secretary of the power ministry argued that the 
choice of the government and the position of the banks 
contributed to a joint action:
"We have liberal access to outside advice in our 
developmental tasks with various multilateral and 
bilateral bodies and what happened was the 
culmination of decisions. I call it a joint effort."
iii. The Negotiation of the Validation of the NEA
The commencement of the NEA was to be the last stage 
in the reorganization process because it would finally 
bring into reality the single utility to replace the 
fragmented industry. However, the formal decision by the 
government to establish the NEA did not imply that 
progress to the commencement was a smooth-sailing
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process. A final decision on the validation by the 
cabinet of ministers was achieved only after negotiations 
took place between the lending agencies and the borrower 
and agreements were finally reached on what was to be 
done, when and how. The two distinct features of 
negotiations at this stage were the close collaboration 
between the two lending agencies and their firm control 
and pressure on fulfilment of covenants of the loan 
agreements.
The visit of the appraisal mission for the fifth 
power project was deliberately delayed by the ADB until 
the borrower committed a decision on the establishment of 
the NEA in March 1983. The ADB mission arrived in Nepal 
in April and they were confident that the reorganization 
was finally on the right track with the recent commitment 
and C&L working out the details for the new authority:
"Government has accepted the pressing need for a 
complete institutional reorganization within the 
electricity subsector and work on this is well under 
way. Attitudes will take longer to change but there 
are grounds to expect substantial improvements over 
the next decade." (ADB, 1983)
The mission team was particularly concerned about the 
past delays in not only the implementation of the 
institutional changes but also in the execution and 
completion of all the power projects from the first to 
the fourth. C&L was already working out a time-table for 
implementation of the authority which included a 
transition programme so as to complete the validation by
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mid-January 1984. The key task remaining prior to 
validation was the approval of the new legislation and 
hence the two parties came to an agreement that the 
legislation should be passed through national parliament 
during the summer session of 1983 so as to make the 
validation possible by the planned date. An agreement was 
reached that the loan for the fifth power project would 
be made effective only following the approval of the 
legislation.
The execution of the fifth power project was delayed 
by over thirteen months because the NEA Act was 
introduced and passed in the summer session of parliament 
in 1984. In the meantime, the consultants handed in the 
final report in January 1984 and the responsibility for 
implementation was taken up by the borrower. The
proposed vesting date for the NEA was put back first to
January 1985 and subsequently the bank agreed with the 
borrower that the authority would commence operations by 
April 1985. The ADB was dissatisfied with the foot- 
dragging policy of the borrower and it was prepared to 
further tighten the screws during negotiations of the 
sixth power project.
The negotiations that took place with the WB for the 
financing of the largest hydro-power project in Nepal in 
1984 has special relevance to the validation of the NEA. 
The WB team was not only familiar with the efforts of the
ADB but fully extended their support by upholding the
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benefits of a single authority (see chapter four) and 
they negotiated with the borrower to introduce a covenant 
on the validation of the NEA by April, 1985. The WB as 
the structural context of the industry at this particular 
time was very influential because of the borrower's stake 
in this relationship, that is, it involved a loan of U.S. 
$107 million for the construction of a power generation 
station with an output capacity of 69 MW. This figure has 
to be compared with the total generation capacity of 133 
MW of the entire power system at that time. The
importance of this project for the future growth and 
development of the industry implied that the borrower 
required to be very careful about the implementation of 
the covenants, especially the ones on the validation of 
the authority:
"The following matters were raised during 
negotiations on which satisfactory agreement was
reached:........  The new authority (NEA) commencing
operations by April 30, 1985......"
"During negotiations, agreement was reached that the 
NEA will absorb the operations of the NEC and the ED 
as well as work of development boards.... after
which future work of this nature would be carried
out by the new authority. This consolidation will 
serve to improve coordination between the planning, 
construction and operation functions and thereby 
strengthen the sector's overall operations." (World 
Bank, 1984)
There was a feeling of desperation in the borrower to get 
on with the construction of this generation project
because there was a huge shortage of power in the country 
and the industry had to resort to massive load shedding. 
The senior management of the industry was under immense
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criticism and pressure from the politicians, public and 
other sectors of the economy. The deputy representative 
of the WB (Nepal) agreed that they were fully aware of 
the difficulties experienced by the borrower and their 
conditions on the loans for the Marsyangdi project was 
the turning point in the process of reorganization:
"As you will recall there was a bad experience with 
massive load shedding because the Kulekhani Power 
project was delayed and everybody was mindful that 
this kind of occurrence had to be avoided at all 
costs in the future. And this was one reason for the 
urgency to get on with the Marsyangdi project and
not to delay the start.....You know if this
(Marsyangdi project) had been just an interim 
exercise, the Kulekhani project had been almost 
completed, or new generation was not needed for many 
years to come, it might be argued that the 
validation decision would not have happened quite so 
quickly. I think there would have been resistance."
The urgency of the loan for the implementation of the 
Marsyangdi project was realized by the ADB as well and 
the loan application for the sixth power project was 
related to this generation project. This loan was to be 
used for financing the construction of a transmission 
line from the Marsyangdi project and one of the 
conditions for the effectiveness of the WB loan was that 
the finance for transmission lines needed to be secured 
from the ADB. Thus, the ADB was fully aware that their 
loan would act as the "key incentive for the borrower to 
expedite actions on the validation". During negotiations 
for the loan the ADB stated that the validation of the 
NEA would be a precondition for the signing of the loan 
agreement and subsequent loan effectiveness and they 
refused to sign a loan agreement for the first time in
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their long association with the industry. The borrower 
was in a situation where both loans from the two banks 
were put at risk and finally agreed on the validation as 
stipulated in the conditions of the two loans.
Power Relationships in Negotiation
Strauss (1982) states that no organization is an
island unto itself and "few if any of those 
interorganizational arrangements, let alone 'agreements' 
or formal contracts, could be instituted and maintained 
without negotiation". He recommends an analytical 
perspective for illuminating interorganizational 
relationship that puts "negotiation into the centre of
the picture - not necessarily as its central feature, but
certainly as a major one"; interorganizational 
negotiations like any other negotiations can be best 
studied by taking into account the structural and 
negotiation contexts. The interrelationship between the 
lending agencies and the electricity industry seemingly 
fits into the concepts developed in the negotiated order, 
especially the three working agreements on 
reorganization. Although these working agreements may be 
interpreted as negotiated orders in the context of 
different definitions imposed by the interacting 
individuals, the prevalence of a certain interest or
definition can be analyzed in terms of the power 
relationship. The following analysis will further explore
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the negotiation process and explain the outcomes as 
results of power mechanism.
Since the mechanism of power of the one-dimensional 
view is relatively straightforward and widely understood 
and such use of power is manifested in negotiations 
between the banks and the borrower, I shall start an 
analysis of such a power relationship. The main issue 
for study here is the observable conflict in a decision­
making situation and the use of power to prevail in the 
bargaining situation. This is the pluralist approach to 
power; power can be exercised by using any kind of 
political resources. The negotiations related to the 
decisions on one-body structure for the industry and the 
validation of the NEA can be understood in terms of such 
a power relationship. In both instances, the key elements 
common to the pluralist definition of power were present 
and can be examined by using the mechanism suggested by 
Polsby (1963), i.e. "who participates, who gains and 
loses and who prevails in decision- making".
The main issue for the lending agencies was the 
creation of a single state-owned enterprise in an 
industry that was alleged to be inefficient and 
inappropriate due to its fragmented structure. There were 
conflicting interests and differences between individuals 
who were representing the industry and the staff from the 
ADB who were urging the borrower to make a final 
selection of one body in the form of a commercial utility
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as suggested by the consultants. Although the second 
institutional study by C&L was meant to provide a 
definite guide-line on the structure, serious doubts were 
raised about the hybrid model by the borrower. A director 
of the NEA who worked as the liaison officer for C&L 
suspected that they made too many compromises and 
concessions to the wishes of both the bank and the 
borrower in the organizational design:
"I think C&L came with the preconception of creating 
one organization because they doubted the need of 
two utilities in such a small country. When they 
started talking to people in the industry and were 
told of the enormous difficulties of moving HMG 
employees to a corporate body, they preferred a two 
utilities concept. But they were unable to change 
their preconception of one single body and they 
created a hybrid. I feel they were unable to give a 
firm decision in view of conflicting opinions. They 
used the two organizations concept and one 
controlling board to create the hybrid model. They 
were not convincing about why they joined it. Maybe 
they were trying to satisfy all the parties 
concerned but I feel they had no guts to stick to 
one clear line of thought. Once the majority of 
staff had expressed a clear consensus that two 
bodies were appropriate, they should have taken a 
bold stand."
The consultants sympathized with the views of the 
borrower but they did not clearly resolve the one-body 
versus two-bodies debate. They indicated the need for a 
single united industry and introduced the controlling 
board over the two utilities. Trevor explained his 
preference and intention in recommending the hybrid 
model:
"You see we took a very consultative approach: sort 
of went around and talked to everybody, an interview 
survey of fifty top people in the industry which 
covered a large number of prejudices of what people
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thought about, a comprehensive selection of what 
management really did think. That's how we put 
recommendations in our report which, it has to be 
said, that my main conclusion, to be honest, was to 
get on, because a lot of other decisions were 
delayed while people debated whether to have two or 
one. It was far more desirable that they should get 
on and take the decision and live with it. And to be 
honest, not to worry too much about what particular 
system they came up with."
The ADB was determined that a single authority was 
the only way the sector could "fit" for their loans. The 
financial analyst of the ADB was convinced that the 
appropriateness and design of a single authority "could 
have been done on the back of an envelope" but since the 
government insisted on reports the consultants were 
brought in. The various ADB mission teams clearly 
indicated in the negotiations of the power project loans 
that one single authority was the right choice. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of the loan for the fourth 
power project was delayed for more than a year as the 
bank exercised power to secure a decision on a single 
authority. The validity of this loan was extended four 
times by four different agreements between the ADB and 
the borrower and the issue of a single utility was the 
key point of negotiations. Thus when the tripartite 
meeting was held in Kathmandu to decide on the 
reorganization and an organizational structure, the 
final choice of one utility was a negotiated agreement 
but the power exercised by the banks in terms of control 
of capital and the dependence relationship of the 
industry seemed to have had a direct influence on the 
interactions that took place. The disagreement on the
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structure was resolved in favour of the banks because of 
their ability to exercise power. Pfeffer and Salanick 
(1978) describe this as the external control of 
organizations arising from resource dependency. Such an 
exercise of power in negotiations was overt and obvious 
because loans were refused to put pressure on the 
borrower for a decision which was in accordance to the 
banks* preference.
The creation of a commercial utility and the choice 
of a single structure in the process of reorganization 
was frequently interpreted by individuals from within the 
industry in terms of power exercised by the two lending 
banks. Many of the senior managers in the industry 
conceived and expressed the power of the banks in terms 
of the dependency relationship arising from the supply of 
finance. A senior electrical engineer of the ED who 
joined a group of private consultants after the creation 
of the NEA pointed at the overwhelming influence of the 
banks in the power sector as well as their influence on 
the entire political economy of Nepal:
"Of course, both the lending agencies always said 
they preferred one executing agency in the power 
sector. The power sector is owned by the WB and the 
ADB because foreign loan is the main source of 
development for the industry, over eighty percent of
the total finance........  There is no way the
government can say no to the WB because the bank 
owns the country. Their involvement is political. 
The money they have given for the Structural 
Adjustment Programme, about US $300 million, is 
basically to keep the present political system in 
power."
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A senior engineer from the NEC who interacted with 
several mission teams of the banks related the single 
utility decision to the power and influence of the two 
lending banks:
"I talked to various mission teams and they felt one 
organization was needed. They argued that there was 
no possibility of improvement in the power sector 
with two organizations although both were under one
ministry.......I believe this organization was
achieved due to ninety-nine percent pressure from 
the banks. They used their financial base to apply 
the pressure and their authority has increased to 
such an extent that we have to surrender. It's due 
to our economy. We cannot do without new projects 
because electricity is now part of the basic
needs We now have a situation similar to the
traditional landowner system. The landowner can 
manipulate and monopolize the farmer and now it is 
the same between the banks and our bureaucracy. We 
had to admit to their pressures."
The single utility was definitely not a choice preferred 
by the borrower but enforced by the banks, with the loans 
for the development projects as the bargaining point, 
according to an adviser to the NEA who was previously a 
senior civil servant with the ED:
"No one wanted the reorganization and creation of 
one single organization. It was not preferred by the 
government. It has been imposed upon us by the banks 
and it has been kind of degrading to us. But we had 
to do it because they would stop the money. They 
threatened to stop the disbursement of the on-going 
projects and also future loan disbursements. Without 
money no projects and then no work."
This control over financial resources and the power 
from the dependence relationship was used again by the 
banks in negotiations of the validation of the NEA. The 
banks successfully followed the same strategy of tying up
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conditions on effectiveness of loans with actions and 
achievements on the validation. Although there was no 
noticeable conflict concerning the commencement of the 
NEA, there were many senior engineers in the ED who 
claimed that they were not serious about the new 
authority even after the government's decision. The banks 
were worried about the potential delay from the borrower 
and wanted to commence the operations of the authority in 
accordance with the time-table and transition programme 
of C&L. This implementation programme was defended by the 
ADB and they pressed for actions on the consultants' 
proposals. The chief engineer explained the pressures he 
experienced:
"The donor pressure built up because we did not 
refute the consultant's reports and we accepted the 
reports but still did not execute them. The donors 
had the leverage and they used it to exploit the 
situation. We had to make quick decisions because of 
external pressures."
As stated earlier, the ADB inserted conditions for the 
commencement of the NEA in the two loans that were 
negotiated after the final decision of the government to 
create a single authority. Power from the dependence 
relationship was exercised during negotiations to 
introduce conditions that ensured actions along the lines 
desired by the banks and these conditions in turn were 
the new contexts which enabled the banks to control and 
apply pressure for the validation of the NEA. Strauss 
(1978) states that "outcome of negotiation itself can 
contribute to changes in negotiation contexts relevant to
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future negotiations”. This concept was illustrated in the 
case of the fifth and sixth power projects of the ADB
when both loans were suspended and dialogue on future 
loans was stopped; such action was considered logical by
the ADB because it adhered to the conditions negotiated
earlier with the borrower. An exercise of power as 
provided for in the loan agreements allowed the bank to
prevail in the bargaining. There is a continuous
relationship between contexts and negotiations and 
Strauss (op. cit.) contends that although the structural
context is larger, more encompassing than the negotiation 
context, the lines of impact can run either way. Changes 
in the former may have impact on the latter and vice 
versa. Denzin (1977) draws a close relationship between 
structural context and negotiations, that is, context as 
a consequence of previous negotiations.
The joint action of the two banks in the final
stages can be seen as an illustration of a joint exercise 
of power in negotiations by the two external stakeholders 
who provided the bulk of the capital for development 
projects. The vulnerability of the borrower was
accurately assessed by the banks as it was pressed with 
the urgency to move ahead with the new generation project 
so as to avoid the bad experiences with massive load 
shedding caused by delays in the construction of the last 
generation project. The key actors such as the secretary 
and chief engineer faced fear of recrimination in case 
this mistake was repeated again in the Marsyangdi
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project. A joint exercise of power and collusion in the 
interests of the two banks seemed to make any further 
delay and resistance to the validation impossible as 
stated by the director of Planning of NEA:
"Though the idea (of reorganization) was first 
initiated by the ADB, later on the WB too fully 
supported it. When these two major agencies were 
behind, there was no way out of this."
The success of the joint action and its influence on the 
validation was reconfirmed by Sieber:
"We have worked together and the only time we had
some impact was when we worked together........ And
of course, a big generation project brought action 
from the borrower. We the banks should never play 
the decisive role but it may appear sometimes that 
we do."
The overt conflict situations described above 
illustrate the issues, grievances and power resources 
utilised to influence decisions. Power was also exercised
in a subtle and less overt method as in the two-
dimensional view of power in the interrelationship 
between the banks and the industry, specially in the 
agreements worked out to undertake the two institutional 
studies. I am arguing that the grievances of individuals 
from the ED such as resistance to the institutional
change during the second power project and much later 
opposition to creation of a single authority were blocked 
from emerging into overt conflict and the agreements 
negotiated for the undertaking of the two institutional 
studies were cases of exercise of power. Bachrach and
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Baratz (1962) state that power can be exercised by 
exclusion of certain participants and issues altogether 
from the decision-making process. The mobilization of 
bias by the powerholders can be sustained primarily 
through nondecisions whereby demands and challenges can 
be suffocated and suppressed even before they are voiced 
or determine whether certain issues reach the competitive 
stage. The resistance and opposition to the ADB's 
proposal of a single utility from senior engineers of the 
ED could have quickly turned into a fierce conflict and 
challenge if the appraisal mission had decided to 
confront such a radical change. The senior engineers 
represented the senior management of the ministry as well 
as the electricity industry and dominated in all key 
activities. Any direct confrontation with them could have 
started a conflict risking the whole business of 
reorganization at its (very) initial stages. On the other 
hand, the financial commitment of the bank was limited to 
just a single loan that was already disbursed and 
negotiations were in process for the second project. 
Although it could be considered that an exchange 
relationship was established, the dependence of the 
borrower was in a very preliminary stage and the bank was 
only beginning to establish its position and influence in 
the industry. Under these circumstances the mission team 
chose to negotiate an agreement on the first 
institutional study rather than include a condition for 
organizational restructuring in the loan agreement. The 
understanding reached between the chief engineer and the
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bank team can be interpreted as a redefinition of the 
situation given the potential opposition to their 
interest. The study was as much a ploy in the form of 
mobilisation of bias by the powerholders who 
intentionally excluded a controversial issue that could 
generate open conflicts thereby stifling their interests 
and objectives. In other words, they carefully managed to 
suffocate a manifest challenge which supported the status 
quo of the existing arrangement. As main actors in the 
negotiation context, the chief engineer and members of 
the bank mission were in control of the agenda and they 
created barriers to actions by potential opposition by 
deciding on an institutional study. Parenti (1970) states 
that one of the most important aspects of power is "not 
to prevail in a struggle but to predetermine the agenda 
of struggle - to determine whether certain questions ever 
reach the competition stage". The agreement on the 
institutional study confirmed that a conflict did not 
take place at that stage.
The institutional study was a successful "diversion"
from the anxieties expressed by the senior engineers who
initially opposed a new institutional arrangement. It was 
only subsequent to BEI's presentation of weaknesses and 
shortcomings in the old structural arrangements and their 
recommendations for restructuring that many senior staff 
felt the study was "political" and a "trick" and a "trap"
set up by the bank which then made actions and
initiatives on the reorganization unavoidable. A director
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of the NEA who worked as a liaison for BEI consultants on 
the study explained how he and many engineers in the ED 
thought and expected that the work of the consultants 
would be limited to "just another study":
"When we took on the technical assistance for the 
study we did not think about it to a considerable 
extent and I did not take the study seriously 
either. I don't think anybody thought about the 
outcome of it or expected the study to make such an 
impact. We had committed ourselves to the next phase 
of the study by agreeing to the technical assistance
........ I think this was a trick by the bank. Now I
am sure the bank normally operates this way. If they 
want to change certain things they start with a very 
mild dose."
A superintendent engineer of the ED who now works as an 
adviser to the NEA reflected on the rather cautious 
approach taken by the bank so that commitments were 
gradually piled up and enforced:
"If they (the ADB) had initially applied a condition 
of reorganization (in the beginning) which implied a 
merger of the organizations, I doubt if this study 
would have come through. But they played it very
carefully and cleverly They gradually led us
towards it with more and more commitments to the 
different loans."
Yet another of the senior staff of the ED who was 
retained as a financial adviser in the NEA stated that no 
one had envisaged such a radical change would follow when 
the bank called for an institutional study:
"When the bank stated that they would not extend the 
loan for the second and the third power projects 
unless an institutional study was undertaken, we 
took it quite lightly. We have always been improving 
our organizations by changing management, changes in 
structure, personnel rules, etc. Therefore this was 
no big deal. But we realized too late that the bank 
was not saying this ...... Moreover, the bank
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agreed to grant the technical assistance for this 
study and our thinking here is that the grants are 
free and we don't care about the possible
consequences...... Hence they gave us the technical
assistance, a bit of loan, appointed consultants and 
by the third power project they had us by our 
necks."
The second institutional study which was a 
negotiated agreement between the borrower and the ADB has 
to be understood in a similar power relationship. I have 
stated that the senior engineers preferred the creation 
of two utilities in which the ED could be retained and 
the status quo maintained. Of course, this contradicted 
the definitions prescribed by the bank which led to
differences during the third power project. The ensuing 
negotiations did not proceed to resolve this difference 
but another study was agreed upon by new consultants. 
This agreement was a method of confining the scope of 
decision-making to safe issues rather than getting
involved in the controversy of a one versus two-bodies
structure. Bachrach and Baratz (op. cit.) state that 
nondecisions can confine the scope of decision-making and 
are themselves decisions. A nondecision is a decision 
that results in suppression of a latent challenge to the 
interests of the powerholder. The borrower challenged the 
interest of the ADB which was not anticipated because
they had earlier jointly agreed on one utility after the 
study by BEI. This challenge was suffocated not by 
conflict and use of power resources but by negotiating a 
decision on another institutional study which managed to 
side-track the main controversy, that is, only issues
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which were comparatively innocuous to the bank were 
allowed for consideration by the borrower. There was no 
clear evidence to the majority of individuals from the 
industry that the bank was trying to impose their 
preference of a single utility. The controversy was left 
to be resolved by consultants who were considered experts 
on the subject of institutional arrangements and the 
borrower could not turn down such a logical proposition 
because they had neither worked out the details of the 
new structure nor could they claim to have adequate 
knowledge and expertise on organizational design. 
Furthermore, this kind of reliance on expatriate experts 
for problem solving was a common practice in the loan 
programmes of the ADB and the WB. The ADB usually passed 
on the responsibility for the transfer of technical 
knowledge and skills to consultants hired directly by the 
bank, in the case of technical assistance grants. In a 
study of the lending activities of the ADB, Wihtol (1988) 
states that the hiring of consultants by the ADB is 
contained within the "economic and political" interests 
of the donors and "conveniences" of the bank:
"For the donors, consultancy contracts represent a 
significant economic return on their contributions 
to the bank and are in some cases directly
connected to further contracts..........On the other
hand, from the point of view of smooth project 
implementation, bank staff often prefer to work with
foreign consultants who are familiar with bank
procedures rather than become involved in the 
complexities of using and fostering local 
consultants."
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Although it might not be fair to suggest that the 
consultants and the ADB were in collusion in recommending 
a single utility, they seemed to share a mutual 
understanding for a commercial utility operated in 
profitability principles. The bank's perception on a 
single commercial utility was a clearly stated objective. 
BEI as an international expert agency on the electricity 
industry and with a previous record of having worked in 
Nepal earlier recommended a similar approach for the 
future development of the industry. Any new consultant 
recruited for the second institutional study would have 
to take into account all these factors and one could 
speculate that the chances of them recommending something 
very different was minimal. The odds were all in favour 
of the bank and they were confident that the new study 
would only enhance their position on the reorganization. 
Pfeffer (1978) states that strategies for achieving 
reorganization are more likely to be successful if 
endowed with the aura of legitimacy provided by 
consultants:
"One of the most effective and most frequently used 
ways of achieving legitimacy for the reorganization 
effort is through the use of the outside consultant. 
The role of the consultant as the "hit man" is 
widely known."
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II. Legislation of the NEA Including the Composition of 
the Board; the MWR as a Stakeholder and Negotiations
A draft legislation was prepared by C&L under the 
terms and conditions of their contract and included in 
their interim and final reports. Although this draft was 
accepted by the main individuals representing the ED in 
their interactions with the consultants and it was sent 
to the Ministry of Law and Justice (MOLJ) for translation 
into Nepalese script, the contents of this draft was 
substantially changed when the same individuals decided 
to prepare the final legislation for implementation. They 
had very serious differences and doubts about operating 
the industry as a pure commercial utility with 
unqualified profit objectives and they disapproved the
limitations imposed on the influence and control of the
parent ministry over the industry. They argued that the 
provisions of the consultant's draft required radical 
departure from the "standard" legislation followed by 
almost sixty other state-owned enterprises. The main 
differences centred around three recommendations included 
in the consultant's draft:
- The NEA shall provide electricity to those areas to 
which it is economic to do so and to those consumers 
willing to bear the cost; and provided that the
government may direct the NEA to arrange supplies to 
other areas or to other consumers on provision that the 
government provides the necessary resources. The NEA
shall follow commercial policies and principles.
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- The role and influence of the government and the MWR 
was specifically spelled out and was limited to the 
following areas: approval of tariffs; determination of 
authorised capital and its issue; contacts with other 
government offices through the MWR as the parent 
ministry; and power to issue directives to operate any 
services or stop operation but the commercial 
implications of such directives for the NEA's performance 
to be made public, i.e. published in the Nepal gazette 
and the authority's annual report.
- The formation of the composition of the board was to be 
guided by these conditions: the board to consist of the 
posts of chairman and vice-chairman; inclusion of not 
more than five and not less than three of the full-time 
NEA staff into the board; no minister to be appointed to 
the board in any capacity; no civil servant to be 
appointed as chairman or vice-chairman; not more than two 
members of the board at any one time to be civil 
servants.
All the provisions included by the consultants 
provided for the creation of an autonomous, commercial 
utility as agreed in the tripartite meeting but there 
were fundamental differences in the perceptions of the 
key individuals in the government when it came to the 
actual preparation of the legislation. They differed on 
all the three issues listed above and worked together 
towards a redefinition of the provisions of the
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legislation to match their expectations and interests. A 
senior engineer from the ED who was assigned the task of 
preparing a new draft explained why the consultant's 
draft was not apposite although it contained the basic 
necessary provisions for the creation of a commercial 
utility:
"The consultants have looked at the prerequisites 
required for a utility and prepared the legislation 
on this basis. It was good that they gave much 
importance for the viability of this institution. 
And since the legislation cannot be easily changed 
once it has been passed as an Act, they have 
included many things in the draft. Maybe in their 
countries, they include everything in the 
legislation itself but everything does not have to 
be explained in our Act. It has to fit in our 
system. Our legislation spells out the policy and it 
is for the board of directors to interpret it, it is 
just a framework, a circle within which to work. Our 
philosophy is different. The legislation has to fit 
into the system that is working and we started 
developing a new legislation."
The new legislation worked out by a few senior 
engineers from the ED and the MWR was designed along 
traditional lines which ensured the continuing influence 
of the government in general and the parent ministry in 
particular. The intervention by the government was
justified as absolutely essential because they argued 
that the industry could not be operated purely as a 
commercial utility given its importance to the economic 
development of the country and furthermore, the
involvement of the government in financing the
development of the industry. I shall refer to the 
meanings upheld by the key actors who were involved in 
working out an agreement on the legislation.
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The minister of the MWR rejected the idea of total 
autonomy to the authority because he considered the 
electricity industry as an integral part of national 
water resources. Since his ministry was responsible for 
the management of water resources in Nepal and because 
hydro-electricity was such a big sector within the water 
resources, the minister was adamant that the MWR could 
not be viable without influence and control over the 
electricity industry. The secretary of the MWR was 
concerned about the national importance of the industry 
and the capital supplied by the government which in turn 
justified governmental interference and participation:
"Electricity is for the development of the country 
and not lighting alone. It should contribute to 
agriculture, industry, drinking water, etc. It 
cannot be run as a pure commercial utility but since 
the banks have stipulated a minimum rate of return, 
there is the need to make a profit as well. Thus a 
mixture of social and commercial objectives should 
be followed. The government has the prerogative for 
major policy decisions and the right to give 
directives because the loans and grants are given to 
the government. The government carries the 
responsibility for such loan and takes the guarantee 
as well. Therefore the government will always have 
say in this sector."
The chief engineer of the ED, in line with the 
secretary, was attentive to the sensitive nature of the 
industry and its relationship with other development 
sectors:
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"Water resources are the property of the government 
and any investment in the exploitation of this 
resource cannot be done without the approval of the 
government. There are other delicate aspects of 
water resources, such as irrigation, flood control, 
etc. which cannot be overlooked for the sole 
objective of electricity generation by the 
authority....What I am saying is that this authority 
cannot operate as a factory selling a product. Since 
its actions are interrelated to other sectors, the 
government should have control and this should be 
defined in the legislation. In this context, the 
authority cannot be totally autonomous. Moreover, 
since this will be a huge organization in the future 
and generate revenue, the government should not make 
it totally autonomous. On the other hand the 
government should leave the day-to-day business to 
the authority since it is a commercial 
organization."
Such contradictory and conflicting intents and
definitions imposed on the authority by the key actors of 
the ministry were clearly reflected in the final 
legislation. For example, the Act required the authority 
to supply electricity to all and to operate on commercial 
principles at the same time. The Act clearly spelled out 
the government's powers over the subsector, including 
requirements for the NEA to submit regular reports and
obtain government's approval for foreign loans, exports
of power and changes in electricity tariffs. The NEA was 
stated to be autonomous but the Act did not spell out
clearly those areas where the NEA could take decisions 
without the need to consult the government. The "Nepal: 
The Power Subsector Review" (1987) of the WB criticized 
the NEA for not having clear corporate goals and the 
report laid the blame on the legislation:
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"The NEA's lack of coherent corporate goals also 
stems from weaknesses in the NEA Act. This is 
because the NEA is required to supply electricity to 
all, regardless of ability to pay while, at the same 
time, to operate on commercial principles. To 
clarify the NEA's corporate goals and thereby make 
it a more efficient power utility, it is recommended 
that HMG/Nepal undertake a review of the NEA Act 
with respect to emphasizing unambiguously the NEA's 
commercial character and the concomitant 
requirements that consumers should bear the costs of 
supply, except in cases of supplies for social 
purposes made at specific government request, for 
which HMG/Nepal would compensate the NEA."
In view of the dominant perception upheld by the key 
actors concerning the future responsibility of the 
government over the authority, it is understandable that 
they proceeded to change the entire composition of the 
board. The best guarantee of government control over the 
authority and its functioning was through a powerful 
board consisting of representatives of the various 
government agencies. Thus changes to the consultants' 
proposals were introduced which did not suit the meanings 
and interests of the interacting actors. They jointly 
defined the need for the parent ministry and other 
governmental agencies to contribute to the operation of 
the authority by their representation on the board. The 
necessity of governmental representation was expressed at 
the highest level by the minister of the MWR:
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"Look at the disadvantages if you did not have the 
representation of the government secretaries on the 
board. The representation of a number of secretaries 
on the board was deliberate because, for instance, 
the representatives of finance and planning were 
essential if that board was to be effective.
Otherwise all the major decisions that the board 
made would not carry through. You see, since this 
authority is making very large scale decisions,
these decisions require the assent of many
government authorities and particularly those of 
finance and planning. Therefore, their presence 
makes these decisions automatically viable. It is 
not only for coordination but it is critical to the 
functioning of the authority."
The secretary of the MWR acknowledged that the presence 
of government officials on the board could contribute to 
the commercial objectives of the authority:
"I do not believe that the commercial and public 
utility objectives cannot be met because the 
government members have their own interpretation of 
protecting the interests and objectives of the 
NEA...It is not necessary that the government's 
majority representation on the board cannot be 
commercial in objectives and action."
The minister proposed that he should be the chairman and 
the other staff in the bureaucracy supported him. One of 
the board members stated the reasons for favouring the 
minister as the chairman:
"The power sector investment is probably the biggest 
single sector in the seventh plan. Why should the 
government agree to drop responsibility for such 
investment? The involvement of the minister in the 
decision-making will make him accountable and 
responsible to the parliament accordingly. The 
minister as a politician is the representative of 
the people and he represents the aspiration of the 
public."
The chief engineer of the ED and other senior engineers 
working with him agreed with the practical advantages of 
having the minister as the chairman because there were
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several government secretaries on the board and the 
chairman would have to be someone senior to them. It 
would not be practical to have one of the secretaries 
appointed as the chairman because this would be resisted 
by other secretaries as they were all of the same status. 
Similarly, the secretaries rejected candidates from the 
private sector in the position of chairman because they 
were "very conscious about their status" as senior civil 
servants.
The position of managing director was created to 
replace the vice-chairman who was to be the chief 
executive. The position of a full-time vice-chairman was 
formally rejected on the grounds that it was a concept 
that did not conform with the customary system in state- 
owned enterprises in Nepal and the NEA needed to fit into 
"the umbrella of the government". A more "political" 
explanation was presented by a senior superintendent 
engineer of the ED who stated that the position of vice- 
chairman was abandoned due to conflict and contest among 
his colleagues:
"A few senior engineers who qualified for the post 
of vice-chairman supported this proposal but more 
candidates who qualified for the posts of directors- 
in-chief resisted someone being appointed at the 
vice-chairman level which would be higher than them. 
Eventually the post of vice-chairman was lowered to 
managing director. Personal interest and group 
interest was always there but people always put 
forward intellectual arguments and reasoned their 
interests."
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The post of managing director was in line with other 
state-owned enterprises and placed it under the 
supervision of the secretary of the MWR. A vice-chairman 
who was to be appointed by the prime minister would have 
been "too powerful" in relation to the secretary and 
other board members. In addition, the lowering of the 
position qualified the chief engineer of the ED to be a 
candidate for the managing director's post as he was the 
fore-runner for the job since the creation of the NEA, as 
well as the legislation being planned and prepared under 
his supervision. Many engineers from within the ED/MWR 
explained the position of managing director as an outcome 
of a covert understanding between the secretary of the 
MWR and the chief engineer of the ED. A joint secretary 
presently with the MWR explained this arrangement:
"As for the position of the managing director, the 
secretary of the MWR wanted the authority to be 
under his control. Therefore, the post of MD was 
made lower than the status of other board members. 
So as far as control and supervision of the 
authority is concerned we are back to the situation 
of the NEC where the general manager had to report 
to the secretary. The whole purpose and philosophy 
of creating a powerful autonomous utility has been 
defeated. And we are talking of a power sector which 
is going to be the most heavily invested sector."
The proposal for including the internal directors- 
in-chief of the authority on the board was rejected on 
the grounds that such representation by senior managers 
was a totally "non-established" practice in the context 
of state-owned enterprises in Nepal. Moreover, there was 
a threat to the majority representation of the civil
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servants on the board in the event of inclusion of senior 
managers and this was freely expressed by individuals who 
participated in working out the board composition. One of 
them explained the reason for avoiding inclusion:
"If the internal staff were included the majority 
would have been from the NEA. The HMG would have 
lost the privilege of majority. We could not do this 
under our conditions. If this organization had been 
floated by the public with hundred percent capital 
then organizational representation would have been 
practical. But here the HMG is the sole shareholder 
and would definitely like to have the majority of 
the say; not because it is the HMG but because it is 
the biggest shareholder. If the majority voice was 
someone else it would not be possible to impose HMG 
rules and regulations."
If autonomy to the NEA was one of the main 
considerations of the lending agencies in the 
reorganization and in turn similar provisions were 
included in the legislation by the consultants, such 
goals directly conflicted with the interpretations borne 
by actors who were responsible for the finalization and 
implementation of the NEA Act. The description presented 
above indicates that these actors successfully worked out 
a new legislation, a negotiated order, in which they 
incorporated the meanings shared by them concerning the 
relationship between the ministry and the industry and 
the future role of the authority. The history of this 
relationship reveals that the power industry was always 
dominated by the MWR as the parent ministry exercising 
its influence through its department, the ED. The 
domineering role was taken by the ED in the construction 
of development works, planning and forecasting, tariff,
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external financing and loans, etc. and additionally 
different kinds of controls were exercised in the
operations of the NEC. For example, the secretary of the 
MWR as Chairman of the NEC board and at least two senior 
engineers of the ED as members of the board, a senior
engineer of the ED appointed as the general manager of 
the NEC, all relationship with other government
ministries communicated through the ED, and many 
interferences and control in the daily operation of the 
NEC. With reference to this situation, it may be recalled 
that BEI stated that the civil service never truly
relinquished its hold over the electricity supply 
industry although a trading enterprise such as the NEC 
could not be run efficiently within the constraints and 
control imposed by the civil service. There was no 
concept of corporate autonomy because of the excessive 
external control. The historical context of ministerial 
control over the NEC was illustrated by an ex-secretary 
of the MWR, Rimal, who personally faced strong resistance 
from the senior engineers of the ED in his effort to give 
more autonomy and improve the management of the NEC in 
the late sixties. He supported the idea of bringing on 
BEI consultant into the NEC to install management 
procedures and systems but the senior engineers of the ED 
objected to this proposal. Rimal recalled how the 
engineers came to him and claimed that they were 
competent and there was no need for foreign experts. Due 
to the ensuing differences between himself and the chief 
engineer on the recruitment of the consultants, the
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matter was referred to the minister of the MWR. The 
minister favoured the ED because he was the school mate 
of the chief engineer. The main reason for the resistance 
according to Rimal was that the "ED wanted to keep the 
whole industry within their sphere of control and that no 
outsiders should interfere".
A long-established pattern and tradition of control 
relationship shows how inextricably structural contexts 
and negotiations are linked. Salient structural 
properties have a bearing on negotiations (Strauss, 
1978). In the case of the new legislation for the 
authority, a historically produced and embedded context 
dominated the process of negotiation and created a 
structure that matched the old context. The dominant 
parties from the context restricted the negotiation 
process (Busch, 1982) among themselves and implemented 
their definitions.
A tradition of intervention and control by the 
MWR/ED was an accepted and "natural" relationship, that 
is, an institutional practice, between the ministry and 
the power industry and similar control by the parent 
ministry of other state-owned enterprises was the culture 
of public sector management in Nepal. This kind of 
control and influence by the parent ministry was 
perceived as legitimate and not challenged because all 
government agencies accepted the order of things that had 
existed for so long and predominated through the public
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sector. Gaventa (1980) refers to such acceptance as 
"internalized understanding" by the membership of the 
appropriate relationship. The individuals who represented 
the MWR drafted the final legislation in which adequate 
provisions were included to maintain the same control 
relationship, that is, a continuity of traditional 
definitions. The three-dimensional view of power of Lukes 
(1974) states that certain individuals and groups become 
equipped to exert their influence over the organization 
by defining situations, and shaping others' perception 
and not necessarily by influencing or controlling the 
decision-making agenda. Power is exercised by making 
people accept their role in the existing order of things 
because they see it as natural and unchangeable or can 
see no alternative to it. Power can be located behind the 
social construction of meaning because the actors who are 
instrumental in defining situations and establishing 
rational of what happens are in fact engaged in the power 
process as they go about interacting and deciding what is 
happening and why and what should be done. This 
interpretation of a power relationship can be applied to 
the interactions between the key players who as 
"defenders of the status quo" (Lukes, op. cit.) wanted no 
alternatives to the traditional relationship between the 
ministry and the state-owned enterprises and they faced 
no serious challenges from within the industry. The key 
actors such as the minister, the secretary and the chief 
engineer upheld the same definition concerning the MWR- 
NEA relationship and they defended the intervention and
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interference of the government as absolutely essential - 
this was how the power industry operated for the past two 
decades and the same was to apply in the future. One 
should be reminded that their individual interests were 
protected in the continuity of the old arrangement and 
the legislation justified and legitimatized their 
position.
The responsibility for finalization of the 
legislation before it passed through the cabinet and the 
parliament was jointly shared by the MWR and the MOLJ. 
The draft legislation prepared by the MWR as the parent 
ministry was endorsed by the joint secretary of the MOLJ, 
Sakya, who was in charge of legislation for all state- 
owned enterprises. He had earlier translated the draft 
legislation prepared by C&L and he appreciated the 
conditions put forward by them to maintain the autonomy 
of the authority:
"The consultant did not want the clause concerning 
the government's authority to issue instructions to 
the NEA and for that reason they included that such 
instructions should be published in the national 
gazette and the costs compensated to the NEA for
such directives...... The main focus of their draft
was the treatment of the NEA as an autonomous entity 
and to enable it to operate independently within a 
certain policy framework defined by the government."
Sakya recalled how the consultants' draft was 
substantially changed when the officials from the ED/MWR 
came to discuss with him the new draft prepared by them. 
The legislation was returned to its traditional form 
because the MWR "could not digest the new ideas put forth
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by the consultants" and the MOLJ agreed that, as a 
policy, the parent ministry should define their specific 
needs in the sector. The MOLJ's main concern was the 
effect of the new legislation on the civic rights and 
liberty of the public because this "corresponded with the 
issue of justice". Sakya agreed to go along with the 
conditions and provisions of the draft because 
"traditional conservatism was a matter of both policy and 
practice" in the preparation of the legislation by his 
ministry and the proposal submitted by the MWR fitted 
into this established definition:
"Even while working in the Law Ministry I sometimes 
feel that the Acts themselves are weak but to change 
the format of the Act is beyond me. Conservatism is 
a matter of policy."
This support of the traditional ways of doing things by 
Sakya enabled the two ministries to work out agreements 
on the details. The structural context of their 
negotiations was the conventional practice and pattern of 
legislations designed for other state-owned enterprises 
and they agreed to maintain the same pattern. For 
example, the minister of the MWR as chairman of the NEA 
was compared to similar practice in other state-owned 
enterprises which had been created under special charter 
acts. Ministers were as chairmen in the Kathmandu Valley 
Development Authority and the Water Supply Corporation. 
In addition, Sakya himself a civil servant, approved the 
government's participation and control of the authority 
as opposed to total autonomy because he believed that
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state-owned enterprises should not be independent while 
receiving finance from the government:
"No organization can be independent of the 
government as long as there is financial dependency. 
Although organizations may claim independence, this 
does not work in practice and it may look good in 
principle only. Organizations have been created as 
autonomous bodies under special charters but they 
have not been independent because of financial 
reasons. All the money is controlled by the 
government and they need to turn to the government 
every time they need their annual budget. You cannot 
do without this relation. Similarly if you do not 
have people representing the government, 
coordination becomes a problem. Representation of 
different ministers in the board ensures moral 
commitment because when the matter is referred to 
their ministries they can at least present the 
issue."
A dominant group from the MWR represented only by 
civil servants denied participation to others in all 
negotiations related to the preparation of the
legislation. These actors believed that it was the 
government's domain and responsibility to spell out the 
nature of relationship with state-owned enterprises and 
others were treated as "outsiders". No one from the NEC 
was allowed access and even the general manager of the 
NEC was not a participant and he recalled how he came to 
know about the legislation:
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"I came to know of the Act on the very day that it 
was to be passed by the parliament only because I 
met the secretary of the MWR in the parliament and 
he told me about it. And I was the general manager
of the NEC...... The legislation was prepared by our
ministry and the Law ministry and they must have 
thought carefully about the requirements of the 
authority. I don't know what happened during their 
interaction."
The consultants wanted to include provisions for 
autonomy, commercial operations, profit, etc. in the
legislation but they were not allowed to contribute or
interfere. The participating actors from the MWR were
able "to organize out" (Schattschneider, 1960) any
complaints from the consultants by blocking their 
involvement from all interactions. This use of power 
ensured non-challenge and John described their exclusion:
"The actual drafting of the Act was done by the 
staff of the ED and the MWR. The i's were dotted and 
the t's were crossed by the Ministry of Law but the 
actual framework of the Act was taken by the staff 
of the ED and the MWR. I don't know where they got 
their interpretations from in addition to our ideas. 
I don't know where the other influences to the draft 
came from and I prefer not to ask. I suspect there 
was a certain degree of traditional input, i.e. we 
have always had this way of doing things and that 
will get through and that won't get through. It's 
the usual sort of thing that happens at that stage 
and it involves traditional civil service ways of 
doing things."
With reference to the content and contribution of 
the NEA Act, the lending agencies seemed to be back in 
the pre-reorganization situation when they proposed total 
autonomy, non-interference in the day-to-day operations, 
commercial operations, freedom from government control of 
the industry, etc. for the authority. The WB stated that 
the Act did not embody sufficient safeguards to the
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autonomy of the NEA because it did not spell out clearly 
those areas where the NEA could take decisions without 
the need to consult the government; the NEA's board 
membership consisted of only government employees or 
nominees, and the only NEA staff member was the managing 
director. The WB recommended important changes in the 
legislation which were not executed until October, 1989:
"HMG/N review the NEA Act with respect to 
delineating those areas where the NEA can take 
decisions without consultation with the government 
and changing board composition to increase the 
representation of NEA management and reduce the 
number of government representatives." (World Bank, 
1987)
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III. The Organization Structure of the NEA: Internal 
Stakeholders and Micro-Negotiations
The details of the organization structure was 
designed by C&L and constituted the main content of their 
interim and final reports. C&L stated in the final 
report:
"We have had many discussions with senior people in 
the existing sector about how the functions of the 
authority should be allocated between the 
directorates, and about how the directorates should 
be organised at the "second tier" and below. We have 
also circulated Working Papers, discussing possible 
options and the arguments relevant to the main 
choices. We have taken careful note of all the 
comments we had, and we have set out to design an 
organization structure which meets the needs of the 
sector in Nepal's managerial and social 
environment."
John, who was stationed in Nepal recalled that this same 
structure was under consideration by the management of 
the industry and he was not aware of any other proposals 
for a new organizational design very close to the time of 
the validation of the NEA:
"I wasn't involved in any meeting concerning the 
organization structure or the appointment of the 
staff. Until two or three weeks before the 
reorganization took place everything was set for a 
fairly close adherence to our structure. I had no 
contribution or input in deciding the organization 
design or filling the names in the slots."
The senior management group of the electricity 
industry which comprised the chief engineer, deputy chief 
engineer and superintendent engineers of the ED and the 
general manager and two deputy general managers of the 
NEC was called to a meeting by the secretary of the MWR
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and asked to draw up an organization structure just after 
the cabinet of ministers had decided on the validation 
date. These individuals who represented the senior 
professionals in the industry were given the choice to 
design their future organization only after the 
government and the MWR had secured their definitions and 
interests in the legislation that had already been 
approved and decreed as the NEA Act by then. The senior 
individuals from within the industry were given an 
opportunity to make arrangements for their organization 
rather than a structure such as the proposal of C&L being 
imposed by a unilateral decision of the minister or the 
secretary both of whom had secured their positions in the 
board of the NEA. The senior engineers with a majority 
from the ED were asked to play an active self-conscious 
role in the management of change in which their 
collective and individual interests were to be decided. 
The same group of key individuals initially responded 
positively to the consultants' recommendations and agreed 
that the design suited the objective of creating a 
commercial utility; and they were not very much concerned 
about the implications of the proposed structure. Then, 
two years later when the implementation of the authority 
was undertaken, the same people proceeded to work out a 
new structure that was more in line with their new 
definitions and interests rather than adopt the proposed 
structure. These individuals quickly realized that their 
status and position in the new authority would depend 
largely on the new design and they started to work on it
381
to suit their expectations. The definitions of these 
individuals seemed to be "changeable" as stated in the
negotiated order perspective because actors in
organizations are continuously engaged in the process of 
defining situations and constructing their actions.
The chief engineer initiated several meetings with 
the senior engineers and the organization structure was a 
result of their interactions consisting of compromises, 
exchanges and consensus. The structure of the NEA was a 
negotiated change and hence the majority of the
participants could claim that the decision was "our 
choice", "we were part of the decision", or "we selected 
what was best". These actors were the key technical 
personnel in the industry and they were assigned the 
authority to design the organization as well as take full 
responsibility for operating it. The minister did not
have the time or the interest to work out the details and 
the secretary left the design work to the senior 
engineers, being fairly new to this ministry and a non­
technical person. The task was largely undertaken by 
senior engineers from the ED according to one of the 
participating actors:
"We have modified the structure of Coopers and 
retained what we liked and discarded what we did not 
and our proposal was accepted at the higher level. 
There was no time or interest for people from the 
ministry to look at the details. Actually all this 
happened at the ED level. We also involved the 
general manager of the NEC and few of his senior 
staff."
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A joint effort among the senior engineers was the key 
contributory factor and this was confirmed by the chief 
engineer of the ED:
"We decided on the organization design in our 
meetings and the ministry endorsed our proposal. We 
had many proposals at that stage from senior 
engineers and also proposal of the consultant. In 
our discussion we collectively agreed on the best 
course of action and adopted this line."
The interests upheld by these central participants 
guided the negotiations and eventually carried forward a 
decision on the structure. In choosing an organization 
design for the NEA, the actors had to examine the 
requirements of the new organization as a single 
authority as well as take into account the arrangements 
of the previous settings and personal and subordinate 
staffs* positions in the changed context. Hence, their 
interest in the structure can go much further than the 
rational justifications expressed by them, such as the 
facilitation of the development of specialist skills in a 
functional organization or the functional organization 
representing all the key activities of an electricity 
industry. These explanations were legitimate and 
acceptable terminology in terms of rationalizing 
organizational functioning but they can conceal the 
contest for control and covert agreements to maintain 
stability. In the selection of the structure, the 
technical ♦considerations related to functional 
specialisation seemed to have been secondary as compared 
to the key actors' perceptions on control and contest for
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structural positions. Their joint effort was motivated by 
self-interest and they initiated bargaining to control 
and maintain their positions. Hall (1972) states that 
realization of interests, material and ideal, are the 
"outcomes of negotiated solution, encounters, and 
relationship". The interest of the participating actors 
was the key element of the negotiation context (Strauss, 
op. cit.).
In a reorganization which constituted the merger of 
two autonomous organizations, the structural context of 
the previous setting can play an important role in the 
planning of the new design. The central actors preferred 
to retain the same responsibilities in a situation that 
was new and uncertain and their best bet of continuity 
was to hang onto something that was already in their 
possession and control, that is, "turf control". The 
actors from the ED wanted to keep the attractive 
functions related to project development and 
construction, engineering and planning. The NEC actors 
wanted to retain their traditional territory and avoid 
any kind of encroachment from the ED and this was 
achieved by not making a claim to share the attractive 
construction activities controlled by the ED. The working 
arrangements negotiated by these actors was the 
continuation of the functional relationship as in the old 
set-up. A dialectical relationship between structure and 
negotiations seemed to exist as in the research works of 
Busch (op. cit.)/ Denzin (op. cit.). The structural
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context of the old set-up generated negotiations and such 
negotiations reaffirmed the new structure. The key 
element in this process was the role of senior engineers 
as conscious, participating actors and the organizational 
structure and negotiations were critical choices of 
actors who were capable of creating situations to match 
their definitions. On the other hand, the definition of 
situation was influenced by the "sensitive acts of 
negotiation" (Perinbanayagam, 1974) .
The chief engineer as one of the principal actors 
and the managing director of the authority supported the 
maintenance of the old arrangement because his preference 
and concern was to continue operations of the industry 
without disruptions in the supply of electricity and 
ensure the smooth performance of the various key 
functions. He believed this could be achieved by adhering 
to the old set-up and any attempts at radical changes 
would be disruptive:
"Our guiding factor was that people should not be 
confused when we integrated them. The old system was 
running by itself and it would be disturbing as soon 
as someone new was sent in. So we adopted a 
functional organization because this would only 
cause minimum disturbances to the prevailing set­
up...... The main problem of reorganization was that
there was a difference in career development of the 
NEC and the ED staff, difference in the work nature 
of the two organizations. Therefore with the 
intention of not disrupting the work that was being 
carried out, we avoided amalgamating the staff of 
two organizations and went ahead on a functional 
basis."
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The majority preference for continuing with the past 
implied replicating the old arrangement in the new. Since 
both the NEC and the ED were organized along functional 
activities and their institutional responsibilities were 
clearly earmarked, it was agreed that the old functional 
order should be continued. The general manager of the 
NEC, now the director-in-chief of the Planning 
directorate, supported sharing the same functions and 
explained how they came up with the six directorates:
"The ED was doing mostly developmental work, 
consisting of major hydro-projects and engineering. 
What we have done is split ED's functions into two 
units, i.e. Design/Engineering and Construction. The 
NEC was maintained as a distribution unit and split 
into Distribution/Customer Service and Operation and 
Maintenance. That's how you have the key functions 
in the four directorates. The Planning directorate 
was created separate, in accordance to the proposal 
of Coopers and Lybrand."
The minister of the MWR representing the parent ministry 
and as chairman of the authority endorsed the creation of 
six directorates proposed by his subordinates. He was 
convinced that it formed the basis of a reasonable 
structure:
"The government felt that the six directorates were
logical and I was convinced that these six
directorates were most logical. I mean if it is 
distribution and consumption that is logically a 
separate unit; operation and maintenance equally so. 
It seems reasonable to have separate units for 
finance and accounting and construction. Each unit
is quite a reasonable organization........... It is
a very, very large organization and a certain degree
of specialisation would probably help.......  You
see the other aspect that must be taken into account 
is that we started with a new organization. We
started with a certain structure as it exists now 
but there is nothing sacred about it. Now if in the 
working of that structure and the idea as I saw it
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was that we should see how it works and having seen 
how it works, if certain structures within it or 
certain organizational links within have become 
redundant or it looks better to reorganize it in a 
different way, that flexibility is there."
The participating actors distinctly realized that 
the number of higher management positions provided for in 
C&L's organization structure was fewer than their 
requirements, particularly in the top two levels. The 
prescribed design only provided for four directorates 
with twenty-four higher level management positions 
altogether and a hierarchy structure with fifteen grades. 
In this circumstance, it may have been easier for the 
actors to find faults with the design of C&L and come 
forth with their own proposals. For example, the deputy 
chief engineer of the ED stated that the planned 
structure was "too compressed" and an increase in the 
number of directorates presented a "functionally more 
elegant organization". Another participant from the ED 
criticized the consultants for not having adequate 
technical knowledge of a power industry to recommend an 
appropriate organizational design:
"We felt C&L were good in the area of Finance and 
Administration and the organization corresponding to 
this was well worked out. But the technical 
organizational design was very weak. I doubt if they 
had technical capability. Hydro-power is the most 
important source of power in Nepal and therefore the 
construction of hydro-power projects is extremely 
important. This is a very specialised subject and we 
need to develop this area. Therefore, we broke with 
the Generation and Transmission directorate and 
opted for functional specialisation. This was the 
preferred organization."
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A top heavy organization structure was facilitated by 
adopting a functional structure which adhered closely to 
the older arrangement. Altogether fifty-nine higher level 
management positions, that is, levels ten to twelve, were 
created along with an increase in the number of 
directorates and the posts of director-in-chiefs. The 
consultants' proposal that some form of differentiation 
should be made in the status of people who were chiefs of 
each directorate in accordance with the volume of 
responsibility and work was rejected because the actors 
agreed that they were all of the same status at the level 
of director-in-chief. Consequently, they secured their 
own posts as well as created sufficient positions to 
promote a large number of middle level managers from the 
ED and to adjust the personnel from the NEC who were 
promoted prior to validation of the NEA. Several of the 
participating actors admitted that one of their primary 
intentions in the design was to fit in as many people as 
possible in higher management grades and I quote a 
superintendent engineer of the ED:
"In the context of merging the NEC and the ED, all 
senior managers felt that their positions should be 
secure. Everybody was vying for positions and so we 
tried to create a large organization to satisfy the 
staff. We thought if nine people were fitted in and 
only two left out then why dissatisfy them. A large 
framework of organizational structure was chosen 
because we did not wish to deprive people who had 
earned positions in the context of the previous 
organizations. More adjustments were made in the 
posts of director-in-chief and directors to create a 
larger organization and to accommodate more people."
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The key actors unanimously agreed that the new authority 
should take in all the staff and everyone should be 
accommodated in the reorganization. This position 
directly contradicted the myth circulated by the lending 
agency and the consultants that the "deadwood" of the 
industry would be removed in the process of 
reorganization to create an efficient utility. Nothing of 
this measure took place because such an idea was never 
considered or endorsed by the senior managers and 
everyone was fitted in. The director of the Planning 
department explained that there was a fundamental problem 
with firing the deadwood because several of the engineers 
who were "technically useless and true deadwood" were on 
the other hand occupying senior positions and 
politically linked to important power centres. The 
minister of the MWR who supervised the setting up of the 
authority acknowledged that most of the senior people had 
been leaders of the industry and they had to be offered 
senior management posts in the new authority. These 
senior engineers who had spent many years in the industry 
could not be just thrown out and instead they were 
assigned to higher positions with more authority and 
responsibility. Miller (1986) states that authority based 
on competence is always a threat to an organization that 
defines authority as based on position and so "the 
imperative to maintain the dependency structure takes 
precedence over effective task performance". Similarly, 
the organization structure of the NEA was designed to 
continue the old dependency structure and the past
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performance or efficiency of the "old guards" seems to 
have been a "non-issue".
Once the six directorates and the departments under 
each were drawn up, the lower organizations of the ED and 
the NEC were gradually fitted and adjusted into the NEA. 
The larger structural context provided the framework 
within which the senior managers could now initiate an 
arrangement which they favoured and select their staff. 
They were given the authority to design their
directorates and assign staff to various positions and 
this situation was ideal for "fitting in candidates of 
choice" and "dispensing privilege", according to a 
retired director-in-chief who actively participated in 
the designing of his directorate. The chiefs were all 
agreed that the lower organization should not be
radically different but more or less in line with the 
old. The director-in-chief of the Construction 
directorate stated that there was no difficulty in
designing the lower organization because there was no 
profound change in the overall structure:
"We discussed, designed and decided on the number of 
directors and managers needed under each director- 
in-chief to carry out the functions. We did not have 
problems designing the middle and lower level 
organizations because we had with us the details of 
the old structure of the ED and the NEC. Therefore, 
we followed more or less the same structure for the 
Distribution and Consumer Service as in the NEC and 
Engineering and Construction was more or less with 
the ED. We made slight improvements but no drastic 
changes."
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The choice and emphasis on succession and continuity 
of the old arrangement by the key actors resulted in an 
organization design in which the structures of the ED and 
the NEC and their respective functions and personnel were 
distinctly earmarked. Three years subsequent to the 
operations of the NEA, the ADB (1988) commented that the 
structure was back to the old situation and the NEA 
lacked organizational effectiveness because of its 
failure to mould the staff and activities of the former 
NEC and ED into a single coordinated entity:
"At the professional staff level for example the 
respective staff of the NEC and ED are segregated 
mainly into separate directorates - NEC staff in 
Operation and Maintenance and Distribution/Consumer 
Services, ED staff in Engineering and Construction - 
doing the same work as they did for their previous 
employers. This has contributed to lack of 
coordination within the NEA, its failure to 
establish a real corporate identity and apparent 
absence of strong commitment to the NEA as an 
institution among its staff."
The participating actors were not only successful in 
creating a large structure to fit in all the old staff 
but were able to recruit more new personnel in the 
enlarged structure which gradually caused the problem of 
overstaffing. The senior people from the NEA at the 
director and manager level were partly satisfied because 
they had been offered higher positions but then 
complained that there were no corresponding volume of 
work to match their new position and status. A joint 
secretary of the MWR who worked for several years in the 
NEA commented that the management deliberately created a 
"bloated" organization with too many people, posts and
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offices but without corresponding increase in work, that 
is, the work was no more than what the ED and the NEC 
were jointly doing together but the expectations of the 
people had been raised. The ADB mission for the seventh 
power project (1988) was concerned about the overstaffing 
caused largely by the extended organization structure and 
its effect on the efficiency of the authority:
"As of June 1989, the NEA had 8299 employees of whom 
750 work in project construction. Of the 7549 
operational staff, 481 are officers of whom over 90 
percent are graduates. The staff is split 
approximately 60 percent to 40 percent in technical 
and non-technical functions. The ratios of employees 
to installed capacity and to sales in fiscal year 
1987/88 were 24 KW and 70 MWh, respectively. These 
ratios are low when compared to power utilities in 
other developing countries. (In Bangladesh, the 
ratios of employees to capacity and to sales are 36 
KW and 93 MWh while Fiji has 130 KW and 193 MWh, 
respectively) . While these low ratios indicate 
overstaffing, the NEA still lacks qualified 
personnel in almost every key functional areas. For 
example, in the finance department and internal 
audit of the NEA, there is not one qualified 
accountant."
The decision on the organization structure can be 
interpreted as a result of the micro negotiations that 
took place among the senior managers. As key 
participating actors, they were interested in 
establishing a pattern of control and authority to govern 
the NEA in line with past arrangements and to secure 
positions for themselves and subordinates. The degree of 
differentiation which they initiated in terms of vertical 
and horizontal expansion of the organizational design 
does not have much relationship to size or technical 
reasons as illustrated in the work of Meyer (1972) and
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Blau and Schoenheer (1971) but seems to have been mainly 
based on political considerations. The organization
structure was not so much a problem of design or 
engineering but an outcome of political contest for 
control. Pfeffer (1978) is one of the few writers who 
advocates a political interpretation of the 
organizational structure because he argues that 
participants in organizations are in a contest for 
resources and their control. The contest is political and 
is fought in many contexts within an organization; and 
the organizational design directly affects control and 
governance in organizations. Therefore, the contest for 
control is extended to the design as well and Pfeffer
(op. cit.) explains:
"it is inevitable, given the power and authority 
conferred, that one of the foci of politics within 
organization will involve the structural
arrangements or the design of the organization."
The collusion among the key actors can be analyzed 
in terms of stability and security with a system that 
held prescribed, stable roles and defined structures of 
power and influence. Pfeffer (op. cit.) states that all 
established structures represent the outcomes of previous 
bargains and a structural change means that negotiations 
and old conflicts must be reopened in order to establish 
new structural arrangement. It may also be argued that 
continued stability avoids conflict by not reopening past 
negotiated settlements among participants in an 
organizational coalition. Stinchcombe (1965) associates
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all kinds of structural changes to costs and risks
because new roles need to be learned, new patterns of 
interaction adopted and new tasks and relationship 
assumed. Thus, if the ED as the more influential of the 
two organizations in terms of authority and
responsibility for managing the reorganization had shown 
more interest and preference for a "new" order, then 
C&L's recommendations may have been implemented to some 
extent. The majority of interacting actors represented 
the ED and they faced the more radical change of 
switching over from the civil service to a state-owned 
enterprise and adjusting to a hierarchy along with the 
staff of the NEC. They always preferred to keep a 
distinct profile apart from the NEC since the time when 
the ADB initiated actions towards the reorganization in
the early 1970's. The stability of the old arrangement in
the new authority at least ensured that their roles and 
functions were retained in the changed context. The 
negotiation of the organization structure can also be 
interpreted as a mobilization of bias by the interacting 
actors because they managed to preserve their respective 
interests and continue the control relationship. Pfeffer 
(op. cit.) argues that all organization designs are the 
outcome of power and influence operating within the 
organization.
Many people from within and outside the industry 
expressed to me that the organization structure of the 
NEA was a political choice of the senior engineers and
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there was collusion to maintain the status quo with the 
hierarchy of power and privileges. Several middle level 
engineers stated that although there was justification in 
developing specialisation in key functional areas, this 
was possible in the proposal of C&L because they too 
prescribed functional departmentation. Similarly 
continuity for people working in the industry was 
possible as long as they were allocated the same 
functions. The key consideration was always the expansion 
of the structure so as to fit in more people and this 
was stated by even the participating actors who were 
members of the negotiating team and were later allocated 
the job of directors-in-chief. For example, the chief of 
Engineering stated that a large organization was formed 
to avoid discontentment for the senior people. The chiefs 
of Operation and Maintenance, and Construction agreed 
that more units in a larger organization were established 
to create specific areas of specialisation as well as to 
accommodate more people. The chief of Planning explained 
that there were six people in the industry who had to be 
given the post of chiefs and therefore the six 
directorates were created even though the proposal of the 
consultant was "ideal". The staff at director level who 
were not participants in the decision-making unanimously 
agreed that a top heavy organization was deliberately 
designed for accommodating staff. The director for 
Planning who worked closely with the chief engineer 
stated his experience:
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"I would say the large organization was created to 
adjust the personnel. We had to take into account 
the promotion in the NEC which was done in spite of 
the fact that the NEA was coming. Promotion in the 
ED had been stopped for almost two years and we 
needed more posts to adjust these people. We decided 
on a functional organization because more posts were 
possible."
A director from the Construction directorate agreed that 
most of the posts were created for people alone and this 
was obvious from the state of affairs after only four 
years of operation of the NEA:
"The top organization was created to fit in the 
people. You have over twenty directors in this 
authority but there is no uniform work for all. Some 
of them are virtually doing nothing. They wanted to 
offer these chaps positions and the organization was 
designed. On the other hand, you still have the same 
problem as between the NEC and the ED because 
Distribution/Customer Service and Construction are 
functioning without any coordination. Same people, 
same place and same pattern of functioning."
The organization structure can be interpreted as a 
political choice as admitted by the participating actors 
and affirmed by others in the industry. These key actors 
negotiated an arrangement and the use of power in such 
interaction determined who got what and how and who got 
left out and why. There was clear evidence that a group 
of actors, that is, a coalition of interests, dominated 
in the decision-making of the structure and they 
negotiated a political choice. There were differences 
with the consultants' proposals but there was no direct 
conflict simply because they were not participants in the 
decision-making or in the bargaining process. This fact 
was admitted by John who was present throughout this
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period but was instead asked to work on improvements of 
the accounting system. What happened here was that the 
participating actors were assigned complete control of 
the decision-making process and this provided the group 
an opportunity to negotiate their definitions and 
interests and come up with an agreement. The decision of 
the secretary of the MWR to involve the senior engineers 
of the two bodies and not the consultants placed the 
balance of power in favour of the former. The secretary 
declared that the implementation of the reorganization 
was the borrower's responsibility and belonged neither to 
the lending agency nor the consultants:
"The ADB sometimes tried to interfere in the 
implementation side and tell us that the 
consultants' recommendation had not been adopted or 
they have not been involved. But we had created one 
organization as was the agreement and I felt that we 
should have been left alone on the content of the 
implementation."
The prescription of the consultants was successfully 
prevented from entering into the bargaining context by 
the participating actors. In the case of the organization 
structure as with the legislation of the authority
discussed earlier, the consultants were excluded from 
participating in interactions which favoured the
interests of the dominant group and challenges to
predominant values or to established norms were avoided 
(Bachrach and Baratz, op. cit.). The values of the key 
actors towards the old arrangements and their perceptions 
and preferences on the adjustment of staff, lead to the 
creation of barriers to C&L's involvement and suffocation
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of their proposals which called for changes in the 
established order that had deeper implications on the 
allocation of benefits, facilities, etc.
In a similar way, the exclusion of the middle and 
junior level staff of the industry from interaction and 
decision-making on the structure highlights the dominant 
role of the senior engineers. The grievances of the lower 
staff on the structure were blocked from expression and 
the mobilization of bias was wielded through nondecision 
and barrier to participation by the more powerful 
individuals. The senior management dominated in the 
participation and this was experienced by Trevor of C&L:
"The whole Nepalese management system frankly sucks 
decisions upwards rather than pushing them down. 
Therefore, the key players in the reorganization 
were the senior people from the ED and a few from 
the NEC."
This practice was common in both the ED and the NEC, 
irrespective of the fact that one unit was part of the 
civil service and the other a state-owned enterprise. For 
example, a middle level engineer of the NEC described how 
everything to do with the structure was decided at the 
"top":
"There were just rumours that four directorates were 
being formed but we never got to see anything on 
paper. This is the tragic part of it. This was all 
done in a hush, hush. They don't take ideas from 
others. They feel that if ideas are freely floated 
then they become part of the idea and have to 
enforce at least some of it."
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This interpretation may provide one of the more important 
reasons for blocking participation so as to avoid the 
perchance of any grievance or conflict later on. All 
interactions were confined among senior engineers in the 
ED too, as explained by a middle level engineer:
"When it comes to the choice of a structure, our 
senior and high level officers think that they know 
everything. Lower staff are never consulted and they 
do not get an opportunity to speak out their minds 
and ideas. Here everything is confined and nothing 
is disclosed to the people affected by their 
decision. It was a question of the careers of 
thousands of staff and people should have been told 
what was coming and what they were getting. The 
practice is for people in senior positions to look 
upwards rather than downward at the organization and 
the staff."
One of the participating individuals in the negotiations 
explained to me that the junior staff were deliberately 
excluded from participation, that is, an exercise in 
nondecision, and all information was controlled at the 
top because there were advantages to be gained by keeping 
secrecy:
"You cannot rule the organization if you are 
democratic in Nepal. So we agreed to disclose very 
little and not involve the lower staff. I strongly 
believe in keeping major policy matter secret and 
our bureaucracy prefers such an approach. 
Manipulation is possible only in a situation of 
secrecy. There is also the possibility of creating 
the wrong impression and testing out various ideas. 
Lastly, it is just easier to work if secrecy is 
maintained."
The control of information can be one of the important 
sources of power in interactions and it was often used as 
a power resource in the negotiations that took place in 
the reorganization.
399
A small change in the organizational structure was 
initiated in negotiations between the ADB and the NEA 
during the visit of the pre-appraisal mission for the 
seventh power project in 1988. Once again the bank as the 
influential member of the structural context was aware of 
the limitations of the NEA structure and the mission was 
specially concerned about strengthening and improving the 
control and efficiency in revenue and expenditure 
accounting which could improve the return on investment, 
the main concern of the bank as the lending agency. The 
responsibility for commercial functions such as meter 
reading, billing, collection, preparation of revenue 
statements, etc. was split between various regional 
offices and a unit of the Distribution and Customer 
Services (DCS) directorates and revenue division of the 
Finance department. The mission was convinced that the 
staff of the DCS were having difficulty in coping with 
technical matters in their work with the result that 
inadequate attention was given to the commercial 
functions. An agreement was negotiated for establishing a 
Commercial department with total responsibility for 
commercial and consumer accounting functions and this 
reorganization was a pre-condition for undertaking the 
appraisal study of the seventh power project. As in the 
previous case of the institutional change, the ADB 
applied the same power mechanism to persuade the borrower 
to comply to their definition in negotiations - the loan 
for the seventh power project was made conditional to 
actions on the structural change. It was convenient for
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the bank to repeat and resort to the same power 
relationship in negotiations which were successful and 
effective in the past. The bank's refusal to send the 
appraisal mission for twenty-one months until the board 
of directors of the NEA approved the establishment of the 
Commercial department in March 1989 was an unambiguous 
use of power to enforce decisions on a negotiated 
agreement. New agreements on the status and 
responsibilities of the director, action plans and 
staffing of the Commercial department, etc. were 
negotiated in the new loan and included as conditions for 
loan effectiveness - this is an another example of the 
cycle of interaction between the borrower and the bank 
and the exercise of power in such dependence 
relationship.
IV. Staff Adjustment:____Conflicts, Disagreements,
Negotiations and Covert Agreements
i. Agreement on the Choice of a MD
The appointment of the managing director (MD) of the 
NEA was done by the government according to the NEA Act 
but the selection of the chief engineer of the ED as the 
MD was a decision reached by the government after covert 
bargaining and compromises. The data on such negotiations 
was not easily forthcoming and accessible but I am 
confident that the examination of events related to the
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appointment of the MD and the contents of interviews with 
other organizational members who kept close watch on 
events related to their industry will reveal the 
political nature of such a choice/ that is, that the 
final decision was the result of negotiations. What I am 
attempting to do is "to convey some feel for the 
confusion" (Allison, 1971) by identifying the key 
players, coalitions and the "games" they played. There 
were several candidates who sought the position of the MD 
and it was generally known by people in the industry that 
so and so were promoting their individual case. The names 
of several candidates who were closely associated with 
the power industry in the past and present were 
circulated and speculated upon at various times but this 
was all hearsay as there was no formal call for 
application or any specific criteria of selection 
designed and made known. In the case of the appointment 
of chief executives of state-owned enterprises in Nepal, 
it was customary for the government to make the final 
selection from several candidates who competed for the 
job. Similarly in the case of the NEA, two candidates 
emerged as the main competitors moving closer to the 
validation date - the chief engineer of the ED, HM and an 
ex-secretary of the MWR, PP. However, the uncertainty 
about the appointment of the MD continued very close to 
the starting date of the NEA as explained by the 
director-in-chief of Planning:
402
"No one knew who was going to be the boss of the NEA 
till the beginning of August. We heard that there 
was a big tussle between HM and PP. These chaps were 
running their horses till the last minute. The 
government should have decided three months earlier 
on the chief and allowed him to choose his people 
and plan accordingly."
This was not a simple or straightforward choice for 
the government and the cabinet postponed the validation 
for a month because an agreement on the MD was not 
reached. The MWR proposed in early July that the NEA 
should initiate operations on July 16 keeping in view the 
pressure and conditions of the two lending agencies. The 
staff in the NEC recalled that they came to work on July 
15 but not knowing whether they would be coming to the
NEC or the NEA the next day or who was going to be the
chief. They were only informed on July 16 that the 
validation was to take place sometime in August. The
fierce competition and race between the two contenders 
for the MD post persisted until the very end when the 
validation was announced by the government and there was 
no prior indication which hinted that one was the 
favourite as compared to the other. A senior engineer 
with ED recalled how HM was tipped-off to be appointed 
the MD only few days prior to the validation but the 
"pulling" initiated by PP caused several days' delay in 
the formal handing over of the letter of appointment to 
him.
I am arguing that the appointment of the MD by the 
government can be explained as a compromise solution
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because the two contesting candidates mobilized power 
resources to influence the decision-making. Both 
candidates were well connected in their power 
relationship with people in positions of authority and 
the common metaphor in the bureaucracy "source and force" 
was often repeated to interpret this case as well. People 
explained to me that source and force were two sides of 
the same coin and one needed both to be effective and 
successful in the Nepalese bureaucracy. Many people in 
the civil service had some form of "source", i.e. 
linkages, but the more important determining element was 
the force of such linkage which could counter the force 
of the other's source. Also equally important was an 
assessment of how much weight the various sources carried 
in relation to the individuals who were making the 
decision. This kind of referent power (French and Raven, 
1959) of the contending actors entered into the 
interactions between the members of the cabinet and it 
was difficult to make an outright decision on one rather 
than the other. Although the agreement to appoint HM was 
justified later by many rational considerations such as 
him being an incumbent in the job of chief engineer, 
senior most engineer of the industry, actively involved 
in the planning of the NEA, etc., I feel it may not be 
speculation to argue that other "political" 
considerations were more decisive especially in view of 
the equally valid arguments put forward by many engineers 
that PP was as "competent" to take up the 
responsibilities of the MD. I shall contend that the
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appointment of HM was a result of the advantages in power 
relationship, that is, in terms of pluralist power 
resources and relations to move the negotiations and 
decision in his favour and, therefore, making him a more 
powerful "source and force". Having been a key figure in 
the industry for the past five years as the chief 
engineer of ED, HM was supported by both the minister and 
the secretary of the MWR because he was "the easier to 
deal with" and he was "somebody who would not rock the 
boat" according to Sieber. On the other hand, PP was a 
"strong personality" and usually "got what he wanted". HM 
had very important linkages within the palace secretariat 
and several respondents stated that his wife was a sister 
of one of the secretaries of the King. Another senior 
engineer traced the link between HM who was a keen tennis 
player and one of the princes who was in charge of the 
National Sports Council. Last but definitely not the 
least important point was the "connections" that HM had 
forged over the years as chief engineer of ED according 
to several engineers who were familiar with the events in 
the department. They cited two significant cases in which 
HM played a responsible role in contracting out 
multimillion dollar construction projects. For example, a 
large generation project was contracted to a Korean 
construction company represented by the elder sister of 
the King; and more recently prior to the final stages of 
the reorganization, the Marsyangdi project was awarded to 
a construction company represented by the queen's 
brothers. This project was under fire from the local
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press because the cost came to U.S. $4, 000 per kilowatt 
of installed capacity making it the costliest project of 
this type in the world. The relevant point I am trying to 
make here is to stress that HM had the stronger power 
relationship within the government and the royal palace 
and the latter was primarily important because the King 
is regarded the "centre of power" in Nepal. Shaha (1982) 
states that close proximity to the centre of power is of 
vital importance in the kind of "personalistic politics 
prevalent in Nepal" and anyone who is close to the king 
physically or socially or has easy access to him may be 
in a position to yield power. Any kind of informal 
contacts tend to take precedence over formal procedures 
and power is exercised through such relationship and 
interactions. HM enjoyed backing and support from sources 
who were closest to the King. This is not to deny the 
power relationship of PP because he had worked for many 
years in the water resources sector and the civil service 
and developed linkages with secretaries in the royal 
palace and other members of the royal family. The issue 
this time around was the degree of strength of the 
"source and force" and HM had a slight edge. This may be 
also evident from the fact that PP was soon compensated 
and appointed the chief of another state-owned enterprise 
by the cabinet of ministers. A compromise and an 
agreement was reached to favour both candidates because 
of the power relationships of the two contenders.
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ii. Negotiation of Staff Transfer
I turn to the adjustment of ED and NEC staff into 
the NEA in the process of reorganization. The consultants 
recommended new appointment to NEC employees and a 
transitional arrangement for civil service employees of 
the ED so as to attract them to the commercially-oriented 
environment of the NEA. Their report did not include any 
criteria to be followed for the transfer of employees 
into the grades of the NEA but they stressed the 
importance of attractive salary and benefits to retain 
the best staff. John discussed the assumptions underlying 
their recommendations:
"This was based upon the premise that provided 
remuneration and benefits are sufficiently 
attractive then you will attract the cream of the 
power sector, engineering, the bureaucratic and
administrative areas .......Yes, this was the
intention of what we were aiming for. We wanted to 
try and create an area of excellence in the business 
with good facilities, incentives."
At the time of validation of the NEA, the government 
decided that all staff working in the industry were to be 
transferred to the NEA but no formal criteria or rules 
had been prepared concerning the adjustment of staff. It 
was, however, clearly implied that the general rules of 
state-owned enterprises concerning personnel, salary and 
benefits, etc. would be applied in the case of the 
authority as well because its legal status was the same. 
The staff were allocated posts and positions on a 
temporary basis in the new organization structure and
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this arrangement continued for the next two years while 
the management attempted to develop and introduce a 
system of staff adjustment to transfer the staff 
permanently. This intervening period was marked by a 
strong feeling of uncertainty and insecurity for the 
staff and it generated conflicts, tensions, and chaos. 
Obviously this had direct bearing on the performance of 
the authority because "nobody was determined about his 
position or organization and this created an indifferent 
attitude toward work" as described by the director-in- 
chief of Administration. John experienced the frustration 
of the staff and its effect on performance as he worked 
along with them:
"Staff adjustment caused a considerable degree of 
heartache taking the time as they did. I think more 
consideration should have been given to the feelings 
of staff who felt themselves to be in some state of 
limbo and it did not do anything to enhance the 
status of the organization as regards being a good 
employer towards the staff. I would not liked to 
have been in that position for that length of time 
and I would have liked to know a lot
earlier Even for a long time after validation,
people were allowed to get away with saying I don't 
know who my boss is. I don't know where I fit in the 
organization, all I know is I am part of it, I don't 
know where I fit. So even what had previously been 
happening in the NEC and in the ED ceased at that 
point because people said I don't belong any longer, 
the old job that I had I don't do any longer. And 
nobody pushed him! And it took more than two years 
in the end before they sorted out and gave people 
posts, jobs, everything else."
In this situation of uncertainty and change, the quest 
for securing positions and promotions was the most 
salient intention of all staff. Since there were no 
formal rules and regulations, a director-in-chief
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described the situation as an "ideal situation for 
jockeying for posts" and "everything could be possible" 
if people put in enough effort. An extensive 
organizational structure with a large number of senior 
positions was already operational and the interest of the 
ED staff was to be transferred at higher levels and the 
NEC staff sought equal treatment.
At the request of the management of the NEA, the PSC 
presented the first set of recommendations on the 
transfer of NEC and ED staff in April 1986 and this was 
based on the rules spelled out in the General Policy on 
personnel matters for all state-owned enterprises. The 
PSC resorted to standard rules on the inter-transfer of 
staff between two enterprises and prescribed the same 
conditions for the NEA. This proposal generated immediate 
rejection from both NEC and ED staff and they were 
supported by the top management and the secretary of the 
MWR. The rules did not allow any preferential treatment 
to ED employees some of whom had worked for long years 
but were in lower grades than their contemporaries in the 
NEC. In addition, the MD and the secretary of the MWR 
were interested in upgrading all the professional ED 
employees by one level in the transfer. The grievance 
from the NEC staff was that they were not treated to the 
same rules and criteria as the ED in the conversion of 
their class grade to the level system grading of the NEA. 
They voiced their resistance against any form of 
discriminatory treatment. Following this diversity in
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definitions imposed by different individuals and groups, 
the NEA represented by the MD and the secretary of the 
MWR (as directed by the cabinet because the transfer of 
civil servants was to be considered) initiated 
negotiations with the PSC over the next two years and the 
second and the third recommendations from the PSC were 
"resultant" of the understandings reached between them. A 
completely new set of criteria for staff transfer was 
worked out which bore no resemblance to the provisions of 
the General Policy. The secretary of the PSC, Singh, 
recounted the process and reasons for such a negotiated 
settlement:
"The General Policy of the PSC did not completely 
define the situation of a merger between a state- 
owned corporation and a government department and 
therefore many issues were open to our
interpretation ...... The period of reorganization
was a transition period and I tried my best to
accommodate. Especially the secretary of MWR and I 
had many meetings and we worked on three or four 
drafts and had long discussions. I think if there 
had been a different secretary instead of me things 
might have turned out in a different way. What I am 
trying to say is that it depends on the person. For 
example, the PSC could have asserted that this is 
our policy and things could not be done differently 
for this authority. But I did not say this, I
supported them."
Even formal rules and regulations of a constitutional 
body seem to have a "fictional" character as they are 
open to interpretation and interaction of individuals and 
their definitions in turn decide the eventual outcome. 
The negotiated order theory questions the adequacy of 
formal rules to govern the activities in an organization 
and gives more importance to continuous negotiations.
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Strauss et al. (1963) states that rules are tacitly known 
and affirmed in daily interaction in their study of the 
negotiated order of a hospital:
"The rules that govern the actions of various 
professionals, as they perform their tasks, are far 
from extensive, or clearly stated or clearly 
binding. This fact leads to necessary and continual 
negotiation........ rules here as elsewhere fail to
be universal prescriptions: they always require
judgement concerning their applicability to the 
specific case."
Hall (1972) supports the argument of Strauss and friends 
that rules are limited to solve the problems of 
consensus, communication and coordination in society. 
Although rules are supposed to be "the height of clarity 
and coverage", Hall shares the view that rules are open 
to negotiations by the participants :
"The fact is that rules are not extensive, clearly 
stated, or clearly binding. They too require 
interpretation and definition as they apply to 
specific situations. In addition there will always 
be situations that have not been anticipated and 
contingencies that cannot be met simply by applying
a rule...... Furthermore, no one knows all the rules
or what those on the books meant when they were 
enacted.... In addition, rules are used and misused 
according to the interests of the participants and 
even "authority" may find it to its advantage to 
ignore certain rules."
Mannings (1977) in his analysis of two police departments 
argues that rules and rule-guided behaviour must be 
examined in context and with reference to the subjective 
definitions that actors attribute to contextual conduct. 
He particularly stresses that rules are resources used 
tactically by participants and by doing so administrators 
negotiate the limits to manipulate situations for their
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own purposes. Blankenship (197 6) agrees with Manning and 
states that "rules and legalistic authority.... are best 
treated as resources in social interaction, often ignored 
as honoured in everyday life". Likewise, Morgan (1975) 
states that a social order cannot be understood in terms 
of rules alone but as continuous negotiation:
"There may be negotiation about the rules 
themselves, about the circumstances under which the 
rules may be said to apply or be stretched, or about 
whether the rules are in fact open to negotiation in 
the first place."
The main controversial issue in the staff adjustment 
was the preferential treatment demanded by engineers from 
the ED. The MD and the secretary of the MWR firmly 
believed that there was an unparalleled difference 
between the career pattern of staff of the ED and the NEC 
mainly in relation to quick promotions in the latter and 
they tabulated and worked out the pattern of past 
promotion in the two organizations. They were sympathetic 
to the demands of the ED staff who like themselves were 
civil servants and they pursued an argument that all 
professional staff should be adjusted in higher grades. 
Apart from this, the secretary of the MWR was working 
under a deadline set by the cabinet to complete the 
transfer of ED staff and he was anxious to complete the 
task as soon as possible so as to make his own mark. In 
view of the grievances expressed by all ED staff about 
their removal from the civil service, the secretary was 
keen to offer them higher levels, to pacify them and make
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his task easier. The MD was under similar pressure from 
his old colleagues in the ED to look into their cases 
favourably and he strongly supported the transfer of few 
of them into higher grades in case all could not be 
upgraded. In addition, he was concerned about the poor 
performance by his staff in the authority which he 
believed was caused by the delay in staff adjustment:
"The staff adjustment took a long time and unless 
this was done, we could not press anyone. We were 
not able to put pressure on anyone because we were 
not sure whether the staff would be permanently in 
the NEA or return back to the government. We could 
not generate a feeling of devotion or commitment."
On the other hand, the NEC staff demanded the same and 
equal treatment because they claimed that they belonged 
to the same industry as a government-owned and controlled 
enterprise and were following rules prescribed by the 
PSC. Singh, the secretary of the PSC, opposed any 
outright preferential treatment in favour of all the ED 
staff because he argued that many of the senior engineers 
in the NEC were originally transferred from the ED; the 
two groups of employees from the same industry should not 
be treated discriminately; and lastly, the PSC held the 
responsibility of dispensing justice and protecting 
personnel of all governmental organizations as it was one 
of the key agencies of the government. In view of all 
these differences in definitions and expectations, the 
main players could proceed with the staff adjustment only 
by making compromises to their positions and changing 
their definitions. Any kind of joint action in such a
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problematic situation was possible only by negotiations, 
that is, order is not something that automatically occurs 
but rather "must be worked at and must occur, to the 
extent that it does, out of the repeated, reaffirmed, 
reconstituted acts of participants" (Hall, op. cit.). 
Strauss et al. (op. cit.) states that that which is 
repeated, reaffirmed and reconstituted are shared 
agreements, tacit understandings and contracts, which 
develop out of give and take, diplomacy and bargaining. 
Similarly the staff adjustment in the reorganization was 
a negotiated settlement to which the chairman of the PSC 
gave his full support:
"The PSC had to be flexible in this situation 
because you had two very different organizations 
with different charters and service conditions. No 
matter what final resolution we would have accepted 
we could not have made both parties happy in those 
circumstances. We tried to accommodate their needs 
within our limits."
The key agreement worked out by the two secretaries 
was the "lateral entry system" which allowed the 
adjustment of staff into two higher levels in the 
transfer. The two secretaries agreed that at least some 
of the people identified by the management of the NEA 
should be adjusted in higher grades instead of all staff 
of the ED. By then Singh was convinced that government 
engineers should not be put at a disadvantage and they 
deserved to be given more incentive; he agreed to make 
compromises:
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"Although we could not differentiate too much 
between the two groups, there were more technical 
staff such as engineers from the government's side 
and they could not be put at a disadvantage because 
most of the project and construction work had to be 
done through them. The lateral entry system was 
introduced so as provide some kind of a moral boost 
to them. This was essential."
The concept of lateral entry as defined by the General 
Policy pertained to the recruitment of exceptional talent 
at higher grades in only very special cases. A 
redefinition of rules was negotiated for this particular 
situation which gave it a novel meaning. The secretary of 
the MWR and the MD worked out the criteria for the 
lateral entry because the selection of staff was 
considered their responsibility; and they formulated the 
criteria in such a way that it matched the candidates who 
were already identified by them from the senior 
management level and the majority of them were from the 
ED. Singh was well aware of their intention but he 
supported his counterpart's strategy:
"We knew the criteria favoured the department 
people. That was also obvious from the several 
recommendations we proposed because the intention 
was to solve the problem of the bigger group. We 
knew we were taking a soft line."
The secretary of MWR credited the support he received 
from the PSC which made it possible to reach agreements 
and make compromises:
"I met the chairman and the secretary at least 
twenty times to get approval for the various rules 
on the staff adjustment. It was lucky that they were
understanding gentlemen..... similarly the lateral
entry rule was approved by them and people were for 
the first time in the history of the service able to 
jump two levels."
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Another important negotiated agreement on staff 
adjustment called for equal treatment and application of 
all rules and regulations to both NEC and ED employees. 
This was specially relevant in relation to the lateral 
entry because it was expected to be the most 
controversial. Since the criteria was drawn up to favour 
the staff of the ED, the key actors unanimously agreed 
that the implementation should appear to be fair to both 
the groups of staff. The NEC should not feel that they 
had been refused participation. The PSC was particularly 
concerned about its image as a constitutional body and 
Singh stressed that the PSC's role should be seen as 
"fair and just” in spite of the hidden agenda in favour 
of the ED:
"The PSC is one of the four agencies in our 
democracy and we are responsible to see that 
personnel rules and regulations are fair to
all..... We felt there would always be a feeling of
two groups in any kind of partial treatment. We 
preferred equal treatment because we knew that
higher benefits would be received by the ED as they 
represented the majority of staff. But because we 
gave a condition of equal opportunity, everyone had 
a chance to apply and as a result there was no hard 
feelings later on."
A mutual agreement on such a condition enabled the 
secretary of MWR to state that he gave "the same
measurement and equal treatment to both the groups" and
"promoted the interest of both". The MD went even further
and claimed that "fair" treatment was given to the NEC in 
spite of their past advantage of quicker career 
progression:
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"When it was done this way, we did not differentiate 
between corporation or department. People who were 
said to be quickly promoted in the NEC had a chance 
and those who claimed that the promotions were slow 
in the department also had a chance. People from 
both sides had equal chance. We looked at their 
performance irrespective of their origin, whether 
they were from the ED or the NEC."
A performance evaluation criteria designed to assess 
and screen the candidates after they met the requirements 
of the lateral entry system was the final working 
agreement negotiated with the PSC. The standard selection 
criteria for promotion of staff as laid down in the 
General Policy was substituted and instead a new 
performance evaluation system was introduced for this 
single occasion. The evaluation system designed by the 
NEA management and approved by their board was endorsed 
by the PSC. Singh explained that the NEA board comprised 
very senior civil servants whose "working could not be 
always looked upon with suspicion and doubts" and hence 
the PSC agreed to their proposal. A selection system that 
gave higher preference to past performance was decided by 
the MD and the secretary because both of them agreed that 
only the efficient staff should be selected in the 
lateral entry. The MD was convinced that this system 
managed to screen the best people:
"My stand was that performance was absolutely 
essential if I was to operate this huge commercial 
organization. What is the use of a senior member of 
staff if he is not capable of performance. In our 
evaluation a senior member of staff only received 
priority if he was competent and I gave 
opportunities to those who could work. If you check 
now you will see that we have given opportunities 
and chances to those who are capable of working and 
no one has complained to me on the grounds that he
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was not given a fair chance. We have looked at this 
very carefully and all the performance evaluation 
has been done on the basis of confidential reports 
prepared by the three experienced seniors.”
The performance evaluation was undertaken by four three- 
member committees with the participation of board 
members, directors-in-chief and directors in the 
different committees and each committee was responsible 
for evaluation of different grades of staff. The 
evaluation system does seem like a participatory, 
democratic and fair process in which members of the 
senior management were allowed to select their staff on 
the basis of past performance. Fifty percent of the total 
marks was allocated for assessment of past performance 
and the candidates were subjectively evaluated on 
professional skills, management knowledge and discipline. 
However, it was a known fact that in both the NEC and the 
ED performance evaluation was hardly ever done on a 
regular basis and no such evaluation was conducted in the 
first two years of operation of the NEA. There was also 
nothing available in the form of records and yet the 
performance evaluation for lateral entry took into 
account the performance of the last five years. In 
several cases, the evaluator did not know the candidate 
or had not supervised his performance. For example, one 
manager recalled how all the results of the evaluation 
were kept secret but later he came to find out that the 
members of the committee did not know him because he had 
never worked under them. This was more evident in the 
evaluation of candidates who were eligible for the job of
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director - the two board members were never direct 
supervisors of several of the candidates and only the MD 
was familiar with the ED staff who were selected for the 
job. Interestingly, all the five candidates who were 
selected at the director level through the lateral entry 
system were close associates of the MD from the old 
setting and were referred to as "pancha pandeva” as 
mentioned earlier in the report.
Several of the evaluators themselves mentioned to me 
that much of the assessment was subjective and 
judgemental and the final allocation of marks was decided 
after consultations among other members. One of the board 
members casually stated that he happened to know all the 
candidates from his long association with the power 
industry and it was "easy to choose the efficient staff" 
even in the absence of records. A director-in-chief
appreciated the evaluation system because he was able to 
use his judgement on the performance of subordinates; in 
addition, this kind of assessment was easy for him 
because "everyone knows who is what out here". The 
retired chief of Administration directorate strongly 
argued that personal linkage was the most important
qualification for securing a post in the evaluation 
system because compromises had to be made to the various 
"source and force" as soon as there was a provision for 
subjective assessment. The majority of staff I 
interviewed in the NEA believed that the secret, 
subjective evaluation was perfectly conducive to the
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predominant practices of compromise and bargaining among 
the power relationship in the bureaucracy of Nepal.
Strong resentment against the staff adjustment and
especially the lateral system was expressed by the 
majority of staff even several years after its
implementation.
All negotiations on staff adjustment were carried 
out in total confidence by the key individuals without
the participation and consultation of other staff. Even 
the directors-in-chief were not participants or kept 
abreast of the developments. The MD was assisted by 
several engineers from the ED and noticeably not a single 
administrative or other staff member of the NEC was 
allowed access to the interactions. The NEC as a state- 
owned enterprise was familiar with the rules of the 
General Policy but they were neither consulted prior to 
the validation nor allowed participation in the 
negotiations with the PSC. A senior civil servant who was 
a member of the board of directors of the NEC stated that 
priority in the reorganization was always to favour the 
civil servants of the ED and the NEC was sidetracked:
"I don't think the NEC knew about the details of the 
reorganization because the corporation was never 
taken into confidence. There was always much concern 
for department people, more specifically how to 
adjust them when they were moved from there. The 
corporation people were taken for granted - they 
would be happy to move into a bigger organization. 
Not much concern was given to their motivation. More 
attention was given to the motivation of HMG 
employees."
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The general manager of the NEC and now the director-in- 
chief of Planning admitted that their experiences and 
expertise in administrative matters was never considered 
seriously:
"It was the few chaps from the ED who have 
completely steered the reorganization. It would have 
been much better if some of us had been involved 
more in the formulation of rules and regulations, 
such as the personnel rules. We had behind us 
twenty-one years of experience but they largely
ignored us I feel strange when I remember this
now. Yes, they should have involved the concerned 
people from the appropriate sector to get this 
organization working....Otherwise we would not have 
had these problems with rules and regulations four 
years later."
A deliberate blockage of the kind mentioned above 
prevented grievances from emerging into overt conflict 
and this exercise of power by the main interacting 
players allowed them smooth interaction with the PSC. The 
presence of representatives of the NEC would have 
probably resulted in different rules and regulations. A 
mobilization of bias was invoked by the participating 
players to protect their intention of promoting the ED 
staff at a higher level. The control of agenda was 
exercised by blocking participation of potential rivals 
and this bias which guided the key players was even 
experienced by an under secretary of the Ministry of 
General Administration who was recruited as a consultant 
to advise on the staff adjustment by the management:
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"My proposal was: let us first prepare job
descriptions and then qualification requirements for 
all the professional posts and then fit in whoever 
matches this requirement. Whether he be a 
corporation or a HMG person. Let us be objective. 
But I realized that their main interest was to 
appoint specific people who were already given jobs 
and positions in the temporary arrangement. They 
tried to retain the same. It was their internal 
matter and I left very shortly after that."
Even when several staff from the NEC broke rank and 
made direct contacts with the PSC to present and protest 
their case, the outcome was not very successful because 
the PSC considered only the view-point of the management 
as rightful and valid. The staff were told that the PSC 
cannot "look into each and every complaint put up by the 
individual". The chairman of the PSC supported his 
subordinates interacting only with key representatives of 
the management:
"The approach we took was that we accepted the 
proposal submitted by the management. We considered 
the proposal sympathetically within the context of 
the General Policy."
The key participating actors seemed to be powerful people 
because they occupied top positions in the civil service 
hierarchy and they tended to fully exercise their 
authority and control in the decision-making process of 
the staff adjustment. In addition, the power relationship 
within the bureaucracy seem to be guided by a tradition 
in which the top officials were seldom formally 
challenged and their definitions of situation were 
accepted by the junior staff. For example, the decisions 
on the lateral entry and evaluation system were accepted
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by the staff even though many of them shared serious 
grievances about it. They did not initiate any formal 
protest but rather accepted "their role in the prevailing 
order of things". Furthermore, the power enjoyed by the 
senior officials can be closely related to the 
powerlessness experienced by the subordinates. For 
example, the NEC staff were unable to oppose the rules on 
the lateral entry that were decided by their superiors in 
the ministry and acceptance was the only choice.
iii. Mobilization of External Power and Covert Agreements
An important organizational change which was brought 
about by bargaining and mobilization of external power 
relation was evident in the creation of the "hydro-power 
project pool" in the MWR during the final stages of the 
staff adjustment. It should be stated that the project 
pool was not a body either recommended by the consultants 
or envisaged by the main actors from the ED/MWR who were 
closely committed to the creation of the authority. The 
cabinet of ministers agreed on the creation of a small 
unit within the MWR, that is, a regulatory body to 
safeguard the interest of the government several years 
prior to the validation of the NEA and an under secretary 
of the ED who was responsible for preparing the proposal 
for such a unit explained its objectives and pointed out 
the differences with the pool:
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"I prepared a proposal to create a small unit to 
undertake the work of the government, a similar 
recommendation was also included in the BEI report. 
Such a unit was essential because government 
regulation is necessary on matters such as tariffs, 
development policy, corporate control of the NEA, 
planning, etc. All loans for the authority come 
through the HMG because it is the guarantor for 
loans. For all these activities I was convinced that 
a special unit with eight/nine engineers was
needed......Later on at the time of the staff
adjustment, a project pool was formed but this was 
not the special unit we had proposed. The unit was 
left as it was and the pool came at a later stage. I 
say that a unit should have been kept and the pool 
is a misnomer."
There was no provision for creation of a pool during the 
validation or immediately afterwards because the minister 
of the MWR who presided over the commencement of the NEA 
was dismissive to the demands made by the engineers of 
the ED to remain with the civil service and he insisted 
that all of them should be transferred. He described the 
unit that was to be set up in the ministry and objected 
to the creation of a project pool during the staff 
adjustment:
"It is certainly true that quite a few of the
engineers were unwilling to go into the NEA. I think 
this is psychology on the part of the people in the
HMG that they want to remain and retain their
position because it is more prestigious. But this is 
really a hangover. I mean once the NEA is created 
and it is an independent authority there is the
possibility of a pension, full scale job with all 
the advantages that you normally get in the civil 
service. This was purely a prestige point which I 
don't think they should have considered. So that's 
prejudice, it is not an argument, logical argument."
"There was an idea to have a small cell in the MWR
with about ten engineers ...... I did not realize
that there were as many as forty-five engineers now 
in the pool."
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The creation of a pool was neither the intention of the 
senior management of the NEA nor were they involved in 
the planning or preparation of it. A board member of the 
NEA who recently retired from the civil service confided 
to me that he came to know of the pool only after the 
decision had been taken and he was disappointed because 
it was a move towards fragmentation as in the past and 
thus a step in a backward direction. The chief of the 
Administration Directorate regarded the creation of the 
pool as a decision against the NEA Act:
"Even the NEA Act does not allow for the creation of 
a project pool because the Act states that all the 
functions are to be taken by the NEA concerning the 
electricity industry, all functions to be handed 
over by the ED to the NEA. There was no need to keep 
a separate cadre of employees because the NEA Act 
dictates that all ED employees should go over to the 
NEA."
So how did the decision to create a project pool 
come about if it was not envisaged from within the 
authority as a solution to the problem of staff 
adjustment? After an agreement on criteria for transfer 
of personnel was reached with the PSC, the staff started 
to make assessment of individual opportunities and 
chances of securing higher levels. It was obvious to the 
staff from the ED that not all of them would be 
necessarily adjusted in higher levels and a substantial 
number of them resented the very mechanism and method of 
the lateral entry system. They complained that divisions 
and differences were created among colleagues as a result 
of the lateral entry. For example, a class two engineer
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of the ED was interpreted as level nine of the authority 
in accordance to the rules prescribed by the PSC; few of 
them were adjusted at level ten and others in eleven in 
the process of lateral entry; as a result, colleagues who 
were working in the same grade were now divided into 
three levels of hierarchy. A large group of engineers 
realized that their career in the civil service was soon 
to be terminated without being adjusted to higher grades 
in the authority. They resented the actions taken by the 
management which hindered their interests and benefits in 
a reorganization programme "enforced" by the banks. 
Although a conflict of interest prevailed, the decision 
on staff adjustment can be expressed as the choice of the 
management because they were capable of overcoming 
resistance from the dissatisfied staff who were allowed 
very little participation in negotiations and decision­
making. The only choice available to the staff was to 
seek "exit" (Hirschman, 1970) from this situation and
this is what they have done to escape the decision of the
management, to avoid an agreement in which the management 
dominated and exercised their power. Simmel (1950) 
suggests that in all power relationships the subordinate 
has some degree of power and this seem to apply in the 
case of the engineers who were able to mobilize power and 
impose a change, in the form of creation of a pool. 
Boissevain (1974) states that impetus to change is always 
present in an unequal relation between those who command 
more power and their rivals who seek more power. The
change which enabled "exit" was made possible by
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mobilization of external power sources and covert 
bargainings with influential individuals from outside the 
industry who agreed and sponsored the creation of a 
project pool. In many respects this process resembled the 
praxis adopted by HM to pursue his own appointment as the 
MD, that is, such behaviour was part of the social 
system. A senior engineer who managed to move back to the 
MWR after two years in the authority described the 
actions of the NEA management as "pressures and power to 
enforce the transfer" and he explained his response to 
such use of power:
"The project pool is the outcome of an unhealthy 
action taken by the management of the NEA in staff 
adjustment. They were possessed with over-confidence 
and they steam-rolled a policy which was not fair to 
their fellow civil servants. They tried to ignore 
the long service period we spent in the government. 
When it happened in excess, some reaction was bound 
to occur. People started running to the ministers, 
to the politicians, and to officials of the royal 
palace. The chief secretary supported the case of 
the government employees and he tried to increase 
the number of posts in the pool."
The "running around" syndrome was equivalent to lobbying 
at various sources to promote one's self-interests and a 
senior engineer confidently stated that intensive 
lobbying could make everything possible in the 
bureaucracy and, furthermore, he claimed the staff 
transfer was a case of "genuine injustice". In addition, 
the engineers of the ED were very "powerful" because of 
their established relationship within the bureaucracy and 
with politicians according to a director of NEA, himself 
an engineer:
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"The people just refused to go on and they were very 
powerful people. These senior guys have undertaken 
so many development projects and in turn done many 
favours for their bosses and ministers. They have a 
lot of influence and you think you can push them 
around. They claimed that they have a right to stay 
in the government and they were eventually taken 
back."
The social relation of these engineers can be defined as 
a "network" that is "a chain of persons with whom a 
given person is in actual contact and their 
interconnectedness" (Boissevain, op. cit.). It is from 
such a relationship that an individual can generate 
support to counter his rival and also mobilize support to 
attain his goals thereby influencing the behaviour of 
others. Boissevain states that everywhere people compete 
with each other and search for allies, friends, and 
friends-of-friends to help them achieve their goals. The 
external sources who were mobilized by these engineers 
were people in very influential positions who could 
propose or recommend on their behalf. The central player 
was the chief secretary who was in a position to 
influence and make decisions, and he was the main focal 
point of the lobbying. In addition to holding the 
position of head of the civil service, he was regarded as 
"very influential and powerful" because of his extremely 
close relationship with the royal palace. It was 
frequently rumoured that his position and opinion on an 
issue could sway a cabinet decision because he had the 
complete backing of the royal palace secretariat. Shaha 
(op. cit.) states that the palace secretariat functions 
not only as a "relay station" between the King and the
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government but "also as a policy and decision-making body 
using the central secretariat merely as an instrument of 
implementing policy decisions". Given this context of the 
bureaucracy, the chief secretary was inundated by the 
engineers as well as other sources who persuaded him to 
interfere. His involvement in the creation of the pool 
was known to many and the director-in-chief of the NEA 
who was responsible for personnel matters disclosed:
"The chief secretary played a major role in the 
creation of the pool. The MWR secretary wanted a 
small cell as originally planned but the chief 
secretary dictated a pool and he was a very powerful 
man in the government."
An under secretary of the Ministry of General 
Administration (and also a member of the recruitment 
committee of the NEA) was familiar with the chief 
secretary's interest to create a large pool because the 
decision involved changes in the structure of the civil 
service, an issue directly related to his ministry's 
responsibility:
"Since most ministries which execute developmental 
projects have some form of pool positions, the same
concept was used in this case......  The important
point is that the chief secretary was sympathetic to 
the requests of the engineers of the ED. Being a 
technical person himself and one time secretary in 
the power ministry he contributed to increasing the 
posts of the pool."
The chief secretary who retired from the civil 
service in 1988 was working in the Asian Development Bank 
in Manila during my field visit and he admitted his 
participation and stated the reasons for creating the
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project pool in our meeting. He defended the necessity of 
a pool so as to have a unit in the MWR to manage the 
water resources of the country, to execute development 
projects in partnership with neighbouring countries, and 
to allocate some of the work to the ministry because the 
NEA was overburdened with too many tasks and 
responsibilities. He supported the rights of the 
engineers to stay in the government and passionately 
argued that "the civil servants are not slaves to be 
forced to work outside of where they were initially 
appointed". Therefore, the cabinet decision to create a 
hydro-power project pool within the MWR with 135 
positions was the result of covert bargaining initiated 
by the engineers of the ED and many individuals in their 
networks, and the chief secretary was the central 
authority figure who shared and formalized their 
definition. His approval of the pool can be expressed as 
a mobilization of bias in favour of what he considered 
was appropriate, and he exerted power over the NEA by 
making a decision that contradicted with the actions 
planned by the management on the staff adjustment. A 
nondecision-making situation prevailed because the top 
management of the NEA was prevented from consultation, 
participation and planning.
The cabinet decision on the pool was changed 
subsequently because the secretary of the MWR and the MD 
expressed disagreements and the royal palace secretariat 
had to mediate to resolve the differences. The two main
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individuals representing the industry opposed such a 
decision because they did not see the necessity of 
maintaining a large pool in the ministry when all the 
activities were already transferred to the authority; 
they feared a shortage of staff in the NEA if a large 
numbers of engineers were kept in the ministry; and their 
work on the staff adjustment was undermined by the 
transfer of engineers to the MWR. They engaged on making 
compromises so as to reduce the figure rather than resist 
the establishment of the pool which was backed by 
important actors and approved by the cabinet. A joint 
secretary in the MWR recalled that the secretary and the 
MD went directly to present their points of view and 
arguments to the prime minister because this was the only 
way of stopping the execution of the decision. Two 
powerful parties were in direct conflict over a decision 
and the prime minister was unwilling to make any 
commitment in favour of any one side; he decided to refer 
this case to the royal palace because of the 
controversies and conflicts. The final decision taken by 
the royal palace secretariat approved the creation of a 
project pool with sixty-five positions. This was a 
compromise figure which took into account the interests 
of the two parties and each could claim that the other 
did not dominate in the decision.
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Summary
The achievements of the reorganization of the 
electricity industry seem to be a far cry from the 
original goal of creating a commercially-oriented, 
autonomous organization operated along the principles of 
a public utility as envisaged by the lending agencies and 
recommended by the management consultants in the planned 
changes. Contrary to this is the establishment of an 
authority which in many ways resembles the old set-up of 
the ED and the NEC and ensures continuity for the 
stakeholders, a situation in creation of new settings 
described by Sarason (1972) as "the more the things 
change the more they remain the same". This resemblance 
with the old set-up in terms of structure, control 
relationships and operation was possible because of the 
calculated and intentional choices of the key players who 
were responsible for the decision-making and 
implementation of the reorganization. They have complied 
to the funding agencies' demands and pressure for 
reorganization so as to secure developmental loans for 
the future but they have concurrently made arrangements 
to protect their role and influence in the industry as in 
the past. The process of organizational change and 
outcomes was analyzed by studying the four main changes 
introduced in the reorganization. The analysis reveals 
that organizational change can be political and 
negotiation may be the key social process in change; 
consequently, change is often a negotiated order. A
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better understanding of the change process in state-owned 
enterprises can be achieved by taking into account the 
multiplicity of stakeholders and their demands, 
expectations, conflicts and compromises that were 
negotiated. The analysis of the four changes seem to 
support my argument that a "political" interpretation of 
negotiation is essential because the process of 
negotiation and its outcome can be determined by the use 
and dynamics of power relationship, especially because 
stakeholders and individuals in negotiations need not 
share equal power. The analysis attempted to relate and 






The central focus of this study has been the 
exploration of the process of organizational change, that 
is, the processual dynamics of changing which exemplifies 
the how and why of change, in government-controlled and 
owned enterprises. A planned organizational change
programme constituting a reorganization of the
electricity industry to create a single, autonomous 
state-owned enterprise in Nepal with commercial and
profit objectives was advocated by the influential
external lending agencies. An internationally reputed 
management consultancy firm participated and designed the 
entire change programme to execute the reorganization. 
The planned changes and contents which recommended 
specific prescriptions and improvements in the new
organization/authority were altered considerably in the 
implementation and adoption phase and this "divergence" 
was studied and analyzed by an investigation into the 
process of change. A political model for understanding 
the change process in organizations has been developed in 
the last three chapters.
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This research on the process of change is directly 
related to the theoretical developments in the area of 
planned change; and although the literature on this 
subject is extensive, I was unable to derive a conceptual 
framework that would provide the basis of my 
investigation. In the early section of this thesis, I 
have argued that most of the theories were highly 
prescriptive and the majority of writers have assumed a 
rational approach to problem solving in organizations by 
initiating planned changes. A planned organizational 
change was frequently recommended in the form of 
deterministic stages and hence linear theories of process 
(Berg, 1979) were the main contributions of many of the 
theorists. This kind of an approach to change was
considered to be inadequate by a growing number of 
critics who argued that the prevalent theories of planned 
change were divorced from the actual change process. They 
stated that the contributors of the main literature on
planned change failed to say what actually happened 
during the change process and offered little guidance to 
exploring and explaining the processual element of
change. On the other hand, although there were few 
indications and suggestions of political dynamics of
change in their writings, this concept was never fully 
developed or pursued because of the aprocessual analysis 
mentioned above. In addition, their very theoretical 
assumptions largely based on system theory and humanism 
placed limitations on further inquiry on this issue. For 
example, the humanist assumptions propounded a view of
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man which saw the self moving towards actualisation, and 
willingness of people to be honest and open to change. 
The pioneering work of Bennis (1969) emphasised truth, 
love and a collaborative approach to change. Greiner 
(1986) described the interventionists as guided by "the 
romantic illusion of humanistic scholars" when they 
recommend a "bottom-up" approach to change for effective 
outcomes. Mangham (1978) states that the adoption of 
system perspective in organizational development leads to 
the view that human beings are not important but "non­
human, measurable variables assume great importance since 
it is these that constitute the bombardment (the 
bombardment of forces upon the individuals)". Similarly 
rationality in planned change underlines logic, 
consistency and determinism (Friedlander, 197 6) where the 
main intention is to discover truth through precise 
construction of concepts and knowledge.
The assumption regarding the nature of man is an 
essential component of all social theory and I have 
argued in this thesis that a political view of 
organization and change is based on a voluntaristic model 
of man where people are seen as actors capable of making 
selection, interpreting other's actions and presenting 
oneself in such a manner that he/she is able to control 
the behaviour of others. Consequently, organizational 
change may be seen as a social construction of reality 
resulting from the interactions among the key actors and 
groups. The symbolic interactionism tradition is more
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hospitable to the political interpretation of human 
behaviour because it assumes that "human beings are 
active creatures, shaping their environments and futures 
but also facing the constraints bearing on their actions" 
(Strauss, 1978).
An important consideration underlying the political 
interpretation of the change process is the view that an 
organization itself is a political system. An 
organization is seldom represented by a unitary actor or 
a monolithic group with united goals and preferences but 
can be seen as consisting of many individuals and groups 
such as coalitions, alliances, functional groups,
specialists, etc. These groups and dominant individuals 
share power and hold different goals, meanings and 
preferences on the choices faced by the organization and
they often differ on what must be done and how. This
common situation of differences among actors may be seen 
as an enduring phenomenon and hence conflict is as much 
a part of organizational life. Political dynamics usually 
stem from diversity of interests and conflicts; and
actions and performances in organization tend to be 
dominated by social processes in which choices are not 
made on the basis of rationality but by "wheeling and 
dealing" and "pulling and hauling". Mangham (1979) 
describes this as a "micro-political perspective" of 
organization because "all behaviour at all levels and in 
all circumstances may be regarded as political - the 
determinants of who gets what - and in this respect
437
organization is no more than a continuation of struggle 
in another form". A view of organizational life in 
"political-cultural terms" (Pettigrew, 1985; Ranson, 
Hennings and Greenwood, 1980; Astley and Rosen, 1983) 
accentuates the competitive tendency of actors and groups 
in organizations to create and maintain a system of 
meaning on the basis of interpretive schemes, values and 
interests; and the resolution of any kind of tension and 
differences may be the consequence of power dependencies.
A situation of organizational change as in the 
restructuring of the electricity industry was concerned 
with the multiplicity of stakeholders who were direct 
players in the planning, designing and implementation. 
Although the main operations and functions of the 
electricity industry concerning construction, generation, 
transmission and distribution of electricity were 
undertaken by the two executing bodies, the ED and the 
NEC, the process of reorganization was linked to several 
external and internal stakeholders consisting of lending 
agencies, management consultants, several government 
agencies, the parent ministry, and many
groups/individuals representing the industry itself. The 
presence of such a wide range of involvement and the 
influence wielded by the numerous stakeholders required a 
pluralist view of organizations, that is, the basis for 
analysis of an organization as a pluralist political 
system. Burrell and Morgan (1979) define the pluralist 
view of organizations as reflecting three sets of
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assumptions relating to "interests", "conflicts" and 
"power" and this framework can be used to understand the 
political dynamics among stakeholders in an 
organizational change situation. From a political 
perspective, an organization may be treated as a network 
of individuals and groups interested in its wider purpose 
as a whole only in so far as it serves their own 
individual expectations and ends. Conflict is viewed as 
an inevitable attribute of social settings and hence it 
must be institutionalised so that it can find expression. 
A plurality of powerholders endure in an organization who 
derive their influence from plurality of sources. The 
pluralist view of organization is directly opposed to the 
unitary view which has dominated much of the writings and 
research on organizations from a functionalist paradigm. 
The unitary view assumes a cooperative enterprise geared 
to the achievement of formal goals and members of an 
organization responding positively to the incentives 
provided to them. Organizational conflict is treated as 
rare and to be promptly controlled by managerial action 
whenever it surfaces. Power as an issue is largely
ignored.
The pluralist interpretation is specially applicable 
in the context of a state-owned enterprise where there is 
neither a clearly defined principal and agent
relationship nor a single responsible principal, and the 
complex, macro-level structure exercise considerable
influence and pressure upon it. The ownership belongs to
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the state and it is represented by ministers, 
legislators, civil servants, etc. who hold very different 
perceptions and expectations. The use of power to 
influence the firm's behaviour and performance is very 
much a part of the organizational process of a state- 
owned enterprise. Mazzolini (1979) states that 
organizational actions and behaviour of government- 
controlled enterprises are the product of various "games" 
among several individuals within the companies, 
government representatives and other outsiders who are in 
positions of influence. Each of the players has the power 
to move certain elements or pieces of the game in which 
he is involved but rarely all. Pfeffer (1981) argues that 
goal or value dissension is an important condition 
leading to the use of power and politics in decision­
making in public sector organizations such as government 
agencies.
The composition of the stakeholders constituted a 
complex social system which dominated and influenced the 
reorganization process. The various external 
organizations related to the electricity industry 
comprised important elements of this system and they were 
represented by a number of key senior individuals who 
occupied top positions in their respective organizations 
and were also key actors in the negotiation and decision­
making concerned with the reorganization. Allison (1971) 
describes the players in the bureaucracy as men who are 
in the job and become players by occupying a position of
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shared power. These individuals as players held separate 
responsibilities in terms of their own positions and 
there were differences in what they saw and judged to be 
important. They were responsible men with power and they 
differed about what must be done with the reorganization, 
and conflict was inevitable because of the differences in 
their definitions. For example, the lending agencies 
defined the need for the industry to be operated as a 
commercial public utility with clear profit objectives. 
The influential parent ministry argued for incorporating 
social objectives given the importance of the electricity 
sector for integrated national development, and control 
in the operation of the authority because of capital 
ownership by the government as in other state-owned 
enterprises. The senior management of the authority 
wanted more autonomy and flexibility in its operation and 
less control from the parent ministry and other 
government agencies. At the micro level, there were two 
distinct groups representing the electricity industry and 
one supported and the other opposed the issue of 
reorganization. Given these marked differences in the 
interests and definitions of the actors and the 
stakeholders who were the key players in decision-making, 
conflict/disagreement was a decisive element of the 
change process. As often repeated in the political 
perspective, responsible players are obliged and expected 
to fight for what they conceive as right and appropriate; 
differences in the actors' definitions are not 
dysfunctional but part of a political process.
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Any organizational change is adopted at the cost of 
making adjustments to the established social order. Such
an adjustment can be a serious threat in the case of a
radical planned change as in this reorganization because 
it required major structural changes and caused 
discontinuity and disruptions to much of the old social 
order. An institutional arrangement which had operated 
for more than two decades was held in place by the key 
actors and stakeholders because the order was a "balance” 
that took into account their interests. The 
reorganization and the planned changes threatened this 
old order and created a situation of uncertainty and 
instability to many individuals. An element of high risk 
was entailed in moving from a context of stable 
relationship to an unknown, new situation where a new 
order needed to be established once again. This move 
included the possibility of losses of benefits and gains 
previously enjoyed by members of the dominant group. A 
single example of fear of such a risk was the long period 
of resistance to the reorganization by the more 
influential actors from the ED. On the other hand, the 
uncertainty and discontinuity brought about by the 
planned change was exploited by a few other individuals 
who saw it as an opportunity to redress their grievances 
or to increase power, status and rewards.
In spite of the plurality of conflicting interests
of the diverse stakeholders and lack of consensus in 
their goals, the reorganization and various changes
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associated with it were implemented. The presence of 
severe differences which caused frequent conflicts and 
disagreements did not imply that there was total disorder 
or that the organization was an arena of "apocalyptic 
class conflict as projected by the Marxist" (Bacharach 
and Lawler, 1980). There were limits as well as solutions 
out of the political conflict because the key players 
were concerned that unity had to be created out of the 
diversity and that the industry should continue as an on­
going concern. Crozier (1964) presents a pluralist view 
in acknowledging conflict of interests in bureaucratic 
organizations but he also makes a very meaningful 
inference when he states that such struggle is often 
limited by the members of the organization themselves. 
McCall and Simmons (1966) state that a social 
relationship continues because working agreements are 
developed which allows the actors to get on with the 
business at hand and is characterized by the absence of 
large disagreements, rather than clear agreements. Blumer 
(1969) states that a social order is established through 
a process of joint action which involves the fitting 
together of separate lines of actions of members of 
groups in a social setting confronted by them. The actors 
will try to jointly align their acts to one another on 
the basis of establishment of common definitions of the 
situation through interpretive interaction between them. 
The negotiated order perspective further explores the 
notion of joint action and provides a richer explanation 
of the processes that contribute to a social order, that
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is, a joint action involves all the manifestation of 
bargaining to arrive at some form of order. Farberman 
(1979) points out that the key underlying theme in 
Strauss' conceptualisation of negotiated order is his 
view of "pragmatic” actors who are concerned about 
"adjustment", that is "it is the sociological process 
whereby actors come over and against each other to ensure 
their own survival and, in the process, create, maintain 
and transform the very social order which creates, 
maintains and transforms them". Actors can be seen as 
pragmatic negotiators who "define and construct the world 
around them, between them and within them".
The process of reorganization and the establishment 
of the NEA clearly exhibit that organizations are not 
harmonious, rational entities as reflected in much of the 
management literature on planned change. Instead the 
change was adopted by a process of interaction among the 
stakeholders which can be characterized as a complex 
process of bargaining, negotiation and making compromises 
to arrive at stable working agreements. The final 
decisions and choices were results of negotiations rather 
than adoption of the planned changes which were 
recommended with the objective of creating an efficient 
public utility, i.e. a value maximizing choice guided by 
rationalistic considerations. Negotiation seemed to be an 
intrinsic political process that enabled the key players 
to come to terms with each other's actions and 
definitions of situation, make compromises and
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concessions, and implement the changes in the end. The 
players accomplished the "macro" goal of implementing the 
reorganization as preferred by the lending agencies but 
also managed to achieve their own interests in 
association with each other at the same time. The key 
players sought to protect their preferences which were 
not accounted for or threatened by the consultant's 
recommendations. The joint actions between the players 
consisted of negotiations for working out compromises so 
that their respective definitions of situation were 
implemented and some kind of a balance between losses and 
gains was reached. For example, the lending agencies 
persuaded the borrower to create a single utility if the 
industry was to receive a continual supply of loan in the 
future; the MWR still retained its control and influence 
over the industry and was supported by other related 
governmental agencies; and the internal actors managed to 
retain the old working arrangements in the NEA and 
secured higher positions and promotions. The lending 
agencies were satisfied with the establishment of a 
single authority because loan negotiation, disbursement 
and repayment would be considerably less cumbersome and 
easier than before. The players representing the industry 
were keen to preserve the features and relationship of 
the old set-up. All these changes have been established 
through negotiations. It was only several years after the 
inception of the NEA that the lending agencies have 
realized that the original goal of creating an 
autonomous, profit-generating public utility has not been
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achieved in spite of the establishment of a single 
authority. They have again embarked on an introduction of 
a new planned change classified as the "twinning 
programme" with the French government and financed by the 
World Bank. Once again a cycle of negotiation was being 
initiated in the NEA which can be expected to have direct 
impact on the prevailing order. Further negotiations and 
changes are very likely as players come together to 
define the new situation and make claims that defend 
their interests and goals. The new cycle of planned 
change supports Strauss' argument that a negotiated order 
and change has a temporal nature as it lacks permanence.
The many proponents of the negotiated order theory 
have been chiefly interested in exploring the 
establishment of a social order at a particular point in 
time but Strauss and his co-researchers (1963) were also 
concerned with the question "how can there be order under 
conditions of change and how can change be made more 
orderly?". I have stated that the main contribution of 
this perspective is that it identifies negotiation as a 
key social process which may be applied to interpret the 
politics of change - organizational politics is 
equivalent to negotiation and change is a negotiated 
order. Negotiation is applicable to a situation of 
organizational change in government-owned enterprises 
because the kind of things that are "problematic" seem to 
prevail and dominate. For example, stakeholders hold 
conflicting goals, objectives of government enterprises
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are seldom very clear and usually very contradictory, 
stakeholders and many individuals have the power to 
define priorities and goals, formal rules do not exist or 
require interpretation, situations are new and ambiguous, 
and conflicts, multiple definitions and interests are 
common. In short, an organizational change situation is 
characterized by many competing stakeholders, groups and 
individuals acting to control and improve their social 
conditions and people go about resolving these problems, 
differences, and ambiguities by negotiation process. 
Thus, change and social order can be established by 
negotiations.
The important contribution of Strauss1 analytical 
paradigm is that it highlights the principal features of 
each case of negotiation and identifies those issues that 
must be incorporated into research. Farberman (op. cit.) 
states that the paradigm sensitizes the investigator to 
the various components and properties of negotiations and 
compliments Strauss for developing a generic paradigm 
which, in principle, has universal application to 
negotiations at all magnitudes of scale, complexity and 
duration. The paradigm was used in my retrospective study 
of the reorganization to identify those areas that were 
problematic and the contents and linkages between the 
structural and negotiation contexts. Many of the findings 
from my analysis corresponds with the key points of this 
paradigm: the embedded structure in the environment
reflected a dialectical relationship between negotiation
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and such structure; interorganizational relationship was 
instituted and maintained through negotiations; 
organizations adjusted to changes in the environment by 
negotiations; and historical processes had direct bearing 
on the negotiations. At the negotiation context level, 
explicit attention was paid to the identification of key 
players and their stakes in the change, the power 
relationship between them, the options available to them, 
the nature of the issues, etc. Much of the early research 
work on the negotiated order has converged in exploring 
micro interactions within organizations at the individual 
actor level but I have argued that negotiation process 
may be evenly applicable in interpreting the interactions 
at the macro level where interorganizational relationship 
is formed and held in place, such as between the 
international lending agencies and the electricity 
industry, and between the several governmental ministries 
and departments and the authority.
The stakeholders were a heterogeneous group of 
actors and players embedded in a social relationship and 
all players in such social relationship share and use 
power. The use of power can be defined as inherent in 
negotiations of changes because actors are eager to 
minimize and avoid uncertainty and risk and hence try to 
bring into effect their definitions and promote self- 
interests. However, a common fact of social life is that 
the power relationship is rarely equal and players may 
exercise varying degree of power to control each other's
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behaviour, choices and decisions. In the event, the 
understanding of the negotiation process is essentially a 
matter of studying the distribution and use of power. The 
negotiated order perspective has made significant 
contribution to the interpretation of the process of 
establishment of social order and change by classifying 
the "problematic" elements in organization and treating 
negotiation as the principal activity in joint action; 
but it still seems to fall short of presenting an
adequate exploratory mechanism through which the process 
of negotiation and its outcomes can be understood. The 
analytical paradigm is useful to locate negotiation, 
actors and the various contextual factors but there still 
remains the problem of explaining how and why an
individual or group was effective, how and why 
participation was allowed or disallowed, how a change 
outcome finally came about, how definitions are formed 
and shaped by actors in negotiation, whose definitions
prevailed and why, etc. My line of argument is that the 
incorporation of power relationship can allow an accurate 
processual interpretation through which negotiation
outcomes are understood. This task has not been
undertaken in the development of the negotiated order 
although several prominent writers from the symbolic 
interactionism tradition have raised the issue. Hall 
(1972) states that the negotiated order perspective like 
interactionism can only analyze the process of
interaction but does not account for the power brought
into a situation by actors; the mechanism of power can
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explain the "how" of negotiation and power helps people 
organize interactions (Hall, 1987). Farberman (op. cit.) 
presents a positive review of Strauss' paradigm but he 
also points out a "major omission" in the 
conceptualisation of the negotiated order - "Strauss' 
unwillingness to assume a priori that power, in many 
guises and disguises necessarily enters into and 
influences the course of particular negotiations". Power 
should be related to negotiations and Farberman uses an 
interesting sailing analogy to develop his point:
"A navigator always feels and sees directly the
force of the wind and the action of the waves - and 
steers accordingly. Yet, over the l o n g  run, one of 
the m o s t  influential forces which affects the boat
heading is usually unseen and unfelt, and that
force, which is both massive and subtle, is - the 
current. It is difficult to observe and note
precisely because the very medium in which the boat 
is moving is itself in motion and the larger 
encompassing motion i s  the current."
Similarly negotiations may be affected by the force of 
the "massive and subtle deeper lying currents of power" 
and thus all organizational analysis should demonstrate 
the affect of power. Mangham (1979) makes a very clear 
statement on the affect of power in negotiation:
".....power is exercised and no matter by whom, it
is an important determinant of the negotiated order; 
if we know the nature and disposition of the power 
in an organization we are well on the way to knowing 
whose definition of situation will prevail. Power is 
the common currency of all negotiation and, the 
basis of all social and organizational behaviour."
A further development of the negotiated order 
perspective was undertaken in this thesis by integrating
450
power mechanism into the analysis of negotiation, that 
is, explication of negotiated interactions and outcomes 
as dependent on the relative use of power by the players. 
The analysis attempted to develop the concept of power 
which seems to be only marginally referred to by the 
several protagonists of the negotiated order without any 
elaboration on its relationship to the negotiation 
process. My data on the reorganization of the electricity 
industry revealed that the currency of power can explain 
the components, occurrences and outcomes of negotiations 
between the numerous stakeholders. The power relationship 
determined the key players, participatioh and access, 
successes and failures, choices and preferences, meanings 
and definitions, etc.; hence an analysis of power was 
fundamental to an understanding of negotiated orders.
If power can be of such crucial importance in 
negotiations, it has to be defined or conceptualized 
before a proper analysis can be undertaken. The existing 
literature on power relationship in organizations 
provided some guidance but also posed limitations. First 
of all, the literature is very undeveloped when it comes 
to analysing the relationship between change, negotiation 
and power though I should mention that a few insightful 
writings have appeared in the area of politics of change 
(referred to earlier in this thesis); but power mechanism 
in negotiation is still a largely unknown and unexplored 
area. The study of use of power in organizations has been 
largely confined to the pluralist view - analysis of
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power is undertaken by an exposition of the successful 
possession and control of scarce resources. The 
frequently addressed power resources in the literature 
include the control of information, access to political 
areas, expertise, control of technology, control of 
rewards and punishment, ability to cope with uncertainty, 
structural positions in organizational hierarchy, etc. 
Following these examples, an inquiry into power 
relationship in negotiation could be initiated by an 
investigation into the successful mobilization of 
resources to prevail in overt conflict in situations of 
decision-making. Although such an analysis may generate 
valuable data on the use of power, the main disadvantage 
would be the confinement of power relationship to a 
single definition and forsaking the other views for the 
sake of "simplicity” of the pluralist view. Since the 
main objective of my analysis was to locate the various 
mechanisms of power in negotiation in addition to the 
pluralist definition, a single view of power was 
carefully avoided. I pursued the argument that power can 
be used in situations other than in overt conflict 
between opponents such as in circumstances of covert 
conflict or even to ensure that conflict does not occur. 
Each of these dimensions of power has been accounted for 
in Lukes' (1974) conceptualization of power and it was 
adopted for my analysis.
To recapitulate Lukes' scheme very briefly, the one­
dimensional view of power is in the form of dominance in
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the decision-making situation by control of resources; 
the two-dimensional view of power may be more covert by 
control of inclusion or exclusion of issues and actors
from the decision-making arena; and lastly, the three-
dimensional view of power is executed with consent and 
acceptance of the other (and without conflict) by 
controlling the creation of meaning and awareness. It is 
important to mention that Lukes did not interpret his
three-dimensional view as a replacement for the first two 
views; rather each represents a partial view of power and 
by itself is inadequate to capture the complete picture 
of the mechanism of power. A gradual development has 
taken place in these three views of power with the 
authors getting involved in evaluation and criticism of 
constructs and ideas proposed by their predecessors. The 
early ideas and writings of pluralists such as Polsby and 
Dahl were reviewed and evaluated by Bachrach and Baratz 
and they were subsequently able to present their own "two 
faces of power", in which resources became less of an
issue but control over access and agendas to decision­
making was the key to power. Lukes’ disagreement with 
Bachrach and Baratz's view of power was based on his 
argument that power can be exercised in the total absence 
of conflict and grievance by controlling the awareness of 
people and he presented his own three-dimensional view of 
power. In fact, Lukes (op. cit.) traces the deep 
historical roots of the various concepts of power and he 
acknowledges the contributions made by the others:
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"My argument will be that the pluralists' view was 
indeed inadequate for the reasons Bachrach and 
Baratz advance, and that their view gets further, 
but that in turn does not get far enough and is in 
need of radical toughening. My strategy will be to 
sketch three conceptual maps, which will, I hope 
reveal the distinguishing features of these three
views of power....... I shall then discuss the
respective strengths and weaknesses of these three 
views..."
The three views put together present a more comprehensive 
framework for analysis of power and therefore the 
appositeness of Lukes' concept for my analysis.
The conceptual analysis of power developed by Lukes 
has been applied by very few writers in studies of power 
in organizations; I have attempted to relate it 
specifically to negotiations of organizational changes in 
this study. Although as a general rule there are inherent 
difficulties in studying the use of power in 
organizations, the identification and analysis of the 
three views of power in negotiations presented a real 
challenge. However, I supported the advantages of 
adopting Lukes' conceptual framework because it was 
"empirically applicable" and the wider meanings attached 
to the concept of power made it appropriate for exploring 
the power relationship in a new context. This framework 
allowed me to identify and establish the instances of use 
of power of the pluralist nature as covered in much of 
the organization literature and build onto it the more 
sophisticated and subtle mechanisms of power of the two 
and three-dimensional views which are exercised in 
situations of covert conflict or even in the absence of
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any conflict. The result of this investigation has 
attempted to present a rich account of the dynamics of 
power relationship in negotiation which has not been 
undertaken so far.
The power mechanism of the one-dimensional view is 
comfortably studied in the negotiation process of the 
organizational change situation because instances of 
overt conflict concerning a decision or a choice between 
the many actors are almost inevitable. Even more so in 
the case of an organizational change in a state-owned 
enterprise where there is the presence of external and 
internal stakeholders who share and hold very different 
views on appropriate actions and choices. The study of 
overt conflict itself will enable the analyst to identify 
the stakeholders and the key actors and the interests and 
definitions held by each of the parties. The 
"problematic” related to the process of joint action in 
change can be considered in the ensuing negotiations and 
resolutions to the differences and conflicts among the 
actors may depend largely on the use of power resources. 
The players who possess and can mobilize power resources 
may try to prevail in negotiation as well as in the 
decision-making. Such a concept of power has been 
characteristic of many of the organizational theorists 
and I briefly refer to only a few of them. Pfeffer and 
Salanick's (1974) analysis of decision-making in a 
university concluded with the relevance of power in 
decisions on resource allocation. Pettigrew (1986) states
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that the most common view of power "is grounded in the 
differential access to material and structural resources" 
and those who successfully possess and control scarce 
resources can be more powerful in organizations in the 
face of competition and conflict. He refers to others who 
have used such a view of power - for example, Mechanic 
(1962); Hickson and others (1971); Pfeffer (1981); 
Pettigrew (1972, 1973); Hardy and Pettigrew (1985). Brown
(1986) makes a similar conclusion about organizational 
researchers being concerned with influence in explicit 
conflicts through use of political resources:
"Some investigators have focused on p e r s o n a l  
influence, such as social attributes that confer 
power (French and Raven, 1959) or strategies and 
tactics for interpersonal influence (Hotter and 
Schlesinger, 1979; Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson, 
1980). Others have emphasized the power conferred by 
organizational p o s i t i o n s ,  such as location for
solving critical problems (Hickson and other, 1971; 
Pfeffer, 1981b); access to resources, support, and 
alliances (Kanter, 1979); or structural positions in 
organizational hierarchies, resource pools, or
central activities (Astley and Sachdeva, 1984)."
This overt and apparent one-dimensional view of 
power relationship was studied in the reorganization of 
the electricity industry by an examination of successful 
mobilization of power resources to influence negotiations 
in a conflict situation. A primary example of such 
exercise of power was the resource dependency exchange 
relationship between the lending agencies and the
borrower which conferred on the former considerable 
control over the course of negotiation of loans, on 
issues related to the reorganization, and the final
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decision to create a single authority. The lending
agencies were in a position to exercise power because 
they controlled the vital capital resources needed by the 
industry. Although all the choices and decisions were 
stated to be made through a process of "open" 
negotiations between the lending agencies and the 
borrower in which mutual exchanges and considerations
were taken into account/ the banks exercised power when 
it came to issues related to their interests, and
particularly when the borrower started to resist and 
challenge the creation of a single, commercial authority 
which was the main interest of the banks. The covenants 
and conditions related to the reorganization were 
included in the loan agreements through negotiations and 
the banks seemed to be able to impose their definitions 
in the form of working agreements in spite of the
resistance mainly because the dependent borrower was not 
in a position to reject the control exercised by the two 
main suppliers of financial resources. The relationship 
between the banks as the influential structural context 
and the industry was maintained by interorganizational 
negotiations (Strauss, 1982) and the outcome of these 
interactions can be explained in terms of the advantages 
of the power relationship in favour of the banks.
The power originating from control of financial 
resources was similarly utilized by the MWR when the key 
players from the ministry negotiated the design of 
legislation including the composition of the board of the
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authority. The civil servants from the ministry claimed 
that they were the rightful owner of the capital supplied 
by the banks and other donors because this was a 
developmental loan given to the government of Nepal at 
very concessionary rate, and not to an autonomous 
industry with commercial objectives. Since the ministry 
was responsible for its repayment and security, its 
control over the electricity authority that was to make 
use of such a loan was justified as well. They claimed 
that ownership of capital and control of operations went 
hand-in-hand and hence they were able to define the 
provisions of the legislation of the authority in which 
control was formalized and legalized. The power from 
financial control by the parent ministry was the basis 
for recurrent interferences in the administration and 
operations of the authority and dominance in all 
interactions and decision-making.
There were other examples of control of resources 
and the exercise of power in the negotiations of 
organizational changes. Most of the
bargaining/negotiation and decision-making were conducted 
at the senior management level with very little 
participation of the lower level staff. The dominance of 
the senior staff was the result of their positions in the 
organizational hierarchy, that is, power conferred by 
positions. In the case of the NEC and ED and later the 
NEA, the organizational structures were vertically 
differentiated into elaborate tiers of hierarchy. An
458
individual's importance and influence was largely 
dependent on his position in this structure, and status, 
authority and responsibility increased as one moved into 
higher levels. For the middle and junior level staff, 
personal influence was the main resource to protect self- 
interest in negotiations. Personal influence in terms of 
access to political arenas and support from actors in 
senior and authority positions was always an effective 
power resource in the context of Nepal where the process 
of negotiation and decision-making could be "favoured” to 
suit the "resourceful" personalities.
The possession and control of information concerning 
the contents and processes of the reorganization was a 
significant power resource monopolized by a few actors 
from the ED and MWR and repeatedly used in negotiations 
of changes. The power from the control of information and 
its effect on performance was a point noted by Goffman 
(1959) :
"A basic problem for many performances, then, is 
that of information control; the audience must not 
acquire destructive information about the situation 
that is being defined for them. In other words, a 
team must be able to keep its secrets and have its 
secrets kept."
The maintenance of secrecy of information was a strategy 
followed by the key actors and, consequently, they were 
able to control the events and interactions in the 
reorganization and keep opposition to the minimum. They 
were able to hide their true intentions and secret
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agendas from the rest until it was safe enough to let the 
others know. The group/player that held the most accurate 
information was able to control the negotiations. Hall 
(1972) states that control of information and control 
over its use allows insulation, independence, and 
flexibility on the part of the possessor:
"Possession (of information) gives rise to control 
either because others are kept in the dark about the 
dangerous disconfirming, discrepant information 
because they have limited access to the 
communication channels or because the actions of 
others can be anticipated and therefore controlled."
The pluralist view of power as used in the preceding 
analysis presents very useful examples and insights into 
power mechanism but one needs to take into account the 
fact that power relationship in negotiations can run 
considerably deeper than that observed in overt conflict 
and decision-making situations. Hardy and Pettigrew 
(1985) affirm that the analysis of power cannot and 
should not be restricted to situations of overt conflict 
- that is to circumstances where power resources are used 
to produce preferred outcomes in the face of conflict 
between declared and active opponents. Similarly in his 
study of power in the Appalachian Valley, Gaventa (1980) 
reestablishes that those studies which apply only the 
pluralists' assumptions will neither discover the hidden 
faces of power, nor understand how they serve to maintain 
the inequalities as observed by him. Power may be 
exercised by exclusion of participants and issues 
altogether from negotiations. Such "nondecision-making"
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in negotiations can be done by allowing access to non- 
controversial actors or issues so that grievances do not 
develop; or by creating barriers to potential conflicts. 
There may be several individuals and groups in change 
situations who can initiate attempts to protect and 
impose their interests by mobilization of bias in the 
negotiation process. Obviously the exercise of such power 
is comparatively more difficult to identify and research 
than the pluralist model of power. Furthermore, the 
literature on power reveals that very little analysis has 
been undertaken on how organizational
subunits/groups/individuals gain access to decision­
making or how decision agendas are controlled, or what 
biases shape the "nondecisions" in organizations.
The power mechanism of the two-dimensional view was 
evident in the reorganization of the electricity industry 
and my analysis indicates how this covert and subtle 
power relationship was used by the key actors in the 
negotiations. The power was apparent and repeatedly used 
in both "macro" and "micro" negotiations, that is, 
between institutions as stakeholders and among 
organizational members of the industry respectively. For 
example, the ADB negotiated "out" the idea of a two-body 
institutional arrangement when proposed by the 
representatives of the borrower and the organizational 
studies by the management consultants were conducted to 
strengthen the bank's position on the reorganization and 
to suffocate opposition and possible conflict. Similarly,
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the dominant key players of the ED/MWR who worked out the 
main contents and implementation of the reorganization 
including the legislation, organization structure and 
staff adjustment, controlled access of the management 
consultants who designed the reorganization programme and 
other actors from the industry. All access to negotiation 
was controlled on the basis of interest, commitment and 
urgency of an issue to the key actors and access was 
prevented whenever a potential threat to their 
definitions was anticipated and experienced. Hence the 
control on inclusion of participants in interactions 
varied from issue to issue. For example, the legislation 
was a very sensitive document which spelled out the 
goals, objectives and future direction of the authority 
and its relationship with the MWR. Negotiations were 
conducted at the highest level with participation of only 
few senior actors from the MWR and ED who shared a common 
vision and perception concerning the preservation of 
influence and control of the ministry, i.e. a 
historically shaped mobilization of bias to retain an 
instilled practice. On the other hand, the details of the 
organization structure was not a major concern to the 
ministry but was specially important to the managers of 
the industry. All the senior managers from the ED and NEC 
were allowed participation in the negotiations of this 
issue that was of personal interest to all of them. The 
staff adjustment was dominated by the secretary of the 
MWR, managing director and secretary of the PSC, but 
access to the NEC was controlled because the key players
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shared a hidden agenda - to "compensate" the government 
staff which was biased in favour of the civil servants. 
Finally/ the cabinet decision on the project pool was 
instigated by the chief secretary of the government with 
covert agreements with external authorities and 
individuals but the negotiations did not include the 
involvement of any actors from the MWR or the management 
of the authority who opposed the creation of such a pool.
There are relatively even fewer empirical studies on 
the three-dimensional view of power in organizational 
settings although a growing number of writers have 
acknowledged agreement with such a concept of power. One 
of the probable reasons may be the practical difficulty 
associated with undertaking research - for instance, 
Lukes admits that it is very difficult to identify the 
occasions when such power is used. Brown (op. cit.) 
states that very little attention has been paid to this 
view of power because of political, methodological and 
organizational reasons - the political economy of 
organizational research discourages investigations of a 
phenomenon that managers prefer not to disclose; 
"unobtrusive" power relations are largely invisible to 
methods that do not permit "richly textured analysis of 
complex situations"; and lastly, organizations being very 
tightly "organized" can obscure the subtle dimensions of 
power. However, the state of the empirical research 
should not in any way undermine the utility of the three- 
dimensional view. Its important contribution is that by
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interpreting power as the ability to shape and form 
other's definitions of situation, it is consistent with 
the ideas developed in symbolic interactionism. Power can 
be exercised through social construction of meaning and 
by making people accept their role in the existing order 
of things where domination may be perceived as legitimate 
and not challenged. Since the negotiated order 
perspective presupposes that people as actors will hold 
different definitions, it can be expected that an actor 
who is capable of shaping other's perception on issues 
and events, that is, definition of situation, can 
dominate and influence the ensuing negotiations and 
social interactions. In this sense, this view of power 
has special significance for analyzing the outcomes of 
interactions by exploring how and why a definition has 
prevailed. An equally pertinent argument is that the 
successful use of this power can also set limits to 
negotiations because an acceptance of a meaning imposed 
by the other can bring about an end to a bargaining 
process or actors may not even be seen participating in 
negotiations where situations of complete consensus or 
quiescence already exists. The process of negotiation is 
usually associated with conditions of conflicts, 
differences and choices and therefore the 
juxtapositioning of negotiation and quiescence may appear 
to be paradoxical. However, the state of quiescence can 
be enforced by the exercise of power (Gaventa, op. cit.) 
and this underpins my argument that the outcomes of a
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negotiation and its presence or absence may be dependent 
on the power relationships in the social setting.
An example of exercise of power by creation of a 
meaning that was received by other people because they 
accepted their role in the existing order of things was 
evident in the predominant role played by the actors 
representing the MWR. They were in agreement that a 
control relationship should prevail again between the 
ministry and the industry in the context of the creation 
of a new authority. These actors jointly adhered to a 
social meaning which had dominated the relationship 
between the MWR and the electricity industry over the 
past twenty years and the majority of staff working in 
various autonomous bodies within the industry accepted 
their role in it. This was the legitimate way of 
organizing the relationship because the practice was 
established over a long period of time and it also 
confirmed with the general nature of linkage between 
other state-owned enterprises and their parent 
ministries. Moreover, the support from the Ministry of 
Law and Justice supplemented the legitimacy of the 
meaning postulated by the actors from the MWR. The 
negotiations on the composition of the board, the 
organization structure, and to some extent the staff 
adjustment were guided by the dominant values, ways and 
culture of the industry, that is, the argument that "this 
is the way things have been done and this is the way 
things should be done". The key actors wanted the culture
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and meanings associated with it to continue even after 
the changes brought about by the reorganization. For 
example, the composition of the board should represent 
all the key ministries and the majority should be held by 
the civil servants as in the NEC and other state-owned 
enterprise; organization structure should retain elements 
of the old arrangement as in the NEC and ED; and civil 
servants need to be favoured in staff adjustment. 
Although this last decision was confronted with some 
degree of grievance by the people from the NEC, the key 
actors from the ministry were able to execute their 
definitions and rules on staff adjustment. This kind of 
dominance in power relationship by actors from the 
ministry relates to Brown's (op. cit.) description of the 
formation of an "influence paradigm" in organizations 
from established practices which determines who has 
power, how it should be exercised and what limits there 
are. This paradigm provides a shared context among the 
organizational members which can determine the subgroup 
awareness by creation of values, beliefs and culture. The 
influence paradigm compels and legitimatizes power 
distribution and its use in organizations.
The role played by the royal palace in the
reorganization, even though it was a body formally
outside the framework of the government needs to be 
appreciated as an exercise of power. The palace has
historically exercised control over the bureaucracy to 
the extent that virtually all major decisions are taken
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by or with the full personal knowledge of the king and 
the palace secretariat. Beenhakker (1973) elaborates upon 
the power of the royal palace in Nepal:
"During the past decade, the Crown has become the 
pivot around which the traditional interest groups, 
the sacred elite, the military, and the landowning 
aristocracy still revolves. These groups gain access 
to the royal palace through their supporters and 
representatives on the staff of the palace
secretariat The palace secretariat has become
the nerve-centre of administrative and political 
structures in Nepal, even though its dominant policy 
and decision-making role is not defined via the law
or within the constitution of the country..... The
palace secretariat today functions not only as a 
relay station between the king and the government 
but also acts as a decision-making component, 
frequently using the central government's 
secretariat as an instrument for the implementation 
of decisions. This situation has led to a 'dual 
government structure'."
Blaikie, Cameron and Seddon (1980) agree with
Beenhakker's analysis in their research on economic
development of western Nepal and they state that the 
overwhelming power of the palace secretariat not only 
limit the independence of the government and dominate the 
running of the central government but all ministers are 
directly nominated by the king from among the members of 
the national assembly and retain their positions only so 
long as they retain the confidence and approval of the
king. In his recent research on poverty in Nepal, Seddon
(1987) concludes that the role of the palace secretariat 
remains of major importance even a decade since 
Beenhakker's study and after several political reforms 
allowed by the king; and he states:
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"What becomes official policy is strongly 
conditioned by the views emanating from the Palace, 
for the king remains the head of state in practice 
as well as in theory as has very considerable 
influence on the direction and character of the 
government policy."
The palace remains a salient, overpowering force and 
its influence within the civil service is concentrated at 
the top among those bureaucrats who compete and manage to 
reserve it's favour. As a consequence, the role and 
performance of the senior bureaucrats is determined by 
the interests of their sponsors in the palace. The civil 
service bureaucracy including the state-owned enterprises 
is operated on a principle of patronage on a massive 
scale and the "level of opposition remains for the time 
being relatively low" (Blaikie, Cameron and Seddon, op. 
cit.). Pandey (1983), a senior civil servant who resigned 
from the job of secretary of Finance in 1981, describes 
the senior bureaucrats as "elites" whose interests match 
with those of the ruling class and both of them want to 
retain the old ways of life and political influence. The 
elites and their patrons are keen to preserve their 
traditional role and status system while receiving the 
material benefits that flow from the attempts at economic 
development.
The dominance of the palace was conspicuous in the 
reorganization as it intervened in the negotiations 
concerning the selection of the managing director and the 
creation of the project pool; in addition, all other 
major decisions on the reorganization were referred to it
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for approval. The decisions of the palace were results 
of "bhansoon", a Nepalese institutional practice which is 
similar to but probably more potent than the universal 
act of pressure groups lobbying. This practice is 
analogous to the tradition of "source and force" and 
Abueva (1975) states that the entire civil service in 
Nepal functioned under this system:
"'Source': having a contact (friend or relative) who 
had the power to do what you wanted him to do. 
Source was rarely considered in isolation. It was 
taken for granted that one's competitors also had 
sources. Therefore, one must discuss the r e l a t i v e  
p o w e r  of one's source: source and force. The
ultimate belief was that every rule, every law and 
every structure could be bent to one's purpose if an 
adequate 'source' were at hand. As individuals, 
Nepalis tended to believe this without question, 
regardless of their place of employment, because 
they saw that it worked."
In this respect, there was a good deal of covert 
bargaining and negotiation between the members of the 
palace secretariat and civil servants because of the 
significance and effectiveness of informal communication 
and personalized interaction to secure one's interest in 
Nepal. The senior civil servants as elites and supported 
by the palace took into account the interests of their 
patrons/masters and this relationship was crucial for 
their dominance in the electricity industry and their 
power and performance in the management and negotiations 
of the reorganization. The final decision of the palace 
worded as "By the command of HM the King" was the result 
(Allison, op. cit.) of covert negotiations and such a 
decision once made public was universally accepted in the
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civil service because it fell within the traditional ways 
and values; that is, a culture of the Nepalese people 
which has been strengthened over many years. A definition 
assigned by the palace was readily received because of
several reasons stated by Lukes: "...that they accept
their role in the existing order of things, either 
because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or 
because they value it as divinely ordained and 
beneficial". The staff in the civil service have been 
socialized into a culture in which the actions and 
decisions of the palace are looked upon as the legitimate
choices and ways of doing things, and this kind of
domination was not challenged. The exercise of power has 
taken place through thought control and was accepted by 
the civil service as a result of a socialisation process 
(Lukes, op. cit.); hence domination was assimilated into 
the culture of the social system. Fine (1984) states that 
the analysis of negotiation should pay more attention to 
the specific contents of negotiations and address the 
cultural components embedded in it more directly.
In summary, the contribution of this thesis is a 
political interpretation of the process of organizational 
change. The pluralist nature of organizations especially 
in the creation of a new state-owned enterprise by merger 
of old settings and the intrinsic features of a political 
model such as the multiplicity of stakeholders and 
actors, corresponding interests and definitions, 
conflicts, etc. have been included in explaining the
470
process of change. Change may be seen as created out of 
interactions between actors and negotiation can be 
identified as the key political process in change. The 
negotiated order theory and particularly Strauss'
paradigm identifies the importance of structural and 
negotiation contexts and draws attention to a list of 
variables for an analysis of a negotiated order but I 
have argued that it can still be inadequate for 
explaining and understanding the processes and outcomes 
of negotiations. The inclusion of power mechanism in
negotiation can overcome this limitation and also
provides solution to a problem area that has been 
referred to by several theorists. The two contributions 
of this analysis are: first, it presents an empirical
study that highlights how the use of power may determine 
the process, content and outcome of negotiations in 
organizational change; second, the power relationship in 
negotiation viewed in multiple dimensions can present a 
rich and comprehensive picture of the power dynamics in 
organizations.
Implications for Further Research
The writers on planned change and organizational
development have churned out a vast collection of
literature over the past three decades but the majority 
of contributors seem to have taken an aprocessual and
apolitical view of organizational change. Even where and
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when the subject of politics has been indicated in their 
analysis, the issue is undervalued or only briefly 
referred to. On the other hand, the writers on power have 
often neglected the implications for managerial behaviour 
and change. This research on the process of planned 
organizational change has concluded that change can be 
seen as a political process where plurality of 
stakeholders and players interact, and negotiation may be 
interpreted as the key social process of decision-making 
and choice. Power is the currency which can determine the 
process and outcome of all interactions including 
negotiation. Future research on organizational change 
should adopt a political framework and pay more attention 
to negotiation and power processes. This can enhance our 
understanding of the politics of change and contribute to 
the development of the negotiated order theory.
A political analysis of organizational change can be 
emphasised and recommended for further research in state- 
owned enterprises. As a matter of fact, there are very 
few research studies that have taken up the subject of 
organizational change in state-owned enterprises and the 
existing literature mainly deals with contributions made 
by the enterprises in terms of macro economic objectives 
of the state, or criticism on the shortcomings of 
enterprise performance, or contribution of government 
intervention to political battle of the state. For this 
reason Vernon (1981) states that state-owned enterprises 
require "a depth of analysis and understanding comparable
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to that which scholarship has achieved for the large 
private enterprise”. The political model of change may be 
applicable to analysis of organizational change in state- 
owned enterprises given the "political" nature of these 
enterprises in both industrialised countries of the west 
and in underdeveloped nations. Vernon (op. cit.) reviews 
the publications on state-owned enterprises from the 
developed west and states that the behaviour of these 
enterprises is affected by a bureaucracy with values and 
objectives distinguishable from those of the public 
enterprises at large and that they are the target of a 
complex set of pressures emanating from government 
offices and interest groups. Suarez (1985) characterizes 
government enterprises in underdeveloped countries as 
existing in an intricate network system of interlinkages 
and their behaviour and performance being constantly 
influenced by external units which are able to define 
goals and objectives in time. Somasundaram (1985) 
accentuates the influence of "interlinkages" on state- 
owned enterprises in developing countries and he 
classifies them as stakeholders who "squash" and assert 
their goal-setting rights and formal and informal powers. 
He portrays a state-owned enterprise as a complex set of 
interrelated processes reflecting a reality consisting of 
"interplay of operating and emerging power groups and 
elites, the balance of local, provincial and regional 
weights and different forces and powers". The political 
nature of all state-owned enterprises implies that the 
process of change can be accurately captured by an
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analytical framework in which negotiations and power 
mechanism among stakeholders are recognized as key social 
processes.
Sarason (1972) states that the creation of new 
settings generally confirms that the more things change 
the more they remain the same and hence there is 
something wrong in how countless new settings have been 
conceived to deal with problems of the old set-up. Berg 
(op. cit.) uses the terminology "paradox of change" to 
explain a similar phenomenon when the outcome of a well- 
planned change programme in a Swedish company turned out 
to be quite contrary to what was intended, and even 
resulted in opposite effects at times, in spite of the 
fact that the quality of the change activities was high 
(in terms of the preparation, performance, follow-up, 
etc.), involved professional consultants, and was 
supported and promoted by the president of the company. 
These experiences and failures in attempts at 
organizational changes and the non-achievement of planned 
consequences compare with the scenario of the 
reorganization of the electricity industry in Nepal. A 
political analysis (as undertaken here) can explore and 
unfold the processes of change, and present various 
explications to outcomes and the paradox of change.
This research concentrated on a major planned 
organizational change that was impelled by the powerful 
lending agencies on an industry reluctant to make the
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adoption to the new arrangement. The politics in change 
originated largely in the negotiations between the 
lending agencies and the electricity industry and in the 
interactions among the other stakeholders who attempted 
to make deals and compromises so as to remodel the 
planned changes to suit their own definitions and 
expectations. The profusion of political negotiations 
throughout the process of planned change can be 
attributed to the fact that this was a radical change 
imposed by an external structure on an industry that was 
desperately dependent on it for financial resources but 
also favoured sticking to the old institutional 
arrangement. One could anticipate that the nature of 
political and power dynamics may be different in a major 
planned change programme initiated and supported by the 
management team of the industry. Although negotiations 
may still be the key social process in such a change 
initiative, the differences in the power dynamics and 
relationship as compared to a situation of change imposed 
by external stakeholders is an area of future 
investigation.
The strength of Lukes’ analytical scheme is that it 
furnishes the possibility of understanding power in 
either the three or two or one-dimensional view and thus 
seems to offer an expanded notion of power than that 
presented by either the definition of the pluralists or 
Bachrach and Baratz's "second face" of power. Hence I was 
able to explore and identify power in its multiple
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dimensions in negotiations of an organizational change. I 
have interpreted and used the three views as analytically 
and conceptually separate with distinct assumptions about 
the nature and roots of power which closely followed the 
distinctions drawn up by Lukes. Further research could be 
undertaken to study the interrelationship among the three 
dimensions and to assess the accumulation in power 
whereby each dimension serves to reenforce the strength 
of the other in the process of negotiation. For example, 
initial dominance in negotiation and decision-making
could make a player more powerful in the second round of 
negotiation where he may be able to control the access of 
agenda and actors. On the other hand, an established myth 
or culture of an organization may either restrict or
favour different interpretations and negotiations. 
Gaventa (op. cit.) argues for an interrelated 
understanding of the three dimensions:
"The power of A to prevail in the first dimension
increases the power to affect B's actions in the
second dimension, and increases the power to affect
B's conceptions in the third.....the total impact
of a power relationship is more that the sum of its 
parts. Power serves to create power. Powerlessness 
serves to re-enforce powerlessness. Power 
relationships, once established, are self- 
sustaining. "
Likewise, Michel (1915) uses all three approaches to 
explain the interrelated impact of power. Once a leader 
is able to dominate in decision-making in an organization 
(one-dimensional view), he can create barriers for 
exclusion of certain players and issues (two-dimensional 
view) which develops a further effect upon their
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consciousness of their own power (three-dimensional 
view).
The third dimensional view of power is exercised by 
shaping or determining the wants of others which results 
in the establishment of myths and culture; but Lukes is 
not very clear on the process of shaping perceptions and 
wants by the powerholders. One probable explanation as 
discussed above is that the continual use of power of 
the one and two-dimensional views can contribute to the 
powerholder1s ability to exercise power over other's 
consciousness. I would argue that the process of social 
construction of meaning can be possible because of an 
established culture or theme in an organization and a 
culture is a social order that has been negotiated among 
the key actors. An investigation into the how and why of 
the three-dimensional view of power will require an 
exploration of the negotiated definitions supported by 
the principal actors and their motives, interests and 
intentions.
My research was conducted under several limitations 
which could be improved upon in further research into 
power and politics of organizational change. First, a 
study on the process of change requires a long-term and 
detailed longitudinal investigation but I was forced into 
making concessions and compromises because of the time 
constraint under which I was conducting my field 
research. Although I have tried to identify the key
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elements in the vertical and horizontal analysis 
(Pettigrew, 1985) to present a complete picture of the 
several organizational changes, a few less obvious issues 
were understandably forsaken. Second, I have tried to 
analyze power relationship in negotiations with 
historical data gathered from interviews. I realize that 
participant observation of "face-to-face" negotiations 
can be a very effective method of inquiry into all kinds 
of power relationships and especially the three- 
dimensional view which is best located and explained by 
close observation of the organizational members over a 
long period of time. Therefore, these limitations could 
be acknowledged and improved upon in future 
investigations and the ideas I have explored in this 
research could be further enriched by new studies on the 
process of organizational change using the negotiated 
order perspective.
In conclusion, these are some of the potential research 
issues suggested on the basis of my experiences and 
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SUMMARY
This thesis is concerned with exploring the process of 
change in government-owned and controlled enterprises, 
that is, the why and how of change and what happens 
during change, and particularly the role, participation 
and interactions of individuals in change. The literature 
on planned change and development is reviewed and it is 
argued that a "processual" interpretation is missing. On 
the other hand, very few research have been undertaken on 
the management of state-owned enterprises in less 
developed countries and little is known about the
experiences and practices of organizational change in 
these enterprises.
An exploratory research of a major planned change is 
undertaken and the analysis of the case study reveal that 
change process can be interpreted in terms of a 
"political" model. Organizational change is the 
"resultant" of interactions among key actors and
political dynamics may be caused by interests, conflicts 
and power exercised by the many actors who represent 
various stakeholders.
Change and order in organizations can be created by joint 
actions and the negotiated order theory (Strauss) further 
explores the notion of joint action. The politics of 
change is interpreted in terms of negotiations and it is 
argued that change may be a negotiated order. The
contribution of the negotiated order theory is closely 
outlined and discussed and its application for a 
processual analysis of "problematic" situations (as
created by a change situation) is recommended. However, 
it is also argued that this perspective needs to consider 
power as a key currency of all negotiations; power 
relationships can explain the components, occurrences and 
outcomes of negotiations. This is one of the main 
shortcomings in the development of the negotiated order 
theory.
A "political" approach to negotiation is suggested by 
conceptualising various definitions and interpretation of 
power relationships and their use in negotiative 
interactions. The negotiation of the organizational 
changes in the case study is interpreted in terms of such 
a framework.
